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PREFATORY REMARKS 
 
 In this work, one may well read, as in a mirror, the insatiability of thought that persists in 
saying what cannot be said, while sufficiently aware of its own deficiencies. In seeking to 
communicate my ongoing scholarly research, the following dissertation evidences traces of such a 
process of reflection and its continuing trajectory of research. It compromises mainly of various 
conference presentations and peer-reviewed articles that have been or are intended for future 
publication. If its repetition becomes at times tedious, then be assured that a change in format and 
further revision will be in order, if in the event of its future publication. 
 
 As a stylistic note to the reader. In the following, I will not italicize my frequent use of 
Ruusbroec's middle-Dutch term, 'minne' (as a substantive), or 'minnen' (in its verbal form) hoping to 
forestall any undue distraction from disrupting the overall flow of the text. I do, however, 
consistently try to provide in brackets the Middle-Dutch equivalent to various key terms, or to 
accentuate a particular nuance in the Brabantine's corpus. As for textual citations of Ruusbroec, I 
deliberately not only provide the original vernacular, but furthermore, when citing a passage from 
the critical edition, the footnote citations for the appropriate section and lines are according to the 
original Middle-Dutch version. I use the English translation provided by the Ruusbroec critical edition, 
except for when I occasionally modify the translation, in which case, I provide the alternative 
translation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 §1. THEMATIC INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The following work undertakes a fundamental theological retrieval of the Brabantine 
contemplative, bl. Jan van Ruusbroec (1293-1381) and his theology of love, or minne, amid a 
constructive/critical interdisciplinary encounter with Jean-Luc Marion.  
 
 This interdisciplinary work is principally rooted within the domain of systematic theology and 
situated amid a renewed focus upon love in theology and philosophy of religion discourses. 
Specifically, this dissertation engages in a constructive/critical encounter with the French 
phenomenologist and Catholic philosopher of religion, Jean-Luc Marion, his erotic reduction and 
univocal conceptuality of love. This critical encounter is brought about by a theological retrieval of 
the admirable doctor, Jan van Ruusbroec, whose exemplary, mystical theological synthesis of minne 
rightfully stands to be counted amongst one of the very best reflections upon love within the 
Catholic tradition. Recognition of this alone, despite any and all claims of partiality, should in part 
sufficiently justify such retrieval. However, this dissertation will not only argue for the theological 
relevance in retrieving Ruusbroec. Yet, in a subsequent manner, it will make its argumentative appeal 
by positively assessing the basis for Ruusbroec's contemporary contextual plausibility. The audacity 
of such an appeal does not escape us, as it is fraught with various historical discontinuities. Instead, 
the fruitfulness of such retrieval will be judged by the extent to which Ruusbroec's minne not only 
helps clarify for us certain discontinuities that result in constricting our contemporary reappraisal of 
love. Moreover, by way of its enduring continuity, the fruitfulness of our retrieval will be assessed by 
the manner in which it can constructively and critically encounter Marion's erotic phenomenon and 
in so doing, furnish a compelling contribution to ongoing theological and philosophical reflections on 
love. 
 
 As a distinctly Leuven dissertation, this interdisciplinary research has jointly benefited from 
strong research specialisations in fundamental theology and its contextual-hermeneutical 
engagement with postmodern philosophy. Likewise, it has well benefited from the expertise of 
Church historians and in particular, the continuing research into mystical literature of the Low 
Countries. While firmly identified as a constructive philosophical theological project, this research 
has well-benefited from the historical critical and theological expertise in Ruusbroec studies unique 
to Leuven's profile. Enriched, therefore, by such specisialisations, this present dissertation hopes to 
contribute a somewhat innovative, fruitful contribution to ongoing contemporary theological and 
philosophical reflections upon love within the Catholic tradition. Innovative, not by way of sheer 
novelty. Rather, in its aims to demonstrate the potential fruitfulness such a thick-hermeneutics and 
historical retrieval of figures from the mystical theological tradition can contribute to contemporary 
theological reflection. 
 
 This dissertation critically reflects upon several key thematics and interlocutors in 
orchestrating its sustained encounter between Ruusbroec and Marion. Following, the interrelation of 
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these core themes will now be introduced, as well as the rationale behind the organisation of the 
various chapters of this dissertation.  
 
 Primarily, a critical challenge and corrective that this dissertation proposes is to be found in 
its critique of distinctly modern approaches to "mysticism". By appealing in contrast for a more 
historically-rooted, contemporaneous mystical theology, such a position invariably entails challenging 
both the a-contextual, universalist tendencies inherent within modern approaches to mysticism. And, 
in similar measure, explicitly non-theological, psychological approaches to "mystical experience". At 
the heart of such critiques, however, is the more primary contention that by retrieving a major figure 
from within the mystical theological canon, Ruusbroec's theology of minne fundamentally challenges 
contemporary approaches to the apophatic legacy within mysticism. And more concretely, the 
largely equivocal view of apophaticism as one of epistemic indeterminacy. Such a view of the 
apophatic and its radical negativity as signaling an indeterminate region of "mystery" and 
unknowability holds little purchase for the Brabantine contemplative and instead, is indicative of 
more modern discourses between natural and positive religion.1 Rather, for Ruusbroec, radical 
apophaticism places its stress clearly upon minne's 'overdeterminacy', excess and the theological 
itself as always 'semper maior'. In a sapiential, praxiological vein, Ruusbroec's texts—as a speaking 
from and within minne—display an unmistakable dynamism that combines an apophatic rigor, 
coupled with an insatiable, erotic insistence in continuing to respond, name and affirm a love that is 
both inalienable to the human person as well as far exceeding the creaturely by way of its abysmal 
depths [afgrondigher minne].  
 
 This dissertation will regularly focus upon such an inexhaustible excess specifically in terms of 
minne's distinctly erotic sense. In this strongly erotic sense, we are introduced to Ruusbroec's bold 
and at times arresting degree of mutuality in and amid the reciprocal demands between Creator and 
creature. A mutuality, for instance, memorably articulated in Ruusbroec's Eucharistic theology and its 
depiction of Christ's insatiable consumption.2 And yet, what frees minne's at times fierce voracity 
from becoming truly monstrous in its absorption and pantheistic confusion is precisely the 
relationship such erotic mutuality holds to the asymmetrical primacy of the gift within Ruusbroec's 
theology.3 We can well see this asymmetry affirmed, paradoxically, amid the full-flowering of minne's 
mutuality—in the union with God as "without difference and distinction" [sonder differentie ochte 
onderscheet]—precisely in the perdurance of otherness, whereby the creature shall eternally remain, 
"een ander van gode".4 Continued emphasis upon, as well as distinguishing how the dynamic 
synthesis of Ruusbroec's minne mobilizes its various claims of mediation, immediacy, difference, 
                                                          
1
 See infra, chapter 4. 
2
 See infra, chapter 5. 
3 See Jan van Ruusbroec, Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit, Opera Omnia VIII, ed. G. de Baere, trans. A. Lefevere 
(Tielt: Lannoo, Turnhout: Brepols, 2001), ll. 723-728: "Now the nature of minnen is always: to give and take, 
minnen and be loved [ghemindt werden]. And both of these are in anyone who loves [mint]. Christ's minne is 
voracious and generous: even though he gives us all that He has and all that He is, He also takes back all that 
we have and all that we are. And He demands of us more than we can accomplish." "u es der minnen natuere 
altoes gheven ende nemen, minnen ende ghemindt werden. Ende dit es beide in ieghewelken die mint. Cristus 
minne die es ghieregh ende melde: al gheeft hi ons al dat hi heeft ende al dat hi es, hi nemt oec weder al dat wi 
hebben ende al dat wi sijn. Ende hi eischt ons meer dan wi gheleisten moghen." 
4
 See Jan van Ruusbroec, Boecsken der verclaringhe, Opera Omnia I, ed. G. de Baere, trans. Ph. Crowley and H. 
Rolfson (Tielt: Lannoo, Leiden: Brill, 1981) ll. 40-41: "[...] it [the human person in union with God] will remain 
eternally creature and other than God." "[…] die sal eweleke creature bliven ende een ander van gode." 
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distinction and otherness are all extremely crucial in facilitating the rigor of its contemporary 
retrieval. However, in an explicitly historical vein, arriving at such a renewed conceptuality by way of 
its thick hermeneutic and close textual analysis is equally beneficial, as it helps clarify the consistency 
underscoring, for example, Ruusbroec's continued critique of the Free Spirits and the latter's 
heterodox claims of 'autotheism' or "becoming God". Equally so, arriving at a renewed conceptuality 
of minne enables a more thorough historical evaluation and response to the famous Parisian 
chancellor, Jean Gerson (1363-1429) and his famous charge against Ruusbroec's Book Three of Die 
Geestelike Brulocht as guilty of pantheistic "absorption". A charge, which Gerson associates with 
Ruusbroec's supposedly illicit, idealized theological exemplarism. If indeed, what Ruusbroec claims 
that his at times radical claims of union with God, "...in minnen, not in essence [wesen], nor in 
nature"5 are consistent with his thought, and not simply a dogmatic cover, then a renewed 
conceptuality of minne is of crucial importance. A conceptuality, not so as to elide the "kernel of 
minnen that is hidden from us in darkness, in fathomless unknowing."6 Rather, a conceptuality that 
mirrors the inexhaustible creaturely undertaking of evermore attesting to God's perduring otherness 
by way of the distinction of our works and cleaving desires wherein "our minne and His minne are 
always alike".7 While, at the same time, a conceptuality that holds onto the dynamic tension of 
Ruusbroec's more audacious claim of unity and sameness wherein we are "one in having joy, where 
His Spirit has drunk up our minne and swallowed it in Him in having joy and in one blessedness with 
Him."8 
 
 In approaching minne's superabundance as a dynamism of asymmetry, yet inseparable 
mutuality, this dissertation will regularly address this dynamism in attempting to situate Ruusbroec's 
minne along a spectrum of univocity—in its abiding sense of unity and sameness—while dynamically 
juxtaposed alongside analogy and its thinking of perduring otherness and the abiding distinction of 
our charitable praxis. Herein, it is this stress of excess, both in terms of Ruusbroec's minne, as well as 
Marion, as a thinker of "givenness" and the "saturated phenomenon" that has principally oriented 
our thinking—despite certain legitimate reservations—towards the univocal. A sameness of 
superabounding excess in its insistence that God cannot but love us with Himself. From which, as the 
charity of the Holy Spirit poured into our hearts,9 the distinct claim that the univocal mobilizes—in 
various ways both in Ruusbroec and Marion—is precisely its situating love's inescapable failure and 
impossibility to adequately return such a love as itself erotically safeguarding God's greater 
dissimilarity. Therefore, it is this impossibility, by ensuring and reaffirming the Creator-creature 
distinction that characterizes the thought of both Ruusbroec and Marion specifically as erotic. As 
Ruusbroec states: "[B]ut it is creature and cannot devour nor grasp the allness of God. And therefore 
it must year and yawn, remain thirsty and hungry for ever."10 
 
                                                          
5
 Ruusbroec, Spieghel, ll. 2139-2140: "...daer wi een mede sijn in minnen, niet in wesene noch in natueren." 
6
 ibid, ll. 2141-2142: "...dat es der miinen kerne, die ons verborghen es in deemsterheit, in niet wetene sonder 
grond." 
7
 ibid, ll. 2147: "Want onse miine ende sine minne sijn altoes ghelijc..." 
8
 ibid, ll. 2148-2149: "...een int ghebruken, daer sijn gheest onse minne op ghesopen heeft ende in heme 
verswolghen in ghebrukene ende in eene saleheit met heme." 
9
 See Rom. 5, 5. 
10
 Ruusbroec, Spieghel, ll. 2095-2097: "Maer si es creatuere ende en mach die alheit gods niet begapen noch 
begripen. Ende hier omme moet si ghieren ende gapen, dorstegh ende hongheregh eewegh bliven." 
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 Hence, Ruusbroec's erotic failure is in many ways exceedingly similar to Marion's erotic 
failure, as both are situated in proximity to the saturated excess and "allness" of God's love, which 
we can neither 'devour nor grasp'. And yet, so too does the difference between these two thinkers of 
excess emerge precisely in terms of the "economic". That is, precisely in terms of our individual and 
collective created capacity to respond to such an excess.  Herein, Marion will insist upon maintaining 
the pure gratuitousness of love's phenomenalization, an excess in which it increasingly appears to 
undermine the capacity to conceive and in turn, ethically respond. Rather, by it adventious 
anteriority, the event of the erotic phenomenon likewise evades any creaturely orientation—
discussions, all of which this dissertation facilitates in terms of "obediential potency" and the natural 
desire for God. Herein, the constructive and critical perspective of Ruusbroec comes to the fore in 
providing a radically alternative, yet similarly robust erotic thinking of love. One in which thinks 
minne's inescapable failure, not in terms of a desire of lack, yet itself one of creaturely abundance. 
The centrality of Ruusbroec's mystical anthropology of "mutual indwelling" presents itself here in 
articulating this specific dynamism of natural, insatiable desire as itself, reflective of an abundance 
that is both asymmetrically Other, yet inalienable to our creaturely capacity to graciously respond. 
Therefore, it is precisely in view of this constructive/critical potential in Ruusbroec that explains, in 
classical terms, why primary attention is given to his "economic" thought more so than his specific 
"theological" reflections. That is, Ruusbroec's thinking of creation, grace/nature, theological 
anthropology, the role of mediation and immediacy in the sacramental life of the Church, as well as 
to his thinking upon deification in terms of the "common life" are of greater importance in this 
retrieval, more so than his equally substantial Trinitarian theology.  
 
 With this said, in Chapter One, after introducing certain openings that envision a 
constructive/critical encounter between Ruusbroec and Marion, the basis of Ruusbroec's economic 
thought commences with a thorough analysis of mutual indwelling. In Chapter Two, mutual 
indwelling is specifically approached in its anthropological domain, as well as with a firm attention to 
its praxiological character. This is specifically facilitated by a relational inquiry into human interiority 
with Ruusbroec's thematic of the "five voices" from Vanden Vier Becoringhen. Following thereafter in 
Chapter Three, mutual indwelling is presented specifically in a more cosmological vein, while 
deliberately counter-balancing our previous treatment of praxis, this time with a more speculative 
approach. Such speculation is specifically facilitated in view of Ruusbroec's "embodied realism" that 
concretizes such a speculative thrust amid a unique sense of greater continuity between the orders 
of nature, grace and glory. Moving specifically from a thick, textual analysis of Ruusbroec's mystical 
anthropology, we then segway in Chapter Four to a comprehensive, theological reflection upon the 
systematic theology of van Beeck, who was both well-versed and strongly influenced by the mystical 
theological tradition and Ruusbroec in particular. Having secured a conceptuality of mutual 
indwelling and Ruusbroec's embodied realism, these insights are brought into greater relief through 
van Beeck's thinking of "native attunement", as well as a contemporary, "intrincist" theological 
approach to grace/nature that is consistent with the orientations within Ruusbroec's own thought.  
This intrincist approach is done by way of orchestrating a variety of sub-themes in approaching 
questions such as the Modernist legacy upon mysticism via George Tyrrell; Blondelian immanence 
and the political; as well as deification. From this expansive, economic approach and theological 
orientation, beginning in Chapter Five, our encounter between Ruusbroec and Marion begins to 
explicitly emerge. Situated amid a contextual, theological aesthetics, under consideration is the 
theme of divided views of love, while theological appeal is made to seek out a renewed conceptuality 
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of love that creatively seeks to think both from within as well as beyond such divisions. In Chapter 
Six, the reading is put forward that what lies at the heart of such divided views of love is not 
necessarily to be found in a moral analysis of competing and contradictory objects of love. Rather, 
this division is seen in attempts at singularly privileging love's gratuitousness. A gratuitousness, which 
in turn results in the familiar construction between "pure" and "impure" love. Approaching Marion 
(and doing so, specifically from a mystical theological angle), these lines of thought are pursued in a 
historical reading of Fénelon's pur amour and its interesting linkages within postmodern approaches 
to the "gift". In Chapter Seven, the specifically erotic tenor of Ruusbroec and Marion's thought is 
brought into immediate relief, specifically herein in terms of the "impossible". A thorough analysis of 
several key thinking patterns within Marion is pursued via the [im]possible and how his erotic 
thought, contra Ruusbroec, responds in a fundamentally different manner to the impossible itself. In 
Chapter Eight, the question of the univocal is specifically confronted both in terms of Marion and 
Ruusbroec. For the latter, this announces the superabundant origins of our creaturely desires, which 
are radically set in familiar contrast to contemporary consumer capitalist narratives of desire as lack. 
Such a view of desire in Ruusbroec is then portrayed as inseparable from the relational demands of 
reciprocity and justice as underscored by Ruusbroec's thinking of "common life", while facilitated by 
an excursus of another modern theologian heavily indebted to Ruusbroec, Piet Fransen S.J. In turn, in 
strong contrast, we see a radically different orientation towards the univocal in terms of Nygren's 
agape, seen in greater continuity with that of Marion's own position, which is here further fleshed 
out in his work on Augustine. Thereafter, in Chapters Nine and Ten, our reading of Ruusbroec's 
minne, its erotic, insatiable desires and subsequent demands for contextual reinsertion, via the 
common life, are themselves tentatively pursued in terms of thinking through the continuing legacy 
of Christian Humanism, with Ruusbroec functioning as one of its early spiritual resources. Thereby,  
the prophetic and public engagement of these perspectives are envisioned amid competing, 
contemporary priorities of identity and plurality today. 
 
   
 
 § 2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
 Despite the immediately obvious historical discontinuity between both Ruusbroec and 
Marion, such recognition begins to be counter-balanced by the frequent appearance of various 
canonical figures from the mystical theological tradition within postmodern thought. This is largely 
attributed to recent philosophical and theological attempts to "overcome metaphysics"  in order to 
think a more radically pure transcendence (Derrida, Marion) and in so doing, have found support in 
the pre-modern mystical tradition (i.e. Dionysius Areopagita, Meister Eckhart, Tauler, St. John of the 
Cross, Theresa of Avila, Angelus Silesius et al.). And yet, from a historical theological perspective, 
frequently, such systematic theological and philosophical re-readings are regarded as largely 
serviceable towards distinctly contemporaneous concerns and apart from historical-critical input. By 
contrast, this present retrieval is marked by a historically-rooted, fundamental theological reflection, 
which likewise adopts a more critical stance towards such hermeneutical strategies. Instead, the 
innovative character of this theological retrieval accepts the burden of its interdisciplinary character 
as a testing of the hermeneutical boundaries under which texts and concepts from the pre-modern 
mystical tradition can indeed be adequately retrieved in contemporary philosophical and theological 
thinking. Doing so, in a historically-grounded, theological manner, this research therefore explicitly 
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opts for a textual heuristic and close reading approach—in keeping with the tradition of Albert 
Deblaere and the Ruusbroecgenootschap11—in search of a rigorous conceptuality and unique 
theological hermeneutic of minne in Ruusbroec's texts. The enduring strength of this textual 
approach to mystical theological texts, while situated within a fundamental and systematic 
theological context of retrieval, can in part be translated as a refusal to instrumentalize such 
historical-theological sources by insisting that assessment of Ruusbroec's contemporary contextual 
plausibility, is an intrinsically necessary, yet secondary approach to the primary issue of its greater 
theological relevance and conceptual, textual accountability. Failure to heed such a dynamic tension, 
I maintain, ultimately disengages the reader not only from the very specificity of the text, but 
furthermore hinders assessment of the text's constructive and potentially enduring relevance. 
 
 A brief, background look will illustrate not only the contextual nature of this retrieval, yet 
furthermore, the research question that this retrieval simultaneously initiates. My initial engagement 
with these issues occurred several years ago, as I was then researching and writing upon 
postmodernism's turn to traditional mystical theological sources and the underlining reasons for it 
doing so. In particular, the well-known engagement between Derrida and Marion at Villanova12 
concerning  kataphasis and apophasis, as well as Marion's defense,13 contra Derrida, of the 
impossible possibility of the via eminentiae as a distinctly performative, non-predicative (and hence, 
outside deconstruction) response to the givenness of the call. In Marion's argument, the tradition of 
mystical theology's "third way" of praise, beyond kataphatic predication and apophatic denegation, is 
appealed to as primarily safeguarding God's pure transcendence. While subsequently, such a 
discourse of praise is established in fundamental accord with Marion's phenomenology of givenness 
and its stress upon givenness as radically anterior and asymmetrical to the donative subject. As a 
"vocative" discourse, Marion argues that the order of praise14 found in speculative and mystical 
theology not only far exceeds the limits of both the kataphatic and apophatic, yet it equally 
undercuts and disqualifies their free standing validity as participative forms of knowing and loving 
God. Rather, the order of praise, as a response to the pure givenness of the call, Marion argues is a 
speaking towards God's unwavering incomprehensibility. The consequence of Marion's argument, 
however, is that such a unilateral emphasis upon this "third way" simultaneously and violently 
collapses any and all creaturely difference, distinction and economic reciprocal response—plateauing 
                                                          
11
 See Rob Faesen, "Albert Deblaere's Study of Mysticism and His Concern for Christian Humanism", in Reading 
Medieval Mystical Texts Today, (eds.) P. R. Cooper, S. Kikuchi (forthcoming): "Though he published relatively 
little, his influence as a teacher was great. He was a teacher who always compelled his students to read the 
texts in their particular literary form—as they are. This often produced a surprising effect." 
12
 See John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, (eds.), God, The Gift, and Postmodernism, (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1999). 
13
 See Jean-Luc Marion, "In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of "Negative Theology"', in God, The Gift, and 
Postmodernism, 20-53. 
14
 Marion has more recently returned to this theme in his work on Augustine and the rhythm of a double 
movement of the "confessio laudatio" as a speaking towards God, and its necessary 'inverse', the "confessio 
peccatorum", as a speaking towards the creature—from the place of praise—as itself, a rhythm that discloses 
the "meaning of praise", and therein as well, the "Confessiones […] from beginning to end, an immense treatise 
of speculative theology". See Jean-Luc Marion, In the Self's Place: The Approach of Saint Augustine, (trans.) 
Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012) 11-20; 289-306, 291. See supra, "Abiding in 
Minne's Demands. Part IV—"Common Love and the Univocal". 
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any and all particularity with praise's "words for saying nothing"15, given that "[s]ince no name says 
God, as such, then all are suitable […]".16 
 
 During this time of research and critically thinking alongside this fascinating debate, however, 
thanks to Prof. Rob Faesen, I was likewise introduced to works of Ruusbroec, as well as the 
esteemed, ongoing tradition of Ruusbroec scholarship in the Low Countries. And resulting from this 
exposure of careful, close readings of the Admirable Doctor's texts, I started to develop (what has 
remained) a continuous fascination towards both the breadth and nuance of Ruusbroec's mystical 
theological synthesis, as well as the unmistakable dynamism of his thought. A dynamism, such that it 
could easily lend itself to be both highly conversant with my then ongoing research into Derrida and 
Marion's respective positions, while unmistakably displaying a radical dissimilarity from that which 
frequently flew under the moniker of "mystical theology" in various philosophical and theological 
discussions. Herein, not only is there an existing lacuna of limited familiarity and reception of the 
Brabantine contemplative17 in a variety of contemporary venues. But furthermore, the thought was 
born whether or not Ruusbroec's theology—and more generally, that of mystical theology itself—
could well indeed constructively and critically contribute to such contemporary discussions (in 
theology, in philosophy, historical and literary studies) in which its legacy and positions were 
frequently invoked, yet itself left out of the discussion. 
 
 
 §2. CONCEPTUALIZING MINNE'S DISTINCTIVENESS 
 
 Specifically in view of Marion's defense of the mystical theology's "third way" of praise, while 
indeed there is a similar apophatic rigour and a thinking of "impossibility" in Ruusbroec, however, 
unlike Marion, such "impossibility" does not rest upon speaking itself and praise's refusal to 
attribute, or to name. Rather, for the Brabantine contemplative, the impossible can be specifically 
characterized  as an erotic impossibility, as a " hunger unstilled [….] Man cannot leave it, nor grasp it; 
he cannot do without it, nor can he obtain it; he cannot speak about it, nor can he be silent about it 
                                                          
15
 See Jean-Luc Marion, "Words for Saying Nothing", in The Erotic Phenomenon, (trans.) Stephen E. Lewis, 
(Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press, 2007)143-150. 
16
 Marion, In the Self's Place, 289. 
17
 Which in of itself, can be attributed to a variety of reasons, including: Ruusbroec writing in the middle-Dutch 
vernacular; the effects of his condemnation by the Parisian chancellor, Jean Gerson; the absence of a major 
religious order to continue to promote his works; in addition to a clear, 20
th
 Century Flemish nationalism that 
upheld Ruusbroec distinctly as a 'Vlaamsche sint'.  For the latter, See D. A. Stracke S.J., "Inleiding", in D.A. 
Stracke, J. van Mierlo, L. Reypens, Ruusbroec De Wonderbare: Zijn Leven - Zijn Kunst - Zijn Leer (Leuven: 
Davidsfonds, 1932) 7: "Van den zaligen Jan van Ruusbroec is herhaalde malen gezegd dat hij geworden is door 
zijn leven, zijn leer, zijn werken, zijn invloed, een toppunt onzer Nederlandsche beschaving. Dien hoogen lof 
werd hem niet allen in dit jubeljaar toegedacht en toegewezen, ook bij kalme studie, in vroegere tijden, heeft 
men zóó over hem gesproken? Stellen wij ons op het standpunt der geloovige Vlamingen, dan is die lofspraak 
dubbel merkwaardig, want in Ruusbroec begroeten we dan niet allen 'n genie maar ook 'n heilige. Als zalige is, 
wie dan ook, 'n hoogtepunt in de echte en eenige beschaving van geest en gemoed, en 'n glorie voor het volk 
waaruit hij is gesproten. Dien roemtitel verdient Ruusbroec des te meer vanwege zijn Vlaamsche volk, niet 
alleen omdat hij al zijn levensdagen onder ons heeft doorgebracht, en sprekend in karakter en uitwendig leven 
onzen volksaard heeft belichaamd, maar ook omdat hij, door zijn volkschen aanleg gedreven, al wat hij was en 
vermocht in den dienst gesteld heeft van zijn land en stamgenooten, om ze hooger op te voeren in het rijk van 
deugd en zielenadel. " 
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[…]".18 In these initial lines, the distinctiveness of Ruusbroec's thought started to emerge amid its 
erotic insistence and his unique approach to God as semper maior— not as an excessive otherness 
and pure transcendence seen in its distance and perpetual withdrawal upon approach. Rather, as an 
"always greater", to which Ruusbroec's minne in its distinct modes as well as its "modeless practice" 
[wiseloese oefeninghe van minnen] unfailingly attests by way of the mutuality of its impossible 
demands.19 
  
 However, as my familiarity with Ruusbroec's writings grew considerably, it became 
increasingly clear that such emphasis did not simply amount to an exaggerated poetic and penchant 
for rhetorical flourish. Nor did Ruusbroec confine reflecting upon such restless desire exclusively 
within a creaturely domain, as though it were indicative of the Fall and set against the eschatological 
hope for beatitude and rest, as Augustine's famous opening to the Confessions announces. Rather, 
such an impossibility and the restlessness of its activity increasingly appeared as distinctly intrinsic 
and co-constitutive to Ruusbroec's depiction of minne itself—alongside its emphasis upon rest, unity 
and enjoyment [ghebruken]—both in the stirrings of grace and speculated upon in its impossible and 
unceasing demands in eternal glory. Arguably, the eschatological discontinuity in Ruusbroec's 
thought is thus minimalized and instead, is punctuated by a greater Incarnational continuity20 within 
the creaturely orders of nature and grace. Therein, eternity itself is speculated upon in terms of an 
inexhaustible abundance, continual activity and thus, by no means is it to be simply regarded as 
"unmoved and immoveable", for "such an eternity would not be inexhaustible".21  
                                                          
18
 See Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia X, Vanden Blinkenden Steen, (trans.) A. Lefevere, (eds.) G. de Baere, Th. 
Mertens, and H. Noë, (Tielt: Lannoo, Turnhout: Brepols, 1991), ll. 554, 555-557: "Ende dit es een hongher 
onghepait [….] Man caent ghelaten noch ghevaten; men caent ghederven noch gecrighen; men caent <oec> 
ghespreken noch verswighen […]" 
19
 See Ruusbroec, Vanden Blinkenden Steen, ll. 554-564: "[T]o always yearn in failure is to swim against the 
current [….] But we should look into ourselves: there we feel [ghevoelen] that the Spirit of God drives us and 
kindles us in restlessness of loving. And we should look above ourselves: there we feel that the Spirit of God 
draws us out of ourselves and consumes us to nothing in His own self, that is the superessential 
[overweselijcke] minne we are united with and possess more deeply and more widely than any other thing." 
"[a]ltoes crighen in dat ontbliven, dat es swemmen jeghen strom [….] Maer wij selen in ons binnenste sien; 
daer ghevoelen wij dat ons die gheest gods drijft ende stoect in dat ongheduer van minnen. Ende wij selen 
boven ons selven sien; daer ghevoelen wij dat ons die gheest gods ute ons selven trect ende verteert te nieute 
in sijns selfsheit, dat es in die overweselijcke minne daer wij een mede sijn ende die wij besitten diepere ende 
bredere dan alle dinc." 
20
 See Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia I, Boecsken der verclaringhe, (trans.) Ph. Crowley, H. Rolfson, (ed.) G. de Baere 
(Tielt: Lannoo, Tunrhout: Brepols, 1981) ll. 34-41. 
21
 See Dumitru Staniloaë, Eternity and Time, (trans.) Donald Allchin (Oxford: Fairacres Publication, 2001) 1. My 
thanks to Rik van Nieuwenhove for sending me this 13 page book. And indeed, it is a 'book', and not simply an 
article. See further as Staniloaë elaborates: "Eternity must include an interior dimension and freedom of will. 
Only thus can it be inexhaustible, a source of continual newness. If we think of the eternity of God simply in 
terms of pure reason, or of an eternal substance, then we have a false picture of eternity, not the true one. 
Eternity must be a fullness of life, and therefore true eternity must be the eternity of God, God being perceived 
as a subject who is true and always the same in himself, but who at the same time is the source of an eternal 
and infinite variety of manifestations." See also Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia X, Vanden Kerstenen Ghelove, 
ll. 261-265; 274-278: "And we shall taste the goodness of God, which is sweet beyond all honey. And it shall 
feed us and go through our souls and our bodies and we shall be hungry and thirsty for it always, and through 
that hunger and thirst both our tasting and our being fed shall remain always and be made new: and that is life 
eternal. We shall embrace love with love and we shall be by love embraced [….] And therefore let no man 
deceive you with false idleness for our faith bears witness to what I tell you now, as do the holy Scriptures, for 
it is a truth eternal. We shall minnen and enjoy, work, and practice and possess rest, all in the same now, with 
no before or after." "Ende wi zelen gesmaken die goetheit gods, die zoete es boven al honech. Ende die sal ons 
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 Moreover, the distinctiveness of Ruusbroec's minne increasingly begins to emerge—and 
therein, its rich potential for theological retrieval—as the Brabantine likewise theologically attributes 
minne's infinite desire and inexhaustible activity as equally and firmly placed within a Christological22 
sphere; in an immanent Trinitarian depiction of "whirling, essential minne" [verwielen in die weseleke 
minne] wherein the Divine Persons "embrace mutually […] with an infinite and active minnen in 
unity"23; as well as in an economic Trinitarian setting, as seen in the following: 
 
Our heavenly Father is avaricious [ghieregh] and 
generous […] He generously gives His grace, His 
gifts and His bestowals, and demands of each one 
in particular that he respond to Him with thanks 
and with praise, and with all good works, in the 
measure of the gifts that he is given without and 
within. For the grace of God is neither given in 
vain nor for nothing [….] But above all works and 
practice of virtue […] not only is [He] avaricious 
and generous in demanding and giving, but that 
He is avarice [ghieregheit] and generosity itself, 
for He wants to give Himself and everything that 
He is, and He wants us to give ourselves to Him in 
return with everything that we are. Thus He wants 
to be ours entirely, and wants us to be entirely 
His; and yet each one remains entirely what he is, 
for we cannot become God, but we are united to 
God by means and without means [….] He lives in 
us and we in Him by means of mutual minne 
[underlinghe minne], namely: His grace and our 
virtues. 
Onse hemelsche vader es ghieregh ende melde [....] 
dien gheeft hi meldelec sine gratie, sine gaven ende 
sine ghiften, ende eischt ieghewelken sunderlinghe 
dat hi heme antwerde met danke ende met love ende 
met allen goede werken, na dat hi ghegaeft es van 
buten ende van binnen. Want de gratie gods en 
werdt niet ghegheven idelec noch te vergheefs [....] 
Maer boven alle werke ende ufeninghe van 
dooghden [...] dat hi niet alleene en es ghieregh ende 
melde in eisschene ende in ghevene, maer hi es selve 
ghieregheit ende meldheit, want hi wilt ons hem 
selven gheven ende al dat hi es, ende hi wilt dat wi 
ons heme weder gheven met al dat wi sijn. Ende 
aldus wilt hi te male onse sijn ende dat wi te male 
sine sijn; ende nochtan blijft ieghewelc al dat hi es, 
want wi en moghen niet god werden maer wi sijn 
gode gheeeneght met middele ende sonder middel. 
Wi sijn heme gheeeneght overmids sine gratie ende 
onse goede werke; hi leeft in ons ende wi in heme 
overmids underlinghe minne, dat es sine ghenade 
ende onse dooghde.
24
 
 
 Indeed, the relationality within Ruusbroec's shows a profound dynamism in and amid a 
startlingly degree of mutuality and similitude, while deployed within an equal sense of attention 
towards the impossibility of any autotheistic fusion resident in minne itself. And yet, the very origins 
of minne's impossibility appear inscribed—not as an impregnable barrier of distance, yet as an 
intrinsic desire and its natural inclination towards a "being other than we are."25 Herein, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
voeden ende dore gaen ziele ende lijf. Ende dair na sal ons altoes hongeren ende dorsten; ende overmids 
honger ende dorst so sal smaken ende voeden altoes bliven ende verneuwen: ende dat es ewech leven. Wi 
selen met minnen minne begripen ende van minnen begrepen werden [....] Ende hieromme, en laet u niemene 
bedriegren met valscer ledecheit. Want dat ic u nu segge, dat tuget onse geloeve ende die heilege scrifture, 
want het es ene ewege wairheit. Wi zelen minnen ende ghebruken, werken ende raeste oefenen ende 
besitten, ende altegadere in enen nu, sonder voer ende na." 
22
 See Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 8, Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit, (trans.) A. Lefevere, (ed.) G. de 
Baere (Tielt: Lannoo, Tunrhout: Brepols, 2001), ll. 718-742. 
23
 See Ruusbroec, Boecsken, ll. 332-333; 339-340: " Ende daer eest te nemene dat die persone wiken ende 
verwielen in die weseleke minne"; "Want die godleke persone behelsen hen onderlinghe...met grondeloeser 
werkeleker minnen in enecheit." 
24
 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 9, Van Seven Trappen, (trans.) H. Rolfson, (ed.) R. Faesen (Tielt: Lannoo, 
Turnhout: Brepols, 2003) ll. 884-903. 
25
 Ruusbroec, Vanden Blinkenden Steen, ll. 618-21 (with slight modification): "For we feel an eternal inclination 
towards an otherness than what we ourselves are. And this is the most interior and hidden distinction that we 
can feel between us and God, for beyond here, there is no other distinction." "Want wij ghevoelen een eewich 
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encounter what has generally been termed as Ruusbroec's "metaphysics of mysticism", 26 one in 
which regards the work of minne's perpetual desire as a thinking of difference and distinction as 
consequential to a more primary relationality, one in which is ensured by Ruusbroec's exemplarism 
and Trinitarian ontology. This convergence of difference and distinction in unity is seen here in an 
admirably concise depiction of the economic and soteriological strands of exitus and reditus as none 
other than the "same" immanent Trinitarian movement: 
 
And in the living fruitful nature all things may 
possibly occur, for in the living fruitful nature the 
Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son, and 
the Holy Spirit in them both. For it is a living and 
fruitful unity which is the source and the fount of 
all life and all genesis. And for this reason all 
creatures are there without themselves as in their 
eternal origin, one essence and one life with God. 
But in the bursting-out of the Persons with 
distinction, so the Son is from the Father and the 
Holy Spirit from them both. There God has 
created and ordered all creatures in their own 
essence [wesen]. And he has remade man by His 
grace and by His death [….] There, the Father with 
the Son and all the beloved [gheminde] are 
enfolded and embraced in the bond of minnen, 
that is to say, in the unity of the Holy Spirit. It is 
this same unity which is fruitful according to the 
bursting-out of the Persons and in the return, an 
eternal bond of minnen which can nevermore be 
unbound. 
[E]nde in der levender vrochtbaere naturen sijn alle 
dinghe mogheleke te gheschiene. Want in der 
levender vrochtbaerre naturen soe es de sone in den 
vader, ende die vader in den sone, ende die heileghe 
geest in hen beiden. Want het es ene levende 
vrochtbare enecheit die een oert ende .i. beghen es 
alles levens ende alles gewerdens. Ende hier omme 
sijn daer alle creaturen sonder hen selven, alse in 
hare eweghe sake een wesen ende een leven met 
gode. Maer in den utebroke der persone met 
onderschede, soe es die sone van den vader, ende die 
heileghe geest van hen beiden. Ende daer hevet god 
alle creaturen ghemaect ende gheordent in hare 
eighen wesen. Ende hi hevet den mensche weder 
hermaect met sijnre ghenaden ende met sijnre doet 
[....] Daer ed de vader, met den sone ende alle die 
gheminde, bevaen ende behelst in bande van 
minnen, dat es, in enecheit des heilechs geests. Ende 
dit es die selve enecheit die vrochtbaer es na den 
utebroeke der persone, ende in den wederboghene 
.i. ewech bant der minnen die nemmermeer 
ontbonden en wert.
27
 
 
 
 A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
 From this proceeding sampling of Ruusbroec's thought, it is evident—by way of both the 
Trinity's "breaking out" [utebroke] in endless activity in distinction [onderscheet] of Persons as well as 
the restlessness of the creature's graced return—that as an intrinsic mode of minne itself, Ruusbroec 
conceives of desire [begheren] as such, in terms of excess over lack; abundance, rather than scarcity. 
How then are we to account for Ruusbroec's logic of desire and furthermore, the question of its 
tenability and theological relevance. Additionally, in proposing to retrieve Ruusbroec's theology of 
minne within contemporary theological and philosophy of religion discourses, what avenues within 
Ruusbroec's thought are available in facilitating a constructive/critical plausible challenge to 
contemporary normative assumptions accorded to desire principally as desires of lack that are in 
turn, directed towards a scarcity of goods? 
 
 Secondly, in view of its interdisciplinary encounter with Jean-Luc Marion, the retrieval of 
Ruusbroec holds that desire's excessive abundance in no way appears in terms of a debilitating, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ute neyghen in eene anderheit dan dat wij selve sijn. Ende dit es dat innichste ende dat verborghenste 
onderscheet dat wij tuschen ons ende gode ghevoelen moghen, want hier boven en es nemmer onderscheet." 
26
 See http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13280c.htm, as accessed on 02.12.10 
27
 Ruusbroec, Boecsken, ll. 366-376, 378-383 (my emphasis, with slight modification) 
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violent grace nor the demands of minne as a cruel, hegemonic imposition. Rather, in what perhaps 
amounts to an original re-articulation of Aquinas' gratia non destruit, sed supponit et perficit 
naturam, the unity of such abundance appears to fundamentally accord with the original, relational 
disposition of the creature to that of the greater dissimilarity to the Creator. Likewise, in its graced 
economic return, Ruusbroec stresses the enduring particularity of the works of minne as transformed 
[overforminghe] in the 'the unity of the Holy Spirit'. Thus, by coming to a rigorous conceptuality of 
Ruusbroec's minne, can such a retrieval, by way of its insistence for economic reciprocity and mutual 
return constructively encounter Marion's erotic phenomenological reduction and call for a renewed, 
univocal conceptuality of love, while critically challenging the pure passivity of Marion's weak, 
donative subject and thinking of the pure gratuity of love's givenness itself.                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
 §3. STATUS QUAESTIONIS. MYSTICAL THEOLOGY TODAY—TRANSFORMATIVE   
        PRAXIS APART FROM DOCTRINE? 
 
 Recently within various contemporary theological perspectives, the "rediscovery" of 
(medieval) mystical theological texts has certainly taken place in various quarters to the extent that 
one may realistically gauge this sustained phenomenon no longer as idiosyncratic or sheer novelty. 
Rather, as an emerging resource of normative, creative theological reflection within Christian 
tradition, the ongoing hermeneutics of tradition-development and more specifically, its critical 
relevance within current research projects in seeking out a renewed theological anthropology open 
to the transformative-character of spirituality as reflective of the praxis of Christian identity. And yet, 
despite such renewed interest there are nonetheless many persistent gaps, misunderstandings and 
suspicions that make such a rediscovery and discussion across various theological disciplines still 
tenuous at best. 
 Retrieval, both within philosophical and theological quarters, can rightfully be called a major 
feature of renewed, contemporary approaches to late-medieval mystical texts. In terms of 
"continuity", this impetus, theologically, can be significantly traced back in part to the continuing 
influence of 20th Century ressourcement, or 'nouvelle theologie' figures who advocated for a fresh 
return to various Patristic and Medieval sources amid the critique of Neo-Scholastic manual theology. 
While philosophically, diverse figures similarly pursued a renewed attention to the question of 
mysticism and its impact upon experience, subjectivity and the boundaries of rationality itself.  
 
 And yet, from a contemporary      - u  u a  perspective, the full-force of retrieving 
(late)medieval mystical texts can be regarded as primarily motivated by the challenges and openings 
posed by postmodernism itself. "[U]p until the middle of the former century," writes Lieven Boeve, 
"Christian religious affiliation and identity were almost self-evident in large parts of Europe". 
However, due to secularisation and detraditionalisation, communal and individual identity 
construction is "much more reflexive than before".28 Spanning the entire spectrum from 
"progressive" openings towards   ff  a    and radical plurality, to that of more "traditional" 
contextually-mediated approaches in response to secularisation and/or detraditionalisation, the 
                                                          
28 See Lieven Boeve, "Orthodoxy in the Postmodern Context: The Interruption of the Christian Truth Claim", 
(Forthcoming) Concilium 2014. 
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rationale for the retrieval of such texts can in part be said to reflect the     ab    y of contemporary 
religious identity itself (individually and communally), thus engendering an unavoidable degree of 
  f  x v  y.29 And yet, it is most explicitly in the field of mysticism itself (and thus in turn, 'spirituality') 
that bears witness to these ongoing cultural debates, often pursued surrounding the question of 
(religious) experience. This is the case, both in terms of new multi-disciplinary academic trends that 
are now studying the 'praxis' of spirituality as a viable academic field of study, as well as their 
vigorous critiques. The latter of which, in part, argue that such developments are largely indebted to 
a late-capitalist consumerist economy and its manipulation of human desire that 'seeks' to construct 
such new identities and manufacture spiritual experiences. From this argumentative line, mystical 
texts become reduced to a preoccupation of 'techniques', founded upon a strong account of 
subjectivity and its construction of meaning. 
 In proposing a theological retrieval of the fourteenth century Brabantine contemplative, Jan 
van Ruusbroec and his understanding of love, or minne, and situating such a retrieval within 
contemporary discussions over love in theological and philosophy of religion quarters, I must equally 
bring into consideration that which minne presupposes, as an intelligible concept. And by doing so, 
distinguish presuppositions specifically intrinsic to minne from what may be contextually relevant in 
further expanding our understanding of minne, yet ancillary and hence extrinsic to minne's own 
distinct, conceptual and theological rigour.30 For Ruusbroec, this intrinsic presupposition can 
primarily be situated in terms of "mutual indwelling", both a cosmological principle of creation that 
bears a "vestigial" or "rough likeness to God" and more importantly, a specific relational 
anthropology between Creator and creature, a defining characteristic of late-medieval mystical 
theology of Northern Europe and specifically the Low Countries. As a uniquely Trinitarian, 
"interpersonal" imago Dei anthropology,31 Ruusbroec uniquely stresses mutual indwelling as an 
intrinsic relationality of radical alterity within immanence wherein both eternal and exemplarist 
strains converge with the historical and soteriological modalities in this natural union of the human 
person and God. Thereby echoing the Johannine prologue: "'All that is made, was life in Him.'"32  
 
 Amid the current theological reception and retrieval of Christian mystical authors, considering 
such an anthropology and the various consequences stemming therefrom, I would like to suggest, 
appears more pivotal than "perennialist" readings that maintain the central importance to the very 
modern question of the (im)possibility of 'mystical experience'.33 From a more modern historical 
                                                          
29 See generally, Lieven Boeve, Religion after Detraditionalization: Christian Faith in a Post-Secular Europe,  in 
M. Hoelzl and G. Ward (ed.), The New Visibility of Religion: Studies in Religion and Cultural Hermeneutics 
(Continuum Resources in Religion and Political Culture), London: Continuum, 2008, 187-209;  
30
 
In this, we advance from what Jean-Luc Marion himself phenomenologically begins with in his conceptual 
plea in thinking anew, away from metaphysical closure, the primacy of the erotic phenomenon as "starting 
from themselves, without inscribing them from the outset and by force within a foreign horizon" and instead, 
"describ[ing] the erotic phenomenon in its own proper horizon [...]" See Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic 
Phenomenon, 5-6. 
31 See Bernard McGinn's typology of the differing schools of imago Dei anthropology: "intellectual, volitional, 
and the interpersonal", "Humans as Imago Dei" in E. Howells and P. Tyler (eds.)  Sources of Transformation: 
Revitalising Christian Spirituality, (London: Continuum, 2010),19-40, esp. 24-25. 
32 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia XIII, Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit, ll. 901-902. See also Jn 1, 3-4. 
33
 
See Louise Nelstrop's overview of "perennialist readings" in the tradition of William James, as one of four 
theoretical approaches to the contemporary study of Christian mysticism, in Christian Mysticism: an 
Introduction to Contemporary Theoretical Approaches, L. Nelstrop, K. Magill, B. B. Onishi (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2009), 3-11. 
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perspective and by contrast, the central importance of such an mystical anthropology is that it stands 
in strong contrast to the implicit, modern/Cartesian anthropology of human subjectivity that we find 
in the manuals of "mystical" or "spiritual theology" predating Vatican II, of which, we can now say 
were overburdened in their own attempts to balance the competing claims of both mysticism with 
that of asceticism and moral theology. Mystical union in this sense was understood as occurring only 
once one has reached moral perfection.34 Adding to this a further subdivision within the dialectics of 
contemplative union, as modulating between "acquired" (i.e. intentional) and the purely gratuitous 
"infused" union with God. Combine these laborious balancing attempts, wherein ultimately we derive 
our contemporary term "spirituality" as a forged synthesis―with the often pejorative connotations35  
that "mysticism" signified, attributed to the likes of George Tyrell, Alfred Loisy and others within the 
early twentieth Century Modernist movement.36  While Modernist advocates like von H gel sought 
refuge in Quietist figures such as Archbishop F nelon and Mme. Guyon as an attempt to broaden the 
sources of Catholic tradition and its theological reflection distinctly away from Neo-Scholasticism and 
the manual tradition37, to their polemical adversaries, being "mystical" was deemed as either 
'heterodox'; dogmatically and theologically insufficient; or at least 'vague' and 'ambiguous'. These 
developments thus contributed to theology's frequent understanding of 'mysticism' as extraneous to 
and at times mutually suspicious towards the nature of revealed, Christian faith in the former's own 
emphasis upon the subjectivity of "religious" or "mystical experience".38 And while contemporary 
                                                          
34 See Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, The Three Ways of the Spiritual Life (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 
1955), 66-80. While in recent memory Garrigou-Lagrange is remembered by both defenders and adversaries 
alike as the staunch opponent to ressourcement theology, describing it as “la nouvelle th ologie” and a resort 
back to Modernism. What is overlooked, however, is the fact Garrigou-Lagrange was already well-known in the 
field of Spiritual theology while teaching at the Angelicum in Rome. Here, contra Scaramelli’s strong division 
between asceticism and mysticism, Garrigou-Lagrange argues for its unity: “The difference between this new 
way of dividing ascetico-mystical theology and the old way obviously arises from the fact that the old authors, 
unlike the modern ones, maintained that all truly spiritual souls can humbly desire and ask of God the grace of 
the infused contemplation of the mysteries of the faith [….] They considered this supernatural and infused 
contemplation to be morally necessary for that union with God in which the full perfection of the Christian life 
consists. Hence it may be wondered whether the new division, as propounded for example by Scaramelli, does 
not diminish both the unity and the sublimity of the perfect spiritual life.” (69) 
35 See e.g. Aidan Nichols' description of Loisy's "mystical faith" and its distinct, individualistic and modernist 
connotations in the following monograph, From Newman to Congar: The Idea of Doctrinal Development from 
the Victorians to the Second Vatican Council (Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1990), 82: "Especially noteworthy here is 
the study of Loisy entitled Un clerc qui n'apas trahi, writted by the Abbé Henri Bremond, the historian of French 
Spirituality [....] Bremond distinguished between 'dogmatic faith' and 'mystical faith'. He argued that at least 
until 1904 Loisy had what might be termed a mystical form of Catholic faith. That is, he did not accept the 
Church's dogmas as true in the sense in which her recognised doctors propounded them [....] 'all the dogmatic 
element had disappeared; all the mystical element remained [...]'" 
36 For a well-rounded critical reflection on figures linked to the Modernist crisis and their retrieval of mystical 
theological figures such as Fénelon, Mme Guyon, Catherine of Genoa and others, see Modernists & Mystics, ed. 
C.J.T. Talar, (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2009). 
37 See William L. Portier & C.J.T. Talar, "Mystical Element in the Modernist Crisis" in Modernists & Mystics, 4. 
See also Friedrich von Hügel, The Mystical Element of Religion as studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her 
friends, vol. I-II, (London: Dent 1961), vol. II, 129-181. 
38 See De Lubac's modern historical description of the Council Fathers of the First Vatican Council's uneasiness 
with defining the Church as the "mystical body" as not only too much in line with the Reformation's own 
'spiritualist' reaction to the Counter- Reformation, but furthermore, as demonstrating its own views towards 
that which is deemed as 'mystical': "When we read, for example, the observations made by the Fathers of the 
First Vatican Council on the plan put before them, whereby the Church was defined from the outset as the the 
mystical body, we note that a good number of them were astonished. Not only did they object to this notion in 
its 'obscurity', or else its overly metaphorical character, or that, in contrast, it was too abstract. Some of them 
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studies on Christian mysticism and spirituality within academic settings have well moved beyond such 
handbooks as "dogmatically subordinate", in fact there is a greater amount of continuity with largely 
psychological and other intentionally non-theological readings of Christian mysticism in their 
perpetuating this conception of "mysticism" as extraordinary and extraneous to the Church and even 
at times Christian faith itself.39 Conversely, by recognizing its theological basis and dependency, 
Christian spirituality need not however explicitly nor implicitly return us to the presuppositions of the 
manual tradition as inaugurated by Scaramelli S.J. D          a        and D          m       (1751), 
Augustin Poulain S.J., and later on typified by Tanquerey's immensely popular Th   p    ua  L f .40 
Philip Sheldrake himself has argued for the distinctiveness of a contemporary "spirituality" as clearly 
distinguished from that of "spiritual theology", noting that spirituality today is "not simply the 
prescriptive application of absolute or dogmatic principles to life."41 And yet, such an identity in 
discontinuity, I would cautiously assert is still more shaped by its distinctly m      heritage and 
tradition as typified by the manual tradition and its disputed relations invariably between 
asceticism―seen as preparatory and theologically based―to that of the extraordinary and overtly 
experiential character of mysticism. Hence, while this has led many to clearly assert spirituality's 
autonomy from that of theology, especially in its institutional application and academic study, such 
counter movements nonetheless owe much to the modern manual tradition's characterization of 
"mysticism" as overemphasizing spirituality's new self understanding, while clearly to the detriment 
of more classical spiritual texts that are disengaged from their hermeneutically grounded, 
theologically engaged religious context.  
 With this in mind, I am therefore significantly hesitant to see the term "my    a   h     y" 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
wanted to outlaw it as a possible source of dangerous error: the sole fact that the Jansenists had used it 
seemed to them to call for its condemnation without further appeal. Without going to such excessive lengths, 
several of them estimated that, valid as it was for mystical theology, it was out of place in a dogmatic 
exposition on the Church, where there was a need to define its essence, rather than to offer nourishment to the 
life of piety [...]' in Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages, (trans.) G. Simmonds, R 
Price, C. Stephens, (eds.) Laurence Paul Hemming and Susan Frank Parsons (Notre Dame, IN, University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2006), pg. 117. 
39
 
See Emile Mersch S.J., The Whole Christ, trans. John R. Kelly S.J., (Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Company, 
1938), 572-573, for a defense of mysticism and the doctrine of the Mystical Body precisely as a corrective to 
the Modernist crisis: "It is [the Mystical Body], lastly and chiefly, a remedy for the heresy of Modernism, for its 
false views on religion, and for its false doctrine of immanence. Modernism, as we know it, is an attempt to 
make all religion, or at least whatever we can know of religion, something purely subjective. The rest is 
Unknowable. Of God, of His nature, even our immortal soul, we can know nothing. A fortiori, the divinity of 
Christ and the transcendent character of the Christ-life and of the Church are wholly beyond the range of our 
intelligence. The most that we can attain is something subjective, an interior sentiment, an attraction for the 
divine, the need for an ideal; these alone can give meaning to religious formulas, and especially to the dogmas 
and facts of Christianity [....] The aspiration toward a more interior religion, with which it has tempted minds of 
our present age, will ever appear false, even painfully commonplace to those who have come to know the 
doctrine of the Mystical Body. What a poor immanence is this, that imprisons man in himself, and how sad this 
cry that loses itself in the darkness! Immanence? Certainly. Why abandon a word that heresy has stolen from 
Truth? [...] But this immanence does not consist in man's isolating himself in himself, but in aspiring to the 
supreme Life and Immanence, to the God who is immanent Life. The Christ-life, too, is immanent, but with an 
immanence far superior to that of unaided man. Since we are all taken up in Christ, we are all united in God. It 
is eternal Life, which by vivifying the sacred humanity of the Savior, vivifies us all in Him [....] It is the presence 
within us of the Mystical Christ, the intimacy of all that is catholic, the union within the individual, in Christ and 
through Christ, with all of regenerated humanity and with God." 
40 A.A. Tanquerey, The Spiritual Life: A Treatise on Ascetical and Mystical Theology, (trans.) Herman Branderis 
(Tournai: ET, 1930). 
41
 Philip Sheldrake, Spirituality and History (London: SPCK, 1995), 58. 
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loose currency—as echoed by the early to mid-20th Century Belgian Jesuit Emile Mersch in his 
explicit, ontological usage of the term "mystical". In his larger theological project of developing the 
understanding of our life and participation in the “Whole Christ”, Mersch deliberately opts for the 
term “Mystical Body of Christ” as reflecting the “realism and mysticism" of our "real and ontological 
union" with Christ and those united in His Body. Thus, an understanding of “mystical” which is by no 
means to be "synonymous with 'nebulous' or 'semi-real', etc.42 At this point, the absence of such a 
perspective in part entails understandings of Christian spirituality as only further divorced and driven 
afield from both theological critical input and conversely, its own constructive/critical stance towards 
theology and more specifically, the identity of the theologian, echoing Philip Sheldrake43 and his 
arguing for a "transformative" hermeneutic that spiritual texts confront the reader within a 
committed, theological perspective.44 
 Not only is the terrain of such discussions both foreign and in discontinuity with Ruusbroec's 
own mystical theological undertaking, but furthermore, as the ongoing retrieval of such patristic and 
medieval figures continue to be performed within contemporary continental philosophical and 
theological reflection 45, the pending theological status and constructive relevance of figures such as 
Ruusbroec shifts away from the "possibility" of such mystical experiences as both "passive" and 
"immediate" as evidenced by various feminist and post-modern approaches. For up until recently, the 
question of the p    b    y of such mystical experience, traditionally seen in its extraordinary character 
                                                          
42 See Mersch, The Whole Christ, 8-9: "Now that we have indicated certain false notions of the Mystical Body, 
what is the correct view? The answer is that there are two; both good, and both orthodox. The first is 
characterized by its realism and mysticism [....] According to this view, men have a true union with Christ, a real 
and ontological union; He is really and truly in them and we are in Him; we are really and truly one in Him as He 
is one with the Father [....] It is best to retain the traditional name and call it a "mystical" union. However, it 
must be clearly understood that this term is by no means synonymous with 'nebulous' or 'semi-real'. On the 
contrary, it signifies something which in plentitude and reality surpasses the things of nature and the positive 
concepts that our reason can elaborate." 
43 Philip Sheldrake, Explorations in Spirituality, 72 (my emphasis): [S]pirituality provides solid foundations for 
judging the adequacy of theological explanations [....] spirituality is the unifying factor that underlines all 
attempts to 'do' theology or, more properly, to be a theologian [....] Spirituality reminds theology that the 
theological enterprise is fundamentally practical and needs to be practiced [....] To do theology means 
becoming a theologial person, not merely using theological tools." 
44 Philip Sheldrake, Explorations in Spirituality, 40: [A] number of scholars now refer to what has been called an 
'appropriative method' in relation to interpreting Christian traditions and texts, whether scriptural or spiritual. 
By this, scholar's means that the purpose of interpretation is not merely accurate knowledge but application, 
and the purpose of application is appropriation. That is, 'understanding' a spiritual text fully is transformative 
rather than purely informative. Understanding is concerned with meanings but also with purpose and values. 
To be appropriated, texts need to be understood from the inside out, as it were." 
45 In terms of the contemporary interest and reception of mystical texts, questions surrounding the 'possibility' 
of mystical experience and the academic reception of such authors, in the tradition of William James' 
influential Varieties of Religious Experience are appearing increasingly to be no longer at stake. This is 
evidenced in large part by the wide range of diverse engagements such contemplative authors have both 
provoked and served as resources within contemporary analyses. For example, recent philosophical and 
theological attempts to overcome ontotheological thinking structures in order to think  a more purified 
transcendence in the works of Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion have often relied upon the tradition of 
apophatic or negative theology, and in so doing, their arguments have sought support from the mystical 
tradition. Conversely, the growing influence of approaches such as those of Amy Hollywood within Feminist 
and Gender Studies have attempted within their own fields of discourse to rehabilitate the performative 
aspects of more "affective" and embodied forms of mysticism in figures such as Bl. Angela of Foligno, St. Teresa 
of Avila or Beatrice of Nazareth, gauged in terms of their contemporary reception as sufficiently resistant to 
more modern reductive psychological views of the 'hysteria' of  female mysticism, as well as to categories that 
have previously sidelined such figures from serious reflection and consideration.  
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in terms of its  mm   a y and pa   v  y to the human subject functioned as a testing grounds and 
determining criterion of its legitimacy and the possibility of its hermeneutical engagement. However, 
while refusing to cede primacy to the question of mystical experience and its (im)possibility, doing so 
while situated amongst various new forms of textual engagements46, I instead hold for a close, textual 
reading under the presumption that Ruusbroec's texts themselves operate within a specific, unique 
theological hermeneutic—with primacy accorded to minne—as itself prior to, yet intrinsic within its 
historical/contextual embedding. From this, I can gauge the unique fluency, particularities and 
nuances of his reflections upon mutual indwelling, while fully recognizing that the latter is 
nonetheless a common mystical theological theme. In Ruusbroec's case, such an anthropology is both 
thoroughly Christological and Trinitarian, while deeply rooted in his dynamic thinking of the primacy 
of minne. Such themes not only demand closer examination, yet further present themselves as key 
entry points in (re)thinking relationality within the contemporary demands for a distinct, reassessed 
theological anthropology. A reassessment, which may in turn function as a potential corrective to 
certain readings and the appropriation of mystical texts.  
                                                          
46 See Nelstrop, Christian Mysticism, 1-20, for her taxonomy of current theoretical approaches to Christian 
mystical texts, consisting of: Perennialist; Contextualist; Feminist; and lastly, various post-modern Performative 
language approaches. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
A  HUNGER UNSTILLED: RETRIEVING JAN VAN RUUSBROEC'S 
UNDERSTANDING OF LOVE AS MINNE IN VIEW OF  
JEAN-LUC MARION'S EROTIC TURN 
 
 
  §1. INTRODUCTION: THE EROTIC LOCALE 
 
 The following essay proposes a retrieval of Jan van Ruusbroec's univocal love concept of 
minne as critically responsive to the renewed, contemporary interest in thinking love anew within 
theological and philosophy of religion discourses.1 This essay will first proceed by briefly examining 
the radical French phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion and the strengths and weaknesses of his erotic 
reduction. In turn, by acknowledging continuing scholarly interest in the mystical theological 
tradition, for both Marion et al., as productively contributing to this contemporary rethinking of 
love's primacy, topics of fruitful and critical development will be explored in Ruusbroec as envisaging 
his sustained, future engagement within such discourses. 
 In Marion's introductory chapter to The Erotic Phenomenon, the "Silence of Love", he 
provocatively sketches the modern divorce between philosophy and love and in effect, calls for a 
renewed focus "that out of philosophy's amorous disaster we can reconstruct an inquiry on love."2 
Marion argues that our contemporary understandings of love and charity have been dramatically 
hollowed out and grossly sentimentalized, from which we increasingly are no longer able to either 
"describe it, nor distinguish it from other erotic dispositions, nor even from nonerotic dispositions, 
much less articulate them in a right and sensible act."3 To reengage love on its own terms and within 
its own distinct rationality, Marion calls for a concept to think love from within its own primacy, as 
foundational to an "erotics of wisdom", while reminding us of the very original, sapiential endeavor 
of philosophy. By doing so, Marion advances the more radical claim that "philosophy defines itself as 
the 'love of wisdom' because it must in effect begin by loving before claiming to know."4  
 Resolutely moving away from more metaphysically predominant modalities such as truth and 
being, Marion puts forth three criteria to conceptually think the modality of love as primary: that a 
love-concept be "univocal"; that such a univocal concept can account for the rationality of that which 
"nonerotic thought disqualifies as irrational and degrades to madness"5; and lastly, that a "concept 
must reach the experience of erotic phenomena starting from themselves, without inscribing them 
                                                          
1
 See generally Transforming Philosophy and Religion: Love's Wisdom, (eds.) B.E. Benson and N. Wirzba, 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008). 
2
 Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, (trans.) Stephen E. Lewis, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
2004), 3. 
3
 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 4. 
4
 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 2. 
5
 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 5. 
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from the outset and by force within a foreign horizon."6 From these criteria, Marion advocates that 
our thinking of love must be informed by, yet ultimately rise above an exclusive, hermeneutically-
based understanding of love as praxis7. Marion positions love's primacy as exceeding a narrow 
voluntarism, phenomenologically insisting that love possesses its own intrinsic, given content. 
However, as a univocal concept that attempts to think such primacy from the givenness of love itself 
and not conditioned by any foreign horizon, such a love concept must equally possess a critical 
capacity in order to attain rigorous conceptuality, if it is to endure exposure to a negative moment in 
which it can thus withstand easy negation. Thus, it is with the aim of developing this intrinsic, critical 
sense that Marion will make use of the mystical theological dialectics of kataphasis, apophasis and 
the via eminentiae [the way of eminence], or more frequently referred to contemporaneously as the 
"third way".8 By insisting on the historical viability of this third way as a way of naming and 
responding to transcendence beyond metaphysical enclosure, Marion thus positions love as escaping 
both the formal impasse of binary predication of thesis and antithesis―in which he directly links to 
kataphasis and apophasis and hence, subject to easy negation―as well as preempting any 
hermeneutical charges of partiality by asserting love's own distinct rationality. And yet, the question 
remains whether his own erotic meditations are themselves responsive to the robust, conceptual 
plea that he sets forth. Does Marion's erotic meditations present a plausible, confessional witness, 
stemming from a conceptuality of love that sufficiently addresses the "disputes" heretofore between 
love's particularity and universality, of which "have not ceased to occupy the lover, who only 
conquers himself by trying to settle them."9 
 
 Instead of attempting to resolve such conflicts by way of speculative detachment, Marion 
proceeds confessionally via the "erotic reduction"10 and his highly particularized erotic meditations 
are structured in response to the originating question, "Does anyone love me?", insisting that "one 
must speak of love in the same way as one must love―in the first person.... [For] loving puts in play 
my identity, my ipseity, those resources of mine that are more inward to me than myself".11 As is 
customary with Marion's works, the definitiveness of his erotic turn, its phenomenological status and 
questioned theological neutrality have all been critically challenged. And yet, while Marion's distinct, 
Pascalian-tinged French Catholicism and theological commitments are clear and unavoidably 
apparent, is such particularity really all that problematic, especially when gauged in terms of love's 
primacy? As Marion's draws upon St. Augustine's Sermon 34 in his prefatory remark, "nemo est qui 
non amet"[There is no one of course who doesn't love], it is not a question of whether or not we 
love—of which falsely presumes suspending erotic determinacy and instead, makes possible my 
neutrality towards love (or hate) itself. For, if we accept the premises of the erotic reduction—and its 
priority to the modalities of reason/rationality, being and non-being—only to later on critique its 
application and distinct hermeneutics as overly particular, phenomenologically implausible and 
theologically determined, such a critique fails to address the erotic reduction itself and the legitimacy 
                                                          
6
  ibid.  
7
 See generally Werner Jeanrond, A Theology of Love, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2010) for a general, topical 
introduction to a hermeneutically-based, theological reflection on love as praxis. 
8
 See Jean-Luc Marion, "In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of "Negative Theology"', in God, The Gift, and 
Postmodernism, (eds.)  John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1999) 20-53. 
9
 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 101. 
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 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 19-26. 
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 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 9. 
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for phenomenology to proceed from love's primacy. Rather, such familiar critiques fundamentally 
aim at disqualifying that which Marion claims to initially bracket―what St. Augustine himself 
proclaims to be at issue―though Marion deliberately chooses not to reference: "There is no one of 
course who doesn't love, but the question is, what do they love."12  
 Claude Romano's "Love in its Concept" makes a similar critique, aptly illustrated when 
observing Marion's erotic terminology in thinking its univocity wherein "love is qualified here as a 
'phenomenon', a word whose neutrality and indetermination is important."13 Romano's stress upon 
the 'neutral' field of the phenomenon itself—and by extension, phenomenology—is thus critically at 
odds with Marion's confessional attempt at thinking the univocity of love, as Romano instead 
situates love more as a second order, derivative phenomenon to that of the gift.14  On the contrary, 
as the erotic phenomenon exposes reason's insufficiency "to give love reason thus marks not only 
the principle of insufficient reason, but erects above all the lover as reason in himself,"15 Marion 
argues that the phenomenality of the beloved appears "in the measure that I, the first to love, 
love."16 Marion furthers elaborates upon the particular phenomenality of the beloved in the 
following:  
the lover alone sees something else, a thing that no one other than he sees—that is, what is 
precisely no longer a thing, but, for the first time, just such an other, unique, individualized, 
henceforth torn from economy, detached from objectness, unveiled by the initiative of 
loving, arisen like a phenomenon to that point unseen. The lover, who sees insofar as he 
loves, discovers a phenomenon that is seen insofar as it is loved (and as much as it is 
loved).
17
 
 
 Hence, Marion strongly argues against such an apparent 'neutrality' and 
indeterminateness―not to be confused with the saturated, intuitive particularity of the beloved 
itself, as a phenomenon, which arises and is foregrounded―yet understood as the worldly context of 
"objectness" that recedes into a background of ontological indifference to the erotic phenomenon. 
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 Augustine, The Works of Saint Augustine: A translation for the 21
st
 Century, vol. II, Sermons (20-50) on the 
Old Testament, (Trans.) Edmund Hill, (Ed.) John E. Rotelle, (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1990), 166. 
13
 Claude, Romano, 'Love in its Concept', in Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion, (trans.) Stephen E 
Lewis, (ed.) Kevin Hart, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 319-335, 320-1. Here, Romano 
further expounds upon the explicit neutrality of constituting the erotic appearance as a phenomenon. "In its 
indeterminate neutrality, it has almost the same meaning as the word 'weight' that St. Augustine, doubtless for 
analogous reasons, privileged, thus refusing to allow himself to be caught in the trap of these oppositions [....] 
Thus Marion dismisses such questions as whether love is of the order of an emotion or of an intention. Is it 
something we undergo or is it voluntary? Does one who loves seek the good of the other or his own 
satisfaction? Is love essentially altruistic or selfish? If love presents itself here in the neutrality of a simple 
'phenomenon', it is precisely in order to escape the dichotomies in which the problem has become mired, to 
the point of becoming insolvable[...]" 
14
 Romano, 'Love in its Concept', 321. Indeed, Romano makes such an argument, characterizing the erotic 
reduction as a "partial reduction" and as "eidetic" to that of a universal one—wherein "the erotic phenomenon 
simply comes under a universal phenomenology of the gift, in relation to which it would be, in some way, a 
particular case." Romano's critique is that the erotic reduction leads to an inquiry about the essence of love, of 
which is a "particular phenomenon", whereas "Marion holds that all phenomenality finds itself modified by the 
erotic reduction: the task of the erotic reduction is to give access to a new domain of phenomenality, more 
originary than that of objects and of beings considered in their being, and thus more originary than the 
domains brought to light respectively by Husserl and Heidegger." 
15
 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 82. 
16
Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 80. 
17
 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 80-81. 
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Devaluing such a worldly, contextual backdrop is a reoccurring position of Marion, as he frequently 
regards such worldly relations explicitly in terms of an economy of exchange that evaluates, demands 
and reciprocates that which it distinguishes by way of "comparisons, of calculations, and of 
commerce".18 While in strong contrast, the isolated lover, as ratio sui  "can no longer see otherwise, 
nor see anything other than what he sees—and what he sees decidedly no longer has the status of a 
thing, but of a beloved."19 Therefore, while aiming at pushing love itself beyond all worldly relations 
seen as inextricably linked with a metaphysical duality, the very particularity of Marion's confessional 
rhetoric―as rooted within a retrieved, neo-Augustinian tradition that aims beyond onto-theo-
logy―may rightfully be seen as responding to a distinct rationale of the erotic reduction itself. 
 Rather than perpetuating such continuing debates over the proper status of Marion's work, 
the question to me steers away from critiques of accessibility and openness to difference and 
multiplicity in response to Marion's radically particular reflections of love. Instead, given the 
unavoidable theological overlap of The Erotic Phenomenon, as confessionally emerging from the first 
person, to what extent does Marion abandon himself to the erotic phenomenon itself, a givenness 
mediated by his conceptual understanding of such a love? As his conceptual plea for love's univocity 
not only gives way to difference as it differentiates that which accedes to the name of love, from that 
which does not, so too does it give way to distinction in individualizing and distinguishing oneself as a 
lover, via the praxis of such loving in mediating our erotic reflections. Thus, to what extent does 
Marion's conceptualizing of love allow for him to receive and respond to the erotic phenomenon 
itself and do so―with authority―as a lover? 
 To access this, if love is to be thought of according to its primacy, a place is requisite for the 
immediacy of its reception, as primary. The phenomenality of love needs a concrete place, as do 
lovers, beyond reification (the what of the lover) and identity (its who interrogated), a relationality 
that is primary and reflective of its erotic origins. And yet, in Marion's erotic meditations, 
concretizing relations―in all of its desire for possessiveness, commitment and sincere, yet 
implacable demands―within the phenomenon of love is a dangerous place, as the relational 
exchange between lover and beloved always risks devolving into an economy of indebtedness, 
determining relations and hence, compromising love's gratuitousness. Hence, the meeting between 
lovers, Marion argues, emerges as an unforeseeable advent in the crossing between lover and 
beloved, such that the phenomenon of love is a "crossed phenomenon with a double entry―two 
intuitions fixed by a single signification."20 And while Marion is here certainly bold and 
phenomenologically innovative in speaking of a singular, shared phenomenon between lover and 
beloved, he then immediately retreats and foregoes ascribing this shared phenomenon any 
permanence or enduring signification. For the meeting place of this shared signification that both 
individualizes and binds the lover and beloved in the erotic phenomenon, "aris[ing] like an oath"21, 
Marion describes as the intuitively rich, yet formally empty "Here I am!".22 Such a relational place, 
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 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 81. 
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 ibid 
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 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 105. 
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 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 104. 
22
 See contra the analysis of Stijn Van Den Bossche for a substantially different take on Marion's "me 
voici"[Here I am!] as directly implying the vows of marriage as a "performative oath". Stijn van den Bossche, 
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this 'here', which Marion describes is as drearily banal and anonymous as a hotel room, a place, 
which "as such signifies nothing and even has no meaning... applicable to everyone and implying 
nothing" until someone "performs it."23 Thus, for Marion, all love language and actions that mediate 
the immediacy of lovers in their relationality and common bond are themselves empty and devoid of 
meaning, stressing such mediation by way of its hollowed-out, formal universality to offset the 
otherwise particularity and individuation that the performance of love ushers forth. What promise 
does such a love concept hold in refounding philosophy based upon such a poor 'erotics of wisdom'?  
 In turn, Marion's emphasis on the erotic phenomenon as individualizing―and hence, away 
from concrete, substantive relation―is expressed in terms of the flesh and advances from his earlier 
accounts in Being Given and In Excess in terms of its strict auto-affection to include more of a 
heteronymous range24, wherein "the other gives me what she does not have—my very flesh. And I 
give to her what I do not have—her very flesh."25 However, while breaking away from the extreme 
insistence of auto-affectivity and its inescapable self-enclosure, similar to Being Given and by 
extension, Phenomenality of the Sacrament26, the problem of receiving the gratuitous primacy of the 
erotic phenomenon persists, such that by way of its immediacy, not only does it individualize me—
for "I do not have flesh, I am my flesh and it coincides absolutely with me,"27—but furthermore, that 
such identity as prior to relation risks idolizing the other. Affirming thus substantive, meaningful 
degrees of the alterity of the other―beyond any and all empty formality―exposes itself to a 
phenomenological "difficulty [...] not in its supposed distancing, poverty, or transcendence [...][but] 
in its absolute immanence".28 Here, Marion encounters a significant constraint in erotically thinking 
alterity―for example, the other's touch―beyond the flesh's own self-reflexive claim of identity, to 
the exclusion of a thicker description of the possessiveness of relationality, desire for union, as well 
as the immediacy of desire's reference towards, affirmation of, and address to the other's alterity. 
For Marion, viewed within the paradigm of givenness, relationality primarily does not reflect such 
alterity, yet is retained within its own self-reference, as the other's  touch gives me that which I lack, 
while in turn the phenomenality of "the other appears in the very measure in which she gives me my 
own flesh."29 However, within the dynamic of such love dialectics, if the lover is to respect the other's 
alterity, while maintaining such self-reflexivity, then the flesh's reception of such touch―the locus or 
meeting place of receiving the primacy and givenness of the erotic phenomenon―Marion maintains 
is one characterized solely in terms of abandonment and dispossession. For "one can possess a 
body," as physically extended within the world, one that accrues both debt and demand, yet 
"possession closes access to the flesh."30 Hence, Marion goes to great lengths in establishing the 
beloved's alterity, as particular and lacking neutrality, though doing so, not as an invitation for ever-
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  Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 107. 
24
 See Shane Mackinlay, Interpreting Excess: Jean-Luc Marion, Saturated Phenomena, and Hermeneutics (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 130-158. and his analysis of Marion's thinking flesh, its evolution and 
Mackinlay's charge that such heteronymous openings occasioned in Marion's more recent writings challenges 
its earlier claim as "absolute". 
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 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 120. 
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 See also Patrick Cooper, Feeding from His Flesh: The Enduring Eucharistic dimensions of Jean-Luc Marion's 
Thought (Unpublished Thesis, KU Leuven, Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, 2010) for a more thorough 
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deepening union as responding to and affirming such alterity, yet as an impregnable limit of 
unrelenting distance. Where thus has the erotic fled and the possessive desire for union? 
 In short, there is nothing new in Marion's posture of receptivity and the affective passivity of 
the flesh―the seat of the lover's identity31―regarded as continuously exposed, with hyper-
sensitivity towards the threat of idolatry and idolatrous appropriation. For such themes are 
consistent and recurring in Marion's works, expressed in the early precaution to "admit a distance in 
order that the other may deploy in it the conditions of my union with him," as justifying Marion's 
recourse and distinct approach to the theology of transubstantiation as preserving an irreducible 
externality, thus safeguarded from idolatrous appropriation when sacramentally approaching the 
Eucharistic flesh of Christ .32  
 However, can we not say that Marion's thinking the univocity of love in such instances moves 
beyond a certain predilection for and emphasis of kenotic abandonment and instead, shows itself as 
an overall weakness in terms of its relational poverty and inability to think of the immanent other in 
any other modality than such dispossession and lack? Are we ultimately prohibited from thinking the 
immediacy of desire towards the other, as enfleshed, in any other manner than its ultimately self-
referential character, as refusing its inclination to anything more than myself as "that [...] [which] I 
lack."33 For if desire maintains both its ultimate self-reference―as loving love itself―and its 
particular response to such lacking absence, then conceiving of desire as such, irrespective of its 
responsiveness towards the other, I would argue necessarily constrains both responding to the 
immediate affectivity of the flesh as well as thinking the full extent of love's primacy. The 
presumption of privileging identity over and against relation hinders Marion's thinking of flesh from 
love's primacy, especially in terms of its unitive erotic character, of which I would argue is both 
inevitably possessive and relational. Hence, I submit that the difficulty of receiving the alterity of the 
other and its poor relationality within the immediacy of erotic thought restricts Marion's otherwise 
notable effort to rethink love from within its own given primacy. 
 
 In response to these standing critiques, the following proposes exploring the possibilities of 
retrieving central ideas and thinking patterns of the 14th Century contemplative theologian, Jan van 
Ruusbroec to not only heed the contemporary call from Marion, et. al. in renewing our approach in 
thinking love, but furthermore, seeing where Ruusbroec can be called upon in both constructively 
adding to, as well as critiquing certain dimensions of this renewed discourse. 
 
 A. METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS 
 
 Why Ruusbroec? The prospects of retrieval opens onto two vulnerable fronts and their 
critiques: from the historian as well as the contemporary interlocutor. As such retrieval engages 
historical sources and attempts at situating them within contemporary discourse, doing so largely 
exposes one to the inevitable critique that such retrieval lacks sufficient, historical 
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comprehensiveness. The second critique emerges more from the contemporary angle, citing the 
possibility of retrieval as unavoidably partial and reconstructive.34 In the face of apparent 
discontinuity as final and irreconcilable, retrieval of pre-modern figures rightly tests the critical-
hermeneutical conditions under which texts and concepts from the contemplative tradition can be 
retrieved in contemporary philosophical and theological thinking. These tests can be quite vigorous, 
as historical-theological input often tends to be considered by many contemporary thinkers as 
merely instrumental to a first and foremost systematic reflection. And while this critique is more 
often than not occasioned by the very content of that which is being proposed, standing contentions 
and their critiques are not so much content-centered as they are methodological and therefore, the 
only way that I presently see for those whose work engages in retrieval to counter such claims of 
over-partiality is to address them right off from the beginning. 
 
 In so doing, I put forth the claim that Ruusbroec's understanding of love as minne—a unitive, 
dynamic concept of love that is differentiated from, yet incorporates dimensions of both 
caritas/agape and eros—has a critical potential to both expand and give further depth to our 
rethinking of love, as well as its distinct promise to do so from the seat of its own enfleshed primacy. 
As a unitive concept both "above reason and yet not without reason"35, Ruusbroec’s  minne can 
enable us to refine, nuance and provide a unique alternative to otherwise polarized, contemporary 
theological discussions over the competing priorities of caritas and veritas, resultant in part by the 
failure to think love beyond what modern metaphysics has thus divided. While maintaining its unity, 
love by necessity needs a third term to think such primacy beyond the current impasse between self-
possessive and self-denying love. In turn, if we are to uphold a unified love concept, we then need a 
conceptuality of love that is able to seamlessly thread the linkages between love's various 
movements, its gratuitousness, its graciousness as well as its possessive desire for union and 
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 In a fascinating passage on "minne" as "totally eliminated from living German speech because it had been so 
misused", c.f. the popular 20th Century Thomist philosopher Josef Pieper, Faith, Hope, Love, trans. Richard and 
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speech. Although a new German translation of Kierkegaard by Emmanuel Hirsch attempted to render one of 
the two Danish expressions for love by Minne, that effort has remained an isolated bit of archaizing without 
any significance for actual contemporary German speech." 
35
 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 3: Die geestelike brulocht, (trans.) Helen Rolfson, (ed.) Jos Alaerts, (Tielt: 
Lannoo, Turnhout: Brepols 1988) b, ll. 1481-1485: "In the unity of spirit, in which this vein wells, one is above 
activity and above reason, but not without reason; for the enlightened reason, and especially, the faculty of 
loving, feels this touch, and reason can neither comprehend nor understand the mode or manner, how or what 
this touch might be." "In eenicheit des gheests, daer dese adere walt, es men boven werken ende boven 
redene, maer niet sonder redene; want die verlichte redene, ende zonderlinghe de minnende cracht, ghevoelt 
dit gherinen, ende redene en can niet begripen noch verstaen wise noch maniere, hoe ochte wie dit gherinen 
si." 
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unbounded excess, without downplaying one modality over another, if love is indeed to convincingly 
assert its primacy. 
 
 In the following contribution, I would like to briefly introduce some of the major themes and 
thinking patterns that are closely related to Ruusbroec's understanding of minne. These aspects 
include: the unitive, ecstatic character of minne; its primacy, as "above reason, but not without 
reason"36 to the modality of truth as normative; its participatory, dynamic character that is 
thoroughly Christological and Trinitarian, understood as both a continual "going out" in works, desire 
and restlessness, all of which affirms the otherness of God in terms of the Divine Persons, as well as 
its continual "return", immersion and rest in the unity of God.37 With due attention to these themes, 
I will introduce them, while explicitly focusing upon the theme of ecstatic yearning and the 
restlessness of loving that is intrinsic to Ruusbroec's understanding of minne. From this, I would like 
to introduce the unique, critical potential of affirming God's alterity within the immanent life of 
minne itself, a critical capacity that arises in part from the excess of feeling [ghevoelen] the  
immediacy of the Other's touch [gherinen] that spurns our continual restlessness and yearning for 
greater union with God in His "greater dissimilarity".38  With these basic orientations in mind, I would 
now like to put forward a few initial remarks concerning further possible openings for retrieving 
Ruusbroec's thought. 
 
 B. POSSIBLE OPENINGS   
 
 First, attention must be given to the reinvigorated theological debates concerning the 
priority of caritas or veritas within fundamental theology, which has contributed to this current 
rethinking of love within both theology and philosophy of religion quarters. More specifically, within 
various theological disciplines, a renewed assessment of ‘love’ is being performed, in part motivated 
by the prominence that Benedict XVI has made of the issue in his encyclicals, Deus Caritas Est (2006) 
                                                          
36
 ibid. 
37
 See e.g. Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia, 1: Boecsken der verclaringhe, (trans.) Ph. Crowley and Helen 
Rolfson, (ed.) Guido de Baere, (Tielt: Lannoo, Turnhout: Brepols, 1981) ll. 332-340 : "And there you must accept 
that the Persons yield and lose themselves whirling in essential minne [weseleke minne], that is, in enjoyable 
unity; nevertheless, they always remain according to their personal properties in the working of the Trinity. You 
may thus understand [proeven] that the divine nature is eternally active according to the mode of the Persons 
and eternally at rest and without mode according to the simplicity of its essence [wesen]. It is why all that God 
has chosen and enfolded with eternal, personal minne [personenleker minne], He has possessed essentially, 
enjoyably in unity, with essential minne. For the Divine Persons embrace mutually in eternal pleasure with an 
infinite and active love in unity." "Ende daer eest te nemen dat die persone wiken ende verwielen in die 
weseleke minnen, dat es, in ghebrukeleker enecheit, ende nochtan altoes staende bliven na persoenleker aert 
in werken der drieheit. Ende aldus moghedi proeven dat die godleke nature ewech werkende es na wise der 
persoene, ende ewech ledech steet ende wiseloes na eenvoldecheit haers wesens. Ende hieromme, aldat god 
vercoren hevet ende begrepen met ewegher persoenleker minnen, dat hevet hi al weseleke beseten, 
ghebrukeleke in enecheiden, met weseleker minnen. Want die godleke persone behelsen hen onderlinghe in .i. 
ewech behaghen met grondeloeser werkeleker minnen in enecheit." 
38
 From the Second Canon of the Fourth Lateran Council, See Giovanni Domenico Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum 
nova et amplissima collectio, vol. XXIII (Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt 1960-1962), 986: '[B]etween 
creator and creature no likeness can be recognized which would be greater than the unlikeness that is to be 
recognized between them.' 
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and Caritas in Veritate (2009). Of particular note is Benedict’s decided praise of eros, from which he 
argues has been historically marginalized and downgraded in various strands of Christianity’s history. 
However, Benedict makes explicit his reappraisal, equally asserting the fundamental priority of 
veritas towards love—eros and caritas—as a corrective to such a unified love going astray or 
becoming mis-directed. Retrieving Ruusbroec's conceiving of minne as "above reason but not 
without reason",  can both widen and nuance these current discussions, as it not only locates minne, 
within the context of union with God, as above the province of reason, but it further articulates that 
such minne indeed possesses its own rationality, even when it goes against normative reason itself.  
 
 This position is not only an advance from the heritage of Gregory the Great's "amor ipse 
notitia est" [love itself is knowledge], wherein love itself possess its own knowledge and distinct 
conceptuality but it furthermore counters what later metaphysics would itself deny, what Marion 
articulates as the division between rational love and irrational passion, the latter of which is 
discarded by the Cartesian ego seen as both voluntaristic, secondary and thus non-essential to the 
primacy of the res cogitans [thinking thing].39 Thus, Ruusbroec's understanding of minne, as that 
which dwells in the very "groundless abyss" of the created self appears uniquely posed to deliver 
both an intelligible concept of love and with it, a rich theological basis in joining contemporary 
appeals to think the primacy of love anew, as an "erotics of wisdom" and away from metaphysical 
closure. 
 
 Ruusbroec strongly challenges basic dimensions of this discourse, namely the treatment of 
caritas and veritas as somehow mutually distinct and isolated from one another, whereas speaking in 
terms of our various forms of union with God—with mediation, without mediation, and without 
difference or distinction40—in order to both feel and understand this union requires that one "must 
live for God with all the fullness of his self so that he may respond to the grace and divine 
movements [....] And because he practices this he has a clear understanding and a rich and abundant 
feeling for he is joined to God, with faculties uplifted, with a pure intention, a heartfelt desire, an 
unsatisfied craving, with the living ardor of his spirit and his nature."41 By his insistence of thinking 
both feeling and understanding, Ruusbroec assumes this perspective by rejecting a distinctly, 
hierarchical view of union with God, in terms of gradation and assent, and with it, a view that 
stresses the activity and achievement of uniting oneself with God and instead, argues for more of a 
                                                          
39
 See Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon,  6-8. 
40
 See generally Ruusbroec, Boecsken, ll. 34-41 (with slight modification): "See, I have thus said that the 
contemplative lover of God is united with God by means, and again without means, and thirdly without 
difference or distinction [sonder differentie ochte onderscheet]. And this I find in nature and in grace and in 
glory. I have further stated that no creature can become or be so holy that it loses it own condition of creature 
and becomes God, not even the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ: it will remain eternally creature and other than 
God." "Siet, ic hebbe aldus gheseghet: dat de scouwende minnere gods met gode verenecht es overmidts 
middel, ende oec sonder middel, ende ten derden male sonder differentie ochte onderscheet. Ende dit vende 
ic in naturen ende in der gratien ende oec in der glorien. Ic hebbe voert gheseghet, dat en ghene creature en 
mach soe heilech werden noch sijn, dat si hare ghescapenheit verliese ende god werde, noch oec die ziele ons 
heren Jhesu Cristi: die sal eweleke creature bliven ende een ander van gode." 
41
 See Ruusbroec, Boecsken, ll. 172-173; 181-185: "[H]i moet gode leven met gheheelheit ende alheit sijn 
selves, also dat hi der gratien ende den beweghene gods ghenoech si [....] Ende omdat hi hem hier inne oefent, 
soe es hi clare van verstane, ende rike ende overloedech van ghevoelne. Want hi es te gode geboeghet met op 
gherechten crachten, met rechter meininghen, met herteleker begherten, met onghepaeyder ghelost, met 
levende eernste sijns geests ende sijnre naturen." 
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dynamic view of union with God, one which always fluctuates and changes, building off and 
deepening one's union, but never going beyond and leaving behind the liturgical practices and 
virtuous activities that ground one's relations, commitments and concrete responsibilities in the 
world.42 
 
 1. The place of impress: Ruusbroec's Theological Anthropology 
 
 Another possible opening for retrieving Ruusbroec are the critical demands placed upon a 
renewed, adequate theological anthropology, seen within specific reference to love's primacy, and 
with it, a view of the human person capable of union with the other without risk of idolatry nor 
disregarding the alterity of the other. This opening is in part motivated by various attempts at moving 
love beyond the divided impasse between self-possessive and self-denying love and with it, the 
'problem of love' and metaphysics' difficulty in thinking the possibility of 'disinterested love' that falls 
beyond egoism and self-benefit. As earlier noted, Marion rightfully critiques the basis of this 
metaphysical dilemma and its presumption of an "erotic neutrality", of which we can never in fact 
affirm, "without lying to ourselves [....] [For] Man is revealed to himself by the originary and radical 
modality of the erotic. Man loves—which is what distinguishes him from all other finite beings, if not 
the angels. Man is defined neither by the logos, nor by the being within him, but by the fact that he 
loves (or hates), whether he wants to or not."43  
 
 Thus, affirming love's primacy occasions a critical review of this very "self" that is suspected 
of having thus contributed to a divided view of love. More specifically, retrieving the dynamic view of 
Ruusbroec's understanding of the primacy of minne subsequently demands for an adequate 
theological anthropology―locus capax Dei44 [place capable of God]―that can both receive such love 
as indeed primary and immediate in its unitive character—as well as reflective of the necessary 
mediated character of such a love, glimpsed both in terms of its cultural and theological milieu, as 
well as its necessary activity as sacramental, virtuous and always "going out" and affirming the 
otherness of God, to whom one responds in and through its works. 
 
 Ruusbroec can critically aid in such a renewed anthropology, as he situates the otherness and 
uncreatedness of minne as emerging within the very distinction and particularity of individuals.45 
                                                          
42
 See e.g. Ruusbroec, Vanden Blinkenden Steen, ll. 1-7: "A man who wants to live in the most perfect state 
offered by Holy Church must be a zealous and good man, and an inward and spiritual man, and an uplifted man 
contemplating God, and an outflowing, common man. If a man combines these four things his state is perfect 
and it will grow and increase always in grace and all virtues and knowledge of truth before God and all men of 
reason." "Die mensche die leven wilt inden volcommensten staet der heilgher kerken, hi moet sijn een 
eernstachtich goet mensche ende een innich gheestelijc mensche ende een verhaven god scouwende mensche 
ende een uutvloende gheme[e]yne mensche. Alse dese viere dinghe vergaderen in eenen mensche, dan es 
sinen staet volcomen, ende altoes wassende ende toenemende in meer gracien ende in allen doechden ende in 
kinnessen der waerheit vore gode ende vore alle redelikcke menschen." 
43
 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 7 
44
 Aelred, R., Speculum Caritatis, b. 1, c. 1, PL. 195, 505, as quoted from Pierre Rousselot, The Problem of Love, 
202 
45
 See e.g. Ruusbroec, Boecsken, ll. 188-189: "The impulse of minne is always directed to the advantage and the 
capacity of each and everyone." "Ende minne beweget altoes na orbore ende na hebbelecheit ieghewelcs 
menschen." 
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Affirming the ecstatic otherness of minne, "drunk and replete in God"46 Ruusbroec does so, not by 
sequestering and distancing that which is beyond and "above" myself and my understanding, but 
places such affirmation of its otherness firmly within the "groundless abyss" of our erotic, created 
selves, "hungry and thirsty", wherein "he must feel that the foundation of his being is unfathomable, 
and as such he must possess it."47 From this groundless foundation, Ruusbroec articulates such 
"possession" as a continuing relational dynamics within contemplative life, such that "we live 
completely in God, where we possess our bliss, and completely in ourselves where we practice our 
love towards God."48 Rooted within such mutual indwelling and Ruusbroec's Trinitarian and 
relational anthropology, this insistence of dwelling in both myself and my continual desires, as well 
as in the Other and its bliss again attests to the general, dynamic approach of Ruusbroec's thought, a 
dynamism that is never "idle" and seen very much at the core of his thinking of minne. For we are 
not being presented with an older, Neoplatonic framework of a "spiritual ladder" of progress, stasis, 
and leaving behind more imperfect modes and practices in view of one's union with God as a first 
principle49. No, quite the opposite is at work here in Ruusbroec's thinking, which attests to the 
dynamism of his thought as well as the distinctly Catholic manner of his approach in upholding the 
continual necessity of mediation. This dynamism and the relational core in which Ruusbroec speaks 
of in terms of minne I consider as critical points in potentially envisaging its sustained, future 
engagement with both theological issues over caritas and veritas, as well as in related discourses 
contributing to re-thinking love's primacy. 
 
 2. Minne as a modeless practice 
 
 From such openings, attention to  Ruusbroec's  understanding of minne, I maintain, can best 
be approached with due attention to both its theological and hermeneutical basis that is profoundly 
Christological and Trinitarian, as well as its phenomenological aptitude, wherein the intelligibility of 
minne is made fully accessible not merely by what he says of it, but how he speaks of such love. 
 
This contemplation always hangs upon 
[anehanghende] a modeless practice, which is an 
Desen scouwene es altoes anehanghende eene 
wiseloese oefeninghe, dat es een vernieutende leven. 
                                                          
46
 Ruusbroec, Vanden Blinkenden Steen, ll. 575: "[...] in gode droncken ende sat" 
47
Ruusbroec, Vanden Blinkenden Steen, ll. 70-72: "Dat eerste poent es dat hi dat fondament sijns wesens 
grondeloes ghevoele, ende alsoe moet hijt besitten." 
48
 Ruusbroec, Vanden Blinkenden Steen, ll. 579-581: "Ende aldus [aldus] leven wij gheheel in gode, daer wij 
onse salicheit besitten; ende wij leven gheheel in ons selven, daer wij ons in minnen te gode oefenen." 
49
 See contra von Balthasar's reading of Ruusbroec within a distinct, neo-Platonic perspective, read in terms of 
the "[...] central point of indifference. Indifference, for the Christian, means Catholic love, which lets itself be 
robbed of form in the movement from the world to God and transformed in the movement from God to the 
world." Such an analysis, which thinks of love more so as a 'principle' than as an unending, desirous yearning 
for the Other, is itself a familiar assessment and/or critique that often fails to reckon precisely with the 
uniqueness of Ruusbroec's thinking of minne, and its continual work and rest as fundamentally averting from 
neo-Platonic categories that privilege stability, presence and permanence over against multiplicity, change and 
becoming. Hence, the continual charge directed towards the neo-Platonic heritage, namely its inability to think 
happiness outside of presence, stability and the rest of contemplation is itself, we would contend, 
problematized when taking seriously Ruusbroec's distinct understanding of minne. See Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol. V, The Realm of Metaphysics in the Modern Age, 
(trans.)Oliver Davies, Andrew Louth, Brian McNeil C.R.V., John Saward and Rowan Williams (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1991), p. 76. 
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annihilating life. For where we go out of ourselves 
into darkness and modelessness that is 
unfathomable, there shines the simple ray of 
God's brightness always, in which we are 
grounded and which draws us up out of ourselves 
into the superessential being and the immersion of 
minne [ontsonckenheiden van minnen]. And this 
immersion always hangs upon and followed by a 
modeless practice of minne, for minne cannot be 
idle, but it wants to know and taste to the full the 
unfathomable richness that lives in its ground. And 
this is a hunger unstilled: to always strive in failure 
is to swim against the current. Man cannot leave 
it, nor grasp it; he cannot do without it, nor can he 
obtain it; he cannot speak about it, nor can he be 
silent about it for it is above reason and 
understanding and above all that has been 
created, and therefore he can neither reach it nor 
overtake it. But we should look into ourselves: 
there we feel [ghevoelen] that the Spirit of God 
drives us and kindles us in the restlessness of 
loving. And we should look above ourselves: there 
we feel that the Spirit of God draws us out of 
ourselves and consumes us to nothing in his own 
self, that is in the superessential minne [die 
overweselijcke minne] we are united with and 
possess more deeply and more widely than any 
other thing. 
Want daer wij ons selfs ute gaen in donckerheiden 
ende in onwisen sonder gront, dzer scijnt die 
eevuldighe raeye der claerheit gods altoes, daer wij 
inne ghefundeert sijn ende die ons ute ons selven 
trecht in overwesene ende in ontsonckenheiden van 
minnen. Ende deser ontsonkenheit van minnen es 
altoes ane hanghende ende na volghende eene 
wiseloese oefeninghe van minnen, want minne en 
mach niet ledich sijn, maer si wilt doerweten ende 
doersmaken die grondelose rijcheit die in haren 
gronde leeft. Ende dit es een hongher onghepait; 
altoes crighen in dat ontbliven, dat es swemmen 
jeghen strom. Man caent ghelaten noch ghevaten; 
men caent ghederven noch noch gecrighen; men 
caent <oec> ghespreken noch verswighen, want het 
es boven redene ende verstaen, ende onthoghende 
alle creatueren. Ende hier omme en machment 
ghereyken noch verhalen. Maer wij selven in ons 
binnenste sien; daer ghevoelen wij dat ons die gheest 
gods drijft ende stoecht in dat ongheduer van 
minnen. Ende wij selen boven ons selven sien; daer 
ghevoelen wij dat ons die gheest gods ute ons selven 
trect ende verteert te nieute in sijns selfsheit, dat es 
in die overweselijcke minne daer wij een mede sijn 
ende die wij besitten diepere ende bredere dan alle 
dinc.
50
  
 
In this provocative passage concerning the ecstatic quality of contemplation and our "immersion" 
into minne, while such contemplative union is described as an "annihilating life" that is "modeless" 
and "unfathomable", the practice of love endures, which "cannot be idle". Here, Ruusbroec affirms 
the abysmal ground of minne "in which we are grounded" as "above reason and understanding" not 
by way of its removal from, negation or frustration of our desires, yet by their very affirmation as a 
"hunger unstilled", the core of which Ruusbroec identifies as the "Spirit of God drives us and kindles 
us in the restlessness of loving." This portrait of restlessness is characteristic of Ruusbroec as well as 
his thinking of minne and yet, such an image significantly diverges from an otherwise familiar, 
Augustinian heritage, for it is not simply a matter of juxtaposing the finitude of our restlessness as 
symptomatic of our fallenness, in the future promise of its eternal relief in glory, but of maintaining 
both rest and restlessness as the life of minne itself. As a dynamic thinker, Ruusbroec maintains both 
modes of rest and restlessness as co-constitutive of the life of minne itself, as lived both here in grace 
as well as in glory. Such ecstatic desire and its ever-increasing hunger for union with God, are not to 
be ultimately overcome and abandoned. Rather, such desire forms the relational basis for our "going 
out" and encountering God through the activity of loving, affirming our created selves and eternally 
remaining a "creature and other than God." 51 In turn, such mediated works and active love can be 
understood as erupting, not only from our lack and the poverty of our desirous selves but 
                                                          
50
 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia, 10: Vanden blinkenden steen,  (trans.) A. Lefevere, (eds.) G. de Baere, Th. 
Mertens, and H. Noë, (Tielt: Lannoo, Turnhout: Brepols, 1991), ll. 546-564. 
51
 Ruusbroec, Boecsken, ll. 40-41: "[…] die sal eweleke creature bliven ende een ander van gode." 
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furthermore as craving for the "richness"52 that stems from our "immersion" into the unity of God's 
self. Hence, these two core movements of minne, as both an eternal going out in mediated works 
and an eternal return in the unitive immediacy of God, show the dynamic character of minne, as well 
as its thorough Trinitarian basis. 
  
 In short, not only do I contend that Ruusbroec's theological understanding of minne can 
necessarily contribute to widening the horizons of contemporary discussions concerning the primacy 
of love, but furthermore, I put forth that with an adequate and balanced attention as well to its 
phenomenological dimensions of Ruusbroec's speaking from within the modeless practice of 
contemplating minne, such attention has a tremendous capacity to teach us what it means to desire 
as an ongoing response to love's primacy. Such a focus has the potential to further articulate the 
unique rationale of our "restlessness" that arises from the immediacy of love's excess, a continued 
restlessness which affirms, a contrario, the otherness and incomprehensibility of the Other for whom 
I yearn, by way of the impossibility of sustaining such a continued desire solely as a form of self-
production and self reference. Further, the rationale of such restlessness accounts for its affirmation 
of paradox and reinsertion within mediation and the praxis of love as equally constitutive of love's 
primacy. In this manner, by rehabilitating our desires worthy of such a love, the necessity of love's 
activity that "demands our action, namely that we love the love eternal."[dat wij minnen die eewighe 
minne.]53 is seen as arising out of the immediacy of its ecstatic excess and the capacity of our 
continuous and unrelenting desires to receive such an immediate and inexhaustible love, thereby 
countering the charge against claims that the conditional externality of such a "demand" and its 
historical "debt" threatens love's gratuitousness and risks its dissolution into any economy of 
exchange.54 For out of the continual, enduring praxis of loving, Ruusbroec repeatedly argues that 
"the more we love, the more we lust to love; and the more we pay what Love demands of us, the 
more we keep owing."55 
 
 3. The Critical Capacity of Minne 
                                                          
52
 See e.g. Ruusbroec, Vanden Blinkenden Steen, ll. 574-576: "And therefore we are poor in ourselves and rich 
in God, hungry and thirsty in ourselves, drunk and replete in God, working in ourselves and empty of all things 
in God." "Ende hier omme sijn wij in ons selven arm ende in gode rike; in ons selven hongherich ende dorstich, 
in gode droncken ende sat; in ons selven werkende ende in gode alles ledich." 
53
 Ruusbroec, Vanden Blinkenden Steen, ll. 726-727: "Want dat uutvloeyende gherinen gods stoecht ongheduer 
ende eyscht ons werc, dat es dat wij minnen die eewighe minne." 
54
 See e.g. Ruusbroec, Brulocht, b, ll. 1152-1159 and his thinking of the "demands" of love as arising out of our 
individual desire to love: "For He shows Himself as so rich and generous, and so fathomlessly good, and in this 
manifestation, He demands minne and honor in proportion to His dignity. For God wants to be loved [ghemint] 
by us according to His nobility; and in this, all spirits fail; and thus, their minne becomes modeless and 
mannerless. For they know neither how to achieve it nor how to induce it, for the minne of all spirits is 
measured. And therefore, minne always begins again from the beginning, so that God may be loved [ghemint] 
according to His demand and according to their desire." "Want hi toent hem soe rijcke ende soe milde, ende 
soe grondeloes goet, ende in desen toene eyschet hi minne ende eere na sijn weerde. Want god wilt van ons 
ghemint sijn na sine edelheit, ende hier inne faelgeren alle gheeste, ende aldus wert de minne zonder wise 
ende zonder maniere. Want si en wetent hoe [hoghe] gheleisten noch toe bringhen, want alre gheeste minne 
es ghemeten. Ende hier omme wert de minne altoes van[den] eersten begonnen, op dat god ghemint worde na 
sine eysch ende na hare begherte." 
55 Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia, 9: Van seven trappen, (trans.) Helen Rolfson, (ed.) Rob Faesen, (Tielt: Lannoo, 
Turnhout: Brepols, 2003)  ll. 1108-1110: "[…]want soe wi meer minnen, soe ons meer lust te minnenne; ende 
so meer betalen dat ons minne eischt, soe wi meer sculdegh bliven." 
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 The primacy and intelligibility of minne, its reception and response in terms of its furthering 
desire also includes with it a critical capacity in Ruusbroec's works, especially as towards claims of 
having permanently moved beyond both mediation and the active practice of love, the sacramental 
life of the Church in its mediation of God's grace as well as claims of "resting" beyond the yearning 
and active dimensions of love itself. In this respect, in no way is Ruusbroec negating or moving 
beyond mediation in view of union with God as solely passive and immediate. In fact, Ruusbroec 
continuously insists on the necessity of mediation, which is at once both conversant with his 
conception of minne in and through its desirous practice of "going out" towards the Other as well as 
a theological basis that informs such a conception, seen as an extension of the sacramental life of the 
Church in her mediation of God's grace. Ruusbroec's insistence on this is rightly seen in its historical 
context amid the "Free Spirit" heretical movement that sought to do away with the 'imperfect' and 
'unnecessary' sacramental life of "Holy Church the Lesser".56  In at times passionately countering 
these widespread claims in his vernacular writings, Ruusbroec not only depicts such positions and 
their claims of having "united themselves to the blind, dark emptiness of their own essence [wesen]" 
as "lack[ing] real faith, hope and love", but furthermore, because of their lack of works and "going 
out" towards the Other, he argues that their autotheistic claims and inactivity results in a self-
enclosure wherein the  "essential repose which they possess they feel neither God nor otherness."57 I 
find this remark continuously fascinating, as it both positively recognizes what such persons 
"possess"—namely, the reduced and simplified autonomy of their own enclosed subjectivity as a 
"place of rest"—as well as what they lack as a consequence of such a self-understanding: the loss of 
the otherness of God, not as a transcendental beyond, but as an otherness that affirms its alterity by 
giving itself, as Other, to the rich and porous life of one's feeling [ghevoelen], desire and its natural 
inclination towards a "being other than we are."58  
 
 Secondly, another consequence of this position of supposedly going 'beyond mediation' is 
that, by endeavoring to simplistically and exclusively be 'turned within themselves', this disposition—
and with it, their own subjectivity—robs or blunts their feeling [ghevoelen] and in particular, its 
orientation towards the Other. This entails, amongst other things, that with the presumption of 
overcoming mediation (the sacraments, the virtues and practices of the Church), these claims exhibit 
a blunting, a desensitizing of sense for otherness and ultimately, for God. This loss of feeling in its 
orientation towards the other, the loss of responsiveness as well as the muting of desire to go out 
and abide in the Other has, as Ruusbroec identifies, been dulled. And it is this critique of the dulling 
of sense and the evacuation of desire for the Other, which demonstrates both the critical capacity of 
minne itself and its prompting in speaking out of such love as a passionate defense. 
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 Another critical feature in Ruusbroec's thinking minne is the manner in which it mobilizes the 
distinct inseparability between our feeling love from that of our understanding or "possessing" love, 
the conjunction of which opens onto intelligibility—and by extension, conceptuality— of minne, from 
within its own primacy and without having to seek recourse to an anterior concept to justify, 
condition, nor limit its felt immediacy. However, from such claims of "possession", the issue arises 
whether or not the otherness of God may well indeed be given and radically affirmed by such felt 
immediacy, while doing so without risking 'fusion' or 'collapse'.  
 
 In short, by taking serious Ruusbroec's manner of discernment—the distinct inseparability of 
ghevoelen and understanding—does the erotic disposition of minne itself have anything substantial 
to say concerning the otherness of God? 
 
And therefore, when we feel he wants to be ours 
with all this wealth and wants to dwell with us 
always, all the powers of our soul open and most 
of all our avid desire, for all the rivers of God's 
grace are flowing. The more we taste it, the more 
we desire to taste; and the more we desire to 
taste, the more deeply we crave to be touched by 
him; and the more deeply we crave to be touched 
by God, the more the flowing of his sweetness 
flows through us and over us; and the more his 
sweetness flows through us and over us, the 
better we feel and know that the sweetness of 
God is incomprehensible and unfathomable. 
Ende hier omme, als wij dan dat ghevoelen dat hi met 
al deser rijcheit onse wilt sijn ende altoes met ons 
wonen wilt, hier jeghen ontpluken alle die crachte 
onser zielen ende sonderlinghe onse ghierighe 
ghelost. Want alle die rivieren der ghenaden gods die 
vloeyen. Ende soe wijs meer ghesmaken, soe ons 
meer lust te smakene; ende soe ons meer ghelust te 
smakenne, soe wi dieper crighen in sijn gherinen; 
ende soe wij diepere crighen in dat gerinen gods, soe 
ons die vloede sijnre soeticheit meer doervloeyen 
ende overvloeyen; ende soe wij meer doervloeyt 
werden ende overvloeyt [sijn], soe wij bat ghevoelen 
ende bekinnen dat die soeticheit gods ombegripelijc 
es ende sonder gront.
59
 
 
 
Here, in this intricate passage that describes the responsiveness to and "avid desire" for the 
otherness of God, affirmed here specifically in terms of the "sweetness" of the Divine nature as 
"incomprehensible and unfathomable", Ruusbroec invites consideration of the otherness of God not 
as a limit of conditionality nor as a border for the possible and impossible, a "beyond" that pivots 
upon the subject and its spatio-temporal categories of immediacy and finitude. Rather, by way of 
Ruusbroec's erotic logic and the "avid desire" of minne, the otherness of God gives itself as a 
"sweetness" and in turn consoles both one's feeling of and understanding of God's otherness—"the 
better we feel and know that the sweetness of God is incomprehensible and unfathomable."60 
 
 C. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
 What sort of consolation is this and is such a statement immediately apparent to us today? 
Does the persistence of my avid, unsatisfied desires yield consolation, both in terms of my desiring 
itself, as well as that of which I am desiring? Am I satisfied, well-pleased and consoled by the 
otherness of God as Other? Does not invoking transcendence occur today more so as a radical 
injunction and interruption of an image that totalizes, one which is "closed", forgetful of difference in 
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its risk of idolatry? In turn, does not mention of the erotic and its possessiveness immediately 
occasion suspicions of a breakdown of "greater dissimilarity" and in turn, usher in a series of 
reductionistic analyses? We can safely say that not only has the erotic become so debased, so banal 
and immanently sexualized to the degree of being virtually synonymous with the pornographic and 
objectifying, which in turn, because of such culturally-based images and its current, situated 
character, it irrevocably challenges our ability of conceiving the erotic and its possessiveness as 
positioned to affirm the felt immediacy of God's transcendence as anything other than perverse and 
limiting. Therefore, precisely due to this apparent discontinuity and cultural unease, we should not 
look away from what Ruusbroec and others in the late-medieval (vernacular) mystical theological 
tradition say precisely on these points, not so as to reduce God's transcendence as exclusively reliant 
upon eros, nor to misappropriate relevant themes and risk in our retrieval a critical imbalance that 
hinges on distortion.61 Rather, to reaffirm His otherness, by way of rehabilitating our own desires for 
His "sweetness" that is "incomprehensible and unfathomable". 
 
 From this injunction, the task remains whether we can in fact conceive, speak of and indeed 
feel God's alterity—both critically and devoutly, remaining thus within tradition—while thoroughly 
inhabiting such an erotic posture? In this context, Ruusbroec's consolation in the "sweetness" of 
God's transcendence is an exemplary portrait of the unique, critical capacity of love itself. As a 
contemplative lover of God, the avidity of Ruusbroec's desire is fueled by the recognition that the 
excessive otherness of God is such that no desire can fully satisfy and comprehend God's 
transcendence.62 And yet, as a lover, such failure results not in rendering 'still' one's hunger, for "he 
cannot speak about it, nor can he be silent about it". Thus, the "sweetness" that Ruusbroec speaks of 
is not merely an immersion into "performative" speech and rhetorical excess, yet as a unique and 
intelligible form of critical speech that speaks from the origins of its very excess, occurring not as an 
extrinsic placid injunction, yet as that which is "sweet to one's throat"63, as minne is both "above 
reason, yet not without reason", which knows the difference and settles for nothing less. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
POSSESSING THE UNFATHOMABLE. APPROACHING JAN VAN 
RUUSBROEC'S MYSTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AS RESPONSIVE TO THE 
PRIMACY AND PRAXIS OF MINNE. 
 
'Let him who has ears to hear, hear what the Spirit 
of God says to the churches,' (Rev. 2, 11) [….] 
Whoever is more inwardly inclined to God's 
speaking in him, than outwardly inclined to the 
words of man, and rather listens to the word of 
God to live by than to know, and for whom the 
word of God is an inleading food in which God 
tastes better to him than all things, and who stays 
onefold with the inner word of faith and trust, 
that is the one who has ears to hear, for he is able 
to understand all the truth God is willing to reveal 
to him.  
'Die  ooren heeft te horne, hi hoere wat die gheest 
gods sprecht de kerken' (Rev. 2, 11) [....] So wat 
mensche die meer inweert neycht tot den insprekene 
gods dan uutwert tot den woorden der menschen, 
ende dien meer lust te hoorne dat woort gods omme 
leven dan om weten, ende dien dat woort gods es 
eene inleidende spise daer hem god in smaect boven 
alle dinc, ende die met ghelove ende met trouwen 
eenvuldich biden inwindighen woorde blijft, dat es de 
ghene die ooren heeft to hoorne. Want hi es 
hebbelijc alle waerheit te verstane die hem god 
vertoenen wilt [...]
1
 
 
 
 § 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the following analysis, I contend that the contemporary reception and possible critical 
retrieval of figures from the late-medieval contemplative tradition—and in particular, the works of 
Jan van Ruusbroec—within larger theological, philosophy of religion discourses as well as the 
academic study of spirituality hinge more upon the plausibility of a mystical anthropology of mutual 
indwelling  more so than the question of 'mystical experience' as a determining criterion of 
legitimacy and hermeneutical engagement.  By way of these shifting approaches, the particularities 
and nuances of this uniquely relational imago Dei anthropology—which in Ruusbroec's writings are 
both thoroughly Christological and Trinitarian, while deeply rooted in his dynamic thinking of the 
primacy of love as minne—are themselves themes called upon for closer examination. Furthermore, 
it will be argued that they function  as key entry points in addressing contemporary demands for a 
distinct, reassessed theological anthropology, while simultaneously functioning as a potential 
corrective to certain readings and the appropriation of such mystical texts. 
 
 Amid  contemporary interest and the reception of mystical texts, questions surrounding the 
'possibility' of mystical experience and the academic reception of such authors  increasingly appear 
to no longer be at stake. More specifically, in the tradition of William James' influential Varieties of 
Religious Experience2, which  earlier had well established the parameters of a renewed engagement 
of mystical authors within diverse academic fields such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, 
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psychology of religion as well as branches of theology has lost much of its earlier appeal and 
resourcefulness.. This is evidenced in large part by the wide range of diverse engagements such 
contemplative authors have both provoked and served as resources within contemporary analyses. 
For example, recent philosophical and theological attempts to overcome onto-theo-logical thinking 
structures in order to think transcendence in the works of Jacques Derrida3 and Jean-Luc Marion4 
have often relied upon the tradition of apophatic or negative theology, and in so doing, their 
arguments have sought support from the mystical tradition (Dionysius Areopagita, Meister Eckhart, 
Angelus Silesius et al.). Conversely, the growing influence of approaches such as those of Amy 
Hollywood5 within Feminist and Gender Studies have attempted within their own fields of discourse 
to rehabilitate the performative aspects of more "affective" and embodied forms of mysticism in 
figures such as Bl. Angela of Foligno, St. Teresa of Avila or Beatrice of Nazareth. For Hollywood, such 
canonical figures are depicted as sufficiently resistant to more modern reductive psychological views 
of the 'hysteria' of  female mysticism, as well as to categories that have previously sidelined such 
figures from serious reflection and consideration. Thus, "by taking seriously the words of those 
women", without however addressing the question of mystical experiences as such, Hollywood's 
approach advocates that such female mystical texts often challenge the "very antithesis between 
affective and speculative forms of mysticism, as well as the resistance to the gendering of that 
distinction, [of which] has its roots in texts written by and addressed to medieval women."6  
 
 In these contemporaneously diverse, yet highly influential scholarly approaches towards 
medieval mystical texts,seldom are they concerned with defending and/or repudiating the possibility 
of "mystical experience" itself. This is especially the case when such experience is understood in 
terms of an "immediate" and "passive" experience. Rather, attention has noticeably shifted and 
centers now more upon the participatory and performative character of such mystical texts, both 
within their historical contextual reception as well as, in specific reference to Marion's reading et. al., 
of mystical theology's move beyond predicative speech of naming and affirming the truth and/or 
falsity of that which it speaks. Thus, the performativity of mystical texts are depicted as moving 
beyond both kataphasis and apophasis, and in turn resolutely moving toward a third mode of 
speaking. A "third way" characterized not in terms of a hyper-affirmative, yet as a mode of speaking 
that passes through such negation that subsequently cannot be separated from the praxis of such 
saying or "unsaying" itself. Hence, like the language of lovers, as Marion himself explicitly states, the 
pragmatic, nonconstative language of mystical theology is seen as speaking towards the other not so 
much to name or describe (and thereby to predicate), yet to call out towards and in a 
"prelocutionary" mode of address prompts and elicits enjoyment of the alterity of the other.7  
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 However, while I am somewhat cautious in my overall assessment of this approach, I 
nonetheless see that it is a mistake to assume that such a 'pragmatic' or 'performative' approach to 
mystical texts thus relieves the text of its content, its claims and kataphatic affirmation, no matter 
the radicality of such an apophatic approach, as is the case for Marion. Instead, by such a 
performative approach to mystical texts, the weight of affirmation noticeably shifts away from that 
which is said and/or negated—as understood as an impartial or exclusive body of thought, a science, 
or a discourse that is sufficiently disembodied from concreteness and particularity—and is more 
dynamically relocated to the speaker himself, to the performer or the performed of the performance 
and the very praxis that such texts initiate and have as their demand. Hence, while we are by no 
means being presented with an anthropological turn as it were, construing the subject as having 
eclipsed the text, its claims and particularity, such a pragmatic approach can neither disentangle the 
content of that which it speaks from the very (un)saying or performing that the text itself demands. 
 
 In this current scholarly climate, Mark McIntosh's Mystical Theology8 helps clarify how 
contemporary readers have become once again alerted to issues of praxis within mystical texts. 
Speaking from a distinct theological perspective that aims at re-examining and reasserting the 
mutual interdependencies between theology and spirituality as academic pursuits, McIntosh notes 
the limited, yet positive contributions that both feminist and liberation theological perspectives have 
made in helping overcome such divides that have bifurcated theory and practice within theology 
itself. Thus, McIntosh notes the privileging of praxis within various feminist and liberation theological 
perspectives and its positions of solidarity and "preferential option for the poor" and marginalized as 
broadly encompassing a "participatory model of truth rather than a purely propositional adequacy 
model."9 McIntosh states: "Feminist and liberationist religious perspectives have recovered a 
fundamental assumption of earlier eras; namely, that living, practical involvement in reality is not a 
recipe for subjective beclouding of our understanding but is rather the prerequisite for true insight in 
conceptualization."10 McIntosh then adds: "[T]ransforming practices of life give rise to a theoretical 
account of reality as it is understood by those practitioners. This account, in turn, is intended not as a 
higher ascent towards reality by means of theorization, but as a preliminary guide for those seeking 
to follow the transforming way of life themselves."11 
 
 Following such a re-examination, Louis Dupré has also highlighted mystical theology's praxis 
approach as a central characteristic of Christian love mysticism. When briefly describing Ruusbroec's 
distinct views of dynamic participation in the Son, within the Persons of the Trinity, as "form[ing] the 
basis of the mystic's view of the finite within the infinite",12 Dupré then anticipates certain critical 
responses to such thinking that would inquire: "Is all this more than speculative theology? If through 
its ontological dependence upon an eternal source, the soul does indeed reside in God throughout all 
eternity, then a union realized from the beginning, in even the least devout person, appears to 
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require no mystical ascent at all—only intellectual speculation."13 In response to this critique that 
such texts are nothing more than purely speculative and demanding not of discernment, yet only of 
consent, Dupré then asserts: 
 
The [mystical] union...takes place not in the order of pure speculation but in that of praxis. It 
is in the practical order, then, that the answer to this objection lies. A persistent use of the 
language of love should alert us that far more than intellectual speculation is at stake. Even 
those speculative mystics who speak of a substantial union grounded in man's ontological 
nature (such as Ibn' Arabi or Eckhart and some of the kabbalists) have recourse to the 
language of love and praxis.
14
 
 
Thereby recognizing such a praxis character to these texts, Dupré rightly observes the "integrative" 
aspect of Ruusbroec and other exemplary figures within mystical theology, which aims at uniting 
contemplation with action without either collapsing nor confusing the distinctiveness of them both. 
And yet what precisely keeps these aspects from collapsing into each other is itself an open question 
and one that I shall return to later on.   Dupré is nevertheless right to stress  the distinct 
understanding that various figures of the mystical theology tradition hold towards love. Ruusbroec's 
understanding of minne is exemplary in this regard in view of its perpetual activity. A dynamic that 
significantly problematizes an otherwise overly hasty reading of his works as indelibly constrained by 
a Neoplatonic privileging of stability, presence and permanence over against multiplicity, change and 
becoming. Or conversely, the charge of Neo-Platonism's inability to think happiness outside of 
presence, stability and the rest of contemplation. To these critiques, understanding the continuing, 
erotic praxis of minne sets itself apart from such an immediate, direct, Neo-platonic reading. Rather, 
the praxis of such a loving union goes strongly against a more "reified"  anthropology. And yet, is 
such a characterization appropriate for  what Ruusbroec has in mind in his understanding of mutual 
indwelling? This issue of forming an alternative mystical anthropological understanding of the 
created human person indwelling in God, other than such a static "reified representation", will 
appear again in the following analysis. But for now, as our brief examination has pointed out, current 
hermeneutical approaches to mystical texts mark a shifting attention towards more praxis oriented 
and performative modes of language pragmatics. All of which attests to the overall fact that the 
question of "mystical experience", while remaining an important inquiry, nonetheless is no longer 
primarily at stake and in its place, such approaches to mystical texts thereby explicitly raises the 
question of the mystical anthropology operative within such texts. 
 
 A. REPOSITIONING MYSTICAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INQUIRY AWAY FROM 'WHAT' OR 
 'WHO', TO THAT OF 'WHERE' 
 
 To address now more clearly the specific issues at hand, Bernard McGinn provocatively 
characterizes the distinct progression of late-medieval mystical anthropology seen in terms of union 
with God: "The union between God and the human person [...] challenges traditional views of 
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anthropology as well as of theology."15 And in referring to the lineage of mystics that uphold the 
possibility of union without distinction, McGinn characterizes the challenge that arises:  
 
Such strong expressions of mystical union (or rather mystical identity, or, better, 
indistinction) between God and the human seem to lead to the following dilemma—either 
they are guilty of a form of autotheism by which the human subject divinizes itself in an 
unwarranted way, or else they imply the complete obliteration, absorption, or annihilation 
of the human personality. In either case, is there room for anything that can still be called an 
anthropology, a doctrine of the human as human or a psychology that studies human 
consciousness?
16
  
 
Certainly, McGinn will fully defend the works of figures such as Ruusbroec and Meister Eckhart 
against charges of autotheism, both of whom speak of union with God without distinction. This is 
especially so for Ruusbroec, who quite clearly defended the theological legitimacy of union with God 
'without difference and distinction' [sonder differentie ochte onderscheet].17 The question that 
McGinn then asks is precisely "who" is such a human person? McGinn, who speaks of mysticism 
specifically in terms of "consciousness", maintains that this is what the "mystics are really about [...] 
to transform both consciousness and the self, the subject of consciousness". Herein, it is the who of 
the human as person, as identity, which appears as the decisive criterion to evaluate such a 
transformed consciousness.  Following from this position, McGinn situates certain mystics, especially 
those who hold out the possibility for a union without distinction, as admitting of the "perdurance" 
of consciousness, one that "challenges [...] all forms of both ancient and modern anthropology and 
psychology that reject in an a priori fashion the possibility of the transition of the limited, discursive 
ego to levels of transcendent awareness [....] the mystics hold out the possibility of the 
transconscious and the suprapersonal."18 McGinn's emphasis is clearly upon the more radical 
position and discontinuity of the mystical tradition from its historically situated character, 
characterizing such figures in a more prophetic light of praxis and of heeding the call not to abandon 
the world, in all of its "quotidian multiplicity", but rather to "transform it", as attested by their 
committed activity within their respective communities and "their subsequent influence on their 
traditions".19 
 
 However, turning now specifically to Ruusbroec, while the question of who/what of the 
"creature" remains in the union sonder onderscheet ochte differencie—Ruusbroec continuously 
maintains throughout all of his works that the creature shall eternally remain, "een ander van 
gode".20 Nonetheless, the guiding presuppositions of this question of who/what remains in the union 
without distinction appears to reveal less about Ruusbroec's own mystical anthropological 
understanding than it shows a more modern perspective in two distinct instances. First, the question 
of 'who' or 'what' of the human as human remains in such "obliteration, absorption or annihilation" 
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in the union without distinction appears at least to presuppose a stable identity of the finite, human 
person understood as autonomous. Closely following is the presupposed understanding of deification 
as discontinuous. Or, in other terms, as a 'trans-formation'. Here, we can see a strong contrast with 
the reoccurring, Ruusbroecian neologism of "over-formation" [overforminghe] in its stress of greater 
continuity. Here, union with God is gauged neither in terms of diminishing or increasing its 
transformed "consciousness", yet the very relational autonomy of the human as such, from which 
such an anthropology assumes as its ground.  Secondly, seen from a distinct, Ruusbroecian 
perspective, the difficulty with such an anthropological perspective is namely, the presumption that 
the human as human, in its autonomy and removed from relation, is regarded as intelligible in of 
itself. Such a perspective—as a foundational assumption within modern psychology—is the 
contention that the identity of the human "psychology that studies human consciousness", at its 
foundational core, can render me myself intelligible, enough so as to ground it as a scientific pursuit. 
This is a position that not only contradicts Ruusbroec's anthropological conception, but furthermore 
is itself a limited position that nullifies the very richness and depth of our very interiority as indelibly 
marked by the alterity of the Other. 
 
 In this regard, a possible opening for retrieving Ruusbroec are the critical demands placed 
upon a renewed, adequate theological anthropology, seen within specific reference to the primary 
modality of love—to competing modalities of truth and ontology—in both affirming the alterity of 
the Other, oneself and in turn, a view of the human person capable of receiving such a love as 
beloved and its return, as lover. This opening is in part motivated by various attempts at moving love 
beyond the divided impasse between self-possessive and self-denying love and with it, the "problem 
of love"21 and metaphysics' difficulty in thinking the possibility of "disinterested love" that falls 
beyond egoism and self-benefit. Jean-Luc Marion critiques the basis of this metaphysical dilemma 
and its presumption of an "erotic neutrality", of which we can never in fact affirm, "without lying to 
ourselves [....][For] Man is revealed to himself by the originary and radical modality of the erotic. 
Man loves—which is what distinguishes him from all other finite beings, if not the angels. Man is 
defined neither by the logos, nor by the being within him, but by the fact that he loves (or hates), 
whether he wants to or not."22  
 
 Thus, affirming love's "radical modality" as primary occasions a critical review of this very 
"self" that is suspected of having thus contributed to the divided view of love. More specifically, 
retrieving the dynamic view of Ruusbroec's understanding of the primacy of minne subsequently 
demands for an adequate theological anthropology. A place, which is to say, a relational inquiry of 
the self. Therefore, primarily not as a reified substance or a 'what';  nor as a principle of identity and 
its self-enclosure as a 'who'. Rather, as a 'where': that is, in terms of both its created origins and its 
progressive, desirous, salvific fulfillment for the place of meeting and union in and with the Other 
and the human, who shall "eternally remain a creature and other from God"23. Such a relational view 
of the self and its interiority inquires specifically over a locus capax Dei24 and its horizon of deification 
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Contribution, (trans.) Alan Vincelette, (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2001.), 12-13. 
22
 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 7. 
23
 See supra, note 20. 
24
 Aelred of Rievaulx, Speculum Caritatis, b. 1, c. 1, PL. 195, 505, as quoted from Pierre Rousselot, The Problem 
of Love, 202. 
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that can both receive such love as indeed primary and immediate in its unitive character—as well as 
reflective of the necessary mediated character of such a love, glimpsed both in terms of its cultural 
and theological milieu, as well as its necessary activity as sacramental, virtuous and always "going 
out" and affirming the otherness of God as Other in and through its works. 
 
 Ruusbroec can critically aid in such a renewed anthropology, as he situates the otherness and 
uncreatedness of minne as emerging within the very distinction and particularity of individuals.25 
Affirming the ecstatic otherness of minne, "drunk and replete in God"26 Ruusbroec does so, not by 
sequestering and distancing that which is beyond and "above" myself and my understanding. Rather, 
he places such an affirmation of its otherness firmly within the "groundless abyss" of our erotic, 
created selves—"hungry and thirsty", wherein "he must feel that the foundation of his being is 
unfathomable, and as such he must possess it."27 From this groundless foundation, Ruusbroec 
articulates such "possession" as a continuing relational dynamics within contemplative life, such that  
"we live completely in God, where we possess our bliss, and completely in ourselves where we 
practice our love towards God."28 Ruusbroec's mystical anthropology as inherently relational insists 
upon our dwelling in both myself and my continual desires, as well as in the Other and its bliss again 
attests to the general, dynamic approach of Ruusbroec's thought. A dynamism that is never "idle" 
and seen very much at the core of his thinking of minne. 
 
 In this regard, Rik Van Nieuwenhove's strong, Trinitarian approach to Ruusbroec's corpus also 
observes this unique relationality as fundamental to Ruusbroec's mystical anthropology: "The most 
remarkable element in Ruusbroec's anthropology is his teaching that the essence of our created 
being is not a substance but a relation to God. Ruusbroec clearly states that the essential unity—the 
unity between our created being and our eternal life in God's Image—is the same as the active unity 
(the ground of the faculties)."29 Van Nieuwenhove perceptively acknowledges that as relationality is 
itself at the core of our creaturely wesen, our "essential unity refers to the union between our 
created being and our life in God, not just to the latter".30 This is itself an interpretation based off the 
reading that wesen is understood, not as a reified substance, yet as a relation in and of itself. From 
this, Van Nieuwenhove reminds us that only such a principle of relationality—as 'one-in-the-other'— 
is able to make sense of why Ruusbroec will assert that "we possess the essential unity both in 
ourselves, and in fact, above ourselves as a principle and support of our wesens and our life"31 Again, 
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 See e.g. Ruusbroec, Boecsken, ll. 188-189: "The impulse of minne is always directed to the advantage and the 
capacity of each and everyone." "Ende minne beweget altoes na orbore ende na hebbelecheit ieghewelcs 
menschen." 
26
 Ruusbroec, Vanden Blinkenden Steen,  ll. 574-5: "Ende hier omme sijn wi in ons selven arm ende in gode rike, 
in ons selven hongherich ende dorstich, in gode droncken ende sat". 
27
 Ruusbroec, Vanden Blinkenden Steen, ll. 70-72: "Dat eerste poent es dat hi dat fondament sijns wesens 
grondeloes ghevoele, ende alsoe moet hijt besitten." 
28
 Ruusbroec, Vanden Blinkenden Steen, ll. 579-581: "Ende aldus [aldus] leven wij gheheel in gode, daer wij 
onse salicheit besitten; ende wij leven gheheel in ons selven, daer ons in minnen te gode oefenen." 
29
 Rik Van Nieuwenhove, Jan van Ruusbroec, Mystical Theologian of the Trinity, (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2003), 119. 
30
 Van Nieuwenhove, Jan van Ruusbroec, 107. 
31
 See Ruusbroec, Brulocht, b, ll. 41-49:"Now note attentively: we find a triple unity in all people naturally, and 
in good people also supernaturally. The first and the highest unity is in God; for all creatures hang in this unity 
with (their) being [wesene], life and subsistence [onthoude]; and if they should be cut off in this way from God, 
they would fall into nothingness and become annihilated [si vielen in niet ende worden te niete]. This unity is in 
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the essential unity is not found in both the human and God, from which their relationality would 
appear as secondary to such a shared wesen as identical. No, quite the opposite is being argued, as 
the relation itself is the wesen and prior to any self-enclosed substance. Therefore, to construct and 
develop these lines of thought within view of a contemporary retrieval of Ruusbroec's thinking, not 
only do we need to have an adequate understanding of minne that better articulates such a relation 
(which admittedly is not so much at the forefront of Van Nieuwenhove's source-based engagement 
with Ruusbroec). Subsequently, so too do we need to better understand such a relationality with 
both the Other, others and its Trinitarian basis if we are to understand Ruusbroec's understanding of 
minne. Therefore, we now turn to a textual analysis of Ruusbroec's Vanden vier becoringhen (The 
Four Temptations) to see more clearly how he understands and observes such a mutual indwelling  
within  human interiority and marked by alterity that is progressively made accessible by way of the 
praxis and primacy of minne. 
 
 § 2. VANDEN VIER BECORINGHEN ANALYSIS 
 
 As a short, concise work, with abrupt and provocative transitions and linkages, Ruusbroec's 
Vanden Vier Becoringhen is unfortunately a far lesser-known and certainly less commented upon 
work then others in his corpus. In this work, historical scholarship has situated this text "at the 
beginning of 1343, as a farewell to Brussels" before Ruusbroec leaves for Groenendaal and the 
Sonian Forest, where he would spend the remainder of his life in the emerging community that 
would eventually adopt for itself the rule of St. Augustine.32 In this text, Ruusbroec begins by 
distinguishing  four basic temptations that both mark his current historical context33, and more 
generally, "all men who seem to lead the life spiritual but are neither true nor virtuous in their life 
have been misled and misguided in one of these four errors."34 From this careful examination of such 
temptations  Ruusbroec first calls for a humility in which one may "ground an elevated life".35 
Ruusbroec then leads us in the "common practice of virtue [...] [to] overcome all temptations"36, so 
that we may then "observe [waernemen] our interiority even more closely so that we may clearly 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
us essentially by nature, whether we are good or evil, and it renders us neither holy nor blessed without our 
effort. We possess this unity in ourselves, and in fact, above ourselves, as principle and support of our being 
[wesens] and of our life." " Nu merket met ernste: drierhande eenicheit vintmen in allen menschen 
natuerlijcke, ende daer toe overnatuerlijcke in goeden menschen. Die errste ende die hoochste eenicheit es in 
gode, want alle creatueren hanghen in deser eenicheit met wesene, met levene ende met onthoude; ende 
scieden si in deser wijs van gode, so vielen in niet ende worden te niete. Dese eenicheit es weselijc in ons van 
natueren, weder wij sijn goete ochte quaet, ende si en maect ons sonder ons toedoen noch heylich noch salich. 
Dese eenicheit besitten wi in ons selven ende doch boven ons [selven], als een beghin ende een onthout ons 
wesens ende ons levens." 
32
 See Paul Mommaers' Introduction to Vanden Vier Becoringhen, 223. 
33
 See Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 45-47 (slightly modified): "For now in this time reigns four temptations 
in the world and through them every man may prove whether he is in error or truly follows after our Lord Jesus 
Christ." "Want nu in desen tide regneren .iiij. becoringhen in de werelt, daer hem eenyege<lijc> mensce mede 
proeven mach oft hi in dole es oft een ghewarich na volgher ons heren Jhesu Cristi." 
34
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 48-50: "Ende alle die menschen die gheestelijc scinen, ende niet warachtich 
noch doochsam en zijn van levene, die zijn verleydt ende verdoelt in eene wise van desen vieren." 
35
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 219: "Ende op dese nederheit mach hi fonderen een hoghe leven [...]." 
36
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 247-9: "Ende dit es eene ghemeine wise van duechden dier alle menschen 
noot es die gode <behaghen> selen ende alle becoringhe verwinnen." 
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and more closely find the richness of God that lives in our spirit."37 And in doing just this, Ruusbroec 
introduces us to a provocative reflection of the "richness" of God's dynamic dwelling within us, of 
which distinctly marks us by its five voices that give rise to our ever-active, ever-yearning spiritual 
interiority and the work of desire in lovingly responding to His "incomprehensible truth," in whom we 
find "its Image in us, and our image mirrored in it, and therefore one with it ".38 
 
 Furthermore, Vier becoringhen is interesting not only for the historical context in which it is 
situated, yet also for its distinct anticipatory character in which the text gives us some concrete sense 
of how Ruusbroec himself had envisioned and justified his forthcoming move to Groenendaal as a 
one of jubilee—in its Biblical dimensions as the 'remittance of all debts'. Which, in its allegorical 
interpretation, Ruusbroec will often reinterpret that which was proscribed as law in the Old 
Testament in distinctly spiritual terms. Thereby, the 'jubillee' of Groenendaal likewise signifies 
Ruusbroec's arrival at a state of spiritual maturity as "all bonds of disorderly affection for any 
creature have been broken and annihilated,"39 and is now ready to come into his " inheritance":  
 
In the fiftieth year the earth was allowed to rest 
under Jewish law. And all debts were remitted 
and all prisoners set free and all freeborn slaves 
became free men. And everybody again came into 
his inheritance that had been his own or that of 
his ancestors. And this is what I want to say: we 
begin to live when we have received the birth of 
our Lord Jesus Christ in us, and then we must 
serve, work and strive in the temple of God, i.e. in 
ourselves, with penitence and holy practice; until 
with God's help we drive out and overcome our 
sinful earthly life and all that goes against God and 
virtue in conduct, in words and works and in all 
our practice and chase it away so that minne 
becomes so powerful in us that it raises us to the 
highest height, which is minne itself. And then its 
goodness will flow through all our interiority and 
fill it with such great pleasure and joy, that our 
earth shall lay idle and rest. For our outward 
earthly man shall then be empty of all work and 
all practice. This then is our fiftieth year of 
remission and of joy, which is called 'jubilee' in 
Hebrew. Here we count fifty years from the time 
Christ, God's Son, was born in us and that is our 
holy pilgrimage to Rome. 
Inden vijftichsten jare zoe lietmen die eerde ratsen 
inder joedscher wet, ende alle scout wart verlaten, 
ende alle ghevanghene verlost, ende alle knechte 
worden vry die van vryer gheborten waren. Ende 
yegelijc quam weder tot sinen erve dat sine ochte 
sire vorderen gheweest hadde. Ende aldus willic nu 
segghen: wannerer dat wij die gheborte ons heeren 
Jhesu Cristi ontfaen hebben in ons, dan beghinnen 
wij te leven; ende dan moeten wij dienen, arbieten 
ende pinen inden tempel gods—dat es in ons 
selven—met penitencien ende met heiligher 
oefeninghen, alzo manghe dat wij met der hulpen 
gods verdriven ende verwinnen onse zondich 
eertsche leven, ende al dat gode ende der duecht 
contrarie es in seden, in woorden ende in werken 
ende in al onser oefeninghen, alsoe dat minne zoe 
mechtich werde in ons, dat si ons verheffen moghe in 
die overste hoocheit die si selve es. Ende dan sal hare 
goetheit <al> ondr inwindicheit dore vloeyen ende 
vervollen met alsoe groter wellust ende vrouden, dat 
al onse eerde ledich ligghen sal ende rusten. Want 
onse uutwendigje eertsche mensche, die sal te dier 
tijt ledich staen alre arbeite ende van alre 
oefeninghen. Ende dit es onse vijftische jare der 
verlatenissen ende der vrouden, datmen jubileus 
noemt in hebreuscher talen. Hier tellen wij .l. jaer 
van dier tijt dat Cristus, die gods sone, in ons 
gheboren es. Ende dit es onse heilighe roemsce 
vaert.
40
 
 
                                                          
37
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 250-2 (translation slightly modified): "<M>aer ic beghere dat wij noch 
diepere onser inwindicheit waernemen, opdat wij claerre ende naerre bevinden die rijcheit gods die in onsen 
gheeste leeft." 
38
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 254-5. 
 
40
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 308-28. 
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 In nucleo, we here see Ruusbroec allegorically intertwining both the ambitious promise that 
Groenendaal represented—with an interesting and perhaps not so oblique, critical irony, terming the 
Sonian Forest as "our holy pilgrimage to Rome"—as well as a unique, clear instance of his thinking on 
the distortive impact of original sin, of which calls for continual "penitence and holy practice", yet in 
no way robs us of our original "inheritance". The aims of such external mediated works, seen in relief 
of the four temptations, consists precisely in ultimately becoming "empty of all work and all 
practice", and resting in the "goodness" of God "that flow[s] through all our interiority". However, 
such a statement does not in any way entail an end to all such works themselves, as such practices 
are not merely confined to an outward working of virtue and charity. Groenendaal was by no means 
a "retirement home" or a luxurious, extended holiday. Rather, Ruusbroec anticipates the spiritual 
"freedom" of this inheritance as prompting the necessary and ongoing interior work of loving, 
thanking, praising and serving God "in every way, without any hinder[ance]...".41 Thus, even in rest, 
the work of minne within the active yearnings of the interior life is constantly new and renewing, as 
Ruusbroec himself states: "For the angels and the saints and Christ himself will work, love and desire, 
give thanks and praise, want and know for all eternity. And without these works they would not be 
able to be blessed. And God himself would not be able to be either God or blessed if He did not 
work."42 Hence, unlike many of Ruusbroec's other, more elevated, contemplative texts, Vier 
Becoringhen may be characterized as more of a praxis oriented text in both its insightful, contextual 
observations of the four temptations as well as the repeated stress on the ongoing, internal work of 
minne that morally prepares one to receive our original inheritance. 
 
 Again, this praxis dimension of the virtuous life and the ongoing work of minne that opens up 
to the richness of God's own active dwelling within us differs considerably in its stress from the more 
uniquely gratuitous aspect of contemplation that is "modeless" and hence, beyond any and all works 
and praxis. The latterof which we see in other Ruusbroec works, i.e. The Spiritual Espousals or The 
Sparkling Stone, The Twelve Beguines (Book 1). By understanding such an exclusive focus on the 
interior, active life, it thus becomes understandable his admission that "many people would be able 
to soon accomplish this life sublime, if only they practiced as vigorously and as wisely as I have 
showed them to. But this way of dying to the flesh and the blood and their own will is very hard and 
unloved and also unknown by many people."43 Furthermore, as is the case in nearly all of 
Ruusbroec's works, we are keyed off to such particularities in his opening passages that are often 
Scripturally-based and set the course for the remainder of the text. Vier Becoringhen offers no 
exception to this, as Ruusbroec begins by citing the following passage from the Book of Revelation: 
"Let him who has ears to hear, hear what the Spirit of God says to the churches."44 Immediately, 
Ruusbroec's scriptural citation both commands our attention and more specifically, our very 
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 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 333-4: "[…] in alre wijs sonder eenich hinder […]." 
42
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 192-5: "Want inghele ende heilighen ende Cristus selve, die selen eewelijc 
werken, minnen ende b<e>gheren, dancken ende loven, willen ende weten. Ende sonder dese werke en 
mochten si niet zalich sijn. Ende god selve, en wrachte hi niet, hi en ware noch god noch zalich sijn." 
43
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 290-2: "Ende dese hoocheit van levenne mochten vele menschen haestelijc 
vervolghen, waert dat si hem alsoe vromelijc ende alzoe wijslijc oefenden als ic hier nu gheseect heb. Maer het 
es herde swaer ende onghemint ende oec met menighen ombekint, hoemen vleeschs ende bloet ende eyghens 
willen sterven sal." 
44
 See Rv. 2,11 as quoted in Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 1-2. 
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attentiveness by way of listening. For readers of Ruusbroec, such an appearance of the auditory 
dimension will draw a likely contrast with the opening scriptural injunction from Brulocht and its 
visual/contemplative stress, namely: "See, the Bridegroom comes; go out to meet Him."45 And 
indeed, by way of a certain phenomenological approach, that which gives itself to visibility presents 
itself, manifests itself and is thereby constituted in our understanding in a fundamentally distinct 
manner than that which gives itself to be heard.46 Unlike the necessary mediation and distance that 
sight implies—a mediationwhich Ruusbroec's foundational optics affirms47—there is a seeming 
absence in his auditory conception, as both hearing and that which is heard are given within a 
greater degree of immediacy than that of sight. Such an immediacy is fitting, as the general focus of 
this work is primarily upon the inner, yearning life, the second of his familiar triptych—the active life, 
the inner, yearning life and the contemplative life. These primary reflections we will soon revisit as 
they become radicalized in the irruption of the "five voices" and their corresponding unities as a 
furthering of the "likeness" of our created image as mirrored in the Image of the Son and "God's 
incomprehensible truth".48  Hence, by introducing a greater sensitivity to such an auditory 
dimension, such reflections are not exclusive to a phenomenological presentation alone, yet are also 
a potential hermeneutical key to reading Vier Becoringhen itself. 
 
 Lastly, the structure of Ruusbroec's Vier Becoringhen highlights the centrality of his mystical 
anthropology, both in his presentation of such temptations, the possibility of overcoming them as 
grounded in virtuous humility. Which in turn leads to a continuously growing recognition and loving 
inclination towards the endless depths of our very interiority in which God dwells in us and we in 
Him. Such a mystical anthropological approach is in turn supported by the foundational injunction 
that "to save ourselves from falling into grievous sins we must learn to know ourselves and observe 
ourselves and turn inward into ourselves, onefold, and keep our dwelling with God's speaking in 
us."49 Therefore, we will first briefly examine the four temptations that Ruusbroec highlights from 
which we will then explore the five voices that characterizes this interior encounter of such mutual 
indwelling. 
 
 a. The 1st Temptation 
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 See. Mt. 25, 6 as quoted from Ruusbroec, Brulocht, bk 1, ll. 1. 
46
 The phenomenologist, Robert Sokolowski provides a helpful introduction to the primary distinction between 
the phenomenal appearing of words and images and its subsequent implications. "[Phenomenology] 
investigates the important philosophical distinction between words and images: words express things and 
images depict things, and the manner in which each of them works is different. It is interesting to explore this 
difference, to show how images contain the presence of what they depict without having the thing itself there, 
while words refer to things without seeming to contain them in the way that images do. There is a more radical 
absence and transparency in words than in images. Both words and images, of course, must be contrasted with 
the direct perception of the thing itself, with the presence the thing has when it is directly experienced. These 
philosophical explorations show how the various kinds of presence and absence interweave with one another 
to constitute the recognizable identity of an object that can be given through all of them: one and the same 
object can be directly experienced, can be imaged in a picture or a drama, and can be referred to and 
articulated in speech." From "Phenomenology and the Eucharist" in Robert Sokolowski, Christian Faith and 
Human Understanding, (Washington: Catholic University Press, 2006), 77. 
47
 For Ruusbroec's foundational optics, c.f. Brulocht, a, ll. 58-70. 
48
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 253. 
49
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 28-31: "Wantzelen wij staende bliven ende behuedt werden dat wij niet en 
vallen in groven zonden, soe moeten wij ons zelven leeren kinnen ende ons selfs waer nemen, ende eenvoldich 
inkeren in ons zelven, ende inwoenende bliven biden insprekene gods." 
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 The 1st Temptation50 Ruusbroec describes as an unrestrained nature—lust in the body and in 
the senses—the lack of control from which its consequences are primarily seen as blunting one's 
sensitivity towards and taste for the greater depth and otherness of God and the spiritual life in 
general: "And even though they pray much, and sing, and recite the Lord's prayer, they have no taste 
for it. For they are turned outward and live according to the flesh, not the spirit."51  
 
 b. The 2nd Temptation 
 
 For the 2nd Temptation52, Ruusbroec describes as a hypocritical spirit, one who "performs" at 
times excessive works, though does so more so "out of self concern" and thereby suffers from 
spiritual pride, "for his love is nature not grace".53 Such a hypocritical spirit—Ruusbroec critically 
observes, again with a touch of sharp humor—is prone to loving more the experience of God over 
God Himself, wherein he states, "And some want God to send them a special message written with 
golden letters, or else they want God to reveal his will in visions or dreams. Look, people who suffer 
from spiritual pride often think they are worthy of such special treatment. For even if these things 
happened to certain saints, men of this sort [those who suffer from such spiritual pride] should not 
take them as an example."54  
 
 c. The 3rd Temptation 
 
 The 3rd Temptation55, Ruusbroec describes as the ever-present threats within academic and 
intellectual pursuits in maintaining the spiritual pride that one may alone "reach and understand the 
first truth with their natural light".56 In this subtle, precise critique, presumably in reference to the 
rise of Scholasticism and the extended, prolonged influence of the cathedral schools over the various 
religious orders and their institutions, Ruusbroec characterizes such emerging patterns of rationality 
and intellectual discourse as founded upon the seeking of self-pleasure in the performance of such 
thinking, wherein their "inner senses flow over and glory in the light of nature. And they possess this 
natural light with such pleasure and self-sufficiency [...] without God's supernatural help."57 In turn, 
by locating such self pleasure at the performative basis and origins of their thinking, the conceptual 
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 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 60-93. 
51
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 83-5: "Ende al eest day sy vele lesen ende singhen ende pater noster 
spreken, en smaect hen niet. Want si zijn uutwendich, ende leven na den vleesche ende niet na den gheeste." 
52
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 94- 140. 
53
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 107: "Ende hier omme es sine minne natuere, ende niet genade." 
54
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 114-119: "Ende selc beghert dat hem god sinde enen sonderlinghen brief 
met gulden letteren, oft in visioene oft in drome vertoenen sinen wille. Siet, dit comt dicwile can gheestelijcker 
hoverden, dat hem <dunct> dat hi werdich es sulcker sonderlin<c>heit. Want al esst ghesciet selcken heilighen, 
dat en selen dese menschen te exempel niet trecken." 
55
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 141-180. 
56
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 153-4: "Want selcke wanen met natuerlijcken lichte ghereiken ende 
begripen die eerste waerheit." 
57
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 146-8; 150 (with slight modification): "Want hare natuere ende har 
inwendighe zinne vloeyen ende glorien inden lichte der natuere. Ende dit natuerlijc licht besitten si met amsoe 
groter wellost ende eyghenheit....sonder die overnatuerlijcke hulpe gods." 
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grasping of ideas become thus reflective of oneself and their own mastery of such ideas, which in 
turn Ruusbroec accounts for why "they feel more inner taste and joy in the things they themselves 
find and understand inwardly with their reason than in the things that  are beyond reason, the very 
things that have to be taken on faith and give us eternal bliss."58 On several differing levels I find 
Ruusbroec's critical observations made here as both unique, as well as productive in situating 
Ruusbroec's vernacular, mystical theology amid the increasing widening of the gap between 
theology, as understood and practiced within various monasteries from those of the cathedral 
schools. In these critical judgments, Ruusbroec clearly shows a certain affinity for a more Franciscan-
Bonaventurian line, more so than Dominican perspective, as seen in his criticism of those that find 
greater delight in the 'light of nature'. Simultaneously, Ruusbroec  shows his indebtedness to his 
mystical anthropology as forming his basic assessment of this distinct, emerging rationality: namely 
that such persons "act and speak from selfness" in their intellectual grasp and productivity and 
therefore are neither interrupted by, nor "have...awareness of God" within their rational 
engagement.59 
 
 d. The 4th Temptation 
 
 And lastly, the 4th Temptation—common to readers familiar with Ruusbroec—we find a brief 
analysis of the fundamental traits of the heresy of the Brethren of the Free Spirits. And in a 
somewhat rare moment, Ruusbroec himself states in the first person as having often spoken of 
before.60 However, Ruusbroec's presentation on this familiar topic to those in Brussels, who 
themselves must have also been thoroughly aware of this movement, thus has somewhat of a 
different stress, focusing not so much upon heretical claims of autotheism and "becoming God",61 yet 
instead showing once more, what he argues as a fundamentally misguided anthropology that 
underlies their 'quietism'. That is, a moral disposition that aims at privileging self identity as 
fundamentally constitutive and prior to the relationality of otherness as such. "They find their 
essential being [weselic sijn] in themselves and possess it in the naked idleness of their spirit and 
nature."62 Immediately there after,  Ruusbroec then shows how such an anthropological conception 
of the human person as an autonomous self, constituted by and subsisting within its own self-
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 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 164-7: "Ende si hebben meer inwindichs smaecs ende vrouden in dien 
dinghen die si van binnen met redenen bevinden ende verstaen, dan in die dinghen die boven redene sijn, die 
men gheloven moet ende die ons eewighe zalicheit gheven." 
59
 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 168-170: "Altoes willen si nieuwe dinghe uutspreken met loste der natueren. 
Want si werken ende spreken ute eyghenheit haers selfs." 
60
 See Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 210-11: "And that is why they are most seriously deceived, as I have 
often said." "Ende hier omme sijn si alder swaerlijc<t> bedroghen, alse ic dicwile ghesecht hebbe." 
61
 See Ruusbroec, Boecksken, ll. 543-556: "And therefore, as I have told you before, watch out for the conceited 
men, who, through their vacant imagelessness, with their bare simple vision, have found within themselves in a 
natural manner the indwelling of God and pretend to be one with God without the grace of God and without 
the practice of virtues and in disobedience to God and to the Holy Church. And with all this perverted life, 
which I have already described, they wish to be a son of God by nature. And in the Prince of angels was cast out 
of heaven because he exalted himself and wished to be like God, and the first man was driven out of Paradise 
because he wished to be like God, how shall the worst of sinners, that is the unfaithful Christian, come from 
earth to heaven, he who himself desires to be God with no similarity (to Him) in grace and virtue? For no one 
ascends to heaven through his own power save the Son of Man, Jesus Christ." 
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 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 185-6: "[…]haer weselijc sijn in hem bevinden ende besitten in bloter 
ledicheit haers gheests ende harer natueren." 
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enclosure is fundamentally at odds with both the external practice of virtues and its underlying 
humility and charity that predispose us towards others, as well as  understanding of the primacy of 
minne and its activity within created persons as inclining us towards our created origins. "For they 
lapse into an idle blind emptiness of their essence [wesens] and are no longer attentive to any good 
works, both outer and inner. For they spurn all inward work, that is wanting, knowing, loving 
[minnen], desiring and all works that join them with God."63 However, similar to other presentations 
on this theme, Ruusbroec repeatedly stresses not only that such positions are fundamentally at odds 
with Christian faith, but furthermore, he ventures to point out the fundamental contradictions within 
such claims themselves. For while such Free Spirits claim to do away with all such inner works in a 
pure, idle emptiness, he shows the utter impossibility for the human to do so on one's own initiative 
without the grace of God.64 "For they lapse into sleep and sink away from themselves in essential 
[weselijcker] natural rest. And when they find that rest in themselves without love or practice of 
virtue, they want to possess it and hold on to it. And this leads to great unbelief and a perverse, false 
freedom of spirit."65 This particular error and the unsustainability of resting in oneself, apart from 
relation, shows itself in tension of wanting to "possess" such rest, while also claiming to be free from 
such wanting in the first place. Therefore, Ruusbroec concludes in very strong terms that for the Free 
Spirits, "...their essence [wesen] is their idol", the anthropological basis that in turn undergirds the 
"impossibility" in which "they have and are one essence [wesen] with God."66 
 
 From this brief consideration, not only does Ruusbroec wish to uncover for those remaining 
in Brussels to understand the core reasons for such errors by way of a dogmatic and apologetic 
approach. But more importantly, and especially within proximity to internal divides and contests of 
spiritual authority67, Ruusbroec repeatedly insists that we must observe [waernemen] ourselves and 
our very interiority as marked by a relational alterity and as continuously dwelling with God in order 
to adequately confront such challenges. Here, by way of the injunction to "observe ourselves", 
Ruusbroec's relational anthropology of mutual indwelling with God is introduced not simply as a 
refuge and counter to that which "often goes against sound doctrine....lead[ing] to much quarreling 
and argument [as] it makes for hearts divided and it is a great obstacle to true charity".68 Rather, as a 
hermeneutic of interiority in of itself, which we will now analyze in the section of the "five voices". 
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 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, 186-190 (translation slightly modified): "Want si vallen in <ene> idele blende 
ledicheit haers wesens ende werden on[ghe]achtsam alder goeder werken van buten ende van binnen. Want si 
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 See also Boecsksen, ll. 145-152. 
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 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 196-201: "Want si ontslapen ende ontsincken hem selven in weselijcker 
natuerlijcker rasten. Ende alse si deser raste in hem bevinden sonder minnen ende sonder oefeninghe van 
doechden, soe willen sise besitten ende daer bi blivan. Ende hier ute comt groet onghelove ende verkeerde 
valsche vriheit van gheeste." 
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 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 207-210: "[…] soe en doerliden si hem selven niet, maer si rasten in haers 
selfs wesen. Ende alsoe es hare wesen haer afgod. Want hem denct datsi hebben ende sijn een wesen met 
gode, ende dat es onmoghelijc." 
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 See Ruusbroec's tensed position between obedience towards one's superiors  and the "harsh words" and 
"angry mien" at the sight of hypocrites, which gives significant room for speculation as to precisely the basis for 
his leaving Brussels in the first place. See Vier Becoringhen, ll. 237-244. 
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 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 22-23; 24-25: "Ende hier omme es hi dicwile contrarie ganser leeren [….] 
Ende hier ave comt vele stridens ende crighens, ende maect ghedeylde herten, ende es een groot hinder 
rechter karitaten." 
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 A. RUUSBROEC'S FIVE VOICES—A CHORUS ABYSS.  
 
 Having thus addressed the four main temptations as well as the continuing virtuous actions 
that we commit ourselves to, grounded in humility wherein one "must put himself in the lowest 
place beneath all men...who cannot do anything or want anything without God's help and grace," 
that from such "humility he can ground an elevated life," Ruusbroec now enjoins us to observe our 
interiority even more deeply so as to find the "richness of God that lives in our spirit".69 In this 
context, it is important to recall that throughout this entire work, his focus has been primarily upon 
the inner, yearning life. The second life of his familiar triptych: the active life, the inner, yearning life 
and the contemplative life. Ruusbroec then prefaces the section of the five voices with two 
foundational statements whereby we observe our interiority more closely: namely, we are to 
"deliver" (leveren) our "bare, unimaged understanding"70 to God's incomprehensible truth, thus 
situating our work within our interiority as distinctly above reason and conceptual grasp. From this, 
Ruusbroec then immediately states that from such a giving of our "bare, unimaged intelligence" to 
the truth of God as "incomprehensible" we shall then "find in us the Image and our image mirrored in 
it, and therefore one with it."71 Interestingly enough, in this account Ruusbroec, more vigorously 
maintains a certain "incomprehensible" dimension of God's image and our created image "mirrored 
in it, and therefore one with it" within our very interiority by refusing to further qualify such a 
ghebeelt.72 Rather, Ruusbroec articulates the further specificity of this Image that dwells within us 
within the very praxis of our observing the depths of our interiority marked by God's relational 
alterity, such that the dynamism of this Image and our created image mirrored in it is brought into 
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 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 216; 217-219; 251-252: "Want hi moet hem setten inde nederste stat onder 
alle menschen [...] en heef [dan alle ghebrec] noch en vermach noch en wilt [niet] sonder de hulpe ende die 
ghenade gods. Ende op dese nederheit mach hi fonderen een hoghe leven,"; "[...] opdat wij claerre ende naerre 
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 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 252-253: "[…] ende leveren onse blote onghebeelde verstendicheit der 
ombegripelijcker waerheit gods." 
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 Ruusbroec, Vier Becoringhen, ll. 253-255: "Ende die zelen wij vinden in ons ghebeelt ende ons wederbeelt in 
hare, ande alsoe een met hare." 
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 See Ruusbroec, Spieghel, ll. 1786-1800: " In the beginning of the world, when God wanted to make the first 
human being in our nature, then He spoke in Trinity of Persons: 'Let us make human beings to our image and to 
our likeness.' God is a spirit: His speaking is His knowing; His working is His willing. And He can do all that He 
wants. And all His working is gracious and well-ordered. and He has created each person's soul as a living 
mirror, whereupon He has impressed the image of His nature. And so He lives imaged in us, and we in Him; for 
our created life is one, without intermediary, with the image and with the life that we have eternally in God. 
And the life that we have in God is, without intermediary, one with God. For it lives with the Son unborn in the 
Father, and it is born with the Son out of the Father, and flows out of them both with the Holy Spirit. And thus 
we live eternally in God and God in us. For our createdness lives in our eternal image that we have in the Son of 
God." "In beghinne der werelt, doe god den iersten mensche maken woude in onser natueren, doe sprac hi in 
drivuldegjeit der persone: 'Maken wi den mensche toe onsen beelde ende toe onsen ghelike.' God es .i. gheest: 
sijn spreken dat es sijn bekinnen, sijn werken dat es sijn willen. Ende hi vermach al dat hi wilt. Ende al sijn 
werken es gratioos ende wel gheordent. Ende hi heeft ieghewelcs menschen ziele ghescapen alse eenen 
levende spieghel daer hi dat beelde sijnre natueren in ghedruct heeft. Ende alsoe leeft hi ghebeeldt in ons ende 
wi in heme. Want onse ghescapene leven es een sonder middel met dien beelde ende met dien levene dat wi 
eewelec in gode hebben. Ende dat leven dat wi in gode hebben, dat es sonder middel een in gode. Want het 
leeft met den sone ongheboren in den vader, ende het wert gheboren met den sone ute den vader, ende 
vloeyt ute hen beiden met den heileghen gheeste. Ende aldus leven wi eewelec in gode ende god in ons. Want 
onse ghescapenheit leeft in onsen eeweghen beelde dat wi hebben in den sone gods." 
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further relief by way of our responding to the Image in terms of five voices and the rijcheit gods that 
lives in our spirit.  
 
 a. The "clearest voice" 
 
 
The 1st voice Ruusbroec begins with is the "clearest voice" [claerste stemme]: 
 
And this is the clearest voice in which we call the 
Son of God in to us and possess with him his 
heritage and ours. With this high honor we shall 
come back to ourselves and we shall bow down 
before God's omnipotent goodness in negation of 
our self, and we shall be prepared to suffer 
whatever God is pleased to have befall us in time 
and eternity. 
Ende dit es de claerste stemme daer wij den sone 
gods mede [moghen] in roepen, ende met hem sijn 
erve ende dat onse besitten. Met deser hogher eeren 
selen wij weder comen tot ons zelven, ende zelen ons 
nederbughen voer die almogende goetheit gods in 
een vernieuten ons selds, in ghedoochsamheiden al 
dat te liden dat god gestaden wilt op ons in <tijt> 
ende in[der] eewicheit.
73
 
 
  
 At the outset of us observing our interiority and God's indwelling, by beginning with the 
"clearest voice", Ruusbroec makes several important initial moves at once. By beginning with Christ, 
seen in His divinity as the Word incarnate in whom we have been created, Ruusbroec situates the 
threshold in which we are poised to delve into the further depths of our interiority by way of such an 
incarnate wisdom. Namely, such wisdom thus teaches us, by way of Christ's kenosis itself, that in 
order to "possess with him his heritage and ours," we must do so by way of self-denial and 
preparation "to suffer whatever God is pleased to have befall us". Thus, our turning inwards joins 
itself to a "negation of our self" as preparatory to the rich alterity of God that further dwells within 
our negated self. 
 
 b. The " gracious voice" 
 
The 2nd voice then, the "gracious voice" [gracioeste stemme] is as follows: 
 
And this is the most gracious voice. And in this 
way Christ went down in his human nature and 
earned us life eternal. And with this we invoke 
God's justice and go down with Christ into the 
unfathomable depth which will remain 
unfathomable for ever. From this deep lowliness 
we shall, with a free mind, raise ourselves to the 
highest height. And with all angels and all saints 
we shall love, thank and praise God in Christ Jesus, 
now and for all time. 
Ende dit es die gracioeste stemme. Ende aldus ghinc 
Cristus neder nader menscheit ende verdiende ons 
ewwich leven. Ende hier mede aenroepen wij die 
gherechticheit gods, ende gaen met Cristo neder in 
die grondelose diepheit die nemmermeer vergront 
en werc. Ute deser dieper nederherit selen wij ons 
oprechten met vrien moede in die overste hoocheit. 
Ende met allen inghelen ende met allen heilighen, in 
Cristo Jhesu, selen wij gode minnen, dancken ende 
loven, nu ende inder eewicheit.
74
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Ruusbroec continues within a Christological mode and its incarnational process, this time as 
concerning the full humanity of Christ and itsas indelible mark upon our very human nature, as 
creatures that mirror the gift of redemption and possibility of "eternal life". Thus, on an 
anthropological level, it is our shared human nature that mirrors the full extent of the incarnation of 
Christ in His life, passion, death and resurrection and whose grace opens up for us within our very 
interiority both "an unfathomable depth" and "height" . By way of "invoking God's justice", we too 
follow Him within the reality of our very own human nature in which Christ himself has traversed and 
in its unceasing depths, has elevated and redeemed. Thus, in its foundational core, we see here the 
basis of Ruusbroec's distinct, Christian humanism, whereby the depths and heights of our human 
nature, otherwise inaccessible to us, by way of such a "gracious voice" allow for us to dwell with the 
"whole Christ" in its ecclesial nature in the profound and "unfathomable" sufferings that He 
continuously bears alongside others. A "lowliness", amid its unceasing call for justice, which "will 
remain unfathomable forever", as well as to ascend to the very heights of human potential, as 
liturgical creatures, in "lov[ing], thank[ing] and prais[ing] God in Christ Jesus, now and for all time." 
 
 c. The voice of "greatest joy" 
 
 The gracious works that traverse the very heights and depths of our human nature and our 
life in Christ thus incline us to another dimension of our interiority, namely the inclination of such 
works towards the enjoyment of "divine unity" in which we respond with the 3rd voice that 
Ruusbroec describes, the voice of greatest joy [blijdste stemme]: 
 
And this is the voice of greatest joy with which we 
invoke the Holy Trinity. And we shall find it 
dwelling in us with the fullness of all its gifts, and 
we shall find that we, too, are turned back to 
divine unity, with all our virtues. We shall freely 
flow from this rich unity with God's mild goodness 
and we shall flow through heaven and earth with 
generosity of heart, with grace and with glory and 
with all good things necessary to each one. 
Ende die es de blijdste stemme daer wij mede 
aenropen die heilighe drivoldicheit. Ende die selen 
<wi> vinden woende in ons met volheyt alre gaven, 
ende ons met allen duechden wederboecht in die 
godlijcke eenicheit. Ute deser rijcker eenicheit selen 
<wi> vrielijcke vlieten met der melder goeth<i>t 
gods, ende selen doervloeyen met melder herten 
hemel ende eerde, met gracien ende met glorien, 
ende met allen goede des yeghewelcken noot es.
75
 
 
In this third voice, we see in Ruusbroec's description of our interiority a fundamental change and 
reorientation, a pivoting upon which "we shall find that we, too, are turned back to divine unity, with 
all our virtues"—a fundamental 'inclining towards', or natural desire for God. Theologically, while 
remaining in union with the divinity and humanity of our Lord, Ruusbroec's Christology opens onto a 
larger Trinitarian unity, wherein we find that the Holy Trinity itself dwells in us "with the fullness of 
all its gifts". And interestingly enough, we also see another pivoting, wherein Ruusbroec transitions 
from his more vertical reflections upon our redeemed human nature in and through the humanity of 
Christ in the 2nd voice, to that of the Trinitarian 3rd voice, one in which opens up a new horizon from 
such an interiority "through heaven and earth", while responding to the unique particularity of "all 
good things necessary to each one".  Hence, the "voice of greatest joy" Ruusbroec describes as able 
to respond to the Trinitarian "overflow" of goodness within creation itself is initially seen in terms of 
the "divine unity" and as envisaging order, mutuality and necessity.  
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 d. The "sweetest voice" 
 
 Therefore, to make sense of such a pivoting, from the distinctly Christological to that of the 
Trinitarian; from crossing the vertical depths and heights of our shared human nature, to that of an 
opening horizon and the distinct goodness of creation at large is itself made possible by the primacy 
of minne itself.Ruusbroec introduces us to this more explicitly in the 4th voice, the sweetest voice 
[suetste stemme]: 
 
This is the sweetest voice in which we invoke the 
Holy Spirit and with it we possess the width of 
loving [wijtheit der minnen] and grow one with it. 
And when love captures the spirit in unity in this 
way, it touches the very life of the spirit and love 
makes the spirit taste its unfathomable riches. 
And then all man's inner faculties are moved with 
delight. And they make him yearn for love's 
infinity [minnen ongheintheit] and crave it. 
Dit es de suuuetste stemme daer wij mede aenropen 
den heilighen gheest, ende daer wij mede besitten 
wijtheit der minnennn   ende met een werden... Ende 
als minne aldus den gheest beveet in eenicheit, zoe 
gherijnt sy des gheests levendicheit ende doet hem 
ghesmaken hoer grondelose rijcheit. Ende dan wert 
met loste beweecht al des menschen inwindicheit. 
Ende hier af comt ghieren ende crighen inder minnen 
ongheintheit.
76
 
 
 
From the divine unity and overflow of the Holy Trinity within the goodness of creation, such a unity 
now shifts away from the external, created horizon to that of the expanding interiority of the human 
person and one's response to the Holy Spirit wherein "we possess the width of loving and grow one 
with it." From a Trinitarian perspective, actively possessing such an expanding width of loving 
embrace complements what Rik van Nieuwenhove has repeatedly stressed as Ruusbroec's distinct 
understanding and  application of regiratio to the "[S]pirit as the active principal of the return of the 
divine Persons into their perichoretic unity".77 While anthropologically, Ruusbroec shows how such 
"width" finds the inner faculties—memory, intelligence and will—actively united and "moved with 
delight" as such active loving gives access to the "unfathomable riches" that are contained within our 
very interiority itself. This robust activity of loving, or "possessing" minne's unending width thereby 
unveils such "riches" within our very interior, yearning life, namely the unfathomability of our erotic 
selves responsive to "love's infinity". 
 
 e. The "most hidden voice" 
 
 And lastly, as "we possess the width of loving" in affirming our very erotic selves in desiring 
the alterity of the Other, Ruusbroec then describes the 5th voice, the most hidden voice [ 
verborhenste stemme] in which we respond to minne itself: 
 
And this is the most hidden voice in which we 
invoke love [minne], that it may consume us and 
swallow us in its fathomlessness, where all spirits 
fail at their work and give in to enjoyment. That is 
where the dark silence reveals itself, which stands 
idle and above all manner. We are dead in it and 
Ende dit es die verborghenste stemme daer wi minne 
mede aenropen, dat si ons vertere ende verslinde in 
huer afgrondicheit, daer alle gheeste haers wercs 
flieren ende wiken der ghebrukelijcheit, daer alle 
gheeste haers wercs falieren ende wiken der 
ghebrukeledich steet. Daer in sijn wij ghestoriven 
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live above our selfhood. For that is our enjoyment 
and the highest bliss of us all. There is an eternal 
silence in this our superessential being 
[overweselijcheit]. Not a word is spoken in the 
unity of the Persons. And nobody is able to go 
there without love and practice of virtue in 
justice. 
ende leven boven ons selfsheit. Want dat es onse 
ghebrulen ende onze <alre> hoochste zalicheit. Daer 
es een eewich swighen in onse overweselijcheit. Daer 
en wert nie woort ghesproken inder persone 
eenicheit. Daer en mach oec niemen comen sonder 
minne ende oefeninghe der duechde in 
gherechticheit.
78
 
   
  
 Here, Ruusbroec uncovers for us the abyss of minne itself, wherein the active possession of 
and return to our very origins in the "unity of Persons" gives way and ultimately yields to the 
"fathomlessness, where all spirits fail at their work and give in to enjoyment".  Consistent with other 
accounts, Ruusbroec describes both the enjoyable abyss of minne itself as "idle and above all 
manner" as well as our relationship to it, having become "consume[d] [...] and swallow[ed] [...]in its 
fathomlessness". And in turn, he locates the very basis of our relationality and mystical anthropology 
of mutual indwelling, as seen within the primacy of minne, whereby "nobody is able to go" to  this 
fathomless abyss "without love and practice of virtue in justice" where we are both "dead in it and 
live above our selfhood". Furthermore, in its core, we can see Ruusbroec' thinking our unity with the 
divine Persons, in minne without difference nor distinction, seen here in terms of the "eternal silence 
in this our superessential being". In the abyss of ourselves wherein the divine Persons dwell in unity, 
"no word is spoken" thus characterizes both the fathomless origins of our created selves and this 
"dark silence" not as an absence nor as a privation, yet itself as a modeless plentitude and excess 
beyond distinction, the fruitfulness of which gives rise to our continuing desire to respond to "where 
all spirits fail at their work and give in to their enjoyment".   
 
 B. CONCLUSION 
 
 As we have seen in this unique glimpse of his mystical anthropology with the "five voices", 
Ruusbroec specifically locates where we become infinitelymore human in terms of our observing and 
responding to the indwelling of God within our own interiority. And yet, thinking the human person 
in terms of the groundless abyss of minne is itself a non-foundationalist view of the self that 
completely reorients and challenges our more contemporary perspective that the intelligibility of the 
human person as such can only be attributed by some form of reified nature, contextually-fluid 
identity or (im)permeable principle, such as "freedom" or "inalienable rights", as adequately 
grounding and safeguard the distinctiveness of the human person as particular and asymmetrically 
dissimilar from other living life. 
 
 By contrast, Ruusbroec's non-foundationalism of mutual indwelling, characterized by and 
possessing it through minne, articulates an understanding of the human person, created in the image 
and likeness of the Trinitarian God, the relationality of which expresses both the continuing and 
eternal intra-Trinitarian dynamics of minne, as well as its economic, creaturely participation in the 
Son, and His love of the Father and the Father's love for the Son in and through the Holy Spirit. Thus 
situating this eternal minne within the abyss of the human person locates and makes sense of other 
central related themes within Ruusbroec's works, such as the relationality between wesen and 
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overwesen, differentie and onderscheet as distinguished from anderheit or conversely, frequent 
expressions such as "boven redene maer niet sonder redene". By understanding relationality in view 
of hisTrinitarian thinking andthe primacy of minne, Ruusbroec'snon-foundationalist view of the 
human person allows for the Brabantine mystic to both uphold and theologically substantiate such 
claims without collapsing them in either their seeming contradiction, nor resolving their tension by 
way of a dialectic. 
 
 Instead, possessing the abyss of love affirms the triptych of minne as above reason, but not 
without reason as well as beyond reason and hence without reason, all of which uniquely functions 
in supporting the particularity and distinction of the human person in whom God dwells. Therefore, 
to assume that Ruusbroec advocates some form of annihilation and/or merging with such a 
groundless love is one of the key mistakes and errors that he  identifies in some of the more 
enthusiastic Free Spirit doctrines. Namely, views that both obfuscate the demands of love in the 
continuing practice of virtue, while obstinately insisting that theirunderstanding is free from images, 
as we have previously seen in the 4th temptation. Instead, by insisting upon minne's distinct praxis 
character, such views are highly incongruous with Ruusbroec. Indeed, for the Brabantine 
contemplative, we are united with such a Minne as none other than our own minne. That is,without 
distinction in terms of its enjoyment; and without difference, in terms of the relational union that we 
share in the Son and the love between the Father and the Son in the active unity of the Holy Spirit—
such that the infinite practice of loving makes one  more creaturely, more particular.. As the width of 
one's loving, in union with the Holy Spirit, further expands and implicates the extent of our loving, 
the width of its grasp of that which is beyond grasp, both in our virtuous going out into the world and 
towards others, as well as inclining and resting in the loving abyss of the Other, is none other than 
located at the depths of our very origins in whom we are continuously created anew. 
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Chapter III 
 
"WE SHALL SEE GOD WITH THE EYES OF OUR BODY".  
MINNE, MUTUAL INDWELLING AND JAN VAN RUUSBROEC'S EMBODIED 
SPECULATIONS ON THE GLORIFIED BODY. 
 
 
"And God has considered from all eternity that it is fitting and proper that good people should be rewarded in 
soul and body, since they have loved God and served him with soul and body."
1
 
 
 
 
 
§ 1.INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In a short, lesser known catechetical work, Christian Faith [Vanden Kerstenen ghelove] the 
Brabantine contemplative theologian Jan van Ruusbroec curiously devotes over half of this entire 
dogmatic and speculative theological reflection to the last two articles that the Church confesses in 
the Nicene Creed,2 namely: that "we must believe in and look for the general resurrection of all 
bodies"3 as well as "life everlasting".4  Eternal life, or the life of glory, should be our desire, Ruusbroec 
says.5  Such is why, he continues, the "[A]postles and holy Church say amen at the end of our creed, 
as a sign that we all should expect and desire the future bliss God has promised us. For it is the end 
and the fulfillment of all we believe now."6  A  guiding question in this following reflection is both the 
manner in which Ruusbroec speculatively envisions such a life of glory and how his speculations are 
both informed by and nourished from his embodied sense of desire [begheren]. For Ruusbroec, 
desire is an essential, constitutive aspect or mode within his overall thinking of love, or its middle-
Dutch vernacular expression, minne. 
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 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia X, Vanden Kerstenen Ghelove, (trans.) A. Lefevere, (eds.) G. de Baere, Th. 
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And  yet,  at  a  glance,  Ruusbroec's  near  exclusive  attention  to  these  remaining  two,  
exceedingly speculative, eschatological articles of the Credo, in contrast to giving almost no comment 
whatsoever on the core Christological statements, may appear to us today as either curious, or 
strangely unbalanced. However, we should not be misled by this unbalanced attention,  as Ruusbroec 
indeed has a well-developed Christological and Trinitarian theology, set in continual relation to his 
overall thinking of minne―what I have  termed  as  his  'desirous  Christology'.7 But  how  then  
should  we  account  for  this  imbalance? Historically, while we have little direct evidence to aid us in 
coming to know the contextual basis for this work, I find it highly plausible that much  like his other 
works, Kerstenen Ghelove was also originally intended for either a specific person or specific group of 
people. Entertaining this reasonable hypothesis could  thus  account  for  why  Ruusbroec  focuses  so  
much  of  his  attention on  these  subjects.  In  all likelihood,  someone, or  a specific  group of  
people in Brussels, would  have approached  Ruusbroec regarding soteriological and eschatological 
questions involving the resurrection of  the body and life eternal, both as general queries, as well as 
perhaps the significance of these themes in relation to Ruusbroec's previous writings. In an 
exceptionally rare admission, we are invited to better consider the contextual basis that may have 
well led to Ruusbroec writing Kerstenen Ghelove, as he gives an explicit, personal comment upon the 
open question of the nature of eternal suffering as not exclusive to, yet inescapably tied to the body: 
 
To lack God for ever and all bliss is a pain that comes 
from loss. The pain  is  spiritual  and stronger  than  
any  pain  man  can  feel  in  the body [....] But 
because they turned towards creatures with 
disorderly love, against the honor of God, to that 
disorderly love corresponds an eternal fire. But 
whether that fire is spiritual or physical, or both, as is 
rather my opinion, is better left to God. 
Gods derven  ewelec  ende  alre  salecheit,  dat  es 
ene pine die comt van scaden. Die pine es 
geestelec  ende si es meerre dan enege pine van 
lijfleke   gevoelen....Maer want so hen gekeert 
hebben toten creaturen met ongeordender mine 
jegen die ere gods, der ongeordender  minnen 
antwert een ewech vier. Maer dat vier wedert sye 
geestelec ochte materileec ochte beide, daer icht 
bat voer houde, dat bevelen wi gode.
8
 
 
While in principle he allows for the question on the nature of eternal suffering (and 
conversely, eternal bliss and enjoyment in glory) as either bodily, spiritual, or both to remain open, in 
fact Ruusbroec's own position is quite clear. This is humorously displayed in an exemplum that 
Ruusbroec tells―not without certain subtle allusions―of "three gluttonous monks over there by the 
Rhine",9 two of which die "suddenly and unexpectedly" and  whose excruciating, bodily sufferings are 
poignantly described by Ruusbroec.10 Hence, we can say that the fides quae of this standard 
catechetical work is uniquely infused with Ruusbroec's own fides qua, a personal faith that  is  deeply 
informed by and consistent with his understanding of minne, and its founding revelatory sources  
within Christian faith. Thus, Ruusbroec affirms with  Christian  tradition  that  "Faith  leads  the  soul  
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to  trust  in  God,  and  gives  it  a  blessed knowledge of God and things eternal."11 Though by 
speculatively elaborating upon such eternal things and their rootedness within the praxis of minne, 
Ruusbroec affirms in a more typical manner: 
 
And we shall taste the goodness of God....And it 
shall feed us and go through our souls and our 
bodies and we shall be hungry and thirsty for it 
always, and through that hunger and thirst both our  
tasting  and   our  being  fed  shall  remain always 
and be made  new: and that is eternal life. We shall 
embrace love with love and we shall be by love 
comprehended. 
Ende wi zelen gesmaken die goetheit gods....Ende die 
sal ons voeden ende dore gaen ziele ende lijf. Ende   
dair na  sal ons  altoes hongeren ende dorsten; ende 
overmids honger ende dorst so sal smaken ende 
voeden altoes bliveende vernuwen: ende dat es 
ewech leven. Wi selen met minnen minne begripen 
ende van minnen begrepend werden.
12
 
 
Here, Ruusbroec plays with the dual sense of "begripen" and "begrepend" as entailing both 
minne's active embrace of the other, as well as its conceptual sense of knowing, or being 
comprehended in and through the mutuality of minne.  Analogous to faith as both personal 
act―"faith  by  which"  (fides qua)―and the content of faith understood as an object of revelation 
(fides quae), for Ruusbroec, minne too  possesses  both  a  strong  praxiological  dimension  as  well  
as  a  participative  form  of  desirously knowing/being known by God.13 
 
With this said, a relevant question for us today is precisely what gives Ruusbroec license for 
such speculation? Is this simply 'speculative', which is to say 'groundless'?14 Or must we fall back 
upon a more typically "modern" position and inquire whether or not Ruusbroec has had an 
extraordinary, "mystical experience" of private revelation? In response to such positions, I find them 
both to be insufficient as well as failing to respond to the particularity of Ruusbroec's own texts. 
Rather, it’s Ruusbroec's own repeated stress of minne's  embodied  sense―that "we shall see God 
with the eyes of our body"15― which appears to mitigate against and at least offer the possibility in 
our critical retrieval to respond to such critiques. For the basis and perhaps the legitimacy of 
Ruusbroec's theological  speculative reflections on the life of glory is his utter insistence on its 
extension from a very real, concrete sense of embodied reality. Such a position is theologically 
possible by recognizing both the formal discontinuity and difference between the orders of grace and 
glory that needs to be maintained, while nonetheless strongly accenting the continuity between 
these two orders, via our loving union with the exalted Christ in His continuing embodiment. Such an 
emphasis on continuity between the orders of grace and glory, as  mediated  by  Christ's  exalted  
embodiment  and  the  Church's  profession  of  the  future  general resurrection of all bodies thus 
gives a new soteriological consideration of eternal life and its 'fulfillment of  all that we believe now'. 
More specifically as a dynamic, ongoing life of continued creaturely  hungering, thirsting and tasting 
the goodness of God, as well as our enjoyment, nourishment and 'being fed' by this love. And this is 
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not only consistent with Ruusbroec's overall thinking of minne as both dynamically one of rest and 
restlessness, but furthermore it retains its linkage with the issue of the body itself as central in 
mediating such continuity. In short, Ruusbroec's speculative depictions on the life of glory as 
continuous with our very own temporal and spatially embodied life in the world in effect appear to 
humanize such a glorious, deified life. However, is such a theological view of continuity between 
grace and glory a contemporaneously viable position for us today? Before addressing this question, 
this reflection will first proceed to inquire over such sources of continuity that Ruusbroec himself 
draws upon and their relationship to minne as ultimately supporting his unique, embodied 
speculations over the glorified body. 
 
 
§2. RETRIEVING RUUSBROEC: CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY 
 
 
It first needs to be recalled that this following reflection stems from an ongoing retrieval of 
Ruusbroec and his understanding of love as minne―a unified love concept that I maintain is uniquely 
responsive to the contemporary interest in thinking love anew within fundamental theological and 
philosophy of religion discourses. And more specifically, contemporary discussions that aim at a 
renewed understanding of love as primary to modalities of ‘truth’ or ‘being’, as performed within a 
post-modern context. At the basis of this constructive/critical retrieval, consideration must be given 
to that which Ruusbroec presupposes specifically in terms of minne. By doing so, one can distinguish 
presuppositions specifically intrinsic  to  minne,  as  distinct  from  what  may  be  contextually  
relevant  in  further  expanding  our understanding of minne, yet ancillary and hence extrinsic to 
minne's own distinct, conceptual rigor. In this, we advance from what Jean-Luc Marion himself 
phenomenologically begins with in his conceptual plea in thinking anew the primacy of the erotic 
phenomenon as "starting from  themselves, without inscribing them from the outset and by force 
within a foreign horizon" and instead,  "describ[ing] the erotic phenomenon in its own proper 
horizon".16 
 
For Ruusbroec, this presupposition can be primarily situated in terms of mutual indwelling, a 
pervasive concept within Ruusbroec's works as well as a defining characteristic of late-medieval 
mystical theology of Northern Europe and the Low Countries in particular. In Ruusbroec's 
formulation, mutual indwelling can be said to uniquely ground minne's conceptual rigor as 
foundational to the Brabantine's corpus. More  specifically, mutual indwelling  can  be  said  to  both  
secure  and  dynamically  deepen  the fundamental alterity between Creator and creature/creation 
as an asymmetrical dissimilarity, affirmed not by way of its difference  and  multiplicity, yet  as  an  
Otherness-in-relation  with  the  creature  itself.  The  mutual indwelling between  the  human  
person  and  God―or  one may say, the  'naturalness'  of  union with God―thereby  ground  minne's  
own  internal  rhythm  as  dynamically  juxtaposing  the  following  as constitutive of minne itself: (1) 
the enduring  relational autonomy of the human person;  (2) mutuality of relations, not of the order 
of being [wesen], yet that of minne; and lastly, (3) the intrinsic condition of alterity in minne, both as 
intra-Trinitarian, as well as the creature's relationship to God as Creator. These constitutive features 
thus envision our personal, created image within the overall economy of salvation and the life of 
grace and glory as an ever deepening of growing in likeness unto, yet never full possession of, the 
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2nd Person of the  Trinity, the Son of God, as the eternal uncreated Image, in whom 'all things were 
made.'17 By recognizing minne's Christological and Trinitarian dynamism, Ruusbroec's understanding 
of the various modes of mystical union of God―with mediation; without mediation; without 
difference or distinction [sonder differencie ochte onderscheet]―are invariably regarded as accenting 
mystical union not as a lifting one above and beyond one's embodied self and the creaturely order in 
the form of a wholly disembodied, two-tiered "supernatural grace".  Rather, we can say that by 
affirming the fundamental autonomy of the created order and its enduring distinction with God as 
Creator, union with God can be depicted in terms of "deifying nature" itself by way of God's grace.18  
From this stems the conviction that in terms of minne's radical language of union with God―without 
difference [sonder differentie] in terms of identity, and without distinction [sonder onderscheet] in 
terms of our loving and virtuous works―affirms that by drawing closer to the "greater dissimilarity" 
of God, such movement equally renders us more concretely human in our very particularity. 
 
Anthropologically, minne's presumption of mutual indwelling can be regarded as entailing 
both an affirmation of radical alterity within immanence as well as union with God primarily as 
natural and intrinsic to the relationship between Creator and creature. Along such an anthropological 
axis, we see Ruusbroec affirming the following: 
 
[The] simple ground of the soul's essence....bears 
the  image  of  God  and  is  a natural realm of God. 
With respect to the body, a person is created from 
the four elements, and with respect to the soul, (he 
is created) from nothing, unto the image of God. 
[I]n  den  eenvuldighen  gront des wesens  der sielen. 
Die draghet dat beelde gods ende es een natuerlijc 
rike gods. De mensche es ghescapen na den lichame 
van den .iiij. elementen, ende na der sielen van 
nieute toe den beelde gods.
19
 
 
 
Hence, as we shall soon see by affirming the human soul as the "natural realm of God", in order to 
maintain relational "greater dissimilarity" within the God/creation distinction, Ruusbroec will stress a 
line of discontinuity within an otherwise immanent frame, regarding our souls as created ex nihlio 
and hence, always growing towards or inclining "unto" [toe den] the image of God―the Son of God 
as Word―yet never confused nor identical with such an Image. And while we can say that 
Ruusbroec's overall understanding of minne and mutual indwelling largely give emphasis  to  this  
mystical  anthropological  dimension,  we  cannot  discard  its  noticeable cosmological aspects. That 
is to say, a cosmological dimension that articulates  key components of what is in total, a compelling 
synthesis that regards minne as a vibrant, sensible reality in its dynamic movement both within the 
Trinity and our mutual embrace―with the Father, in the Son and in the unity of the Holy Spirit―that 
overflows and enriches the world as created. 
 
Thus, in mutual indwelling's more cosmological frame of reference, or the "outward way of 
the senses" [de uutwendighe senleec wech]20, Ruusbroec stresses a continuum of relations between 
God and world as created. In addition to his specific reflections on this "outward way of the senses" 
in his first work, The  Realm  of  Lovers [Dat  rijcke  der  ghelieven]21 and nature's adornment by the 
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way of minne, Ruusbroec's  cosmological  emphasis  upon  the continuity of  relations contributes to 
fueling minne's dynamism between the orders of nature, grace and glory as fundamentally 
continuous. More generally, this continuity is evidenced in diverse, yet related thematic areas such 
as his strongly realistic Eucharistic theology as well as what we shall later on see in his speculations 
over the humane glorified body of Christ and our beholding of Him, who sits at the right hand of the 
Father, as "see[ing] God with the eyes of our body".22  Thus, along this axis of continuity, Ruusbroec's 
cosmological sense of mutual indwelling can be generally regarded as ordering  and  codifying  the  
nature  of  world  as  creation, both in its autonomy as world, as well as its divine participation as an 
"[O]utward, sensible realm of God, a vestige of God, and a rough likeness of God."23 
 
Therefore,  in  terms  of  our  overall  critical  retrieval  of  minne,  its  founding  presumption 
of mutual indwelling  and more specifically, mutual indwelling's cosmological reference that stresses 
an axis of continuity between God and the created world, the present objective in this reflection is to 
specifically highlight that which is central to this embodied, "outward, sensible way".  And in doing 
so, distinguish its central, retrievable tenets from what is otherwise a pre-modern cosmological 
worldview that is no longer feasible nor desirable within a contemporary scientific rationality. It will 
be argued that these core theological  tenets  can  indeed  be  isolated  from  such  a  pre-modern  
cosmology―without textual distortion―specifically in terms of Ruusbroec's understanding of 
embodiment and the outward, "life of the senses" [in dat senleke leven].24 Such a retrieval is crucial, 
in that for Ruusbroec, such embodiment is directly associated with Ruusbroec's overall mystical 
theology as tied to the "active life" of charitable works towards God and others as indispensable and 
of enduring worth to our human nature, human knowing  and  loving.  Thus,  Ruusbroec's  early-
humanistic  emphasis  on  the  endurance  of  human autonomy and particularity are well attested in 
those very realms―union with God, the life of glory― by which we  today  regard as  perhaps  the  
most  discontinuous from our "being-in-the-world" and the mundane of everyday life. By this, it is my 
hope to show the very provocative and fascinating linkages Ruusbroec's understanding of minne and 
mutual indwelling allows for him to make, upholding both the necessity of alterity in union with God, 
while refusing to "spiritualize" such differences between nature,  grace  and  glory. And in contrast, 
insisting  instead  upon  their  greater continuity and concreteness  as  an affirmation of all that is 
human, all that is created in their graceful inclining towards God. 
 
 
A. CONTEMPORARY INTERLUDE: OLIVER DAVIES AND THE NEED FOR COSMOLOGICAL 
READINGS WITHIN MEDIEVAL MYSTICAL TEXTS 
 
 
A plea for a renewed theological sensitivity to world and embodiment has been given strong 
emphasis by Transformation theologian, Oliver Davies, in recent works such as The Creativity of 
God25 as well as his contributions to the inaugural publication of the  transformation  theological  
movement, Transformation Theology.26 Broadly situated, in many of his recent contributions Davies 
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has aimed at revivifying a contemporaneous, theological cosmology that creatively looks towards the 
world and our embodiment as created. This is largely pursued by a critical retrieval of the doctrine of 
the exalted, ascended Christ. That is, a doctrine seen in continuity with his strong Incarnational 
theology, the combination of which looks to reaffirm and think anew the ascended Christ's 
continuing, living presence within the world, made possible by the linkage with His continuing 
embodiment within our everyday, sensible perception of the world as created.27 
 
Retrieval of the embodied, exalted Christ, is historically and contextually situated as 
beginning with the narrative of the birth of modern theology and its "turn to the subject" as arising 
out of the collapse of the pre-modern, Ptolemaic cosmology. While this shift within early-modern 
cosmology can be gauged in nearly every forum of human culture and society, Davies argues that this 
paradigm shift was especially felt within Christian faith and theology in its specific disruption of God's 
ongoing relationship, or creatio continua to the world and the performance of its rationality within a 
world regarded as created. This difficulty is especially poignant with the Church's reciting of the 
Apostles Creed and itsaffirmation of the exalted Christ. Who, while remaining fully human and fully 
divine, has "ascended into heaven, and is seated at the right hand of God, the Father Almighty". But 
where is that actually? And how are we, today, to understand such an expression, "at the right hand 
of the Father?" As  Davies relates, in various pre- modern contexts, the question of the identity of 
Jesus as the Christ, Son of the Father, was addressed not only dogmatically as 'what' He is, nor 'who' 
He was historically, but furthermore, the question of Jesus was answered cosmologically, or 'where' 
He is, as Lord. Davies writes,"The pre-modern world understood this in terms of his 'heavenly 
session'. The fact that the exalted Jesus was held to be present in heavenly space and time, at the 
very 'highest point of heaven'...meant that he still lived in continuity with our own earthly life."28 This 
continuity thus characterized the materiality of the world in its sacramental character and thereby 
shaped various understandings of the world itself.29 Whereas, by contrast, with the collapse of this 
pre-modern cosmology and theology's projection of 'Heaven into the heavens', in such a " [D]ismissal 
of heaven then, there was nowhere else for Christ to be, and so no point of contact between our 
space and time and his resurrected and exalted life."30 
 
An important consequence of Davies' retrieval is his insistence on embodiment and the 
bodiliness of rationality itself. Analogous to Davies' theological axiom that "We cannot [...] separate 
our beliefs about who Jesus Christ is and our beliefs about the world,"31 so too does our 
understanding of rationality and its praxis as mediating self and world  come to "determine the ways 
in which we perceive and experience the world."32 Thus, Davies' movement towards a renewed, 
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theological cosmology has crucial importance in our own current critical retrieval of Ruusbroec and 
our hermeneutical engagement. This is explicitly so, as it draws attention to our inherited, modern 
categorical understandings of "religious" or "mystical  experience"  as  conventionally   understood  
as  disembodied,  extraordinary,  and  'other worldly', all of which are reflective of more modern 
views increasingly incapable of understanding the createdness  of  world  amid  emerging,  secular,  
scientific   discourses.  In the following, Davies summarizes a point that has significant consequences 
to the present retrieval of Ruusbroec and what precisely underlines our conceptions of "religious 
experience". 
 
From the perspective of religion, and our communion with God, by far the most important 
consequence of this state of affairs is the disjunction between our sense of the divine and our 
ordinary perceptual experience. The vocabulary we use about ordinary perception and our 
knowledge of the world can be extraordinarily precise, but when we speak about knowing 
God, we   refer   to   'mysticism',   'spirituality'   or   'religious   experience',   all   of   which   
are highly indeterminate [....] To some extent, of course, this is explicable as an 
acknowledgment that God is not an object and cannot be known as objects in the world are 
known. But it is indicative also of the deeper problematic which flows from the fact that the 
world is not known as created in our ordinary perceptions. Our knowledge of God is thereby 
not set in any kind of relation at all with our ordinary knowing, neither one of consummation 
nor of contradiction, despite the fact that according to the Christian doctrine of the creation, 
the world which we ordinarily know belongs to God and is of God's making. Here the contrast 
with a pre-modern world-view is helpful. Since the createdness of the world was visible in its 
nature as world, in the medieval synthesis, the human faculties which were ordered to that 
world retained an openness from within [my italics] to the knowledge of God the Creator. 
What we would today term 'religious  experience' was understood  in  the  pre-modern  
cosmos  to  be  already  implied  in  and  intrinsic  to  ordinary cognition.
33 
 
 
Davies makes a very strong case in linking the increasingly modern retreat from the world as 
created and the epistemological issues consequent of such a retreat and how this development has 
conditioned our distinctly modern understanding of religious experience and "mysticism" as 
disembodied, privatized and inaccessible to "common", public rationalities as it is situated largely set 
apart from the world. However, he is equally and continuously assertive that in no way does his 
critical retrieval amount to a return to a pre-modern cosmology. Instead, the very critical dimensions 
of his retrieval are to distinguish that which is properly theological to the doctrine of the exalted 
Christ as distinct from its overlap with pre-modern Ptolemaic cosmology. Thus, he writes: 
 
The change in cosmology did not and does not invalidate the doctrinal principle of a 
continuing and full Incarnation. Christian faith does not entail any kind of belief in a heaven 
that is 'beyond the stars'. But it does commit us to a belief that Jesus has risen from the dead 
that he lives and is still fully human. And being fully human, as well as fully divine, Jesus must 
still in some sense have 'local' existence and thus be in continuity with our own space-time 
reality today [my italics]. The alternative to this possibility is either that the Incarnation has 
ceased (Christ is no longer properly alive, or properly human) or that the humanity of Christ 
has been absorbed into his divinity: a possibility which the early church specifically rejected.
34 
 
Davies attempts to disassociate our metaphorical understanding of heaven as associated 
with 'height' and  with  it,  its  pre-modern  Ptolemaic  underpinnings,  from  the  clearly  theological  
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imperative  of  a traditional, Chalcedon Christology as well as His Incarnation as contemporaneous 
and perpetual. This is particularly the case, given the continual metaphorical usage of thinking 
"heaven" as well as God's transcendence  in terms of  "height" or  that  which  is  "above"  material,  
human existence. Davies  is particularly  insightful  in  his  reading of  this  pervasive  metaphor of  
"[D]imensionality―in  this  case, height―[which] is not a metaphor like any other."35 This is due to 
the fact that "Height is an indexical category, which means to say that it is a relational category which 
is predicated upon the human body."36 Hence, the intrinsic relationality of this metaphor, in order for 
it to be meaningful, needs a center and place of reference, within spatiality and temporality, in order 
for the metaphor to have significant meaning. And yet the result of this metaphorization―in the 
instance of speaking of God as Creator and thus, radically other than the created  order, thereby 
refusing to be conscripted within a fully immanent view as an object―Davies concludes that this 
metaphor precisely functions in leading one away from the world. "Whereas natural verticality for 
the pre-modern paradigm", given its established, cosmological continuity between the created, 
material order with that of the Christ's exalted humanity at the highest height of the created order as 
a "pointing to...[while] metaphorical verticality is only a pointing from (that is, from the  world)."37 
And it is this metaphorical action of distancing one from the created world―of becoming "overly 
spiritual"―and the significant cultural and linguistic "internalization of such a metaphorical 
conceptual paradigm...[that] the Christian self is drawn to live under alienation within the real 
world," living but "poorly in the world [in terms of inauthentically, and not in terms of the evangelical 
counsels], and not at all in any other."38 
 
Hence,  Davies  draws  the  distinction  between  that  which  "was  being  communicated  
through that cosmological system", while affirming that the "doctrinal content can in principle 
legitimately survive the former's [pre-modern cosmology] demise."39 In this sense, in trying to 
revivify modern theology's de facto  abandonment  of  the  exalted  Christ  and  His  Ascension―seen  
as  the  'cosmic  nature  of  the Incarnation'―the  axis of continuity with the "present reality of the 
incarnate Christ" is stressed as a fundamental  engagement  of  what  transformation  theology  often 
makes as its appeal. That is, not  so  much  a  change  of theological  method, yet its transformation, 
as well as its re-orientation as "[R]esolutely  and uncompromisingly a theology in the world".40 By this 
resolution, transformation theology claims that such a re-orientation amounts to an "attentiveness" 
within the "crowded spaces" of contemporary life, and a "[R]ediscovery of the real world of 
embodied sensible human experience in space and time as the ongoing and indispensable source of 
theological authority today."41 
 
 
B. RUUSBROEC'S MINNE, COSMOLOGY AND ITS AXIS OF CONTINUITY 
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Turning immediately now to Ruusbroec and his cosmological writings, the Brabantine 
contemplative fully develops his own unique, cosmological thematics explicitly in his last, though 
incomplete work, The Twelve Beguines [Vanden XII Beghinen] in the following passage: 
 
In the beginning of the world and of the holy 
Scripture, the prophet Moses teaches us that God 
made heaven and earth, in order to serve us, so that 
we should serve Him here on earth in good works   
and in honorable conduct without [i.e., externally]; 
and in heaven in spiritual virtues, in holy life, in 
practices within; and in the highest heaven, in 
contemplative life, united to God in enjoyment and 
in love. This is why all things were made. This is 
what nature, example and types, and holy Scripture, 
and the eternal truth that is God Himself, witnesses 
to us. 
 
Inden beghinne der werelt ende der heiligher 
scriftueren, soe leert ons die prophete Moyses, dat 
god  maecte hemel ende eerde ons te dienen, op dat 
wij  hem dienen souden hier opder eerden in goeden  
werken  ende  in  eersamen  <seden>  van buten; 
ende in die hemel in gheestelijcken duechden, in 
heilighen levene, in oefeninghen van binnen; ende in 
den oversten hemel in scouwende levene, gode  
gheenicht  in  ghebrukene  ende  in minnen. Ende 
hier omme sijn alle dinghe ghemaect. Ende dit 
tuyghet ons natuere, exemple ende figuere ende 
heilighe scriftuere ende die eewighe waerheit die 
god selve <es>.
42
 
 
By this opening, Ruusbroec gives us a cosmological outline wherein order and reciprocity are utterly 
written into the very fabric of creation itself. For Ruusbroec, nature not only shows itself as ordering 
life, a  "vestige"―perhaps what we are more familiar with today in certain, "creationist" arguments 
that seek to portray  nature as a static artifact that evidences its Creator―yet more importantly, as a 
"rough likeness of God".43 That is, a likeness that shows itself in the manner of a reciprocal demand, 
as creation serves humans so that we may, through  our  works,  serve God. Such  relationality,  
Ruusbroec  attests  along  a  more Franciscan-Bonaventurian line, as witnessed by both revelatory 
"books": the book of nature, as well as the  Holy  Scriptures.44 This is clearly put forward by 
Ruusbroec in a  later work,  The Little  Book  of Enlightenment [Boecsken der verclaringhe], offering a 
concise, declarative summation of this cosmological angle within the overall entirety of his thought 
and work: 
 
 
See, I have thus said that the contemplative lover 
[minnere] of God is united with God by 
intermediary, and again without intermediary, and  
thirdly  without  difference  or  distinction. And this I 
find in nature and in grace and also in glory. I have 
further stated that no creature can become or be  
so holy that it loses its own condition of creature  
and  becomes  God, not even the soul of  our Lord 
Jesus Christ: it will remain eternally creature and 
other than God. 
Siet, ic hebbe Aldus ghesehaghet: dat de scouwende 
minnere gods met gode vernecht es overmids 
middel, ende oec sonder middel, ende ten derden 
male sonder differentie ochte onderscheet. Ende dit 
vende ic in naturen ende in der gratien ende oec in 
der glorien. Ic hebbe voert gheseghet, dat en ghene 
creature en mach so heilech warden noch sijn, dat si 
hare ghescapenheit verliese ende god werde, noch 
oec die ziele ons heren Jhesu Cristi: die sal eweleke 
creature bliven ende een ander van gode.
45
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Hence, Ruusbroec places significant importance on the endurance and the redemptive value of what 
he "find[s] in nature" that enables one to respond to the central event of creation as arising ex nihilo, 
as well as the events of the history of salvation in the Incarnation, Passion, Death, Resurrection and 
Ascension of Christ by way  of  "overflowing" and gratuitously mediated works of virtue and charity 
towards others. In turn, as an "outward, sensible way", such an emphasis affirms what is for 
Ruusbroec, his  understanding  of  ratio  as  embodied  and  thus  affirmative  of  the  overall  life  of  
the  senses  as synthetically linking a more fully fleshed account of the life of minne and how 
Ruusbroec understands life in union with God as both with and without images. By building upon 
Davies, such a concrete, relational worldly emphasis within Ruusbroec not only serves as a corrective 
to more distinctly modern accounts of disembodied forms of 'mysticism'―as wholly 'interior' and 
thus, without any real sense of engagement with the world. Furthermore, it advances an intriguing 
alternative to what often remains as our incomplete, bifurcated sense of stressing either kataphasis 
or apophasis at the expense of the other.46  By noting such an "outward way"  within  Ruusbroec  
valuably  contributes  to  a  more  fuller  comprehension  of  another  one  of Ruusbroec's key ideas: 
that is the "common life" [ghemeyne leven]. For Ruusbroec, the world is "[C]reated and endowed for 
human needs, in order for a person to behold it, consider it, and be faithful to God, and serve and 
praise Him for all and with all (creatures) [van alle ende met alle]."47 
 
For  Ruusbroec,  ghemeyne  leven, in  its  cosmological  expression  and  embeddness  is  even  
more pronounced when Ruusbroec makes distinctly clear the importance of cosmology in the first 
place. Ruusbroec writes: 
 
Now understand and mark with earnestness: all 
creatures show and teach us how we shall live. The 
nature of the heavens and the ordinance God has 
given them are for us an exemplar and a true type, 
as to how we shall confess God above the  elements 
in the heavens, by means of an inward  hidden 
spiritual life that no one knows nor feels but the one 
who feels it, practices it, and is occupied with it. 
Nu verstaet ende merct met ernste alle creatueren, 
die wisen ende leeren how wij leven zullen. Die 
nature der hemele end die ordinancie die hem god 
ghegheven heeft, dis sijn ons een exemplaer ende 
een warachtighe figuere how wij god belijen   zullen   
boven [alle] die elemente <in> die hemele, overmids 
een inwindich verborghen gheestelijc leven, dat 
niemen en weet noch  en  ghevolet  dan  diet  
beleeft,  diet  oefent ende diet pleecht.
48
 
 
 
By this, Ruusbroec affirms his view of the created world fundamentally in terms of mediated 
relations and virtuous activity, speaking of creatures as an "exemplar" and distinct from more 
modern accounts of viewing nature and world as a collection of distant, quantifiable, static objects. 
Hence, at first glance, we can  affirm  that  Ruusbroec  demonstrates  a  certain  Franciscan  based,49 
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biblically-informed  sense  of creation, echoing, for example, Matthew's Gospel, a parable of Jesus' 
recounts the manner of living by the "birds of the air" and "lillies of the field" as clearly distinct to 
common sources of human anxiety.50 However, Ruusbroec  appears  to  differ  noticeably  from  
other  more  pronounced and sustained trends within various Neoplatonic and Scholastic ventures 
into cosmology, all of which aimed at accounting for and harmonizing creation accounts in Genesis 
with various positions found within natural philosophy.51 By no means do we wish to imply that in a 
more general vein, Ruusbroec could not also be placed within such "harmonizing" tendencies. This is 
certainly not in question. Rather, when noting the more distinctive features of his cosmological 
thought, aims at harmonizing creation as a revealed datum of Christian faith with that of natural 
philosophy simply does not appear as a central concern to the Brabantine contemplative. And yet, 
Ruusbroec's cosmological reflections―while clearly not preoccupied with making sense of questions 
of the nature of movement in the heavens or attempting to make sense of Aristotle's fifth  
element―should not be easily discarded as naive or unsophisticated according to the scientific  
discourses  at  the  time.  For he  clearly demonstrates his familiarity and certain awareness of these  
Scholastic discussions by venturing into one of the most contested areas of pre-modern cosmology: 
the material nature of the firmament and its relation to the Empyrean―God's primary dwelling place 
along with the angles and the saints. As the historian of science W.G. Randles points out in his work, 
The Unmaking of the Medieval Christian Cosmos, 1500-1760, he writes: 
 
The prime difficulty faced by the early Christian commentators on the Book of Genesis was in 
positioning the second heaven of Firmament created by God on the Second Day...in relation 
to the First  Heaven of the First Day....To  this was added the further problem of defining the 
material nature of the barrier formed by the Firmament to 'divide the water which were 
below it from those that were above it.
52 
 
 
For Ruusbroec, it is clear that he attempts to resolve such issues of  distinctiveness, as well as 
the relation the Firmament possess towards the Empyrean―how earthly immanence relates to 
heavenly transcendence,  and  where  precisely  to  situate  the  border  between  the  two―in  terms  
of  mutual indwelling itself. As bookends to his written works, Ruusbroec explicitly treats this issue in 
both his first and last works, Dat rijcke der ghelieven and Vanden XII beghinen. In his first work, while 
the basis for mutual indwelling is clearly present in terms of the continuity between these two 
realms, Ruusbroec first describes the Firmament in largely physical and material terms as a 
"transparency" to a certain unmistakable, Neoplatonic language of "resplendence" or the light of the 
heavens: 
 
The uppermost part of the firmament is shone upon 
by the resplendence of the uppermost heaven and 
is reflecting it back. He created the middle  heaven, 
called the transparent, or aqueous, or crystalline 
heaven, not that it is of crystal, but on account of its 
resplendence. This heaven is an enrichment of the 
firmament; since it is transparent, it illuminates the 
Ende dat overste des fiermaments wert besceenen 
ende wederblickende van claerheiden des oversten 
hemels.  Ende hi hevet ghescapen den middelsten  
hemel, die heedt  der doerscineghe hemel ochte 
waterachtighen ochte crisstallen, niet dat hi 
crisstallen si maer overmids sine claerheit. Die hemel 
es eene cierheit des firmaments; want hi doerscinich 
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uppermost part of the firmament with the light of 
the uppermost heaven. 
es, so wet verclaert dat overste des firmaments met 
den lichte des oversten hemels.
53
 
 
 
Ruusbroec returns to this issue again in Beghinen in language far more typical of his overall thought, 
and yet we can clearly see both the evident progression and maturation in his later work of ideas 
such as: "mutual indwelling" as well as his cosmological approach to the question of the Firmament 
as indicative of his thinking of mutual indwelling. Ruusbroec introduces this topic specifically in terms 
of the "natural inclination of our soul" towards God and that "nature always desires the good" in 
terms of an "inward spiritual firmament" [een inwindich gheestelijc firmament].54  Now, as he 
explicitly and starkly declares elsewhere, such a characterization of nature's autonomy does not 
render it fundamentally good and complete in of itself, for apart from God, "nature without grace is a 
bastard".55 However, nature's fundamental inclination and orientation are themselves good. Good, 
not in terms of its teleological ends, yet by virtue that such activity and working of creatures 
themselves, while wholly autonomous, nonetheless are a realm wherein God dwells. And it is such 
mutual indwelling that renders the inclination and the distinctiveness of human activity as 
fundamentally good, as Ruusbroec writes: 
 
So, likewise, the good will in which God lives and 
reigns with all His gifts is very like the firmament  of  
heaven, for it is always moved from above by the 
Holy Spirit, who is the prime motion of  all  holiness.  
And this firmament is transparent and clear from  
the  indwelling  of God,  and  also  from  the  sun  of  
Wisdom who lives therein. This is why this 
firmament is a spiritual  intermediary that divides 
and distinguishes [onderscheet] between the waters 
of the heavens and the waters of the earth, that is: 
between  virtues and works of virtue; between time 
and eternity; between an outward active life and an 
inward spiritual life; between grace and nature; 
between sign and truth; between works of the 
senses, which pass away, and spiritual  works  which  
are  eternal, which are performed in grace. 
Alsoe, ghelijcker wijs die goede wille, daer god in 
leeft ende regneert met alle sinen gaven, hi es wel 
ghelijc  den firmamente des hemels, want hi wert 
altoes  bewecht   van boven vanden heilighen gheest, 
die de eerste berueringe es alre heilicheit. Ende dit 
firmament es doerschinich ende claer vander 
inwoninghen gods ende oec vander sonnen der 
wijsheit, die daer inne leeft. Ende hier om [dit] es dit 
firmament een gheestelijc middel, dat dielt ende  
onderscheet  ghevet  tusschen  die  wateren der 
hemele ende die watere der eerden, dat es: tusschen 
die doechde  ende  werke der duechde; tusschen tijt 
ende eewic-heit; tusschen een uutwindich werken 
ende [in]een inwindich gheestelijc leven; tusschen 
gracie ende natuere; tusschen teekene ende 
waerheit; tusschen senlijcke werke die vergaen ende 
gheestelijcke werke die eewich bliven, die in gracie 
sijn ghedaen.
56
 
 
In short, while such a pre-modern cosmology is very far from contemporary rationalities and 
our worldview today, we can speak of Ruusbroec's thinking of the question of the Firmament as an 
attempt at articulating a "transparent", invisible barrier of otherness that makes real the 
immanent/Transcendent difference and distinction. A distinction, not in terms of distancing such 
transcendence by infinite degrees, yet by way of a model of continuity and a sacramental, relational 
world of inter-penetration. For Ruusbroec, this cosmological distinction is clear and necessary, and 
yet it is because of such a cosmological "outward way of the senses" and its insistence on virtuous, 
charitable works that he can better account for mutual indwelling as precisely upholding these 
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differences amid the continuity and "transparency" between the orders of nature, grace and glory as 
a concrete, continuing, embodied reality. 
 
By extension, with this distinct, cosmological sense in mind and our natural, fundamental 
inclination to God and virtuous works, it makes sense that Ruusbroec would use the metaphor of the 
"scales of love” to articulate such reciprocity as seen within creation, keeping well in mind its distinct, 
Augustinian heritage wherein the Latin Father speaks of his love as his "weight".57 And yet, by 
emphasizing creation as having come ex nihilo whereby God's minne "outweighs everything" as "God 
made us from nothing and that He gave Himself to us and all that  He had made," Ruusbroec opts not 
to speak of such a reciprocal love as teleologically seeking its final place of rest.58 Instead, he 
deliberately uses the scale analogy to emphasize minne's cosmological movement as one of 
mutuality and balancing: "See, this is the scale of His love [minne] that He has given us, and demands 
of us to weigh evenly and alike, if our life is to please Him."59 
 
 
1.Cosmology, Speculation and Minne as "above reason, but not without reason" 
 
 
Cosmologically, wherein  all  created,  material  reality  is  both  "encompassed"  by  and  
"hang[s]  in  a spiritual,  uncreated  resplendence",  such  an  embodied,  "life  of  the  senses"  in  
turn shows the foundational contours of Ruusbroec's view of rationality and understanding, attesting 
to minne's own embodied, speculative character as both "above reason, but not without reason" 
[boven redene, maer niet  sonder  redene].  The  basis  of  this  Augustinian  view  of  the  intuitive,  
"possessive"  character  of "understanding" [verstaen]―which can be situated within the long legacy 
of nous and the participation theory of divine illumination―can be seen in the range that Ruusbroec 
accords to speculation, and is thus seen in the following: 
 
What is below the firmament, a person can see and 
perceive by his outward senses. What is above the   
firmament, one can imagine and speculate (on) by 
one's inward senses and by rational discernment.   
Where the corporeal heavens end, there end all 
imagination and (use of)  the  senses, outwardly  
and  inwardly; for where bodiliness ends, all the 
senses end; for no  sense  can  comprehend  God  or  
angels  or souls,  for  they  are  without  form.  This 
is the outward way of the senses, and it is the first. 
Beneden <den> firmamente machment sien ende 
vernemen met den sinnen van buten, boven den 
fiermamente machment imagineren ende speculeren 
met den sinnen van binnen ende met redeliken  
imagineren  ende speculeren met den sinnen van 
binnen ende met redeliken merkene. Daer de lijflijke 
hemele inden, daer indet alle imaginacie ende sen 
uutwendich ende inwendich, want daer lijflicheit 
indet daer inden alle senne; want gode noch inghele  
noch  sielen  en  mach gheen sin begripen, want dat 
es sonder ghedeente. Dit is de uutwendighe senleec 
wech ende es de ierste.
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In this sense, it is helpful to briefly clarify what Ruusbroec specifically means by "speculation". In 
Vanden XII Beghinen, he describes the mediated character of "speculatio" as a rational mode of 
conceptual knowing  "in  images,  in  forms,  and  in  likenesses"  as  distinct  from  the  simplicity,  
immediacy  and gratuitous passivity of "contemplatio". 
 
This mode is called speculatio, that is: to see in a 
mirror; for the intellect of a contemplative is a living  
mirror, in which the Father with the Son give Their  
Spirit of truth, so that the reason is illuminated and  
it can recognize all truth that can be  understood   in  
modes, in images, in forms, and in likenesses. But 
the mode in which a person sees the face of  God, 
above reason and  without  reason, in  bare  
intellect  and  in imageless mind, is something that 
neither consideration nor reason can attain....This  
is called contemplatio, that is: to contemplate God 
in a simple manner [....] By means of His light, the  
rational eye is enlightened so that it can recognize  
in forms, in images and in likeness, God and all 
creatures, insofar as God wills to show them. 
Dese wise es gheheeten speculatio, dat es: in eenen 
spieghel sien. Want des scouwenden menschen 
verstannisse es een levende spieghel, daer die vader 
met den sone  ingheven  haren gheest  der  waerheit, 
op dat die rede verclaert worde ende bekinne alle 
waerheit diemen verstaen mach in wisen, in  
beelden,  in formen ende  in  ghelijcken. Maer die  
wise daermen  dat aensichte gods in siet  boven 
redene ende sonder redene, in bloeten verstane 
ende in onghebeelder ghedachten, dat en mach 
ghemerc noch reden niet ghereiken.... Ende dit  heet  
contemplatio, dat es: gode scouwen  
eenvuldigherwijs [....] Ende  overmids sijn licht soe es 
die redelijcke oghe verclaert, alsoe dat si bekinnen 
mach in formen, in beelden ende in   gheliken gode 
ende allen creatueren, alsoe verre alst god vertoenen 
wilt.
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For Ruusbroec, the performance of rationality within speculatio clearly has an illuminative-
participative character. And yet, unlike contemplatio, which is positioned as both "above and without 
reason" [boven ende sonder  redene],  speculation itself retains a more mediating sense of rationality 
as distinctly related  to  the  body  and the  senses.Thus, by exploring this  distinct  sense  of minne's 
rationality and the mediated, embodied, life of the senses as "above reason, but not without 
reason", such a cosmological axis of continuity further aids what is for Ruusbroec, minne's strong, 
univocal sense. Such univocality can be precisely identified as fundamentally linking God's minne and 
our minne,62 beyond Creator/creaturely dissimilarity, as indeed one and the same minne and the 
same life of minne in terms of its various manners (gratuitous; reciprocal/demanding; mutual), its 
modes (affection [liefde]; charity [karitas]; desire, yearning [begheren]) as well as its modeless 
enjoyment and bliss. The strength of minne's appeal, especially for us today, are the linkages  that 
Ruusbroec makes between seemingly disparate realms and substantiates them as founded within 
minne itself, as rendering an account of love's own inherent logic and rationale. This is seen in 
minne's various manners and modes of activity―both outwardly and inwardly―alongside its 
modesless enjoyment, or rest, within a dynamic of endless unity that is continuously active and 
desirous, as well as "without cease enjoyably suspended" in unity with the Other in "eternal 
blessedness".63 While always affirmative of the abiding and irreproachable sense of alterity between 
lovers―both human and with the Trinity―an immediate consequence from Ruusbroec's theological 
reflections over minne is his affirmation of the particularity of human and divine Persons as seated 
and differentiated not in terms of identity [differencie], yet by the very distinction [onderscheet] and 
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modality of one's (loving) works itself. Hence, while the unity and ultimate signification of minne  is  
regarded as fundamentally and universally the same   intra-Trinitarian wise, amongst creatures, and 
finally, between creatures and their Creator, nevertheless the way and manner in which we 
love―the activity and work of our loving―is unsubstitutable. While their love may be called the 
same, no two lovers love alike. This critical insight will be further elaborated upon in our discussion 
over the Ruusbroec's speculations concerning Christ's distinctly humane, glorified body and our 
glorious beholding of him. However, before we can explore this thematic directly, its cosmological 
background and its overall implications for critically retrieving minne, first, we must lastly give 
attention to what is specifically meant by the term "mutual indwelling" and its anthropological 
register. 
 
 
C. MUTUAL INDWELLING AND RUUSBROEC'S MYSTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
 
As a uniquely Trinitarian, "interpersonal"64 imago Dei anthropology, Ruusbroec stresses 
mutual indwelling as an intrinsic relationality of radical alterity within immanence wherein both 
eternal and historical modalities converge in this natural union of the human person and God. 
 
In  this  Image  God  knew  us  before  we  were 
created, in Himself, and now, created in time, unto 
Himself. This image is essentially [weselec] and 
personally in all people, and every person has it 
whole and entire, undivided [....] And thus we are all 
one, united in our eternal image, that is God's image 
and the origin of us all: of our life and our becoming 
[ghewerdens]; wherein our created  being  and  our   
life  hang  [in hangt] without intermediary as in its 
eternal cause. Yet our createdness does not become 
God, nor the image  of  God  (become)  creature;  
for  we  are created unto the image, that is: to 
receive  the image  of  God.  And that image is 
uncreated, eternal: the Son of God 
In desen beelde bekinde ons god, eer wi ghescapen 
waren, in hem selven, ende nu in der tijd  ghescapen,  
toe hem selven. Dit  beelde  es weselec  ende 
persoonlec in alle menschen ende ieghewelc  
mensche  heevet  al  te  male  gheheel, onghedeilt 
[....] Ende aldus sijn wil alle een, vereenecht in onsen 
eeweghen beelde, dat gods beelde  es  ende  onser  
alre  orsprong,  ons  levens ende  ons  ghewerdens,  
daer   onse   ghescapene wesen  ende  onse  leven  
sonder  middel  in  hangt alse in sine eeweghe sake. 
Nochtan en wert onse ghescapenheit niet god noch 
dat beelde  gods creatuere. Want wi sijn ghescapen 
toe den beelde, dat  es:  dat  beelde gods to ontfane. 
Ende dat beelde es onghescapen, eewegh: de sone 
gods.
65
 
 
 
An important stress for Ruusbroec shown here is his reappropriation of the traditional, biblical imago 
Dei anthropology of "image" and "likeness"66 as mutually supporting, yet functioning as distinct 
domains on several different accounts. By "in the image", Ruusbroec will speak of as denoting an 
eternal realm: "And thus this image, which is the Son of God, is eternal, before all createdness."67 By 
contrast, our reception of this image―the Son of God, as well as all of creation, in whom we have 
been created―can be clearly seen as accenting both the historical as well as that of minne and the 
order of grace as our growing in union with and likeness unto this image. Such an accent of 
distinction [onderscheet] thereby emphatically stresses the perdurance of alterity between creatures 
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and Creator, as actively mirroring an image is fundamentally other―no matter the degree of its 
(un)likeness―than the image itself.  In another context in The Spiritual Espousals wherein he 
specifically treats of mutual indwelling via our reception unto the Image in its historical incarnation, 
Ruusbroec writes: 
 
[F]lowing  into  the  unity  of  God  and  into  the 
unity of the mind, so that the rational creature 
may supernaturally obtain and possess the lofty 
union of God. This is why God created heaven 
and earth and everything; this is why He became 
man and taught us and lived for us, and He 
Himself was the way into unity. And He died in 
the bond of love [in bande van minnen], and 
ascended, and unlocked for us the same unity in 
which we can possess eternal blessedness. 
[I]nvlietende  in  die  eenicheit  gods  ende  in  die 
eenicheit  ger ghedachten, op dat die redelijcke 
creatuere  die  hoghe  eenicheit  gods  vercrighen 
ende  besitten moge overnatuerlijcke. Daer omme 
hevet god hemel ende eerde ghescapen ende alle 
dinc, ende daer omme is hi mensche worden, ende 
hevet ons gheleert ende ghelevet, ende self die wech  
gheweset in die   eenicheit.   Ende hi is ghestorven in 
bande van minne, ende opghevaren, ende hevet ons 
ontsloten die  selve enicheit daer wij inne moghen 
besitten die eewighe zalicheit.
68
 
 
  
This above quotation  establishes   the  Christological  and  Soteriological  context  in  which  
Ruusbroec's  early-humanist claims are expressed. Namely, that loving union with Christ is itself not 
only the way to living into loving unity with God, but the further claim that Christ's life and death 
equally 'unlock[s] for us the same unity' and thusgives us access to a greater depth of the significance 
of our humanity itself. This soteriological prologue is therefore critical in beginning with Ruusbroec's 
understanding of mutual indwelling, for it directly links his theological anthropology with the very 
salvific unity that we come to share in and possess with Christ―"becoming partakers of the divine 
nature"69―through living a life of minne with God and with others. And for Ruusbroec, the language 
of deification is indeed, beyond analogical distance and creaturely dissimilarity, an  immediate  
sharing  in  the  "enjoyable  unity  of  the  Godhead"  [in  ghebrukelijcker  eenicheit  der godheit].70 
Here, Ruusbroec's usage of "unity" [eenicheit] is deliberate, in its articulation of immediacy, as 
terminologically distinct from the connotation of differentiation and distance that the language of 
"union" [eenich] entails. 
 
In this case, loving unity with God in and through living in union with Christ, imitatio Christi, is 
not to be confused solely with the moral perfection of the human person, as telos, yet formally 
extrinsic to the human person. Rather, it is in this gratuitous, yet particular relationality that 
Ruusbroec begins with, only then to move to a more generalized theological anthropology, with the 
clear implication that the depths of the human person are themselves inconceivable and unknowable 
outside of its lived relation. Again, union with God is not something additional to our very humanity, 
yet it comprises the very ground or wesen of the person. And yet at the same time, mutual indwelling 
neither deprives nor confuses its mystical anthropology with the order of grace and that of minne, as 
Ruusbroec repeatedly emphasizes.71 
 
Such an anthropology in its distinctly Christological character, for Ruusbroec is equally 
Trinitarian as it builds from its Augustinian heritage in conceiving  of  the  higher  faculties   of   the   
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human person―memory, understanding, will―in a strong, participatory sense, wherein the "living 
ground" of the higher faculties is an "eternal living mirror of God, always without cessation receiving 
the eternal birth of the Son, the image of the Holy Trinity, in which God knows Himself".72  And yet, 
grounding the wesen of the human person upon union with and relation to the radical alterity of God 
is itself a move that affirms a groundless-ground, a unique depiction of a non-foundationalist 
anthropology. Depicting the  human  person,  as  creature,  sustained  by  and  suspended  in  or  
hanging [in hangen]  in  the "fathomless abyss"73  [grondelos abis] of God, Ruusbroec 
characteristically writes that one "[M]ust feel that the foundation of his being [wesen] is 
unfathomable, and as such he must possess it."74 Possession, in all of minne's erotic fullness, can be 
said to function here as the "bliss" of one's loving immersion into an "unknown knowing"75 
[ombecande becantheit]―both in discursive reason's act of knowing, regarded as "unknown", as well 
as the immediacy of 'knowing' within the higher faculty of 'understanding'. Thus, while strongly 
affirming the primacy of minne in terms of our deepening union with God and others, Ruusbroec 
upholds the various modalities of union with God as possessing both a "living knowledge and an 
active loving in us, for without our knowledge we cannot possess God, and without our practice of 
loving we cannot be united with God, nor remain united with him. For if we could find bliss without 
knowing, a stone, which has no knowing, could also find bliss.”76 
 
By better coming to understand the distinctiveness of mutual indwelling for Ruusbroec, we 
can thus see it as supporting a continuum of mutual relations between the radical alterity of the 
Trinitarian God within the immanence of world and the human person as creation. While at the same 
time, such a continuum of world and relations as created, also reinforces the greater dissimilarity of 
creation and the human person with that of the Creator. Thereby conceiving such a radical 
dependence, intimate bond and relational continuity with the nonetheless distinct and autonomous 
orders of the creaturely to that of the Creator renders sensible and consistent what Ruusbroec says 
of minne's distinct sense of knowing and knowability―recalling  the tradition of  Gregory the Great's  
amor  ipse  notitia  est"  [love  itself  is knowledge]―as "above reason, but not without  reason". For 
such a relationality is itself a relation of minne, from which Ruusbroec's  anthropology  can  be   seen  
as  supporting  the  four  fundamental movements or manners of minne itself: facilitating a continual,  
dialectical tension of first charitably "going out" in mediated works that lovingly affirms alterity by 
way of its  "overflowing", gratuitous activity; pivoting in its turn towards an interiority of immediacy 
and marked by an erotic and insatiable yearning in its reciprocal demand for the other; yielding thus 
and "over-formed"  [overforminghe] in an immersion  of  minne  and  resting  enjoyment  in  unity  
"without  difference  or   distinction"  [sonder differentie  ochte  onderscheet];  only  to  lastly  
reaffirm  our  created  particularity  in  distinction  and otherness with God and others as the full-
flowering of Ruusbroec's the "common life" [ghemenye leven]. Here, as seen from the vantage of 
minne, ghemeyne leven's reaffirmation of particularity in distinction and otherness is concretized as a 
creaturely life of eternal, "restlessness of loving" [ongheduer van minnen]. That is, an insatiability 
that is modeless and "beyond reason and beyond manner, for minne desires what remains 
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impossible for it and reason bears witness that minne is right but it can neither advise minne in this 
case nor forbid it."77 
 
Again, the various modes and modelessness of minne are anchored in this primary 
relationality in which mutual indwelling facilitates, wherein Ruusbroec states that: 
 
[W]e live completely in God, where we possess our 
bliss, and completely in ourselves where we practice 
our love towards God. And even if we live   
completely in God and completely in ourselves,   yet 
it is only one life. But it is contrary and twofold 
according to feeling, for poor and rich, hungry and 
replete, working and at rest, those are contraries 
indeed. Yet in them resides our highest nobility, 
now and forever. For we cannot become God at all 
and lose our createdness: that is impossible. And if 
we remained in ourselves completely, separated 
from God, we would be wretched and beyond bliss. 
And therefore we should feel ourselves completely 
in God and completely in ourselves. 
Ende aldus [aldus] leven wij gheheel in gode, daer wij 
onse salicheit besitten; ende wij leven gheheel in  
ons  selven,  daer  wij  ons  in  minnen  te  gode 
oefenen. Ende al eest dat wij gheheel in god leven 
ende gheheel  in ons selven, dit en es doch maer een 
leven. Maer het es contrarie ende tweevuldich van 
ghevoelne: want arm  ende rijcke, hongherich ende 
sat, werkende ende ledich, dese dinghe sijn te  male  
contrarie.  Nochtan  gheleghet  hier  inne onse  
hoochste edelheit, nu ende eewelijc. Want wij en 
moghen te male niet god werden ende onse 
ghescapenheit verliesen; dat es ommoghelijc. Bleven 
wij oec te male in ons selven ghesondert van gode,  
soe  moesten  wij  sijn  elendich  ende onsalich. Ende 
hier omme selen wij ons gheheel in god ghevoelen 
ende gheheel in ons selven.
78
 
  
 
The rhythmof minne concretely images the relationality between the human person as growing unto 
the uncreated Image in whom we have been created as highly dynamic in mutual suspension in the 
Other. Juxtaposing autonomy, relationality and alterity, such rhythm portrays both mystical union 
and salvation in Christ in terms of deification and the radical language of union with God. 
 
As it was earlier introduced, Ruusbroec's synthesis of minne grounds an opening towards a 
distinct mystical theological conceptuality, while equally showing a sensitivity and firm attention to 
issues of praxis. Subsequently, as we have argued that the founding presupposition to minne's 
synthesis can be seen in mutual indwelling, it is sensible that mutual indwelling too would evidence a 
similar predilection. Hence, retrieval  of Ruusbroec's understanding  of  minne  and  its  
presupposition  of  mutual  indwelling  must  ultimately contend  with  such  a  presupposition  in  
both  its  cosmological  and  anthropological  sense,  which Ruusbroec explicitly indicates in the 
following: 
 
See, this is the highest mode of living that a person 
can express about God. By it, He lives in the highest 
nature of heaven, and with respect to our mode, 
(He lives) nearer and more nobly in the apex of our 
createdness. He has called and chosen us: if we seek 
Him, we shall find Him in ourselves, and  above 
ourselves, where He occupies Himself  in  His  glory,  
with  His chosen  ones,  contemplating,  knowing,  
loving, enjoying and perfusing everything with 
eternal blessedness. 
Siet, dit es de hoochste levende wise die men 
ghewaerden mach van gode. Ende hier mede levet hi 
in  die  overste  natuere  der  hemele,  ende  na onser   
wijs   naerre ende edelre in dat overste onse<r> 
ghescapenheit. Ende hi hevet ons gheroepen ende 
vercoren; eest dat wine soeken, wi selenen vinden in 
ons selven ende boven ons selven, daer hi sijns selfs 
pleecht in sijnre glorien met sinen uutvercornen,  
scouwende, kinnende, minnende, ghebrukende ende 
al doervloeiende met ewigher salicheit.
79
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Hence, as we shall now see, these convergences are made specific in the Brabantine contemplative's 
speculations on the glorified body and its very humane, sensuous beholding of the exalted humanity 
of Christ. Such a thematic instantiates a generalized presumption of minne's embodied, speculative 
reason in  facilitating a greater continuity between the orders of grace and glory. A continuity, which 
(to emphasize once again) at the same time mirrors its more overarching, early-humanist claim that 
progressively deepening in loving union with God's alterity affirms one's own created particularity. 
 
 
             D. EMBODIMENT, IDENTITY AND RUUSBROEC'S SPECULATIONS OVER THE  GLORIFIED BODY 
 
Having undergone this significant detour of examining Ruusbroec's understanding of minne 
as guided by his founding presumption of mutual indwelling—a presumption which in turn has been 
shown to consist of  both  cosmological and  anthropological realms—we can now  return to our 
initial focus. Namely, Ruusbroec's speculations surrounding the life of glory made in Vanden 
Kerstenen Ghelove. Following our text-focused approach, it was initially introduced that the basis and 
license that allowed for Ruusbroec to speculate on the life of glory was not to be found in some form 
of mystical experience of private revelation. Rather, his speculations stem from his repeated 
theological emphasis placed upon the Church's confession of the "general resurrection of all bodies". 
An emphasis supported in part by minne's own embodied sense and the enduring importance placed 
upon the body and its works as creaturely. Hence, Ruusbroec's speculations on eternal life and its 
embodied reality are based upon a sense of continuity between the orders of nature, grace and glory 
and the founding basis for this view has  been situated in terms of mutual indwelling. However, it has 
been argued that Ruusbroec's distinct, "interpersonal" imago dei doctrine of mutual  indwelling  is  
not  solely  an  anthropological  doctrine,  yet  it  shows  similar  instances  of  the creature's "hanging 
in" [inhangen] or being "suspended-in" the Other within Ruusbroec's cosmological writings  as  well.  
 
This  cosmological  perspective  is  analogous  to  Ruusbroec's  more  well-developed 
anthropology that contrasts certain exemplarist leanings—of eternally being begotten in the Son, in 
the Image—with the firm instance that we are also created unto the image in our historical reception 
and growing in likeness to Christ through a life of grace and virtuous living. By employing and 
interplaying such a dynamic exchange of perpetual distinction and otherness, Ruusbroec goes to 
great lengths to think the naturalness of union with God as the relational foundation to the creature 
itself, without however distorting or confusing the orders of Creator and creature and running the 
risk of pantheism. Such is also the case for Ruusbroec's cosmological writings, and in particular the 
question of the firmament, conceived as a resplendent transparency that both mirrors the 
"resplendence of the uppermost heaven [i.e. the Empyrean] and is reflecting it back"80 while at the 
same time,"...divides and distinguishes [onderscheet] between the waters of the heavens and  the  
waters of  the earth". A cosmological division,which Ruusbroec then  goes on to metaphysically liken  
to  the  foundational  border "between time and eternity; between an outward active life and an 
inward spiritual life; between grace and nature".81 
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By  drawing  sufficient  attention  to  Ruusbroec's  cosmology,  such  a  reading  further  
attests  to  the compelling nature of his synthetic thought, as he considers the broad sweep of the 
intrinsic logic of what the life of minne fully entails. By both drawing inwards within the Trinity as 
well as spilling out and "overflowing"  throughout  the  very  fruitfulness  and  activity  of  creation,  
minne's  linkages  in  these cosmological movements are affirmed as bearing a "rough likeness" to 
the gratuitous, fruitful nature of the  Father. Furthermore, as an "outward way  of  the  senses",  
attention to Ruusbroec's  cosmology highlights the enduring and extraordinary importance that he 
places upon the body as the seat of embodied rationality and the praxis of outward works within the 
common life [ghemeyne leven] and his overall mystical theology. However, when speaking of a 
glorified body, what type of body is Ruusbroec referring to and can we earnestly speak of such a 
glorified body in continuity with our own present, lived embodiment in the world? 
 
Briefly returning to Randles' Unmaking of the Christian Cosmos, it is helpful to see the 
manner in which certain Patristic and Scholastic theologians have speculated upon the glorified body, 
especially when largely accenting the body's strong degree of discontinuity from our present lived 
embodiment, as well as the (unforeseen) consequences of such speculative thought. Such accents 
are particularly noticeable in Albertus Magnus, when he first "[R]ealized, in his Commentary on the 
Sentences, that the Almighty could not be contained within the Empyrean," as the manner of 
conceiving of the Empyrean was now being viewed as a definite place along the lines of an 
"Aristotelian 'body (corpus)'."82 The profound significance of this point is in part two fold. First, by the 
full admission of Aristotelian terms and categories and in particular, Aristotle's conception of the 
body as corpus―as materially extended in the world and thus requiring spatiality, or a place for its 
extension―such an understanding of corpus no longer made it possible to conceive of the Trinity as 
dwelling within and in effect, being contained by the Empyrean itself. Hence, out of deference to 
God's transcendence, the immediate move of Albert and his noted pupil, Aquinas, (amongst others) 
was to propose a new, outermost "eleventh heaven", whereby such a heaven was no longer 
conceived of as a corpus and "God alone was held to occupy an infinite imaginary space."83 
 
Similarly, such distancing moves were duplicated when it came to speculating upon the 
glorified body and its life of the senses, in that according to Aristotle's positing of the "fifth  essence" 
as filling what the Scholastics would assign to the Empyrean, such an essence could neither be 
divided nor distinguished, thus remaining unchanged and foregoing decay. This Aristotelian essence 
would thus prove problematic for the Dominican scholastics, as the question of the voice provided a 
significant challenge in affirming its glorified existence. This is so, since the voice  "[C]annot be 
produced without what Albert called in Aristotelian terms 'the breaking of air (fractu aeris)', [since] 
there would  be  no  air  capable  of being divided [....] Thus there will be 'neither voice nor sound'."84 
Despite his dissatisfaction with such a conclusion, Randles notes that the famous pupil furthered his 
teacher's position on this point, such that: "On the transmission of sound in the Empyrean, where 
there would be no breathing and without breathing there can be no voice, Aquinas notes that some 
had said that praise of God there [in the Empyrean] might only be 'in the mind (mentalem)."85 The 
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same can be said for taste, for example, where Albert acknowledges that "taste implied the ingestion 
of something but bodies in the state of glory ingest nothing, therefore they would not be able to 
taste anything."86 By this, we can already see a strong contrast with Ruusbroec's conception of the 
life of glory, recalling an earlier quoted passage: "And we shall taste the goodness of God [....] And it 
shall feed us and go through our souls and our bodies and we shall be hungry and thirsty for it 
always, and through that hunger and thirst both our tasting and our being fed shall remain always 
and be made new: and that is eternal life."87 
 
In short, what Randles excellent scholarship in part unveils is how spiritualized the glorified 
body was becoming, as challenging attempts to reconcile and harmonize this "problematic" creedal 
tenet  with natural philosophy increasingly amounted to hermeneutical strategies that stressed the 
glorified body's utter discontinuity with our present, lived embodiment. The glorified  body  was  
quickly becoming envisioned as far more disembodied. While along strictly cosmological lines, any 
sense for the continuity and  interpenetration  between  the  waters'  above  from  those  below  was 
increasingly becoming rarefied, well before the collapse of the pre-modern cosmological synthesis 
itself. In turn, just as Oliver Davies has drawn attention to  the Ptolemaic  cosmos  and  its  thinking of 
"heaven  in the heavens" by the metaphorical logic of 'height', so too we can see in Albert's proposal 
of an outermost, "eleventh heaven" the instinctually metaphorical thinking of "distance". With such 
"distance", as set apart from creaturely immanence, Albert's metaphorical action of distancing God is 
illustrative of an increasingly familiar instinct that, in more general terms, Nominalism would later 
take on with full force as the manner in which to think, affirm and ultimately protect God's 
transcendence, especially when philosophic categories and modes of thought appear to impinge 
upon such transcendence.  
 
As a thinking pattern and on purely metaphorical lines, by recognizing the relational 
foundations of mutual indwelling and its centrality for Ruusbroec, we see the opposite tendency for 
the Brabantine contemplative. That is, minne's erotic affirmation of God's greater alterity is always a 
matter of both flowing outwards with and for others in virtuous works, which then in turn pivots by 
way of desirously drawing inwards and inclining towards what remains an unsurpassable and 
founding alterity.88 In short, it is only by drawing relationally closer and more proximate to God, in 
minne, that thus reaffirms His otherness. Hence, there is an apt parallel between what we have 
earlier encountered with the relational affirmation of particularity amid union with God in His 
greater alterity and that of the glorified body. Namely, just as for Ruusbroec, deeping in likeness and 
union with God renders the creature more creaturely, more particular, so too is the greater 
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particularity and distinctiveness of our lived embodiment to be affirmed, not presently, yet when 
gloriously beholding "God with the eyes of our body". 
 
1. "With the eyes of our body" 
 
With this, we can now turn directly to Ruusbroec's Kerstenen Ghelove and his treatment of 
the last two articles of the Nicene Creed. In introducing the eleventh article of the "general 
resurrection of all bodies", Ruusbroec immediately clarifies this by first stating that "Each soul shall 
be given its own body again, which it wore and lived in on earth."89 For Ruusbroec, the basis and 
theological rationale for this article of faith is none other than the founding reciprocal dimensions of 
minne itself, which includes the enduring efficacy and value that he places upon the person's 
outward, charitably virtuous works. This is seen as Ruusbroec writes that "God has considered from 
all eternity that it is fitting and proper that good people should be rewarded in soul and body, since 
they have loved God and served Him with soul and body."90 Therefore, as it is generally consistent 
with his entire oeuvre, Ruusbroec's understanding of minne in this instance can be affirmed as 
guiding his mystical theological approach and speculative reflections upon the life of glory itself.91 
Employing minne's distinct rationale can further be seen in what amounts to a curious turn that 
Ruusbroec later makes concerning the resurrected body, this time as it is envisioned at the last 
Judgment. 
 
And through His power and His commandment all 
bodies of all people shall be made new and rise at 
the same moment; they shall not be the same in 
rank or reward, but they shall all be of one and the 
same age, that is the age at which our Lord Jesus 
Christ died for our sake. For a man of a hundred 
years and a child of one night shall be of the same 
physical size. And even if good people can be 
crippled on earth, lame or blind, they shall rise 
perfect, with all their limbs unstained and 
unblemished, glorious as the body of our Lord Jesus 
Christ. 
Ende overmids sine macht ende sijn gebot so selen 
alle lichamen der menscen weder gemaect sijn ende 
op verstaen in enen ogen blicke, niet gelijc van 
ordinen noch van loene, maer al gelijc van enen tyde 
der ouder, dat es van den selven tide dat ons here 
Jhesus Cristus was, doe hi starf omme onsen wille. 
Want een mensche van  hondert jaren  ende een  kint 
van  eere nacht die selen ghelijc groet van lichamen 
sijn. Ende al sijn die goede menschen hier cropel, lam 
ende blent, si selen op verstaen volcomen, met allen 
leden, sonder vlecke ende  sonder  smette, glorioes  
alse  die  lichame  ons heren Jhesu Cristi. 
92
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Here, Ruusbroec employs minne's familiar semantic categories of "difference" [differencie] 
and "distinction" [onderscheet] when describing the Last Judgment. In terms of onderscheet―which 
entails the question of the activity of minne and the life of grace as a growing in likeness unto the 
Image, the Son, 2nd Person of the Trinity, in whom we historically receive as created―for the life of 
glory, Ruusbroec consistently affirms that their will remain distinction and otherness in both 
"rank...[and] reward".  Not only is this stress consistent with his overall understanding of minne and 
union with God as admitting of distinction and otherness, but furthermore, it is a historically 
important point, as the ideas surrounding the Free Spirit Heresy and Ruusbroec's depiction of it had 
directly challenged this point of distinction, opting instead to envision such a glorious union with God 
as an eschatological merging and an inactive dissolution of any and all otherness.93 For Ruusbroec, 
such ideas not only easily merge into forms of autotheism that compromise the essential difference 
between Creator and creature, but they also contradict fundamental tenets and thinking patterns of 
minne itself as a praxis of loving that can never extract itself from its more active modes of desiring 
and virtuous living. Nevertheless, while affirming the enduring onderscheet in the life of glory, 
Ruusbroec also affirms―in a consistent, yet albeit curious manner―that at the moment of 
Judgment, "all bodies...shall all be of one and the same age, that is the age at which our Lord Jesus 
Christ died for our sake." Hence, as Ruusbroec speculates that no matter our length of years while 
living in the orders of nature and grace, we shall all come to judgment at the age of thirty-three, the 
age when "Christ died for our sake." It is a curious and perhaps at first glance, a somewhat bizarre 
insistence, and yet what Ruusbroec aims at conveying in this passage is that there will be no 
fundamental difference both amongst everyone in coming to receive the judgment of Christ, as well 
as our common [ghemeyne], full mutuality with the humanity of Christ in which he died for us on the 
Cross. By maintaining both full mutuality and the absence of any fundamental difference, along with 
the remaining distinction of our works and rewards, Ruusbroec's understanding of minne once more 
allows for him to affirm his understanding of relationality and radical union that distinctly avoids the 
problematics of the Free Spirit's heretical views of glory as an ultimate merging with and becoming 
God. 
 
However, concerning issues of embodiment and Ruusbroec's thinking of the glorified body, 
how does his embodied speculations of the "man of a hundred years and a child of one night" as 
without difference make sense with his earlier insistence that "Each soul shall be given its own body 
again, which it wore and lived in on earth."94  Barring any easy reading solutions that would simply 
assert that Ruusbroec has clearly contradicted himself in this instance, instead, I would like to put 
forward the alternative reading that there is no immediate conflict here for Ruusbroec and that such 
an insistence is well in keeping with what he have seen previously in Ruusbroec's founding 
presumption of mutual indwelling. Namely, Ruusbroec's understanding of mutual indwelling 
articulates a foundational relationality of the human person in union with God as inherent and prior 
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to any forms of 'identity'―with what we more commonly associate with modernity's "turn to the 
subject"―as the latter would insist upon (in keeping with Ruusbroec's idiom) 'difference' and not 
'distinction' as founding the creature's inherent alterity amongst both others as well as with God. 
Rather, by minding Ruusbroec's paradoxical insistence that the Final Judgment will entail a common  
embodiment as both without difference as well as unquestionably particular, the paradox that 
Ruusbroec's speculations employ are similarly echoed by the traditional, biblical affirmation of where 
the seat of identity is located. That is,  a "tree is known by its own fruit". 95  
 
Nevertheless, why does Ruusbroec envision our entry into the life of glory at the seat of 
Christ's Judgment in such an admittedly bizarre manner? Despite its odd insistence, Ruusbroec 
displays the consummation of its logic in a unique, fascinating passage: 
 
Look, in this way every soul shall put on its own 
body, and (people) shall come to judgment with 
soul and body. And as Job says, the holy man, we 
shall see God with the eyes of our body that means 
we shall see our Lord Jesus Christ in his human 
nature. For He shall show himself to all people in 
the same form and the same shape in which he 
lived and died for our sake. The good shall see joy 
and glory on his face. But to those who are evil he 
shall show himself in terror, with great contempt 
and great anger. And every man shall receive just 
sentence on his words and works and all he has 
done, through the justice and wisdom of God who 
knows all things clearly. 
Siet, aldus sal iegewelke ziele haren eigenen lichame 
ane doen ende sal comen ten ordele gods met zielen 
ende met live. Ende alsoe alse Job sprect, die heilege 
man, so selen wi met onsen vleeschliken ogen gode 
sijn, dat es te verstane onsen here Jhesum Cristum na 
sier mensceit. Want hi sal heme vertoenen allen 
menscen inder selver vormen ende gedaenten daer hi 
<omme onsen wille> in leefde ende starf. Die goede 
menscen selen sien sijn aenscien blide ende glorioes. 
Maer hi sal heme vertoenen den quanden in gruwele, 
met groter onwerden ende sere vertorent. Ende 
overmids die gerechtecheit ende die wijsheit gods, die 
alle dinc claerlec bekint, so sal iegewelc mensce recht 
ordeel ontfaen van waerden ende van werken ende 
van alle dien dat hi iegedede. 
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In this passage, Ruusbroec begins by emphasizing once more that we shall come to judgment, coram 
deo, with both our own soul and body. And while onderscheet remains in terms of our reception of 
Christ, the basis for our lack of embodied difference is clarified by Ruusbroec in an interesting move 
wherein he speculates that everyone shall be of the same "form and [...] shape" of Christ, "in which 
He lived and died for our sake." This point can be seen as a development of his earlier cosmological 
writings in Rijcke, wherein he states that "[W]here bodiliness ends, all the senses ends; for no sense 
can comprehend God or angels or souls, for they are without form/shape [sonder ghedeente]."97 Of 
course, Ruusbroec does not contradict this early position. Rather, in Kerstenen Ghelove he further 
develops and nuances it, by reasserting a distinct, Christological perspective (and later on, a 
Mariological assertion98) of Christ's glorified humanity in which we shall behold at judgment.99 Such a 
dogmatic theological perspective then in turn makes way for the uniqueness of Ruusbroec thought, 
first and foremost, as a mystical theologian, whereby he then situates our common beholding of 
Christ at the seat of judgment as none other than sharing the full, embodied reality of the Cross―"in 
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the same form and shape in which he lived and died for our sake." Such is why he stresses that while 
we shall receive once more our own particular bodies, as our bodies shall be of no difference―of the 
same physical size and age of Christ―in commonly baring his embodied outpouring of love beneath 
the weight of the Cross. Furthermore, Ruusbroec speculates that there shall be no difference 
amongst all as we equally behold the external loving work of Christ, giving Himself to all as "He shall 
show himself to all people in the same form and the same shape [...]”  
 
For Ruusbroec, as we have consistently seen earlier in his cosmological reflections, it is 
crucial that he emphasizes this point that at the Cross, all people shall commonly "see God with the 
eyes of our body". For such an embodied emphasis displays, what is for Ruusbroec, the body and its 
senses as the mediating forum and gateway for both knowing  that which is "above reason, but not 
without reason" and in turn—through the specificity of one's works as the seat of personal identity—
being known. According to the logic and rationale of minne and its embodied form of knowing, to 
come to fully know the other is to affirm union with the other, without difference. Or, in this case, to 
become the "same form and shape" with the other's embodied life. And yet, the mutuality and 
relationality of minne places an equal (if not greater) emphasis upon how we are to be known in such 
an embrace, as "We shall embrace love with love and we shall be by love comprehended."100 Such 
is where the uniqueness and particularity of our bodies and their loving works, of the order of 
onderscheet, is to be affirmed.  For its how we shall receive Christ―and receive Him, joined with Him 
on the Cross―which shall ultimately come to reflect ourselves and our (un)likeness to Christ. 
Whether we mirror and reflect Him, both in our shared embrace, without difference, with his 
humanity, and whether we are also to see the "glory and joy on his face" as imaging His divinity. 
Which is to say, while fully joined with Him in His suffering humanity, do our lives, through such 
works, equally bear witness to the divinity of Christ as inescapably Other. Or, as is often the case 
when it comes to physical and/or emotional suffering, does such a relationality and its abiding 
otherness ultimately collapse while enduring such suffering. Thereby growing in greater dissimilarity 
and unlikeness to Christ―fully human, fully divine―and in turn, mirroring more our own selves and 
the absence of such a redeeming relationality, seeing ourselves in Him that collapses such otherness, 
such that  Christ "show[s] himself in terror, with great contempt and great anger." 
 
2. "Go into the joy of thy Lord" 
 
 
Ruusbroec builds from this depiction of Christ’s Final Judgment and in turn, envisions the 
glorious life not as a static beholding, yet as a redeemed, fully human embodied life that participates 
within the Trinitarian life—without difference, with distinction—as a dynamic life of minne itself, 
wherein “God Himself is our essential [wezeleken] reward.”101 Thus, unlike what we have briefly seen 
by the Dominican Scholastics such as Albertus Magnus and Aquinas, speculation about the life of 
glory does not encounter God as still fundamentally removed, continuously mediated and set apart 
from the blessed, as evidenced in what we have seen in the cosmological proposals that would 
create a further, separated ‘eleventh heaven’―a space fundamentally set apart, and in discontinuity 
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with the created world wherein God alone could dwell.102 As we have seen throughout this 
reflection, what allows Ruusbroec to articulate a fundamentally different depiction of the life of glory 
rests primarily in his presumption of mutual indwelling. As mutual indwelling presumes the very 
naturalness of union with God―fully dwelling in God, and God fully dwelling in His creatures―which 
in turn, through an active, virtuous life and by God’s grace is brought to likeness and distinction 
[onderscheet] in further imaging the Son and its perfection in glory. The dynamism of this union, 
introduced by Ruusbroec's biblical reference to the Matthean Gospel account of "Go into the joy of 
the Lord"103 is seen in the interplay between minne's wezeleke rest in enjoyment, as well as its 
continual activity and praxis:  
  
[W]e shall go into the joy of our Lord which is 
measureless and fathomless. And we shall lose 
ourselves in it and remain there essentially 
[wezeleke bliven] in an eternal enjoyment. And we 
shall stand in ourselves, each in his state and his 
order. 
[D]an selen wi ingaen in die vroude ons heren, die 
sonder <mate ende sonder> gront es. Ende daerinne 
zelen wi ons verliezen ende wezeleke bliven in een 
ewech ghebruken. Ende wi zelen in ons selven staen, 
iegewelc in sinen staet ende in sine ordine.
104
 
 
 
Consistent with other accounts, Ruusbroec depicts minne in its glorified state as both one of restful, 
‘essential [wezeleke] […] eternal enjoyment’, as well as its continuously active, virtuous and 
charitable sense, as seen in the full-flourishing of the creature’s autonomy as distinctly particular. By 
this, Ruusbroec summarizes the distinctly anthropological dimensions of mutual indwelling, such that 
a permanent dynamism and an axis of dissimilarity are maintained between the ‘greater dissimilarity’ 
of Creator and creature, by its contrasting of ‘essential rest’ in God and minne’s eternal activity 
wherein we shall “stand in ourselves” according to the distinction of our works, “each in his order 
and state”. Likewise, Ruusbroec also gives mention to mutual indwelling’s more cosmological 
dimensions of continuity wherein he states: 
 
And we shall be raised up towards our heavenly 
Father in Christ Jesus with honor and praise eternal. 
We shall have the beauty of heaven and earth 
under us, and of all the elements in the splendor 
they shall have after the last day [....]And our bodies 
shall be seven times brighter than the sun and 
transparent like crystal or glass [...] 
Ende in Cristo Jhesu zelen wi op gerecht sijn tote 
onsen hemelscen vader met eweegher eeren ende 
met eweghen love.Onder ons zelen wi hebben 
scoenheit des hemels ende der erden ende alle der 
elemente, die geciert zelen sijn na den lesten dach [....] 
Ende onse lichamen zelen sijn zevenvout clare dan die 
zonne ende dorscinech alse cristael ochte een gelaes 
[...]
105
 
 
In such a glorious state and from a cosmological perspective, Ruusbroec speculates upon our 
union with God in greater continuity with the world as created. Just as we shall receive once more 
our own body, so too is the blessed Empyrean envisioned in continuation with the 'beauty of heaven 
and earth under us'. By this, the Empyrean is envisioned by Ruusbroec as a specific, soteriological 
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place:as the perfection of creation itself . Which in turn, by virtue of mutual indwelling, the created 
world is thus viewed as neither absorbed in glory, nor diminished. Instead, just as we had previously 
seen the question of the firmament and its "transparency" cosmologically functioning for Ruusbroec 
as a "spiritual  intermediary that  divides and distinguishes [onderscheet]"106 God from the created 
world; so too in glory, it is the glorified body itself, "transparent like crystal or glass" that is upheld as 
the source of mediation―distinguishing and preserving God's relational alterity, while equally 
affirming our union with God as distinctly and necessarily embodied. Thus, as Ruusbroec's 
understanding of mutual indwelling synthesizes both its anthropological and cosmological 
dimensions—such that "if we seek Him, we shall find Him in ourselves, and above ourselves, 
where He occupies Himself in His glory,"107—these modalities converge in Ruusbroec's speculation 
about our sensuous, embodied beholding of God's glory with our "interior" and "exterior" senses: 
 
With the eyes of our body we shall behold our Lord 
Jesus Christ and his glorious mother with all the 
saints and all the physical beauty I told you of 
before. With our inner eyes we shall see the mirror 
of the Wisdom of God in which all things that have 
ever been made and can bring us joy shall glitter 
and shine. And with our outer ears we shall hear the 
melody and the sweet song of the angels and the 
saints who shall praise God forever. And with our 
inner ears we shall hear the inborn Word of God the 
Father, and in that Word we shall be given all 
knowledge and all truth. And the noble odor of the 
Holy Spirit shall pass by us, sweeter than all balsam 
and all the most expensive herbs that have ever 
been grown. And this odor will draw us out of 
ourselves into the eternal love of God. And we shall 
taste the goodness of God, which is sweet beyond 
all honey. And it shall feed us and go through our 
souls and our bodies and we shall be hungry and 
thirsty for it always and through that hunger and 
thirst both our tasting and our being fed shall 
remain always and be made new: and that is eternal 
life. 
Wi zelen met onsen lijfleken ogen ane sien onsen here 
Jhesum Cristum ende sijn gloriose moeder met allen 
heileghen, ende alle die lijfleke scoenheit die ic u vore 
genoemt hebbe. Wi selen met onsen inwendegen 
ogen aensien den spighel der wijsheit gods, daer alle 
die dinghe inne blicken ende lichte<n> selen die yege-
worden, die ons verblinden mogen. Ende wi zelen 
horen met onsen uutwendegen oren die melody ende 
den zoeten sanc der ingelen ende der heilegen, die 
gode zelen loven ewelec. Ende met onse inwendege 
oren zelen wi horen dat ingeborenne woert gods des 
vaders. Ende in dien woerde zelen wij ontfaen alle 
const ende alle waerheit. Ende die edele goere des 
heilechts geests sal vore ons liden, die zoetere es dan 
alle die balseme ende alle die dierbare crude die 
yegheworden. Ende die goere sal ons trecken ute ons 
selven in die ewege minne gods. Ende wi zelen 
gesmaken die goetheit gods, die zoete es boven al 
honech. Ende die sal ons voeden ende dore gaen ziele 
ende lijf. Ende dair na sal ons altoes hngeren ende 
dorsten; ende overmids honger ende dorst so sal 
smaken ende voeden altoes bliven ende vernuwen: 
ende dat es ewech leven.
108
 
 
Immediately apparent in this section is the very Trinitarian structure of our embodied 
beholding of God in glory. In this way, this passage bears a distinct resemblance to his description of 
the “five voices” that mark human interiority, as presented in Four Temptations [Vier 
Becoringhen].109 However, unlike the ‘Five Voices’, and our previous analysis of the Trinity and 
human interiority, as beginning with the Son of God distinctly regarded in His divinity; in this current 
passage re our embodied beholding of God in glory, Ruusbroec reemphasizes the basis of this 
beholding in view of Christ’s exalted, embodied state, joined with his ‘glorious mother’ and ‘all the 
saints’ at the right hand of God. This distinct starting point is significant in that it highlights the role of 
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Christ’s exalted embodiment and our union with Christ by way of our own glorified bodies as 
continuously mediating our beholding of the Trinity. Thus, such a portrait of an embodied life of glory 
and its eternal hungering and thirsting for God’s goodness stands as a preeminent example within 
Ruusbroec’s oeuvre that demonstrates what we have earlier indicated as Ruusbroec’s distinct, early-
Humanist stress upon union with God in his ‘greater dissimilarity’ as a further redeeming of the 
intrinsic goodness of creation as well as our own goodness in all of its distinct, embodied 
particularity. 
 
 
§3. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS  
 
 
In our analysis, it has been shown, by way of mutual indwelling and its distinct, cosmological 
register that Ruusbroec depicts the various modalities of union with God along an axis of greater 
continuity that attempts to seamlessly thread, ‘transparently’, yet without confusion, the orders of 
nature, grace and glory. Such a reflection hopefully has left little doubt as to the enduring 
importance Ruusbroec accords both to the body itself and its outwards works of virtue and 
charitable love within his own mystical theology. For Ruusbroec, issues of embodiment and 
particularity are approached, not according to the basis of identity, but relationally thought, as 
extending from the uniqueness of our works and the uniqueness of our loving. Seating the 
particularity of the embodied individual, by way of the uniqueness of their works, the uniqueness of 
their loving, thus challenges our more modern presumptions that particularity is assigned and 
preserved by way of autonomy and 'difference'. Rather, it may come as a surprise to see—amid 
thinking such strong continuity—that not only does Ruusbroec equally insist upon the creature’s own 
distinct form of autonomy, as created and in the world. But moresothat Ruusbroec maintains such an 
insistence in his speculations on our embodied specifically in terms of our life in glory. By way of its 
unyielding, erotic insistence, Ruusbroec’s embodied speculations of our life in glory illustrate minne’s 
own continual dynamism as a sensuous beholding, tasting and thirsting after the goodness of the 
Trinitarian God. And it is this unyielding dynamism, which Ruusbroec thus emphatically calls ‘eternal 
life’. Hence, by such an eschatological view, for Ruusbroec, union with God necessitates forms of 
mediation, such that the perdurance of the body in glory effectively mitigates against Free Spirit 
heretical claims of authotheism (‘becoming God’) or pantheistic versions of union with God as a full 
merging, envisioned as completely ‘imageless’ and ‘idle’ [ledicheit]. 
 
In turn, the issue for us all along has not to become overly burdened by pre-modern 
cosmologies as such, yet to see how Ruusbroec thinks of such sensuous embodiment and his 
speculations over our glorious beholding of Christ's very humane, glorified body. That is, in seeing 
God "with the eyes of our body" and its specific relevance to issues of particularity, universality and 
alterity. Thus, we have set out to investigate how minne contends with these competing claims, via 
ghemeyne leven as dual cosmological and anthropological imperatives, in all their continuity and 
discontinuity. An imperative toseek God both "in ourselves, and above ourselves", and how such an 
unceasing rhythm is dynamically secured through a more comprehensive understanding of mutual 
indwelling itself. 
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From this analysis, we have analyzed the synthetic breadth and sweep of minne, by way of 
viewing Ruusbroec's thinking of mutual indwelling in both its anthropological and cosmological 
domains. The compelling, retrievable nature of Ruusbroec's view of minne has in turn been asserted 
in terms of the various linkages that it frequently maintains, both in assuring the foundational 
relations and alterity between Creator and creature, as well as the various modes and modelessness 
of minne itself. Not only does Ruusbroec link, what is largely for us today a more divided view of love 
in terms of caritas, eros and agape, yet he does so precisely by thinking their mutual implication and 
involvement, without collapsing one against the other. Again, I contend that minne's appeal is 
attested in the various linkages that Ruusbroec makes between seemingly disparate realms and 
modes of loving, founding such disparities within the very dynamism of minne itself. A dynamism 
that images and renders i n t e l l i g i b l e  love's own inherent logic and rationale. And it is precisely 
here that the enduring significance of the body and Ruusbroec's glorified speculations upon its 
continuing embodiment show itself to be of founding importance in coming to a fuller account of 
minne's dynamic synthesis. For just as mutual indwelling's anthropological domain stresses the 
creature's relationality with God as "suspended" and "hanging- in" [inhanghen] the other―hence, a 
relationship of foundational immediacy; conversely, Ruusbroec's cosmological and embodied 
reflections on the "outward way of the senses" and the charitably virtuous aspects of ghemeyne 
leven ultimately secure the equally enduring status of minne's active, mediated character. The 
perdurance of the body in the life of glory is thus fully consistent in demonstrating minne's ongoing, 
dynamic character that maintains and upholds minne's various modes and modelessness. Contrary to 
the Free Spirit's thinking of charitable, virtuous acts as preliminary and provisional, Ruusbroec's 
insistence on a very real, continuous and particular embodied life in glory is thus set in strong 
contrast to this view, as such an active life, like the body itself and its loving works, is partially 
constitutive of minne itself and hence, refuses to be left behind. For Ruusbroec, such an insistence on 
the body attests to his overall strong sense what we may call his embodied realism. For it is the same, 
continuous body: whether that be the Eucharistic body or the Glorified body, as opening onto 
ghemeyne leven, as indeed the same sensuous, concrete, human body is seen in stark contrast away 
from a spiritualized, universal and overly-transcendent body removed from immanence and all traces 
of human particularity. For in closing as Ruusbroec writes in describing the "first scale" of minne 
"that was ever practiced", he eloquently describes what it is in fact that he "finds in nature", a 
cosmological perspective that affirms not the world, in of itself, but the very manner in which world 
has been given and how we are to live and respond to God and others within such a world, as 
created, amid the ongoing activity and fruitfulness that nature shows us―a view, eminently 
retrievable for us today. 
 
It teaches us that God made us from nothing and 
that He gave Himself to us and all that He had 
made. This love that is God is common to us all and 
to each one in particular and (belongs) totally to 
those who love. This love is one, above all 
enumeration and without enumeration. And it is 
eternal above time and without time, above 
measure and without measure. And it is a pure 
spirit, without place. See, this is the noble scale of 
love, which God has given us and it is all that He can 
give. And this is why we must leave all things and 
Die leert ons dat ons god van nieute maecht, ende dat 
<hi  ons> hem  selven  gaf  ende  al  dat  hi ghemaect 
hadde. [Dat] Dese minne, die god es, die es onser 
alder ghemeyne ende yeghewelcs sonderlinghe, ende 
al <ghe> heel die mint. Dese minne es een boven alle 
ghetale, sonder ghetal. Ende  si  es  eewich  boven  tijt  
ende  sonder  tijt, boven mate ende sonder mate. 
Ende si es een puer gheest, al sonder stat. Siet diet es 
die eedele waghe der minnen, die ons god ghegheven 
hevet ende al dat he vermach. Ende hier omme 
moeten wij alle dinc laten ende begheven, selen wy 
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give them up, if we are going to satisfy the scale of 
highest love. 
die waghe der hoochster minnen pleghen.
110
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
110
 Ruusbroec, Beghinen 2b, ll. 660-669. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, NATIVE ATTUNEMENT AND THE  
“ADMIRABILE COMMERCIUM” 
 
 
 
 
 §1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The following reflections will consider at large the late Dutch Jesuit systematic theologian, 
Frans Jozef van Beeck (1930-2011) as innovating and expanding upon my general critique of the 
reception of mysticism within modernity. It will then be shown how van Beeck supplants this critique 
with his own distinct theological treatment of mysticism as an integral feature within his theological 
synthesis. A synthesis, which, for van Beeck, reflects a profound sense of unity, both between the 
various theological disciplines in relation to the “Great Tradition”, as well as the equally profound 
cosmological-anthropological-theological unity underlying his work. For van Beeck, this overarching 
unity innovates the premodern anthropological trichotomy of body-soul-spirit in a variety of 
formulations, such as: heteronomy-autonomy-theonomy as well as the post-Vatican II distinct faith 
identities, which he identifies as Pistic, Charismatic and Mystic.1 
 
In terms of the study of mysticism, van Beeck’s trichotomy is a helpful hermeneutic when 
approaching the distinctly modern, psychological/universalist legacy within mysticism and its 
founding support in “mystical experience” (religious, or otherwise). Wherein, such understandings of 
mysticism are upheld within the tradition of the Enlightenment in terms solely of the autonomous 
subject. It is argued [See Introduction §3] that modern approaches to the practice and study of 
mysticism are paradoxically indebted and owe a strong sense of continuity with the manual approach 
to mysticism. In such an approach, the relation between asceticism and mysticism were increasingly 
being divided, such that mysticism—as ‘infused contemplation—was seen as largely extraordinary to 
the revealed faith of the Church. Hence, any attempts at trying to maintain the linkage between 
asceticism and mysticism concentrated on the relation between ‘acquired contemplation’ as 
mediating moral theology with that of the extraordinary phenomenon of passive and immediate 
‘mystical experience’. Furthermore, from a historical-contextual perspective, mysticism by its 
association and renewal with figures of the Modernist crisis, substantially developed the reputation 
that it was at odds with speculative and dogmatic theology and a red flag for heterodox views—that 
“false mysticism [...] in its attempt to eliminate the immovable frontier that separates creatures from 
their Creator”.2 
 
                                                          
1
 See Frans Jozef van Beeck, S.J., Catholic Identity After Vatican II: Three Types of Faith in the One Church 
(Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985). See also Frans Josef van Beeck, S.J. God Encountered: A Contemporary 
Catholic Systematic Theology, Volume 1: Understanding the Christian Faith (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 
1989).  See also Frans Jozef van Beeck, S.J. God Encountered: A Contemporary Catholic Systematic Theology, 
Volumes II/I-II/IVB (Collegeville, MN.: The Liturgical Press, 1993-2001); henceforth: GE.  
2
 See Pius XII, Mystici Corporis Christi, 9. 
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 While these discussions have certainly waned, their historical relevance is that within a 
greater purview of theology as a whole, the defense and legitimacy of mysticism had become 
dramatically reduced, thus occupying a highly narrow, individualized sphere of relevance. In a word, 
mysticism itself, along with ‘mystical experience’, had itself become extraordinary, interventionist 
and wholly extrinsicist. In reaction to this sustained development, we find opposite pleas for the 
more ordinary, everyday, and immanently active forms of mysticism, in works from Jesuits such as 
Karl Rahner and Michel De Certeau. And yet, while this was certainly a necessary corrective, such 
appeals were nonetheless largely based equally upon the experiential basis of mysticism as largely 
distinct from the praxis and content of theological reflection itself.  
 
 Here, amid these unfortunate, though historically undeniable developments, we in turn can 
add the separation between mysticism—construed in its modern sense as highly individualized and 
autonomous—as entirely distinct with advances in the liturgical movement, as well as liturgical 
theology as necessarily communal and social. In van Beeck’s writings, not only is such a false 
dichotomy both historically, as well as fundamentally challenged. But furthermore, by resituating the 
unspecified “hierarchy of truth”3 to D   V  bum’  teaching, life, worship, van Beeck repeatedly 
argues that “doctrines arise in worship and witness, and must never be allowed to belie their 
pedigree; their key function is and remains to ensure worship and to enable witness.”4 Hence, by 
challenging the false distinction between liturgical and mystical theology, we can further speculate 
that by securing the distinct, theological credibility of these distinct disciplines, the legacy of van 
Beeck’s work invites us to consider in what ways each of these disciplines can further engage, in a 
constructive manner, with systematic theology. Such that “pia veritas amounts to vera pietas. [For] 
at heart, the practice of theology is intellectual worship, not only on account of its divine subject 
matter, but also on account of the God-given thirst for understanding with which the subject matter 
is pursued.”5 For it is this thirst—an unrelenting and inexhaustible eros for the “admirable exchange” 
at the heart of Christian life and enshrined by liturgy itself—which, in response to Christ having 
                                                          
3
 See Lumen Gentium 10 
4
 Frans Jozef van Beeck S.J., “Trinitarian Theology as Participation”, in Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall S.J., 
Gerald O’Collins S.J. (eds.) The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity (Oxford: University Press, 
1999), 295-325, 313. 
5
 van Beeck, GE, §8, 8, 26. Van Beeck goes on to further exemplify the constructive relevance and interchange 
that he sees between liturgical and mystical theology in this illustrative, pastoral reflection. “Let me sing an old 
song. I have long felt that Christians who leave the church nowadays do so to a significant extent out of 
boredom. In church, you can count on finding some pretty good people and ditto fellowship, and some fine 
initiatives on behalf of the growing multitude of the disadvantaged, but no amplitude of purview, no ecstasy, 
no  h ō  a—in sum, no sense of participation in God, no mysticism. The inner affinity with the Mystery in whom 
we are alive and move and have being—Father, Son, Holy Spirit—can grow on us only in the experience of God 
as ‘the All’: the God of each of us at the expense of none of us, the God who never comes alone but always 
with the entire cosmos and all of humanity. This experience is the heart of common worship, with its cosmic 
and universalistic dimensions, its significant silence and significant speech, its significant gesture and significant 
motionlessness, its interplay of the seen and the unseen—in sum, its doxology made tangible. Prayerlessness 
and presencelessness are the bane of Christian churches today, it seems to me; ‘praying-for-this-that-and-the-
other’, professions of the human need for ‘salvation’, and homilizing disguished as prayer have largely eclipsed 
prasise and thanksgiving. Among theologians, overconcern with soteriological and ethical themes has bred, by 
default, a lack of taste for the mystagogical, liturgical, and mystical traditions as major loci theologici. It is 
crypto-Pelagian to be too ethical in Church. End of song.” See van Beeck, “Trinitarian Theology as 
Participation”, 318. 
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“lavished upon us his divinity”, we can thus understand “Christian worship...[as] the act by which it 
most closely participates in the divine nature.”6 
 
 
 A. THE BASIS FOR A NEW THEOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS. TRICHOTOMY: COSMOLOGY –   
       ANTHROPOLOGY – THEOLOGY 
 
 A helpful entry point into the theological synthesis of the Dutch Jesuit Franz Jozef van Beeck 
is to gauge his specific, theological anthropology as a dynamic, “native attunement to God”. The 
primary way in which he situates and expands upon such a theological anthropology, always from 
within the “Great Tradition” and with an eye towards the contemporary world, van Beeck does so by 
reinterpreting the premodern traditional trichotomy of body-soul-spirit in terms of cosmology 
(body), anthropology (soul) and theology (spirit). Clarifying this central importance of this 
reinterpretation, van Beeck states: 
 
It has been repeated again and again in this systematic theology that humanity is ultimately 
what it is by virtue of the dynamic orientation to God that lies at the core of its being—that is to 
say, by virtue of final causality. It is true, of course, that humanity remains essentially marked 
by cosmic heteronomy and by anthropological—that is, distinctively spiritual—autonomy. Yet 
in the last analysis humanity is essentially and decisively marked by theonomy. Created and 
sustained by God in everything we are and have and do, we are natively aimed at God.
7
 
 
Van Beeck diversely employs this trichotomy in various parts of his work, such that, for example, he 
interprets Aquinas famous five proofs along such cosmological, anthropological and theological  
lines.8 Primarily, however, van Beeck employs this trichotomy in order to account for the very 
dynamism of humanity’s potentia  obedientialis9 and desirous, thenomous attunement to God. 
Which in turn, as natively attuned, van Beeck’s approach to Revelation shows forth a dynamic, 
“anthropological infrastructure”, especially evident in the “mystical form of faith” wherein the 
                                                          
6
 van Beeck, GE, §67, 1, 79. 
7
 van Beeck, GE, §141, 5, 8. 
8
 See van Beeck, GE, §102, 1-10, 68-85, 85: “[T]he human spirit’s dynamic attunement to God, left implicit in 
the argument [Aquinas’ “five ways”] serves to detect that cosmic realities are similarly attuned to God. Thus, in 
a real sense, the progression of the quinque viae as a whole is an ascent:    m    y → a  h  p    y → 
theology. And the one motor force that drives the ascent is the attraction universally exercised by the 
transcendent God, who accounts for the dynamisms of both cosmos and humanity, as well as for their natural 
affinity with, and mutual attunement to, each other.” 
9
 As one of the rare lights in 19th Century dogmatic thought, the "chief theologian of the supernatural order", 
Scheeben writes of the potentia obedientialis, with reference to Aquinas, as the "transformation" of the natural 
into the supernatural whereby the "essence of nature remains, it is only elevated and transformed. Therefore it 
must have a capacity for such elevation and transformation", see Matthias Scheeben, Nature and Grace trans. 
Cyril Vollert S.J. (St. Louis, MO: Herder Book Co., 1954), 39-40. Scheeben goes on, arguing that: "This is the 
reason why supernature is not contrary to nature (and hence unnatural) but is quite in harmony with nature, 
and can even be called natural, in the sense that it is conformable with nature and is not unnatural [….] In a 
word, the supernatural may be called natural to the extent that it is not unnatural. And it is not unnatural, first, 
because nature, while not aspiring to the supernatural by its own forces, is capable of reaching the 
supernatural through the influence and operation of another, higher nature. This is obediential potency, which 
is actuated under the guidance of a higher being to which unreserved obedience is given [….] Therefore, 
although the two orders [natural/supernatural] are not so connected that the lower encloses the higher, they 
are united in such a way that the higher encompasses the lower and presupposes it as its substructure and 
prerequsite condition." 
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transition from nature to grace “meet in perfect harmony, as humanity truly comes into its own, on 
the strength of total dependence of God.”10 Hence, theonomy is of a fundamental, natural 
orientation, one that shows “a new relational self [...] their deepest identity, filled to overflowing, 
[which] turns out to have an ability that they barely, if at all suspected: the capacity for total abandon 
of self.”11 And it is this capacity for ecstasy, or de-centering, which van Beeck interprets as our 
potentia  obedientialis to God. An immanence of Christ as one's center, intimior intimo meo, the 
“person’s deepest identity”, which in a participative encounter, van Beeck will himself define itself as 
“mysticism”.12 Mysticism, in this sense, is itself “natively” rooted in a fundamental, theological 
anthropology, which in turn, by way of the tradition of Christian humanism, is nourished by a 
continual vision of man as fundamentally relational, showing human integrity, fulfillment and 
solidarity with others in the world by way of furthering our union with God. 
 
 B. AUTONOMY, HETERONOMY AND THE QUESTION OF “RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE” 
 
 It is crucial to understand the dynamic, theological anthropology at root in van Beeck’s 
theological synthesis and how it furnishes a dynamic sense of unity between religious faith and 
contemporary culture amid the dialectics of cosmological heteronomy, anthropological autonomy 
and theological theonomy. For such a unity and “integrated account of the cosmos, humanity, and 
God, van Beeck argues, has animated the Great Tradition of the undivided Church.”13 Concerning the 
task of systematic theology, van Beeck portrays this unity as something that seeks to be achieved 
anew, and yet it stems from the very givenness of creation itself. Thus, while he is at times realistic 
and openly recognizes that such claims of unity are clearly “disputable”, however, the proposed 
synthesis that van Beeck proposes avoids any justifiable charge of simply being Romantic or 
“optimistic”. For the validity of such a critique would instead be rightfully addressed to the tradition 
of the Enlightenment, one that “holds that the autonomy of the truly emancipated human individual 
is the privileged norm of authentic religion. That autonomy is found by a return to nature in its 
purity,” which shows no signs of “heteronomy”.14  
 
 Interestingly enough, it is here, in this isolated view of anthropological autonomy as 
immanent do we see a view of “mysticism” tied with the “religious experience” of such autonomous, 
emancipated individuals. By stressing a dynamic, theological anthropology,  van Beeck’s thickly 
aesthetic, participative hermeneutics of the Great Tradition steers mystical theology away from its 
modern association with “religious experience” as its sole justification. In an interesting footnote, van 
Beeck elaborates on these perspectives when noting: 
 
Here also lies the root of the modern identification, so widespread in North America, of faith in 
God with ‘religious experience’. This experience tends to be viewed as a completely inner 
event—that is, an event to be interpreted entirely on its own terms. Thus religion (and 
presumably, faith in God) is turned into an individual claim, whose sole verification is the 
authenticity of the individual who makes it. (Needless to say, this idea has profoundly affected 
                                                          
10
 van Beeck, GE, §84, 1, b, 198-9. 
11
 ibid. 
12
 ibid. 
13
 van Beeck, “Trinitarian Theology as Participation”, 307. 
14
 See van Beeck, GE, §84,1, 196. 
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the discipline usually referred to as ‘psychology of religion;’) In this construction, faith in God, 
along with whatever interpretative knowledge of God goes with it, is radically divorced, in 
Cartesian fashion, from the shared human understanding of humanity and the world.
15
 
 
Instead of situating such claims of religious experience within the wholly modern category of 
anthropological autonomy, van Beeck instead, time and time again throughout his work, gives a 
more thick, hermeneutical account of various figures of the Great Tradition, and the unity in which it 
attests that “knowledge of God is (1) a matter of ecstatic de-centering,  h ō  a (i.e. contemplative 
self-abandon), and (2) that it is, paradoxically, both entirely natural and entirely God-given.”16 
 
 As an alternative to such systematic impulses and their frequent extremes, for van Beeck, a 
reoccurring, corrective source within the Great Tradition is none other than the Christian humanism 
of Jan van Ruusbroec, who, van Beeck correctly identifies as combining a rigorous, “fully apophatic 
account” of contemplation and union with God, while equally drawing attention to Ruusbroec’s “fully 
Trinitarian (and thus, wholly dynamic) interpretation of contemplative prayer.”17 Thus, van Beeck 
draws attention to Ruusbroec’s dynamic exemplarism of being created in the Image, while equally 
noting the historical, soteriological and erotic—hence never-ending—dimensions of the creature’s 
graced action of deepening in likeness with such an Image (the Son, 2nd Person of the Trinity) in 
whom one is naturally united. 
 
 §2. NATIVE ATTUNEMENT  
 
 As a privileged interlocutor within van Beeck's richly resourced series God Encountered, 
Ruusbroec's influence upon the Dutch Jesuit is considerable. This is most evidently the case in 
exploring the dynamism of van Beeck's 'native attunement'—holding together, in an unceasing,  
unity of tension, that which is both 'entirely natural and entirely God-given'. Namely, humanity's 
desiderium naturale visionis beatificae. However, retrieval of Ruusbroec's theo-anthropology within 
van Beeck's decidedly contemporary systematic theology is not performed unaware of questions of 
historicity, contextuality nor modernity's 'turn to the subject' [die Wende zum Subjekt].  Rather, in an 
attempt at continuing to hold together such an erotic unity of tension, van Beeck adroitly turns to 
Maurice Blondel18 as emblematic in his own "forthright insistence both on authentic immanence and 
on the truly supernatural", all the while pivoting "humanity as the decisive locus of their 
encounter."19  
 
 A. BLONDELIAN IMMANENCE 
 
                                                          
15
 Van Beeck, GE, §84, 1, footnote [p]. 
16
 van Beeck, “Trinitarian Theology as Participation”, 311. 
17
 van Beeck, “Trinitarian Theology as Participation”, 312. 
18
 See generally Maurice Blondel, Action (1893): Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of Practice, trans. Oliva 
Blanchette (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); The Letter on Apologetics & History and 
Dogma, trans. Alexander Dru and Illtyd Trethowan (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995).  
19
 van Beeck, GE, §87, 1, 231 (my emphasis). 
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 Akin to the various strands of 20th Century Catholic Theology20, the theological implications of 
Blondel's philosophical plea for "immanence":"nothing can enter into a man's mind which does not 
come out of him"21is a fundamental hermeneutic for the Dutch Jesuit. For van Beeck, Blondel's turn 
towards immanence creates an opening for a renewed theological anthropology and human 
authenticity as cooperative in its view of the intrinsic, native dimension of God's grace.  
 
 Contra the then singular focus neo-scholastics frequently made upon "miracles and 
prophecy" in chapter 3 of Dei Filius, van Beeck argues that "Vatican I had never declared that unaided 
natural reason was necessary, let alone sufficient, to establish, beyond a reasonable or respectable 
doubt, the credibility of the Catholic faith on miracles and prophecies."22 Rather, such a "purely 
rationalist-historicist apologetics"—despite varying differences amongst the orders23—was 
nonetheless the standard of seminary education. Such an outdated apologetic—appealing here to 
Blondel's critique—in failing to take serious the Enlightenment and its 'turn to the subject' as 
modernity's condition of human authenticity24 both "misreads the cultural situation we are in, and in 
doing so, it is making a theological mistake".25 That is, such an approach leads to the warped, 
rationalist conclusion of the Catholic faith as a "closed system", dependent upon a rationally 
autonomous praeambula fidei, all the while ensuring the particularity of Catholic faith to be "credible 
without appealing to anything in themselves".26  
 
  Similiarly, for those figures positioned contrary to Neo-Scholastic extrincism (see below my 
treatment of George Tyrrell), equal appeal was made to the authority of Vatican I's  defense of faith. 
Which, it must be said, made pronouncementsnot only against fideism, yet also against over-
rationalization. This latter stress is emphasized when highlighting the capacity and understanding of 
"reason illumined by faith", and its "fruitful insight into the mysteries" to be set within view of the 
"connection of  the mysteries among themselves and with the last end of man."27 Thus, Blondel's 
"method of immanence" acts as a corrective to the exclusivity of extrinsicist appeals to 'miracles and 
prophecy' in its insistence that "God's revelation and the possibility of supernatural life correspond to 
our deepest longings[….]They [i.e. the 'interior fact' of our natural desire for God] are not imposed 
from without by any external authority."28 
 
                                                          
20
 For a compelling introduction to Blondel's works, viewed in historical and theological continuity with Henri 
de Lubac, See William L. Portier, "Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology and the Triumph of Maurice Blondel", 
Communio, vol. XXXVIII, n. 1, Spring 2011, 103-137. 
21
 See Blondel, Letter on Apologetics, 152. 
22
 van Beeck, GE, §86, 4, a, 218. 
23
 See van Beeck, GE, §86, 3, 214: "Contrary to currently prevailing stereotypes, late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Catholic seminary philosophy and theology of the (broadly) Thomistic variety was not a 
completely uniform, standardized system. It was, rather, a sprawling aggregate of various schools of neo-
scholastic thought." 
24
 See van Beeck, GE, §85, 5, 208. 
25
 See van Beeck, GE, §85, 4, 208. 
26
 van Beeck, GE, §86, 5, 219. 
27
 See Denz. 3016 See also Portier ""Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology and the Triumph of Maurice 
Blondel", 116 and his focus upon the Belgian Cardinal Victor Dechamps' "method of Providence" and his 
"interventions at Vatican I were largely responsible for the appeal to the Church and its holiness as a motive of 
faith in Chapter 3 of Dei Filius." 
28
 Portier, "Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology and the Triumph of Maurice Blondel", 113. 
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 1. Immanence opening onto the Political 
 
 Nevertheless, by avoiding a fideistic tract, attention to Blondel's philosophical insistence 
upon immanence as the "very condition of philosophizing", in a historical-contextual view, initiates a 
more fundamental openness to human integrity and culture within philosophical reflection. In a 
modern context, what would arguably only be fully heeded in the Second Vatican Council (i.e. 
Gaudium et spes), in turn equally recalls a primary "conviction" that is "integral to the Great Tradition 
of Christian faith and theology: both nature and reason can be trusted."29 More fundamentally, 
Blondel's position of authentic immanence at the same time opens onto an authentically theological 
immanence.30 Amid Blondel's heavy philosophic and theological critique against, in part—
substantially Neo-Scholastic 'extrincism', as well as the institutional Church's Ultramontane character 
at the turn of the 20th Century, van Beeck argues that in Blondel, "we catch the Great Tradition of 
Catholic Faith and theology astir once again, in the act of renewing itself."31 Hence, Blondel's deeply 
contextual rethinking of Tradition and its dynamism—contra both liberal Modernists as well as the 
integralism of political Catholicism in France and the Action française at the threshold of the 20th 
Century—emerges as a compelling portrait once more of human integrity as viewed in its intrinsic 
relation to the supernatural. A philosophical approach, upon the "threshold" that witnesses a view of 
the mutuality or the intertwined character of nature and grace, like "two currents, flowing from 
different sources, mingl[ing] their waters without losing their identities."32  
 
 For Blondel's opponents such as the well-known Dominican Neo-Scholastic Reginald 
Garrigou-Lagrange, such appeals to immanence are rigorously countered on the basis of 
gratuitousness. As the predominant Neo-Scholastic argument goes, such an immanent orientation to 
the supernatural—humanity's desiderium naturale—renders the gift of God's grace as necessary. 
Which in turn, results in a certain natural "possession" or claim upon the beatific vision as owed to 
the creature, due to the lack of such gratuitousness.33 Herein, the dynamic unity, "unit[ing] in order 
to distinguish the better"34 between mutuality (nature) and the asymmetrical (grace) is challenged 
because of the lack of utter gratuitousness of grace, regarded as pure and in a sense, without interior 
demands.  
 
 In view of 20th Century grace-nature debates within Catholic thought and against extrinsicist 
tendencies, William Portier convincingly argues that Blondelian immanence is first and foremost to 
                                                          
29
 van Beeck, GE, §87, 1, 230. 
30
 See Pascendi Dominici Gregis (DS 3487): "Concerning immanence it is not easy to determine what 
Modernists mean by it, for their own opinions on the subject vary. Some understand it in the sense that God 
working in man is more intimately present in him than man is in even himself, and this conception, if properly 
understood, is free from reproach." 
31
 ibid. 
32
 Blondel, Letter of Apologetics, 148. See also, van Beeck, GE, §86, 10, 229 he similarly cites this passage from 
Blondel. 
33
 See supra, Chapter 8, " Abiding by Minne's Demands. Part IV—Common love and the Univocal" and my 
discussion of "gratuitousness" in Bonaventure's distinct rejection of Peter Lombard's identification in Book 1, 
distinction 17 of the Sentences wherein Peter Lombard identifies the Holy Spirit as the "charity by which we 
love God and neighbor". 
34
 See Portier, "Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology and the Triumph of Maurice Blondel", 126, as quoted 
from De Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Crossroads, 1998), 30-31. 
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be seen as contextual and thereby inescapably political. What loosely coalesced Blondel's association 
with the Modernists is that "opposition to Neo-Scholastic thought" was fundamentally regarded as " 
inadequate to contemporary religious needs."35 Thus, Blondel's project is to be viewed contra two-
tier extrinsicist approaches, the latter of which entailed it "theoretically possible"—due to its strict 
separation—"to keep completely separate such spheres as 'religion' and 'politics'…theology and 
philosophy'".36 And in an attempt to eliminate any sense of lingering doubt, Portier again asserts, 
"The emphasis in the previous sentence should be on completely."37 Hence, in thoroughly countering 
this position, Blondel's rejection of varying philosophical apologetics at the time "has an inevitable 
political dimension".38 Portier's insight, which reflects both a compelling historical analysis of 
Blondel's political advocacy of the "social Catholicism" of the semaines sociales is at the same time, 
inextricably, a working through the very implications of immanence—consonant with van Beeck's 
native attunement—as a thorough critique of two-tier extrincism. Namely that from an immanent 
perspective the political, is interwoven with the theological, as nature is natively open to grace.  
 
 Portier's insightful historical/contextual as well as theological reading of immanence and the 
grace-nature debates as the proper entry for the political within theological reflection is supported 
by drawing out the various strands of De Lubac's connection with Blondel, or "les jésuites 
blondelisants".39 Portier thus continues John Milbank's own argument in The Suspended Middle40: 
that is, analogous to the opposition both against L'Action française and later on, supporters of the 
French occupied Vichy government, for both Blondel and De Lubac, their "theological opponents" 
were equally their "political opponents".41 
 
 Such theological, as well as political oppositions are not only confined to an early to mid-20th 
Century French context, yet equally redound for us today amid the many unresolved theological 
debates surrounding contextual relevance and the particularity of Catholic identity. Herein, Portier 
sufficiently recalls: 
 
 In view of his notion of 'the ebb and flow of theology', it might not have surprised de Lubac that 
 a Blondel-inspired theology of nature and grace, rather than a once for all achievement, 
 has proven unstable and unfinished. On the one side, undifferentiated appeals to the graced 
 character of our world threaten to evacuate its Christological and Trinitarian center. 
 Reassertions of philosophical autonomy in appeals to the praembula fidei in the Summa 
 theologiae of St. Thomas  (1,2, ad 1) and Vatican I's dogmatic constitution Dei Filius unsettle the 
 Christological and Trinitarian center of this theology of nature and grace from another  side.  
 Clarifying the senses in which we can truly say the world is graced remains a major task of 
 contemporary Catholic theology.
42
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In the following, we will indeed see how post conciliar theology is continuing to wrestle with the 
various consequences of a more intrinsic view of a graced world and the theological/political 
priorities that it establishes in terms of "contextual relevance" and "identity"; the challenges such 
'intrinsicism'  poses to the integrity and relationship between theology and philosophy;  and later on, 
the implications of these positions in van Beeck's engagement with contemporary fundamental 
theology and  the presence of a certain renewed "extrincism" under the moniker of "dialogue" .43 
 
 2. After Blondel:  Post conciliar Trajectories 
 
 By introducing Blondel at this critical juncture,  van Beeck strongly orients two poles that are 
intimately associated with his thinking of "native attunement". Namely: (1) a view of the 
anthropology that is variably upheld by the Great Tradition and given renewed expression by 
Blondel's "immanence". Human integrity is here understood as fundamentally relational and 
theonomous. Which in turn, by way of grace's equally immanent character as fundamentally 
gratuitous, yet natively anchored and oriented within the created world, (2) highlights the 
importance of the question of contextuality and historicity for the Church and its relationship to the 
modern world. Here, contextuality provides an engagement of plausibility, while equally recognizing 
that the stage of culture, history and late-modernity is not a 'neutral' region of autonomy, yet one of 
graced nature and thereby, intrinsically demanding of theological relevance and potential 
accountability. A more thorough consideration of Ruusbroec's theo-anthropology of mutual 
indwelling will ensue. But first, van Beeck well describes the dynamism of his 'native attunement' and 
its implicit reference to Ruusbroec as the: 
 
[P]aradox of the mystical position. Immanence naturally inspires the search for transcendence; 
being is natively oriented to ecstasy. In the act of turning away from self-containment [i.e. 
against Neo-Scholastic 'extrincism'] and towards transcendence, therefore, all creatures, each 
according to their proper place in the universe, actualize and identify their most authentic 
selves to the highest attainable degree. The essence of the mystical vision and experience is, 
therefore, that the free, patient, self-abandoning focus on the transcendent, unknowable God 
involves the recovery, in actuality, of the true, implicit identity of humanity and the world. 
Becoming de-centered turns out to be the finding of the true Center; becoming selfless in this 
fashion turns out to be the finding of the self, in God; the encounter, in actuality, with the living 
God prompts true, experienced, minimally self-conscious, genuinely responsive identity.
44
 
 
 
Here, the dynamic movement of van Beeck's native attunement—wherein "immanence naturally 
inspires the search for transcendence"—explicitly entails a robust "recovery, in actuality, of the true, 
implicit identity of humanity and the world". Such a position strongly recalls Ruusbroec's own 
intuitions via the 'common life' [ghemeyne leven].45 Here, a basic thrust of openness towards 
transcendence orients one fundamentally towards a recovery and the potential redemption and 
transformation of the world. Instead of leading one away from the world, it instead leads humanity 
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and the created world in their respective integrities as locus capax dei.46 And yet, as we will now see, 
the fecundity of this locus itself leads to a plurality of differing trajectories. 
 
 a. Locus capax dei: Alejandro García-Rivera's Theological Aesthetics 
 
 
 A dialogically distinct, yet related contemporary engagement with this view of locus capax 
dei  that I would like to briefly consider—especially in view of its theo-anthropological basis (capax 
dei) and its view of contextuality (locus)—is its treatment by the late Cuban-American mestizaje 
theologian Alejandro García-Rivera (1951-2010). For García-Rivera, engagement with theological 
aesthetics primarily involves that which "recognizes in the experience of the truly beautiful a 
religious dimension".47 Such aesthetics is in turn founded upon a strong fundamental theological 
engagement with Erich Przywara's analogia entis, its use by Przywara's student, Hans Urs von 
Balthasar in the latters own theological aesthetics of glory, as well as a provocative attentiveness to 
issues of contextuality and alterity as arising from his diasporic Cuban-American community, in exile 
after Castro's revolution.  
 
 For García-Rivera, interest in theological aesthetics is founded upon the recognition that 
while "Beauty is embodied in the natural world"—the "linchpin" of the transcendentals as von 
Balthasar argues—it does not originate from the natural, as a theological aesthetics maintains that 
"Beauty's origin is God Himself."48 To substantiate this aesthetic crossing, through metaphysical 
difference between Creator and creature, García-Rivera seeks the support of Przywara's analogia 
entis precisely in terms of a thinker of difference or "dissimilar-similarity", in contrast to Rahner's 
transcendental theological anthropology that seeks a "subjective unity between Creator and 
creature".49 This familiar contrast between Rahner and von Balthasar is positioned by García-Rivera 
as two separate approaches emerging from Blondel's thinking of the immanent character of human 
integrity. Which, contra Neo-Scholastic extrincism, entails the view "that grace is an intrinsic rather 
than an extrinsic demand of the human spirit."50 García-Rivera specifically opts for von Balthsarian 
difference over Rahnerian view of transcendental unity for clear theological reasons, though these 
reasons may come as a surprise. For it is specifically as a contextual mestizaje theologian that García-
Rivera opts more for a Balthasarian-influenced theological aesthetics of difference that is at once 
attentive to issues of ressourcement.51 This is so, García-Rivera argues, since "[M]odernity rejected 
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the sources of its own tradition, postmodernity now calls into question modernity's sources. As such, 
postmodernity calls for a re-look at traditional sources in order to re-think or go beyond modern 
assumptions. Rahner's work may have ushered the Church through the abyss of Modernity, but von 
Balthasar's work, I believe, may help guide the Church out of the morass of postmodernism."52 
Wading through such a morass, García-Rivera pushes against postmodernity's singular 
"contextualizing appetite"53 by furnishing a dual appreciation of both contextuality and particularity 
of human/cultural difference that emerges from the very primacy of a relationality of "greater 
dissimilarity" of the analogia entis. What emerges is a theological anthropology that resources the 
traditional Catholic view that sees the intrinsic connection between Creation and Redemption as 
"crucial loci for liberation theology [….] if liberation is to have a subject which seriously answers the 
challenge of postmodernism".54 That is, by presenting "a subject capable of being redeemed".55  
 
 In attempting to address such a challenge by way of his theological aesthetics, García-Rivera 
rallies to  von Balthasar, who García-Rivera argues, "much to his [von Balthasar's] surprise joins 
Hispanic theology as a welcomed conversation partner."56 This surprise is none other than the 
revealing of the dynamics between contextuality and cultural and human differences with that of a 
Balthasarian theological aesthetics that "rethink[s] the relationship between nature and grace."57 For 
not only does the 
 
 [R]elationship between nature and grace determines, e.g., how faith understands or explains 
 the human capacity to 'see' God, i.e., the capax Dei of a theological aesthetics. The 
 relationship of nature and grace determines, as well, how faith might understand or explain 
 the human capacity for differing 'visions' of God, i.e., a theology of human difference. Thus, von 
 Balthasar and Hispanics have similar if not identical  projects [….] Hispanics, however, ask a 
 further question. Can these visions change the world. 
58
 
 
 
Here again, this transformational project of not only "seeing the form", yet receiving it in the manner 
of doxological response orients García-Rivera's theological aesthetics in its thick, contextual and 
participative view. The kataphatic is vividly present in García-Rivera, thus "against Rahnerian 
transcendence, von Balthasar's analogy of being demands the human creature contemplate the 
Creator from within the very stuff of creation rather than from some transcendental horizon."59 
While at the same time, by way of privileging contextual and human differences is none other than 
an affirmation of deus semper maior such that, "Our 'dissimilar similarity' of creature to Creator 
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allows the human spirit to participate in the knowledge and the love of God but only by having every 
concept, form, or symbol irrupted in the very act of knowing and loving God."60 
 
 B. RUUSBROEC AND VAN BEECK'S  NATIVE ATTUNEMENT 
 
 While García-Rivera's theological aesthetics aims to account for difference and identity in its 
distinct, contextualized Latin Hispanic 'theology of human difference'—anchored in a resourced, 
theological anthropology of the analogia entis—for van Beeck's "native attunement", the emphasis is 
clearly upon unity whereby particularity "proximately" emerges, though never coincides.61 Van Beeck 
does so by way of turning to the other trajectory that stems from the reception of Blondel as "yet 
another instance of the age-old Christian faith recovering its own native, authentic vitality by 
reopening itself to the world."62 Blondel, van Beeck recalls, stands as a major voice within the modern 
Tradition of the Church in rearticulating its relational anthropology and fundamental openness to the 
modern world. That is, recasting the view of integrity and authenticity of human 'immanence' by way 
of "humanity's essential resemblance to God."63  
 
 More generally, for van Beeck, we can speak of universality and particularity as an unceasing, 
erotic unity of tension, best articulated by our natural desire for and native attunement to God. 
Turning to Blondel, van Beeck, will argue that contra the Church's then thoroughly anti-Modernist, 
Ultramontanist position, Blondel's turn towards immanence is performed as a "threshold 
apologetics", as once innovative as well as deeply within the Tradition. Such that the gratuitousness 
of God's intrinsic grace within the world is met by humanity's fundamental openness towards and 
completion of its own native integrity as fundamentally relational (capax dei) and particular within its 
distinct contexts (locus capax dei).  
 
 It is in this dynamic renewal of Tradition that indeed—for both myself and van Beeck—opens 
a doorway for a compelling retrieval of the relationality of Ruusbroec's theo-anthropology of mutual 
indwelling, such that "Ruusbroec confirms, in his own way, the truth of Blondel's anthropological 
idea."64 Namely that human autonomy stems from the primacy of a fundamental, dynamic 
ontological relationality with the world and with God. In terms of a theology of creation, union with 
God, for Ruusbroec, is primarily ontological and essential [weselijcke] that "renders us neither holy 
nor blessed without our effort"65. Rather, as created in the Image—that is Christ, our "eternal 
exemplar"—union with God is both fundamentally natural that upholds the dignity of our human 
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nature wherein such perichoretic relationality is continuously created anew [creatio continua]. 
Emphasizing the conjunction, for Ruusbroec, mutual indwelling consists of "posess[ing] this unity in 
ourselves" and "above ourselves, as a principle and support of our wesens and of our life."66 Thus, 
contra extrincism, nothing is fundamentally "added" to the human person in such a loving 
supernatural and gracious union with God. Rather, the life of such  grace is found in the native 
capacity for the "superabounding actualization of aspirations [desiderium naturale] in creation".67 
Herein, van Beeck nicely summarizes the view as follows: "human integrity turns out to be union with 
God, and this union turns out to be reunion."68   
 
 1. Unity—'in the Image of the Son' 
 
 This 'essential resemblance', or in Ruusbroec's terms—"in the Image"—can be seen as 
upholding the  Christian Tradition's universalist strand of native attunement to God, via our 
desiderium naturalis. Otherwise known in vernacular mystical theological tradition as the "spark of 
the soul" [de vonk der zielen], the "natural inward inclination of the soul towards its origin."69 That 
place of relational heteronomy (or 'theonomy', for van Beeck) towards God, Ruusbroec clarifies as 
"God's image and the origin of us all: of our life and our becoming; wherein our created wesen and 
our life hang [in hangt] without intermediary as in its eternal cause."70 Here, speaking in terms of his 
theology of "image and likeness" and in exemplarist terms, Ruusbroec first reflects upon both the 
unity of our universal human nature as grounded in the particularity of the image in specifically 
Christological and Trinitarian terms:  
 
In the beginning of the world, when God wanted 
to make the first human being in our nature, then 
He spoke in Trinity of Persons: 'Let us make human 
beings to our image and to our likeness.'…And He 
has created each person's soul as a living mirror, 
whereupon He has impressed the image of His 
nature. And so He lives imaged in us, and we in 
Him; for our created life is one, without 
intermediary, with the image and with the life that 
we have eternally in God….For it lives with the Son 
unborn in the Father, and it is born with the Son 
out of the Father, and flows out of them both with 
In beghinne der werelt, doe god den iersten mensche 
maken woude in onser natueren, doe sprac hi in 
drivuldegheit der persone: 'Maken wi den mensche 
toe onsen beelde ende toe onsen ghelike.'....Ende hi 
heeft ieghewelcs menschen ziele ghescapen alse 
eenen levenden spieghel daer hi dat beelde sijnre 
natueren in ghedrucht heeft. Ende alsoe leeft hi 
ghebeeldt in ons ende wi in heme. Want onse 
ghescapene leven es een sonder middel met dien 
beelde ende met dien levene dat wi eewelec in gode 
hebben....Want het leeft met den sone ongheboren in 
den vader, ende het wert gheboren met den sone ute 
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the Holy Spirit. And thus we live eternally in God 
and God in us. For our createdness lives in our 
eternal image that we have in the Son of God. 
den vader, ende vloeyt ute hen beiden met den 
heileghen gheeste. Ende aldus leven wi eewelec in 
gode ende god in ons. Want onse ghescapenheit leeft 
in onsen eeweghen beelde dat wi hebben in den sone 
gods.
71
 
 
By fully engaging with Ruusbroec's distinct exemplarism, van Beeck rightfully acknowledges that in 
order to understand the full "flowering of the order of grace",72 as famously described in Book 3 of 
the Spiritual Espousals—the same text that the Parisian chancellor Jean Gerson famously charged as 
pantheist73—such a gracious union "is undergirded at the level of human nature itself: Christian 
prayer and Christian service are [thus] deeply natural."74 From Ruusbroec's decidedly Christian 
exemplarism— which by virtue of its particularity maintains a clear distinction from its inevitable 
neo-Platonic association—van Beeck first notes that given this fundamentally 'natural' dimension of 
such particularity, the "spiritual   ō  with which all human persons seek God…is not a faceless 
homing instinct automatically impelling them to reunite with an impersonal divine Prototype. Quite 
the contrary: it is radically personalized….For human persons to be created in the image and likeness 
of God means: to be naturally stamped with the visage of Christ, the divine Logos."75  
 
 2. Particularity—'unto His likeness'. 
 
 Alongside such exemplarity, equally important to Ruusbroec's thought lays within the 
concrete  particular. Here, Ruusbroec will semantically speak of history andthe order of salvation 
specifically in terms of "likeness".  That is, to "receive His likeness" entails that we are "like God 
through grace and virtues and united with Him above likeness in blessedness."76 Equally so, the 
Brabantine contemplative maintains the necessity of grace's  heteronomous asymmetry, such that 
"…the blessedness that is God we can neither contemplate nor feel [ghevoelen] in natural 
light…without the grace of God."77 Recalling Augustine's famous “interior intimo meo et superior 
 umm  m  ” [higher than my highest and more inward than my innermost self]78, Ruusbroec's 
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reflection upon the life of grace succinctly encapsulates this dynamic rhythm of exteriority and 
interiority (or mediation and immediacy) between God and the human person in the following: 
 
Out of this unity where the spirit is united with 
God without intermediary, flow grace and all 
gifts….Thus grace falls into us in the unity of our 
superior faculties and of our spirit, from which, by 
the power of grace, the higher faculties flow out 
actively in all virtues and into which same (unity) 
they return again in the bond of minnen….Now the 
grace of God which flows out of God is an inward 
impulse or prodding of the Holy Spirit, Who impels 
our spirit from within and stokes it towards all 
virtue. This grace flows from within, not from 
without. For God is more inwards to us than we 
are to ourselves, and His inward impulse, or 
working, within us, naturally or supernaturally, is 
nearer and more inner to us than our own work. 
And therefore God works from in us outwards [van 
binnen uutweert], and all creatures from outward 
inwards [van buten inwert]. And this is why grace 
and all divine gifts and God's interior speech come 
from within, in the unity of our spirit, not from 
without, in the imagination, by sensory images. 
Ute deser eenicheit daer die gheest vereenicht is 
sonder middel met gode, hier ute vloeyt gracie ende 
alle gaven....Dese gracie valt in ons in die eenicheit 
onser overster crachten ende ons gheests, daer die 
hoochste crachten ute vloeyen werelijcke in allen 
doechden overmids cracht der gracien, ende weder 
inkeeren in dat selve, in bande van minnen....Nu es 
die gracie gods, die ute gode vloeyt, een inwindich 
driven ochte jaghen des heylichs gheests die onzen 
gheest drivet van binnen ende stoect in allen 
duechden. Dese gracie vloeyt van binnen, niet van 
buyten. Want god es ons inwindigher dan wij ons 
selven sijn, ende sijn inwindich driven ochte werken in 
ons, nattuerlijcke ochte overnatuerlijcke, es ons 
naerre ende innigher dan ons eyghen wercken; ende 
daer omme werket god in ons van binnen uutweert, 
ende all creatueren van buten inwert. Ende hier 
omme comt gracie ende alle godlijcke gaven ende 
gods inspreken, van binnen in eenicheit ons gheests, 
niet van buyten inder fantasien, met senlijcken 
beelden.
79
 
 
 
Here, Ruusbroec profoundly reflects upon the human person and the created order as intrinsically 
open to God and the gift of His grace. Creation is here unmistakably capax dei. However, such grace 
is reflected upon by Ruusbroec in a clearly non-extrinsicist manner, not as coming "from without" 
into a supposed autonomy and self-sufficiency of the created order. Rather, Ruusbroec recounts  the 
"inward impulse " [inwindich driven] or "prodding" [jaghen] of the uncreated grace of the Holy Spirit. 
Herein, there is an elegant, dance of grace that God initiates with created nature intrinsically open to 
such a mutual exchange. As interior intimo meo, the intrinsic grace of the Holy Spirit  moves 
internally to externally,  from immediacy to mediation [van binnen uutweert]. While in response to 
such "prodding", Ruusbroec recounts the counter rhythm of the human person as "going out" in 
affirming the heteronomous otherness of such prodding's amid  faith, liturgically and sacramentally, 
as well as in works of virtue and charity. From where in turn one is capable of pivoting inwardly [van 
buten inwert], of desirously encountering the utter alterity of God, He who simultaneously works in 
us amid our own work.  
 
 Here too  particularity is upheld as 'proximate'80 to such universalism by way of the 
commitments that emerge from such a natural desire. Again, in Ruusbroec's theological idiom, such 
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proximate particularity is spoken of in terms of "likeness", or "unto His likeness". Hence, the 
irreducible particularity that emerges from the performance and distinction [onderscheet] of our 
works and commitments are proximate to, yet can never coincide with such a universalist ontology. 
Rather, such commitments and particularity indeed remain proximate and distinct. Here, continuing 
with his theology of "image and likeness", Ruusbroec equally speaks of the dynamism and the erotic 
unity of the human person as always mirroring such an Image in likeness, yet never coinciding with it: 
 
For even though the image of God is without 
intermediary in the mirror of the soul and united 
with it, yet the image is not the mirror, for God 
does not become creature. But the union of the 
image in the mirror is so great and so noble that 
the soul is called the image of God. Furthermore, 
the same image of God that we have received and 
carry in our soul is the Son of God, the eternal 
mirror, the wisdom of God, wherein we all live and 
are eternally imaged. Yet we are not the wisdom 
of God; for then we would have made ourselves 
and that is impossible and contrary to faith; for all 
that we are and all that we have, we have from 
God and not from ourselves….And all that we can 
know in the light of nature [i.e. reason] is 
imperfect, without taste and without feeling 
[ghevoelen]. For we cannot contemplate God, nor 
find His realm in our soul without His help and His 
grace, and our true practice in His minnen. 
Want al es dat beelde gods sonder middel in den 
spieghel onser zielen ende heme gheeenecht, 
nochtan en es dat beelde de spieghel niet, want god 
en wert niet creatuere. Maer de eeninghe des beelds 
in den spieghel es soe grooet ende soe edel, dat de 
ziele ghenoemt es dat beelde gods. Voertmeer, dat 
selve beelde gods dat wi ontfaen hebben ende 
draghen in onser zielen, dat es de sone gods, de 
eeweghe spieghel, de wijsheit gods, daer wi alle in 
leven ende eewelec in ghebeelt isjn. Nochtan en sijn 
wi de wijsheit gods niet; want soe hadden wi ons 
selven ghemaect, ende dat es onmoghelec ende 
onghelooeve. Want al dat wi sijn ende al dat wi 
hebben, dat hebben wi van gode ende niet van ons 
selven....Ende al dat wi bekinnen moghen in lichte der 
natueren, dat es onvolcomen, sonder smaec ende 
sonder ghevoelen. Want wi en moghen gode niet 
bescouwen noch sijn rike venden in onser zielen, 
sonder sine hulpe ende sine ghenade ende onse 
ghewareghe ufeninghe in sijnre minnen.
81
 
 
 
In this respect, for van Beeck, Ruusbroec admirably speaks from the Tradition of the Fathers wherein 
"mystical union […] lays[s] bare the breathtaking depth" of our native attunement.82 Here, not only 
does grace presuppose and perfect nature [gratia non destruit, sed supponit et perficit naturam], yet 
beyond Aquinas and more in a Bonaventurian direction, van Beeck continues: "Far from being 
obliterated by the actuality of grace, nature is fully revealed only in the light of the supernatural. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that Ruusbroec, before venturing, in the third book of the Espousals, into 
his account of the mystical union, takes time to fathom human nature."83  In one sense, van Beeck 
reflects upon what I have regularly stated: namely, that in view of the primacy relationality entails in 
Ruusbroec, union with God renders one more not less, yet more human, more particular, more 
distinct.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
it be recognized that Humani generis expressly mentions 'knowledge by connaturality'—that is, interpretative 
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mind [….] Not surprisingly, Newman's distinction, explained in the Grammar of Assent, between notional assent 
and real assent is foreign to the encyclical's way of thinking." 
81
 Ruusbroec, Spieghel, ll. 1849-1858; 1859-1863. 
82
 See van Beeck,  GE, §90, 3, 248. 
83
 See van Beeck, GE, 90, 3, 248 (my emphasis). 
Chapter IV. Van Beeck, Native Attunement and the 'admirabile commercium' 
84 
 
 However, van Beeck appears to be suggesting something more by recognizing nature's 
theonomous dependence—that 'nature is fully revealed only in the light of the supernatural'. Here, a 
fascinating paradox emerges, both within the Tradition itself, and in particular with Ruusbroec. That 
is, while Ruusbroec exemplarism upholds the intrinsic dignity and nobility of our human nature, as 
continued within the tradition of Christian humanism, nonetheless, it marries such intrinsic nobility 
with a radical sense of heteronomy. This heteronomy is seen in Ruusbroec in the above quote, 
recognizing the radical insufficiency of our rational knowledge, the "light of nature", "without taste 
and feeling" [sonder smaec ende sonder ghevoelen] that is graciously given in contemplation and 
"and our true practice in His minnen".  
 
 Now, in a historical contextual sense, Ruusbroec's frequent remarks that appear to disparage 
the "light of nature" can be viewed as directly responding to heretical, autotheistic currents within 
the Free Spirit movement. Therein, Ruusbroec will occasionally recount in various works the 
dangerous view that specifically upholds the possibility for "natural contemplation" [natuerliken 
scouwen]—a position, which Ruusbroec will regularly charge as lacking both humility and sufficient 
works of charity. Thus demonstrating that such contemplation is neither theo-centric, rather "intent 
on itself" and thus not motivated by minne itself, as he forewarns in his first text, Dat Rijcke der 
Ghelieven:  
 
On account of the emptiness of this natural 
contemplation and because the grace of God does 
not impel them, they often fail their fellow 
Christian [evenkersten] in his need. For charity has 
never failed, but nature is unjust, for in 
contemplation it is intent on itself. These people 
consider contemplation to be greater than any 
work of charity. But that is not true, for works of 
charity are commanded us. But contemplation, 
however supernatural, without works of charity, 
would turn to nothing. 
Ende overmids ledicheit dies natuerleecs scouwens 
ende om datse de gracie gods niet en drijft, so 
ghebreken si dicke haren everkersten in sijnre noet. 
Want caritate en ghebrac nie, maer natuere die es 
ongherecht want si meint haer selven in den 
scouwen. Ende si achten dat scouwen meerre dan 
enich werc van caritaten. Ende dat en es niet waer 
want werke van caritaten die sijn ons gheboden; ende 
scouwen, al waert oec overnatuerlijc, sonder werken 
van caritaten: he ghinghe te nieute.
84
 
 
It is undoubtedly the case, that while Ruusbroec's theological reflections are inescapably contextual 
and should be regarded as primarily set in contrast to such trends within the Free Spirits at the time, 
it nonetheless appears as though these frequent controversies have had a greater formation upon 
his thought itself and the "limits" of natural reason. Herein, comparison with the Franciscan-
Bonaventurian line of thought is quite evident, as in the following from Vanden Vier Becoringhen: 
 
Into this temptation all those fall and stray 
through the devil's deceit who want to live a 
spiritual manner of life and are of subtle mind, 
clever and intelligent in natural understanding, as 
long as they want to indulge their nature without 
charity and humility of spirit, following their 
nature's delight. For their nature and their inner 
senses flow over in the light of nature and take 
great pride in it. And they possess this natural light 
Ende daer inne vallen ende verdolen overmids des 
viants raedt alle de ghene die eene gheestelijcke wise 
willen voeren, ende subtijl zijn van zinne, ende scalc 
ende behendich in natuerlijcken verstane, eest dat si 
die [die] natuere oefen willen sonder caritate ende 
oetmoedicheit van gheests, na lost der natueren. 
Want hare natuere ende har inwendighe zinne 
vloeyen ende glorieren inden lichte der natueren. 
Ende dit natuerlijc licht besitten si met alsoe groter 
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with such pleasure and self-sufficiency that they 
think they can grasp and understand all truth and 
all manner of living without God's supernatural 
help….For they think they can reach and 
understand the first truth with their natural 
light….And they feel more inner taste and joy in 
the things they themselves find and understand 
inwardly with their reason than in the things that 
are beyond reason, the very things that have to be 
taken on faith and give us eternal bliss. And this is 
why they are as pagan unbelievers who have no 
awareness of God. 
wellost ende eyghenheit, dat hen dunct dat si alle 
waerheit ende al datmen leven mach, begripen ende 
verstaen moghen sonde die overnatuerlijcke hulpe 
gods....Want selcke wane met natuerlijcken licht 
ghereiken ende begripen die eerste waerheit....Ende 
si hebben meer inwindichs smaes ende vrouden in die 
dinghen die si van binnen met redenen bevinden 
ende verstaen, dan in die dinghen die boven redene 
sijn, doe men gheloven moet ende die ons eewighe 
zalicheit gheven. Ende hier omme sijn si als 
onghelovighe heidene menscen, doe gods niet 
ghewaer en werden.
85
 
 
From these points, it is good to restate the challenge that Portier himself announced in view of the 
contemporary theology's reception of Blondel, namely: 'Clarifying the senses in which we can truly 
say the world is graced remains a major task of contemporary Catholic theology.' In view of 
Ruusbroec, it may well be added that this is not merely a contemporary imperative, yet a reoccurring 
tension within intrinsic views of grace and nature. Thus begging the question: does the recognition of 
grace's intrinsic character with nature inevitably result in a devaluing of reason, of philosophy 
becoming monologically "subsumed" into the theological?86 For the intrinsicism of van Beeck's native 
attunement, his reading of Ruusbroec implicitly asserts that in view of the relationship of philosophy 
and theology, autonomy, as well as the dialogical mutuality of philosophy emerges, not as pre-
conditional in its relation to the theological, yet as a posteriori in the primacy of its heteronomous 
relation to the theological. Hence, it is only in an authentic relation to the theological that legitimate 
autonomy, particularity and distinctiveness of philosophy emerge. Thus, akin to the mistake of 
Gerson—and his nominalist misreading of Ruusbroec's exemplarism for pantheism—while the threat 
of forgetting such a native attunement and viewing such intrinsicism as 'obliterating nature' is very 
much present, philosophy is nonetheless not so much 'subsumed into theology' as a certain 
Bonaventurian line holds. Rather, its autonomy only emerges and is subsequently safeguarded by the 
primacy of its intrinsic, heteronymous relation to the theological.87 Such tensions raised by van 
Beeck's intrinsicist view of grace and native attunement—functioning as the paradoxical origin and 
guarantor of nature's autonomy—will be further explored specifically in terms of the liturgical. 
 
 
 C. DOXOLOGY, THE ADMIRABLE EXCHANGE, AND LITURGICAL PARTICIPATION 
 
 
 Speaking on the foundational primacy worship possess to doctrine (Lex orandi, Lex credendi) 
and in turn, what van Beeck will call “sound theology”, he writes that one of the foundational themes 
in his God Encountered series is a sustained commitment to liturgy and its relation to theological 
reflection, of which exists on two levels. First, “proximately, theologians must regard liturgical texts 
as a principal source of sound doctrine”; while secondly, and “more importantly...they must regard 
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the practice of worship itself as fundamental to doctrine.”88 This argument is not to be seen as a 
unilateral assertion of “ecclesiastical discipline [nor]...individual piety”.89 Rather, it is intended as a 
critical renewal, both for the “traditional appreciation of the fundamental significance of worship” 
while equally noting the disjuncture between the praxis of theological reflection removed from the 
act of the liturgy. Hence, van Beeck notes that “we can no longer assume” that theological 
discussions themselves, “even serious ones...are always and everywhere backed up by worship or 
prayer, and hence, a matter of Christian faith.”90 Centering theological reflection thus upon the 
primacy of worship as a theologia prima91 is indeed the footing wherein both liturgical and mystical 
theology can thus stake claim in terms of both the originality of its object and manner of reflection, 
while in clear mutuality with both systematics and theological ethics. 
 
  1. Excursus: George Tyrrell and the Modernist Legacy upon Mysticism and Spirituality 
      Today 
 
 In this respect, it is perhaps helpful to briefly contrast van Beeck’s plea for the centrality of 
worship—in both its liturgical and mystical theological aspects—with a historical excursus on the Irish 
Jesuit Catholic Modernist George Tyrrell (1861-1909) who, in his similar appeal to the mystical 
tradition, also repeatedly emphasizes the principle of “Lex orandi, Lex credendi”, though with 
considerably different results.92 For George Tyrrell, appeals to the primacy of devotion to that of 
doctrine and theological speculation takes a decidedly polarizing turn, arguably collapsing both 
speculative theology and mysticism into one another, resulting in an non-dynamized, platitudinarian 
encounter. To be clear, Tyrrell will reference the principle of lex orandi as unambiguously reflecting 
its origins signification in Prosper of Aquitane, ut lex supplicandi legem statuat credendi [let the law 
of prayer determine the law of belief] and not, what Laurence Paul Hemming notes, its more recent 
historical reversal that switches the order of orandi and credendi, as for example in Pius XII’s 
Mediator Dei.93  Which in turn, is continued more recently in Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI’s famous 
Motu Proprio, Summorum Pontificum, which states that orandi 'corresponds to her law of faith'.  
Such a reformulation is not at all the case for Tyrrell. Rather, Tyrrell’s works, of course, are highly 
contextual, inescapably linked in reaction to the then high degree of rationalism within the Neo-
Scholastic manual tradition at the turn of the 20th Century. Such contra positions were thus 
intensified by Tyrrell’s adamant pragmatism and preference for the praxis of Christian life, or “living 
theology” to that of Church’s Creed and more sober, dogmatic Tradition. Taking an isolated quote 
from St. Augustine, Tyrrell exalts this voluntaristic line in exclaiming, “’We are nothing else but 
wills,’” from which he then ontologizes: “[a] man is, in his veriest reality, what he loves”.94 This 
ontology becomes historicized, as Tyrrell juxtaposes the seeming chaos and historical change of our 
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conflictual “world of wills”, which stands in need of an emerging Revelation, “discerned in its 
universality as the Alpha and Omega of all spiritual movement [....] a Divine Love which gives us a 
standard and criterion whereby to discern between love and love, and to guide our feet through the 
labyrinth of warring affections into the way of peace.”95 
 
 Hence, from within the very depths of the modernist controversy, appeals to lex orandi are 
inexorably linked with an array of issues that include doctrinal development, historical-critical 
exegesis, religious experience, ecclesiology and the specific identity and role of the Magisterium. 
Nevertheless, despite the contextuality of Tyrrell’s writings, given the profound influence that early 
20th Century Catholic Modernism has had upon the retrieval of mysticism and spirituality throughout 
the previous century, current efforts at trying to reunite both mystical and liturgical theology under 
the unifying banner of worship—such as van Beeck proposes—must therefore take serious the 
various roots, and in this case, intensification of this divide. Thereby, in retrospect, we can ask, with 
appeals made to lex orandi, whether such appeals arise from the very act of piety and worship itself 
as an attempt to genuinely transform theological discourse, both in terms of its object and manner of 
reflection? Or conversely, do appeals to devotion seek to expand the range of sources for theological 
reflection, while largely reinforcing, or challenging, existing methods of speculative theological 
reflection, made possible by an expanded, diffuse array of sources?  
 
 To answer this, and how lex orandi functions within the broader array of his thought, we first 
must have a better sense of what Tyrrell understands as “devotion”. For one, it is immediately 
evident that the sphere of devotion remains largely privatized and individual, while any degree of 
substantive reflection upon the liturgical rootedness of devotion is virtually absent. And this absence 
is quite influential, for prayer is almost exclusively referred to as interior and mystical, “taken widely 
for the life of Charity, of Divine Love, of will-union with God and His Saints.”96 Appeals to such 
interiority under the idiom of charity are employed by Tyrrell as an overarching “sacramental 
principal” of religious life and faith in toto, in such a way that its plays off the “relation of inward and 
outward in religion [that] is akin to that of soul and body.”97  
 
 By prioritizing interiority and its alliance with both the law of prayer and seeking support 
from the canon of mystical theology, it is well-known that many of these positions would come under 
significant scrutiny after Pius X’s Lamentabili sane exitu and Pascendi dominici gregis, both released 
in 1907, as well as by the historically complex pronouncement by the Belgian Cardinal Mercier in his 
Lenten Pastoral.98 With an eye towards Rome with the assurance that his Belgium flock has been 
spared from this Modernist contagion, Mercier reiterates, and thereby reinforces, Pascendi’s 
characterization of “modernism” (typified by Tyrrell) as founded exclusively upon the individual and 
the authority of the “interior life of religion [which] remains itself the supreme directive rule of 
beliefs and dogmas”99. To which, in response, Tyrrell shifts attention away from his “equally flawed 
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pragmatism” and exclusive voluntarism and instead, responds to Mercier et. al., arguing that these 
criticisms are due to his lack of an explicitly developed, Neo-Scholastic metaphysics. Which, Tyrrell 
adds, is foreign to both the “ancient Catholic and Apostolic conception of a teaching authority 
belonging to the Church as a whole”, as well as the depositum fidei, to which Christ commissioned 
the Church and is entirely foreign to such a metaphysics.100 Following this contra position, Tyrrell will 
nonetheless go on to argue for the distinctly “interior” and thereby “mystical” dimensions of 
Revelation itself, as “directed to, and in some sense proceeds from, the life of Divine Love in the 
soul”.101 However, before charges of “v  a   mma     ”102 are made, it is perhaps equally important 
to note that even in Pascendi, defense of an Augustinian interior intimo meo is upheld, which, when 
“rightly understood, bears no reproach”103. For Tyrrell, such a theo-anthropological “understanding” 
is implausible, which we will see, radically changes the trajectory of his work.  
 
 Rather, Tyrrell repeatedly cites support from the then lesser known 14th Century English 
anchorite, “Mother Juliana of Norwich” as providing the “key to the true interpretation and criticism 
[of] [...] Christian Revelation and of every religion so far as it reaches after the fullness of Christ” as 
nothing other than love itself.104 Here, Love dynamically functions as both “revealed and revealer”, 
such that, for Julian, “  v  wa  h   m     . h   h w       h ? L v . ha   h w   h   h ? L v .”105 
With this context in mind, Tyrrell’s key, repeated references to the English anchorite mystic—with 
little to no recourse to her theological anthropology—is exemplary of the ways in which the mystical 
theological canon were being resourced and reshaped by Catholic Modernists as a traditional 
counter to the form of Neo-Scholasticism as exemplified by Pascendi.106 And in view of lex orandi, lex 
credendi, such references to Julian are quite significant in emphasizing a certain polarization, 
bordering upon the hyperbolic, as Tyrrell quickly enlists the English anchorite’s own theological 
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entanglements as foreshadowing his own Neo-Scholastic adversaries. Therein, the appeal of this 
otherwise reclusive, late 14th Century English mystical writer as none other than a proto-Modernist. 
And it is this form of historical revisionism that one frequently continues to encounter today, as it 
pertains to mystical theology and its familiar discourses over negative theology and religious 
experience.107 For Tyrrell, while such revisionism is consistent throughout his works, these positions 
are succinctly captured in his 1899 essay, The Relation of Theology to Devotion.108 Here, Tyrrell 
displays this often conflictual, polarizing relation between devotional life and rationalized theology, 
at first sight as a mutual encounter, as a both/and approach, not intending that “popular devotions 
are to dictate to theology, but that theology together with them [devotions], must be brought to the 
test of primitive revelation as interpreted by the Church.”109 Initially in the essay, Tyrrell’s tone is one 
of mutuality and encounter, wherein the influence of Newman is especially evident. However, 
Tyrrell’s particularity later on emerges wherein he argues that as a “concrete religion left by Christ to 
His Church” Christian Revelation is thus more “directly a lex orandi than a   x         ” since the 
“creed is involved in the prayer, and has to be disentangled from it.”110 To disentangle its 
pronouncements from its worship, Tyrrell says that we are in need of a “wise and temperate 
theology”, which in large part, for Tyrrell, means a theology that does not forget about the 
specifically limiting features of analogy. Such an emphasis, combined with a lack of kataphasis and/or 
derivative Augustinian participative metaphysics, is a clear forerunner for the latter “rediscovery” 
and reassertion of negative theology within late-20th Century theology. For Tyrrell, such a theology 
would refuse to “forget that we are constrained to think and speak of things supersensible and 
eternal in the language proper to things sensible and temporal”.111 And in another context, he writes 
of analogy’s purely negative function, not in “giv[ing] us any more comprehensible idea of God...but 
that it impresses upon us the necessary inadequacy of our human way of regarding Him.”112 For 
Tyrrell, appeal to analogy’s greater dissimiltudo is resourced by Vatican I’s equally influential defense 
of theological mystery, which Tyrrell uses as a rebuttal to his critics in their overemphasized 
rationalism:  
 
And indeed reason illumined by faith, when it seeks it with diligence, devotion and sobriety, 
receives at God’s hand a certain most fruitful insight into mysteries, partly by aid of analogies 
from things naturally known, partly from the connection of one mystery with another or with 
another or with the last end of man, yet never is it capable of beholding them after the manner 
of those truths that constitute its proper object. For of their own nature divine mysteries so 
surpass the created intelligence that even after they have been propounded by revelation and 
accepted by faith they remain covered by the veil of faith itself as it were wrapped in a certain 
obscurity so long as, in this mortal life, we are exiled from the Lord: for we walk by faith and 
not by vision.
113
 
 
 With Dei filius as a support, Tyrrell will maintain the usefulness of analogy, yet whenever it is 
forgetful of its inadequacy, he will maintain that it nevertheless remains “fruitful”—albeit, with his 
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typical flare, the “fruitful mother of all deception.”114 Hence, as a corrective, such wayward 
rationalism requires that it “often to be brought to the lex orandi test”115, one in which is verified and 
“adheres to the ancient Catholic and Apostolic conception of a teaching authority belonging to the 
Church as a whole.”116 While Tyrrell clearly wants to shift the understanding of the Magisterium away 
from its then ultramontane character, he nevertheless is adamant in insisting that devotion itself 
possess its own critical capacity, in terms not only of witnessing consistent practice by Catholics, but 
furthermore, an ability to critically engage with speculative theology, especially when it is forgetful of 
the role of analogy itself. Hence, by insisting upon subjugating theology to the “test of lex orandi”, 
Tyrrell is wanting, in a certain sense, to return devotion and prayer (lex orandi) back to its proper 
theological setting. However, he does so by way of polarization and diffidence. Thus, one can easily 
say that the pendulum swings radically opposite for the Irish modernist, such that once enduring the 
test of devotion, theology recuperates itself “as far as it formulates and justifies the devotion of the 
best Catholics, and as far as it is true to the life of faith and charity as actually lived, so far is it a law 
and corrective for all.”117 In this case, by way of lex orandi, lex credendi, devotion is not once again 
integrated into theology, yet theology itself collapses into lived mysticism—which, by way of its 
historical reconstruction, can no longer be called mystical theology. 
 
 Not only was Tyrrell’s lack of balance theologically problematic at the time from a dogmatic 
perspective—given his repeated stress on analogy’s limitations, as a forerunner to late-20th Century 
“negative theology”. Yet as I have been arguing, such a polarizing approach was perhaps even more 
so for proponents of mystical theology itself—a distinct, mutually related theological canonical 
tradition and sub discipline—which both absorbed views upon analogy’s limitations in the name of 
religious “mystery”, while now being aligned solely within the realm of “religious experience”. In this 
sense, it is interesting to consider certain themes that Tyrrell develops in his 1897 essay, “What is 
Mysticism”, wherein he develops a more expansive, explicitly non-hierarchical notion of mysticism, 
such that “if love be mysticism, then we have the key to all mysticism within ourselves.”118 For 
mysticism and spirituality within the 20th Century, Tyrrell’s greater stress upon the immanent 
accessibility and socio-horizontal focus of mysticism is immensely influential, as it is combined with 
the living of Christian life within a soteriological horizon. Interestingly enough, he pursues this topic 
of mysticism immediately with a discussion of hagiography and the need to critically update its 
approach, in accord with the tastes and demands of the “subjective temper of our days”.119 For in 
terms of modern educated sensibilities—an audience to which Tyrrell was initially writing for in the 
London Jesuit publication, the Month, before his removal from staff120—Tyrrell cites broad, diverse 
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influences, ranging from the advent of the modern novel, developments with history and the “art of 
biography”, in its “portrayal of a life, of a process; the record of the growth and unfolding of a soul 
and character.”121 Note here of course, the not so subtle references to doctrinal development that 
Tyrrell is equally calling to attention, as one equally marked by “process”, historical “growth and 
unfolding”, etc. Hence, given 20th Century modernity’s “subjective temper”, Tyrrell pointedly remarks 
that in terms of hagiography, lists of miraculous events, earlier chronicled at the expense of the 
ordinary and mundane, are of little interest for educated moderns, for “we care less for what a man 
does, and more for what he is.”122 This plea for the subject and identity of the saint is also in line with 
the explicit utility of hagiography: namely, imitation. To which, in reflecting modern aesthetic 
approaches, Tyrrell poignantly observes that “we are but slightly stirred to grasp at what is only very 
remotely within our reach.”123 Tyrrell bases such observations as a bridge to his primary contention: 
that mysticism itself has suffered deeply from such hagiographical tendencies. And in this sense 
Tyrrell is certainly convincing, in light not only of outdated hagiographic methods, but furthermore, 
the manuals of spiritual theology, such as Tanquerey's The Spiritual Life, which had largely 
segregated mysticism within a very narrow theological field as something wholly extraordinary to 
revealed, Christian faith.124 Such presentation, Tyrrell argues, regards mysticism as 
 
[…] attributed to them [the Saints] as a peculiar possession from which other Christians are 
excluded. Moreover, mysticism itself, if not entirely misunderstood, is at least regarded as 
something vague and unintelligible, something akin to illusions and visions, things which no healthy 
and practical mind would care to meddle with.
125
 
 
 Thus, in seeking to reintroduce the credibility and validity of the mystical theological canon, 
Tyrrell will thus argue against such a rarefied, “infused” understanding of mysticism. Instead, Tyrrell 
assents to a more broad, inclusive redefinition of mysticism, synonymous with the life of grace as the 
“love of God[...]’Every Christian in the state of grace loves God and is therefore more or less a 
mystic.’”126 Certainly, Tyrrell wants to humanize and immanetize mysticism as “something within our 
grasp”—a somewhat unilateral expansion of what the manuals of spiritual theology call “acquired 
contemplation”, or its French 17th Century precursor, “prayer of the quiet”. Tyrrell will thus 
emphasize a definite degree of the very naturalness of the act of mysticism, as he broadly 
understands it. And likewise, it is to be expected that by lacking attention to a certain metaphysic, 
demanding questions, such as the relation between nature and grace is problematically left 
unattended. Rather, concerning our love for God and the mystical experience of His immediacy to 
the soul, for Tyrrell, such immediacy is never one of sensible, and thus conceptual, “intuition”. 
Instead, mysticism is experientially inferential, as “fairly expressed by saying that they feel, though 
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they do not behold, the Divine presence.”127 And as a wholly immanent act, Tyrrell will identify this 
inference as a “natural act of the intellect, and will give birth to a self-caused, natural act of love.”128 
This here, for Tyrrell, is the core value of mysticism: its immanence and naturalness, while the 
“utility” of mysticism is seen as contributing to a “living theology that continually proceeds from and 
returns to that experience of which it is the ever tentative and perfectible analysis.”129 And yet, the 
reason why the charge of “immanence” was so damaging—a heterodox account of interior intimo 
meo—is precisely because Tyrrell wishes to uncritically marry this living, experiential theology—
which he finds in the premodern mystical canon—with the “modern subjective tempor” that regards 
the subject as autonomously independent from both community and world. Combining such 
anthropology with his limiting sense of analogy, Tyrrell’s plea for mysticism, exemplified by someone 
as evocative as Julian of Norwich, without recourse to her wider theological context and distinct 
theological anthropology, only historically reconstructs mysticism as a discourse further afield from 
serious theological consideration.130 The pleas for religious experience, as mirroring and arising from 
the autonomous subject, become inexorably epistemological, while largely overlooking issues of 
hermeneutically engaging with content as a source for theologizing within the broader Tradition. This 
point is distinctly born out by late-20th Century scholarship on mysticism precisely over the question 
of the possibility of the immediacy and passivity of mystical experience.131 The critical presumption, 
however, within these past debates over the mediated or immediate character of mystical 
experience is precisely how it hinges upon the modern subject himself and the extent to which such 
experiences reflect and attest to his questioned autonomy as such.  
 
 Here too do we see why renewed attention has been given over to the mystical canon 
explicitly concerning in its views on love, explicitly seen through the prism of a personalist 
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anthropology—what the French Jesuit Pierre Rouselot would typify as the “ecstatic view of love”, 
with the likes of St. Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St. Thierry, in contrast with the “physical” or 
“Greco-Thomist synthesis” on the “natural view of love”.132 Reflecting such a modern, personalist 
anthropology, and love’s ecstatic overcoming of individual isolation, Tyrrell writes: “It is precisely by 
love and its dependent affections that we are brought into conscious and active relation with the 
whole world of personalities outside our own....It is love which at once saves and yet overcomes that 
separateness and individual distinction which is of the very essence of personality...”133 Given such an 
isolated, autonomous personalist anthropology, love is seen as “overcoming” such isolation. Here, 
the modern subject is depicted in full view, while love is addressed as a distinct need for fulfillment 
and relationality, born from lack. And yet, Tyrrell himself is not ignorant of this “gulf” that divides 
someone such as Julian and the modern subject. Tyrrell acknowledges that figures from the medieval 
mystical canon are operating from a “psychology of their own”, which he maintains is entirely 
distinct from scholastic theology and in turn, is “difficult to disentangle from the necessarily 
figurative language in which it is wrapped.”134  
 
 Tyrrell’s views are here fortunately outdated, in so far as both the advances by Maréchal and 
transcendental Thomists as well as by Blondel's "immanence" and its theological historical 
ressourcement by De Lubac, et. al. in rediscovering  precisely a more dynamic Thomas, the full extent 
of potentia oboedentialis and the forceful return of a robust, imago dei theological anthropology 
within Catholic theology precisely under the the idiom of our “natural desire for God”. It is this 
precise theological development as a ressourcement, which in looking back at Tyrrell works, is 
abundantly missing in his pleas for a certain form of natural mysticism and turn towards immanence. 
And while these themes have been strongly developed within various systematic theologies, the fruit 
of such development appears at times hardly visible within scholarly reflection over mysticism that is 
either explicitly non-theological or if it is, still relegates itself within outdated views on the modern 
subject confined exclusively to the parameters of religious experience. From a systematic theological 
perspective, such developments clearly signal an opening for a more substantial, mutual encounter 
between mysticism and systematic theology—as typified by van Beeck. And it is the Dutch Jesuit’s 
intuition, in seeing the potential of this encounter, that if there is to be a real exchange—one in 
which respects enduring human autonomy as well as the creature’s “native attunement to God” as, 
what van Beeck would call the creature as radical decentered in their  theonomous dependence—
then this exchange must indeed be oriented to an admirable exchange. That is, to the creature’s  
deification as the fullness of Christ Incarnated, which, given our natural attunement to God, renders 
the greater particularity and flourishing of the human person as such. Such a perspective, as we shall 
now see, for van Beeck, is one of lex orandi, wherein liturgical worship is both a source and more 
importantly, a participation and praxis whereby speculative theological reflection must orient itself in 
and, as “intellectual worship”, must ultimately return. 
 
 §3. Van Beeck and mystico-liturgical participation 
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 Returning once again to van Beeck, the Dutch Jesuit broadly situates the liturgical and 
“doxological essence of the Christian faith”—between the corresponding mysteries of the theological 
and the anthropological—within the cosmological sphere, “in place and time that this essence is 
being played out, in response to the person of Jesus Christ”.135 Here, van Beeck explores the liturgical 
within an ongoing fundamental theological discussion of the Creed, one in which mediates the Creed  
between the theological as “utterly and transcendently gracious”, while equally emphasizing the 
liturgical as an “invitation to human authenticity in believing, inspired by u  v   a  huma   y’  G  -
given capacity for God—a capacity definitively revealed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ.”136 Once 
again, not only do we see van Beeck heavily reliant upon this theological anthropology to which he 
will return to time and again via the Tradition, but equally important is that the human integrity of 
such an “invitation” thus involves fundamental theological reflection. 
 
 And while such mediation clearly gives way to an ongoing hermeneutics of interpretation, 
liturgical mediation—contextualized and always concretized in the particularity of the embodied 
material world—is “far from keeping the worshiping community at a distance from God”.137 Rather, 
van Beeck will reengage such hermeneutics with his more characteristic, thick aesthetics of 
participative worship, which he argues is squarely in line with deification and hence, mystical 
theology’s “admirabile commercium”. Here, bridging the discourses and mutual influence of liturgical 
and mystical theology upon a firm Christological grounding thus allows for van Beeck—once again, 
showing a profound resemblance to the inheritance of Ruusbroec—to liturgically characterize both 
the transcendental and immanent encounter with Christ in more familiar mystical theological 
categories, such as kataphasis and apophasis.138 Here, van Beeck can thus argue for the tension of 
both “’saying and unsaying”, not as a suspended dialectic, yet as a dynamic that yields to a “positive 
result’”.139 Here, the primacy of Christianity as a positive religion, over and against any natural 
religiosity comes to expression. Such a positive result is thus, none other than the liturgical, whereby 
“Christian worship is the act by which it most closely participates in the divine nature.”140 Here, van 
Beeck is both recalling us, yet innovating at the same time, a crucial point that has so often been 
overlooked and compromised in the late-20th Century rediscovery of “negative theology”, whereby 
he warns us against “the concomitant development of a notion, prepared by nominalism, that 
apophatic theology and mysticism are free-standing, self-authenticating acts of the human mind in 
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relation to God, and not forms of worship, let alone Christian worship.”141 Not only do we see a 
certain balance between the kataphatic and the apophatic, which is always to be commended. But 
furthermore, he roots the via negativa away from an all too common, platitudinous speculation and 
Derridean indecision.142 Instead, he marries it with a robust, participative metaphysics of desire—one 
in which is equally lacking in Jean-Luc Marion—whereby God’s utter transcendence and greater 
alterity is performatively approached in liturgy itself. That is to say, as worship. Here, the via negativa 
is enshrined and enhanced by liturgy itself and likewise, theology, its servant and beneficiary, as the 
pursuit of “intellectual worship”. For this sense of performativity—“to a positive result”—is 
continuous in its linkages, both with kataphasis and apophasis. And unlike Marion, it is rooted in the 
need, urge and proliferation of naming and imagining, as well as unsaying, evidenced by the Roman 
Rite’s enduring, regional practices of the Lenten veiling of crosses, statues and altarpieces. For van 
Beeck, the appeal of lex orandi and the liturgical does not stem from a Modernist hostility and 
opposition from the law of belief (as we have seen in George Tyrrell), nor as a pious refuge of 
unspeakable, glorious alterity in an attempt to collapse the philosophical and theological rationalities 
under the idiom of onto-theology—as is the case for Jean Luc Marion. Rather, for van Beeck, he 
bridges the strengths of both the mystical and the liturgical in such a way that characterizes worship 
itself as arising from the erotic; from our “native attunement to God”. What Ruusbroec, in reflecting 
upon the “way and manner” in which Christ gives himself in the Eucharist”  similarly depicts Christ’s 
minne as both utterly gratuitous, as well as the “voracious lust [ghiereghe ghelost] Christ has for our 
blessedness”, such that, “no matter how much He consumes of us, He cannot be satisfied, for He has 
bulimia [den mengerael], and His hunger is without measure.”143 Here, worship arises specifically 
from this inexhaustible eros, one in which does not reflect human subjectivity characterized by a 
fundamental privation and lack, yet a human desire that fundamentally participates in God’s greater 
alterity. Here, such a transcendent otherness is deduced neither from early modernity’s take on the 
remoteness of God “shorn of all immanence”144 nor the weakness of analogy seen in Tyrrell’s 
Modernist plea for “mystery” and its reiteration in an exclusive, rational argument for negative 
theology. Rather, for van Beeck, such a desire is deeply liturgical and participative in its origins and 
return, as he recalls to his aid various sources from the Tradition (Gregory of Nyssa, Clement of 
Alexandria, John Damascene, Dionysius the Areopagite, Augustine, Aquinas, Ruusbroec, Nicholas of 
Cusa) that culminate in an “aware[ness] of the limitlessness of our own inner desire for beatitude”, 
which, as an admirabile commercium, preserves and advances human integrity amid “our total 
consummation in God.”145  
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 Such a participative desire is in turn Christologically centered and reaffirmed as 
fundamentally liturgical, as “paradoxically [...] in proportion as Christians have more emphatically 
professed that in Christ risen they truly know the God they worship, they have also felt more, not 
less, deeply compelled to profess God’s utter transcendence.”146 Here, Christ is not merely the object 
that elicits the liturgical act ‘to God’, yet in a participative move, in God, the Church “appeal[s] to 
Christ’s perfect worship”.147 Such liturgical participation in Christ’s own kenotic worship, as mystici 
corporis148 thereby mediates the immediacy in which “Christians truly know the God they worship—a 
God who becomes more, not less, adorable and ungraspable for being so intimately known.”149 
 
 This liturgical emphasis within theological reflection, in turn, van Beeck identifies another 
primary theme in God Encountered that is especially relevant to our reflection on mystical theology 
and its status in relation to systematic theology. Namely, a Christology of “encounter” as 
“interpreted in terms of a mutuality of sharing”, which van Beeck argues is the “central focus” or 
primary object of Christian theology.150 Such a systematic Christology of encounter, at the 
intersection of cosmos and humanity, yields a distinct opening to mystical theology. This is evident 
precisely in terms of divinization, whereby to ”become partakers of the divine nature” [2 Pt, 1,4] by 
virtue of the Incarnation itself and its transformed enhancement of created material reality such 
that, as Ruusbroec states, “He remained God and became human, that humans might become 
God.”151 Appropriately positioned not as a privatized form of autonomous experience, instead van 
Beeck generously conveys the Tradition’s “endless variations” of this “exchange principle”, or 
“admirabile commercium” [admirable exchange] as a core dimension of revealed, Christian faith that 
has organically developed by Tradition, as an economy that mediates and fulfills both cosmological 
and anthropological spheres.152 Such an assertion builds upon a natural openness, theonomous 
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grounding and “native attunement”, as “actualized” or furthered in “likeness” of its deified ends. This 
point is evident in noting the very contextual basis in which many of the Patristic Fathers made use of 
this exchange principal, wherein van Beeck argues: 
 
Christianity entered a world where religion was often associated with trade and where trade 
was largely carried on by barter, often across the forbidding barriers of race, language, religion, 
and spheres of influence and power. In such a world, the image of the exchange of goods 
(along with related images, such as redemption) could furnish the Christian faith with a telling 
metaphor: God involved the human race in a paradoxical trade-off. The Church Fathers, from 
Irenaeus on, never tired of repeating, in endless variations, the divinization theme: ‘the Word 
of God, our Lord Jesus Christ..., out of his limitless love, became what we are, so that he might 
make us what he is.’
153
 
 
Speaking against the excess of “modernism”, as exemplified by many soteriological threads in certain 
strands of the Protestant tradition and its “experientialist bias”, over and against both the “integrity 
of the faith...[and] the visible faith-community”154, van Beeck juxtaposes this with the Tradition’s 
natural transition from Christological dogma and creation’s fundamental attunement to God to that 
of the admirabile commercium: 
 
Consequently, faith introduces the believer, not so much to God, as to God’s work; it becomes 
a matter, in Melanchthon’s classic phrase, of ‘knowing his [Christ’s] benefits,’ rather than of 
becoming, in Christ, ‘partakers of the divine nature’. This has profound consequences in the 
area of Christology. It removes from the heart of Christian theology what is perhaps the most 
central theological theme of the patristic tradition—a theme that gave rise to endless 
variations: ‘Out of the limitless love God’s Word, who is God’s Son, became what we are, so as 
to make us what he is.’ This broad and capacious theme, known as the ‘exchange principle’, 
had warranted, since Ireanaeus, the Christian conviction that humanity and the world are 
called into participation in the divine life.
155
 
 
 
 In arguing for the inseparability of a hermeneutics of tradition and “participation in the 
church’s present faith experience”, like Tyrrell, van Beeck interestingly, yet repeatedly cites D       u ’ 
“most fruitful insight into the mysteries” (DS 3016) to support this stress upon both participation and 
mystery inherent within theological hermeneutics. For van Beeck, the key importance Dei filius (DS 
3016) reinstates is the inherently hermeneutical task of theology, one in which privileges the 
centrality of the mysteries of revealed, Christian faith. And thus in turn, the necessity for their thick, 
hermeneutical pursuit as a form of participative understanding. Furthermore, "objective”, scientific 
knowledge cannot stand apart, van Beeck argues, from “antecedent, human interest—i.e. 
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participation.”156 Which is to say, the intentionality inherent in knowing, an intentionality that 
includes: “interest, a sense of presence, encounter, participation, self-abandon, capacity for 
worship”.157 This participation, furthermore, is distinctly a human phenomenon, intrinsic to sociality 
whereby we can neither refuse to “project a presence onto others”158 nor “cannot not participate”159 
within a mutual intentional structure. Rather, relationality is inherently natural for humans, argues 
van Beeck, and such mutual intentionalities are never “neutral”, never an objective as such, for it is 
always already touched and invested with meaning, identity and relationship. This anthropology of 
mutual intentionality and participation, refuses however a reductive, hermeneutical circle and 
instead, turns upon a theological, sapiential foundation wherein knowledge of God functions in one 
“being content to be known by It, and to feel Its touch within us, which will transform us in all we 
do”.160 However, with regards to participation, such a sapiential knowledge as being-known is always 
contextual, rooted in relationships and the very givenness of Creation: “[W]e will know It only by 
participation, yet never apart from everything and everybody else we know.”161 Thus, such 
participative knowing resists the very modern (and Modernist) trappings of autonomous exclusion, 
possession and verifiability, such that we see in exclusive appeals to the autonomy of “religious 
experience”. Of course, van Beeck certainly recognizes a deeply apophatic move in God’s greater 
dissimilarity as “irrevocably Other”, and yet, such alterity and its participative knowing, for van 
Beeck, is inescapably a function of bearing witness to such knowing in and through its contextual, 
mediated horizon. 
 
 §4.  Unity and Catholicity in Theology: Fundamental and Dogmatic Theology, Conversant 
         with Mystical and Liturgical Theology 
 
 What is at stake in “economy” and theology? As we have seen, the admirable exchange both 
epitomizes and preserves none other than the crucial linkage between doxology and soteriology, 
between the divine exitus and humanity’s and the world’s graced reditus. While economy here 
stands for reditus, it is one fundamentally of reception and participation, yet founded upon a clear 
asymmetry, in so far as the 
 
[N]atural order and the order of grace are governed by the dynamics of an encounter that is 
divinely initiated—of a partnership that is entirely of God’s making [.....] The account of God’s 
exitus—the central profession of faith—must, therefore, be considered the foundation of 
Christian faith, and consequently the standard against which all other doctrines are to be 
measured.
162
  
 
 
Hence, the dogmatic content of Christian faith—Creed, Councils, the Church’s magisterium— in their 
respective legitimacies are normative and asymmetrically asserted. And yet, van Beeck will also 
stress that such an exitus and asymmetry is not to be understood in a linear progression, yet as 
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mutually related with the act of creation itself and its “native attunement” to such exitus. Hence, the 
interpretation of grace and nature is seen as mutual and dialectical. Or, in philosophical terminology: 
a greater preference for univocity in its stress of immanence over and against equivocity, while 
clearly reaffirming God’s greater dissimilarity precisely in terms of semper maior. Hence, van Beeck 
clearly refuses a clear, two-tiered structure, such that the “orders of grace and nature are 
intertwined, not juxtaposed.”163 This relationship he will term as perichoretic, though because of the 
prior asymmetry of the exitus as the normative content of Christian faith, the intertwining and 
mutuality of nature and grace are placed in the tension of balancing mutuality and asymmetry.  
Which in turn confirms that for van Beeck, the positive and revealed dimensions of Christian faith 
make it superior to natural religion. Such an affirmation is mutually balanced by the   v     x  u ’ 
anthropological infrastructure. Herein, van Beeck argues that the Incarnation event has neither 
“replaced or overwhelmed” creation’s integrity. Instead, such an event enhances it to “rediscover, at 
the heart of the order of creation, its prior, native openness to the order of the incarnation”.164 
Hence, such an emphasis upon creation’s native attunement to God, not only as mutual, yet intrinsic 
to the asymmetry of the divine exitus is the opening for the necessity of fundamental theology. 
 
 In establishing the basic parameters of systematic theology and its foundational unity, van 
Beeck first describes the relation between constructive, dogmatic and fundamental theology as 
ideally marked by a shared sense of “mutuality”, most distinctly between that of dual integrity of 
understanding and faith.165 At its core, theology is marked by the mutual interplay between its 
ongoing hermeneutical pursuits, fides quaerens intellectum, while “at a deeper level...theology must 
be mystagogical”. Neither due to theology’s object, nor the personal piety of its practioner, rather, 
as we have analyzed earlier on, theology’s intrinsic mystagogical dimensions, van Beeck argues, 
stems from the human person’s immanent theonomous core. For a mystagogical theology “leads the 
mind into the depth and fullness of its own native potential in the very process of leading it to its 
limits, as well as beyond them.”166 By virtue of this immanent theonomous core of the human 
person, van Beeck sees in this theological anthropology not only theology’s primary function in terms 
of the service of faith. Instead, in furthering the tradition of Christian humanism, van Beeck correctly 
sees theology’s equally important, critical function as intrinsically stemming from our own “native 
potential”.  “Thus, on the other hand, theology is also meant to be an education of human 
intelligence precisely insofar as it is natively in search of the infinite: theology is ‘understanding in 
search of faith’ (intellectus quarens fidem).”167 
 
 Here, the critical function of theology is once again stressed by way of its “native” or 
“natural” character of the human intelligence itself, one in which is characterized by way of its erotic 
search for the infinite. Van Beeck’s Christian humanism is especially evident whereby he states that 
“faith in God must be the exaltation of humanity, otherwise the Christian faith-commitment would 
be merely superimposed, adventitious, and sectarian, and its only possible defense would be of the 
fundamentalist kind.”168 Thus, the very critical dimensions arise intrinsically within theological 
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reflection itself, and not extrinsically, as conceived in the more critical dialogical model of theology 
and its relation to other academic fields, society and the Church. Rather, by theology’s intrinsic 
critical sense, as stemming from its desiderium naturalis, van Beeck provides a compelling 
groundwork to contemporaneously argue for the continuing place of theology within academia 
today.169 In this case, native attunement grounds the interplay and commitment to both the very 
particularity of religious traditions as interpretative of such a theological anthropology, while equally 
universal and naturalistic in its acknowledgement of humanity, the world and other faith traditions. 
Therefore, the function of such native attunement is that with regards to its intrinsic character, van 
Beeck’s “conception” aims at “put[ing] an end to all ‘extrinsicism’ in the understanding of the 
relationship between positive religion and natural religiosity, faith and reason, grace and nature, the 
living God and the universe.”170 Instead, on a horizontal level, such an immanent, native attunement 
mediates religious particularity, universality and difference, while aiming to ensure their respective 
integrities. And in turn, in its in-depth, vertical mediation, native attunement “upholds the traditional 
Catholic realization that the order of grace, symbolized by the positive Christian profession of faith, 
transcends humanity and the world in their natural integrity without being alien to them.”171 
 
 While such orientations establish systematic theology as a hermeneutical interpretation of 
culture and religion, van Beeck nuances the very contextual nature of such a hermeneutical theology. 
Interpreting the thick, dynamic convergence between religion and culture in light of the “Great 
Tradition”, van Beeck writes that “The great Christian Tradition, however, has never simply 
contented itself with this natural, spontaneous interplay between religion and culture. It has always 
also sought to influence and even transform culture.”172 Thus, from this conviction, theology can 
neither resort to mere description, nor can its Tradition hermeneutics remain static and avoid 
cultural developments as well. Instead, van Beeck will insist upon this point in raising to issue 
systematic theology’s “central—or in any case most challenging—task...[as]the search for new forms 
of unity between religion and culture.”173 Such an appeal for “new forms of unity” is characteristic 
and equally at the core of van Beeck’s thought, as he lays out systematic theology’s equally intrinsic, 
constructive dimension in mediating between the positions of dogmatic and fundamental theology: 
“situated as it is between Church and Culture, worship and worldliness, witness to the world and 
willingness to learn from it”.174 And in true Jesuit manner, such a constructive mediation and 
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development requires “true spiritual discernment” as well as a “special sense of balance between the 
appreciation of existing harmony and order and the power of imagination.”175 In turn, such a 
constructive theological angle, van Beeck puts forth, is theology’s “first loyalty, as well as the core of 
theologian’s vocation:     h  p       m m       u      a  , a   p  hap     fu  h  ,  h  Chu  h’  
living, historic Tradition as a who  .”176 
 
 The ”Great Tradition”, consistently referred to by van Beeck, is the “Tradition of worship, life, 
and teaching of the undivided Church.”177 Furthermore, there is an unavoidable heuristic that he 
establishes in God Encountered, in both its “discovery and...recovery”, which nonetheless avoids 
specific definition.178 Instead, van Beeck will argue that the fundamental openness of the Great 
Tradition preserves its “spacious structures” by precisely foregoing the temptation of  reducing it to 
“certainty and assurance rather than understanding.”179 And in pursuing and safeguarding such an 
understanding—rather than clear, certain knowledge of the Great Tradition—so too does it avoid 
both “intergralism” and “modernism” reductions. Instead, van Beeck characterizes the Great 
Tradition as an “organic, open unity of structure”180 that is fundamental to catholicity and the 
“search for new forms of unity between faith and culture”181, positions that are at the heart of van 
Beeck’s theological contributions. In a concise manner, van Beeck nicely defines the twin positions of 
integralism and modernism, which, van Beeck argues with appeal to the Great Tradition, are both 
“extremes and equally undesirable”.182 Van Beeck states:  
 
Reductive systematizations take the depth out of the structures of the Christian faith; they 
create forced coherence by reducing the faith to the totality of its manifest, objective elements. 
Selective systematizations take the breadth out of the structures of the Christian faith; they 
create forced coherence by                f  h  fa  h’  ma  f     h m   a   f       a     h   
themes into subordination around it. The former introduce totalitarian principles into the 
Christian faith, which tends to turn it into an ideology; the latter introduce rationalist principles, 
which tends to lead to heresy; both set themselves up as authorities over the living 
Tradition.
183 
 
 
Hence, in one way, we can see this defense of the openness of the Tradition as an expression of van 
Beeck’s Christian humanism, which recognizes the mediation of context to the mysteries of the 
Church’s faith. “The Great Tradition understands that humane cultural developments will prosper, 
not in a setting of total control (i.e. ‘integralism’), but in a basically free, dynamic openness that 
favors the human potential [....] Culture, therefore, deserves a discriminating welcome; it must not 
be fought and tamed.”184 
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 A. VAN BEECK ON THE ROLE AND IDENTITY OF FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY TODAY 
 
 Returning once more to the very mediating function of van Beeck’s theological anthropology 
as a plea for a dynamic immanence between the orders of nature and grace, the importance of such 
mediation in terms of fundamental theology is that such an emphasis goes both ways. Native 
attunement, van Beeck reminds us, as a movement from particularity to universality, precisely 
involves a fundamental theology that demands for “integrity” in such a move.185 Integrity, both for in 
respecting the dignity and alterity of others—which Christian faith, given its hermeneutical status, 
can never dismiss as “definitively irrelevant, dated, or unworthy of consideration”186 —as well as  the 
Church’s own human affirmation of the fundamental integrity of the act of faith. While the 
particularity of faith is reaffirmed as a “gracious gift”, it nonetheless corresponds to the humanity’s 
native attunement as precisely open and receptive to the gratuity of such a gift. Likewise, the 
mediation of native attunement, from universality to particularity is similarly upheld, in that such a 
“universalist orientation [...] is not available apart from some positive form of commitment or 
faith.”187 
 
 With this two-way exchange in mind, a more distinctly radical hermeneutics, as well as 
postmodernity’s affirmation of difference, contingency and theological reaffirmation of an 
adventitious extrinsicism amid a Derridean posture of hospitality to pure alterity would undoubtedly 
be highly critical of van Beeck’s thinking of unity. Unity, from this vantage point, is construed as a 
form of ontological enclosure and a reduction of difference to a closed, hegemonic narrative in its 
privilege of unity as primary. Hence, postmodernity’s engagement with contemporary culture and 
the technological onslaught of excessive, communicative mediums resorts to a more descriptive, de 
facto recognition, one in which “casts doubt on the very possibility of any unified understanding of 
the world and humanity.”188 Here, the prospect of “unity” is gauged as a modern, human 
achievement, under the banner of “progress”. Against this modern, technological and socio-
economic argument, one in which does not purport to leave the realm of description in its culture 
hermeneutics, unity is thereby seen as idealistic and implausible. Theologically speaking—and it is 
important to bear this in mind—here, it is not a matter of whether or not claims of unity are credible 
or accountable, with reference to its primary sources of reflection and discourse. Rather, the critique 
is made with reference to plausibility and a certain foundational ratification and legitimation of a 
credibility-gap as now fundamental in its cultural hermeneutical description.189  
 
 By shifting the theological terrain away from the task of credibility and/or accountability to 
that of cultural plausibility, such shifts lead to the adoption of a critical fundamental theological 
approach, which in part sees theology’s apologetical dimensions as situated within and oriented 
towards the radically secular, post-Christian cultural climate within major regions of Europe and the 
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urban cosmopolitan centers of North America today. In Leuven, we know this approach quite well as 
the hermeneutical-contextual theological approach. And as the praxis of theology should always 
attend to its embodied, concrete, Incarnational rootedness, the emphasis upon such a contextual 
approach is not only the distinguishing hallmark of current theology within Leuven, yet its very 
strength. However, in terms of unity, there is a profound risk in rejecting the claims of a 
differentiated unity—both intrinsically, within the practice of theology itself, as well as its continual 
reemergence within both religion and culture—by the gradual, habitual substitution of the de facto 
credibility-gap of its cultural hermeneutics for a more fundamental, de jure divorce between Creator 
and the creaturely itself. Here, whether it be a resignation towards, or the celebration of difference 
and multiplicity, recognizing the contextuality of theology shifts its contemporary imperatives away 
from the transformative demands of an ever-new unity and synthesis, and instead, steers it towards 
the description of plausibility. Here, one runs the grave risk of losing a taste for unity and the 
inexhaustible participation within the “admirable exchange”. This is especially the case, van Beeck 
argues, “in the universities, where theology most keenly experiences the pressure to adopt a truly 
scholarly (i.e. neutral, critical, skeptical) stance.”190 By this, van Beeck at first charges such a scholarly 
independent, fundamental theology as guided not so much by its Tradition hermeneutics as its self-
reflexive, critical attitude, which of itself is an insufficient guide.  
 
 However, as a “good Jesuit”, transforming the praxis of criticism as nothing other than 
discernment191 van Beeck also sees potential in such a scenario that fundamental theology currently 
occupies within the academy as suspended within an epoch  that “can be both deeply fruitful as well 
as deeply missionary.”192 In such a milieu, he notes that while more traditional apologetics and their 
unqualified use of positive theology may indeed at first appear to be more properly and “explicitly 
theological”, given their rhetorical particularity. However, while functioning within the universalist 
tendencies of a fundamental apologetics by contrast “sounds more secular, but in practice it is often 
more properly theological—or rather, Christological.”193 As an exercise in cultural hermeneutics that 
takes culture and its concerns seriously, such a praxis-oriented fundamental theology is inherently 
Incarnational in “continuin[ing] to take on humanity and the world with a love that includes every 
conceivable concern.”194 Here, such a praxis-oriented, fundamental theology thrives upon its critical 
discernment as nothing other than an imitatio Christi in taking serious contemporary culture and its 
concerns.195 And yet, discernment acts as a corrective to a hermeneutics that bases itself upon 
neutral description, which “tend[s] to adopt dominant concerns as the arena for their encounter with 
culture.”196 Instead, such discernment operates by way of an accountability in recognizing various 
                                                          
190
 van Beeck, GE §92, 4, 267. 
191
 See Henri De Lubac, S.J., M    a      u   ’E     , trans. Michael Mason (Glen Rock, NJ: Paulist Press, 1963) 
174: “The very word ‘criticism’ means discerment, and there is, of course, a kind of criticism which is good—
particularly self-criticism. That kind is a striving for realism in action—a determination to bar all that cannot 
justify its claim to genuineness. It is an examination carried out in humility, capable of recognizing the good 
acheived, but arising out of an essentially apostolic discontent and a perpetually restless spiritual dynamism.” 
192
 van Beeck, GE, §92, 4, 267. 
193
 van Beeck, §GE, 93, 9, 282. 
194
 ibid. 
195
 An example of van Beeck’s distinct cultural engagement is exemplified by a fine article concerning the 
Denying Politicians Communion, as proposed by the US Archbishop Raymund Burke leading up to the then 
2004 Presidential elections. See, Frans Jozef van Beeck, S.J., “Denying Communion to Politicians: A Theologian 
Explains Why it is Wrong”, Commonweal Magazine, volume CXXXI, Number 11, June 4
th
, 2004, 19-21. 
196
 ibid. 
Chapter IV. Van Beeck, Native Attunement and the 'admirabile commercium' 
104 
 
cultural concerns by way of the credibility of their theological relevance, and not simply because they 
appear somehow as dominant. 
 
 While mindful of van Beeck’s balanced, constructive approach to current trends within 
fundamental theology, he is nonetheless equally, if not moreso, critical of its current pursuit and 
autonomy in relation to other theological disciplines. For van Beeck, this autonomous, fundamental 
theology that he has in mind is epitomized by his well-known fellow Chicagoan, David Tracy.197  
 
 The first challenge that he levels against Tracy is the way in which he separates the various 
“publics” of Church, academy and society in which fundamental theology is called to recognize and 
mediate between in our contemporary, post-modern, pluralistic context. Contrary to this contextual 
departure, van Beeck recognizes that native attunement itself fundamentally mediates the 
theological and cultural in a “direct encounter”, one in which is always open to new expressions of 
unity between religion and the contemporary world.198 This direct encounter is then analogously 
applied whereby van Beeck recalls the “classic Catholic configuration” in equally placing dogmatic 
and fundamental theology in such a direct relationship. Following from this direct encounter and 
recalling van Beeck’s earlier sapiential definition of theology as “intellectual worship”, he thereby 
argues that it's a matter of concrete “discernment [...] to determine if the need for a configurative 
balance between Church and culture demand more emphasis upon fundamental or dogmatic 
theology.”199 Once again, this appeal to “discernment” is made with the view of a concrete, 
embodied cultural hermeneutics that participates in this direct encounter and ultimately open to 
cultural transformation, rather than primarily one of adaptability, accommodation and neutral 
description. From this prerogative, van Beeck charges that fundamental theology today often too 
easily invests criticism with a near formal authority, which “in an autonomous, unbiased 
fashion...abjudicate[s] the claims of both faith and culture.”200 Admittedly, the strength of this 
approach in positioning theology as a mediator of distinct, yet related publics is that it takes 
secularization and pluralism seriously, responsive to the contextual nature of theology in general and 
in particular, “empathetic to the credibility gap that de facto separates faith from culture and hence, 
doctrinal theology from fundamental theology.”201 However, and this is indeed a strength in van 
Beeck’s critique, not only is this credibility gap empathetically recognized, yet the problem is that, 
when viewed from a perspective of unity and direct encounter between faith and culture, such a gap 
also becomes ratified and legitimated as such. Which in turn, under the idiom of “dialogue” between 
these contextually divided publics, such a ratified gap, de jure, increasingly appears in its 
hermeneutical engagement as a latent return of “extrinsicism” and further polarization. With this 
heavy critique, van Beeck claims that such trends within much of current fundamental theology 
depicts a view of the world and humanity as intrinsically separate and distinct from God. And 
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specifically in terms of Tracy, van Beeck concludes that  privileging the primacy of critical reflection 
results in “control[ing] the encounter”, unflinching in its gaze towards the academy and thus, 
maintains its neutrality as an “arbitrator” and not as a “mediating participant [...] between grace and 
nature without sharing in either.”202 
 
 Arising from this critical depiction of current trends within fundamental theology as separate 
and autonomous, van Beeck extends this critique in noting that while critical reflection is absolutely 
necessary to “purify positive faith and thus deepen it”, however it can by no means “generate any 
positive faith itself.”203 Rather, positive faith alone can give meaning and purpose to critical 
reflection, without which criticism alone cannot justify itself. For, as van Beeck very wisely points out, 
given the insistence of separating such disciplines, “it is notoriously hard to pass from critical 
reflection to positive theology.”204 Instead, for van Beeck, such difficulty shows both an asymmetry 
and primacy to positive faith, though albeit inseparably intertwined with a fundamental theology—
what positive faith alone can provide: “the account of the actual life of grace experienced in positive 
Christian worship, life and teaching.”205 
 
 B. CONCLUSION 
 
 To conclude, the wealth of van Beeck’s theological synthesis and the dynamic immanence of 
his ‘native attunement’ allows for us to better heed the compelling injunctive put forth by Louis 
Dupr . Writing in the forward to the revised translation of Henri De Lubac’s famous Surnaturel, 
Dupré rightly calls upon the great Brabantine mystical theologian, stating that “Spiritual writers…who 
wrote in the tradition of Ruysbroeck, held out for an unmitigated version of the desire of God as God 
is in himself.”206 Which, by way of continual ressourcement and retrieval, “[T]heology must once 
again become spiritual. The spiritual attitude excludes a break between nature and grace. Embracing 
all of life, yet in a receptive attitude, it is at once more worldly and more deeply steeped in grace.”207 
Hence, “spiritual” theology here means a praxis oriented discourse committed to thinking through 
the profound repercussions of both cosmological and anthropological orders as natively attuned to 
God. While in turn, upholding this natural relationship as a furthering of their respective autonomy, 
particularity and immanence amid such a theonomous relation. Thus for van Beeck, the question 
becomes whether or not contemporary theology, in proceeding from such a native attunement, is 
indeed relearning how to be spiritual? 
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 van Beeck, GE, §92, 5, 271. 
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 van Beeck, GE, §92, 6, 271. 
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 ibid. 
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van Beeck, GE, §92, 6, 272.  
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 See Louis Dupr , “Introduction”, Henri De Lubac, S.J. Augustianism and Modern Theology, trans. Lancelot 
Sheppard (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2000), xiv-xv. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
ABIDING IN MINNE'S DEMANDS. PART I—CONTEXT AND RETRIEVAL 
 
 And this is what it is to love God and to be loved. What love is in itself we cannot 
 understand, but its works are like this. Love gives more than one can grasp, and it demands 
 more than one may or ever can pay. The demand of love is sometimes in the heart as a 
 desiring, burning fire, in the soul and the body, a violent storm [oerwoet] and restlessness, 
 and in the spirit a hungry, consuming voracity. The voracity of this love consumes the work 
 of the spirit in a simple inactiveness [....] There, modeless love is brought to perfection.
1
 
 
  
 
 1. INTRODUCTION.  CONTEMPORARY AESTHESTIC CONTEXT: A LOVE DIVIDED 
 
 In the spring of 2012, I had the privilege of attending a major biennial modern art exhibit 
with a group of Leuven colleagues in Luik entitled, "Images of Love, Love of the Image".2  And after 
having reflected upon the diversity of exhibits, often depicting excessive and conflicting images of 
current conceptions of love, such an exercise has definitely helped me with my research and the task 
of situating my retrieval of Ruusbroec's mystical theological understanding of love, or minne within 
contemporary discussions over the nature and significance of love today.  Two immediate and 
enduring impressions that I had from this exhibit are: First, after having viewed and engaged with 
many (though certainly not all) of these images, at the end, this exhibit left me thoroughly 
exhausted. And secondly (and this is immediately related to the first point), current Western cultural 
venues display an incredibly divided sense, boardering upon incoherency, of what constitutes and 
passes for "love" today.  
 
 Entering the exhibit itself―interestingly enough, gesturing more towards a universal 
language―the introduction made the claim that "Love never attains its goal. Instead, its movement 
alone is that which counts"3. For my part as a viewer, by trying to generously follow such movements 
throughout the exhibit, I was being pulled in so many diverse areas that at the end, I was emotionally 
left with that certain "morning after...never again..." sensibility. The performance of a particular 
aspect of love's unambigious violence and jarring destructiveness were highly visible.4 Or the many 
images of bedrooms having been wrecked and beds completely a mess, after the sexual act had been 
                                                          
1
 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 7a, Vanden XII Beghinen, I, ll. 604-611, 612 (slightly modified):"Ende dit es 
gode minnen ende ghemint werden. Want minne si in haer zelven, men caens niet verstaen, maer hare werke 
sijn dusdane. Minne gheeft meer dan me ghevaten mach ende si eyscht meer dan men betalen mach och can. 
Der minnen eyschen es biwilen int herte als een begherende berende vier, in ziele ende in lijf oerwoet ende 
ongheduer, ende inden gheeste een hongherich verterende ghier. Der minnen ghier verteert die werke des 
gheests in een eenvuldich ledich zijn [....] Daer es wiselose minne volbracht.". 
2 This past artistic exhibit can be consulted at 
http://www.bip2010.be/theme/medias/site/NL_Persbericht_BIP2012_NEW_SP.pdf, as accessed on 
16.08.2012. 
3 ibid. 
4 I am thinking specifically about the sprawling list of in memoriam that ended the photographic slideshow of 
those who had appeared in Nan Goldin's "Ballad of Sexual Dependency", some of which can be consulted at the 
following site, http://visualarts.slowcentury.com/post/86796415/the-ballad-of-sexual-dependency, as 
accessed on 10.08.2012. 
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performed. Or the very frequent appearance of guns as erotic instruments of power and the 
subject's willful and domineering extension into the world as erotically and preversely embraced.  
 
 In short, what many of the contemporary photographic exhibits overwhemingly had depicted 
was the very collapse of love conceived largely in Romantic and  idealistic terms. That is, the 
individualistic promise of the naturalness of human love. And in turn, the familiar narrative of the 
force of love as surpassing social constraints and mores, while offering itself as the end goal of 
volitional, human strivings. Hence, a Romantic idealism that holds out for and optimistically aims to 
secure love as a natural, human end—an end, in all of its promise and hope. Which, in turn, 
isregarded as the very source of love's meaningfulness. It is the collapse of this distinctly modern, 
naively optimistic romantic understanding of love that grounded the thrust of most of the exhibits, 
imaging love largely in terms of a disordered and uncontrollable eros. Frequently, erotic love was 
depicted as ruthlessly personal and with no communal basis. Instead, it was shown as unlearned, 
passionately wild, and inevitably destructive. A force—uncoupled from the vast range of procreative 
fruitfulness—that resists being conscripted into the safe harbors of promise, meaningfulness and 
resolution. Instead, the rawness of love was being imaged and depicted as largely responsible for the 
wreckage of both physical environments and ultimately the wreckage of lives. Thus, while I regard 
many such artistic depictions as at best extremely limited and lacking nuance in their understanding 
and depiction of love—especially its poor depiction of erotic love as “obsession”, “addiction” and 
ulmtimately pathological—I nonetheless am very intrigued by a certain caution and trepidation that 
is implied by many of these depictions. Fear, not so much connected to places of vulnerability in 
which love often occurs, yet in love's ability to wound us. Which, albeit perversely, attests to the 
continuing sense of meaningfulness that we ascribe to love and the traditions that such wounds 
continue to echo. 
 
 As a strong constrast, the exhibit made exception for a few more "iconographical", gratuitous 
and less-injurious depictions of love, most of which I sense our group of young theologians 
immediately recognized and were thus more open to huddle around and take certain "rest" within. I 
am thinking of the vivid simplicity and clear lighting of Chrystal Mukeba's "Confrontations: 2009-
2011" that depict her aging grandmother bravely, yet vulnerably confronting her own nearing 
mortality.5 Or Sibylle Fendt's Gartners Reise6 that depicts an elderly married couple going on their 
last vacation, as the wife suffers from a progressive form of Alzheimers and the newness of life such 
loss of memory brings, not only for the woman suffering Alzheimers, yet seemingly also for the 
marriage itself. And while both exhibits were also deliberate in showing glimpses into the vividness of 
exhaustion that is also an unmistakable reality within such loving, the simplicity and clarity of 
presentation and execution of both of these photographic exhibits clearly attests to their undeniable 
sense of 'rest'. Love, seen in its tenderness, fragility and gratuitous self-offering. 
 And yet, amid such stark divides that this exhibit portrayed, the one photographic series that 
continues to remain with me is that of Moira Ricci's exhibit, 20.12.53 - 10.08.047. The dates mark the 
birth and unforeseen, tragic death of Ricci's mother.  This photographic exhibit is comprised of the 
                                                          
5 These photos can be consulted at http://www.chrystelmukeba.com/index.php?/project/confrontations/, as 
accessed on 10.08.2012. 
6 These photos can be consulted at http://www.sibyllefendt.de/, as accessed on 10.08.2012. 
7 These photos can be consulted at http://www.strozzina.org/manipulatingreality/e_ricci.php,as accessed on 
10.08.2012. 
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subtle manipulation of old family photos of Ricci's mother throughout various stages of the mother's 
life, as Moira gently inserts herself in these photos that seemingly neither distorts nor alters the 
photo's original composition.  
 
  
 Figure 1 Mamma e Lidia - “20.12.53 - 10.08.04”, 2004-2009 Lambda Print, Aluminium  
 Courtesy l’artista; Galleria Alessandro De March, Milano  
 © Moira Ricci 
 
Speaking of her artwork, Ricci said once in an interview about the exhibit: 
 
20.12.53 – 10.08.04 [exhibition title] didn't come up from an idea but rather from a strong 
desire to go back in time and stay with my mother [....] I left my hometown at 18 years old, and 
when I lost her I immediately regret for the time we didn't spend together. From the day I saw 
her lifeless body I have been trying to enter in her pictures in a way that could help me in 
removing that image from my head. Transferring my own figure in my mother's photographs I 
had the illusion to be with her, take care of her as her guardian, and warn her on what could 
happen to avoid her death.
8
 
 
These photos exhibit Ricci's desire that is both entirely understandable as well as completely other 
than the more typical performance of desire that so readily claimed much of the exhibit's attention. 
Ricci's desire is shown as both entirely unique and particular, all the while remaining publically 
communicable. 
                                                          
8 See http://www.artfacts.net/index.php/pageType/newsInfo/newsID/6193/lang/1, as accessed on 25.05.2012. 
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 Figure 2 Zio Auro, Cla e mamma - “20.12.53 - 10.08.04”, 2004-2009 Lambda Print, Aluminium  
 C u    y  ’a     a; Ga     a A    a     D  Ma  h, M  a    
 © Moira Ricci 
 
There are both clear boundaries wherein the family's private history remains intact and 
enclosed―most notably, the unspecified nature of her mother's death. And yet, the choice of 
photographs that Ricci used are of situations that are quite common and thus, present no obstacle in 
our sharing Ricci's equally complex, yet simplified gaze. In short, we are presented with the 
impossibility of love's object. No matter how much Ricci inserts herself into this photographic past 
and attempts to warn her mother and save her from her unexpected death, such aspirations are 
themselves impossible. And yet, such an impossibility neither subdues her loving nor prevents her 
from remaining close to her mother. She is aware of a certain degree of failure and this shows itself 
in her regret. Yet this failure is also articulated in the intensitity of her desire to remain with her 
mother, a desire that violates the unavoidable facticity, historical privilege and normativity that we 
give to the photographic image as an artificat and documentary evidence. Love thus shows itself 
above such horizontal, normative constraints, while at the same time, abiding in love's own rationale, 
ordering and desire, Ricci responds to these demands, as she inserts herself within these concrete, 
old family photos. How do we understand Ricci's desire to remove the image of her deceased mother 
by inserting herself in such old photos with the destructive, erotic violence earlier on depicted? 
While their movements and their overall direction are quite opposite, can we still affirm by way of 
love's own distinct logic and rationale, these diverse images under a general, unified heading of 
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'love'? And secondly, how are distinctly theologically-based, Christian understandings of love to 
respond to such current and largely predominant notions of love today? 
 
 §2. RETRIEVING RUUSBROEC'S MINNE 
 
 With these challenges in mind, I find such contexts ripe in the possibility for retrieving 
sources within the Christian tradition―and more specifically, within the contemplative and mystical 
theological tradition―that can both effectively respond to these discussions, as well as critique 
certain normative presumptions that may well hinder us from rethinking love anew, doing so while 
firmly and creatively situated in continuity with Christian tradition itself. In this regard, I put forth the 
claim that the admirable doctor, Jan van Ruusbroec's understanding of love as minne—a unitive, 
dynamic understanding of love that is differentiated from, yet incorporates dimensions of both 
caritas and eros—has a critical potential to both expand and give further depth to our rethinking of 
love, as well as its distinct promise to do so from the seat of its own embodied primacy. As unitive 
both "above reason and yet not without reason"9, Ruusbroec’s reflections upon minne can enable us 
to refine, nuance and provide a unique alternative to otherwise polarized, contemporary theological 
discussions over the competing priorities of caritas and veritas, resultant in part by the failure to 
think love beyond what modern metaphysics has thus divided. While maintaining its unity, love by 
necessity needs a third term to think such primacy beyond the current impasse between self-
possessive and self-denying love. In turn, if we are to uphold such a unified understanding of love, we 
then need a conceptuality of love that is able to seamlessly thread the linkages between love's 
various manners and modalities, as Ruusbroec’s minne provocatively illustrates. For Ruusbroec, the 
modes of minne—karitas, or active love; affection [liefde]; erotic love or desirous yearning; modeless 
enjoyment—are phenomenologically integrated and theologically synthesized with equal attention 
to minne’s various manners: gratuitousgratuitous, reciprocal. Thus, holding out for such a 
synthesized, unified conceptuality of love is called for  if love is indeed to convincingly and creatively 
assert such primacy for us today.  
 
 Working more broadly within the tradition of Christian humanism, my retrieval of Ruusbroec 
in part echoes the work of the late University of Chicago philosopher and classicist Allan Bloom and 
his own "[A]ttempt to discover the real phenomenon of eros".10 For Bloom, this entails moving away 
from erotic love's modern, debased impoverishment that has univocally linked eros to sex, while 
dismissing erotic longing and the impossibility of its satisfaction within relationships (most notably in 
terms of friendships). Instead, Bloom regards emmerging patterns of relationality as having largely 
discarded such longing for far more banal forms of relationships in terms of "contacts". For Bloom, 
therefore, "retrieval" is inherently coupled with polemic, whereby his advocacy of the Western 
                                                          
9 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 3, Die geestelike brulocht  b, ll. 1481-1485: "In the unity of spirit, in which 
this vein wells, one is above activity and above reason, but not without reason; for the enlightened reason, and 
especially, the faculty of loving, feels this touch, and reason can neither comprehend nor understand the mode 
or manner, how or what this touch might be." "In eenicheit des gheests, daer dese adere walt, es men boven 
werken ende boven redene, maer niet sonder redene; want die verlichte redene, ende zonderlinghe de 
minnende cracht, ghevoelt dit gherinen, ende redene en can niet begripen noch verstaen wise noch maniere, 
hoe ochte wie dit gherinen si." 
10 See Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 29. My sincere thanks and 
gratitude to my dear friend Bradford Manderfield demands mention, for not only referring me to this text, but 
in so doing, reminding me of my own educational roots in the Chicago Great Book tradition. 
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Canon and the Great Books education entails a "flight out of our own time to those times and places 
that believed in it [eros]"11 and that "the best books not only help us to describe the phenomena, but 
help us to experience them."12 In this respect, Bloom's literary and phenomenological descriptions of 
eros, while himself aiming for a "detailed and comprehensive description of what is it we are trying 
to to explain as we experience it before we enter into explanation"13 is instructive for those of us 
who research medieval mystical (and especially vernacular) theological texts. Namely, our continuous 
fascination with mystical theological texts and their display of an unmistakable dynamism, one of 
both ardent apophatic rigour, coupled with the erotic insistence and unique logic to speak, to name, 
to respond as a "hunger unstilled [...] [which one] cannot speak about it, nor can he be silent about it 
"14, as evidenced in the various, highly embodied metaphors that such authors make use of to 
describe the reality of love and union with God. Beyond mere literary performance, traditionally, we 
can understand various mystical theologian's expansive use of metaphor and play with the 
constraints and the possibility of language as intensifying Gregory the Great's "amor ipse notitia est" 
[love itself is knowledge], a perspective that we may today analogously translate as Bloom highly 
doubts whether "one [can] really discuss eros without arousal".15 
 
 For Ruusbroec, his unified descriptions of minne—"the nearest and the clearest truth that I 
understand and feel"16—are frequently seen as one of the last examples of this great Augustianian 
synthesis of  understanding and will that so strongly characterized late-medieval mystical theological 
texts.17 Here, while writing within a specific eucharistic context, Ruusbroec shows this snythetic 
unity, characterizing the various modalities of union with God as a life of minne, of "versta ende 
ghevoelen" with exuberant phenomenological and literary force, grounded upon its theological 
literacy and clarity: 
 
Whoever wants to become drunk with minnen 
should behold and note and admire two points of 
minnen that Christ has shown us in the holy 
Sacrament [....] The first point teaches us that 
Christ has given His flesh as food to our soul, and 
His blood as drink. Such a marvel of minnen was 
never heard of before. Now the nature of minnen 
is always to give and take, minnen and be loved 
[ghemindt]. And both of these are in anyone who 
loves [mint]. Christ's minne is voracious and 
generous: even though He gives us all that He has 
and all that He is, He also takes back all that we 
Soe wie dronken wilt werden van minnen, hi sal 
aensien ende merken ende verwonderen .ij. poente 
van minnen die ons Cristus bewijst heeft in den 
heileghen sacramente [....] Dat ierste poent leert ons 
dat Cristus ghegheven heeft onser zielen sijn vleesch 
in spisen ende sijn bloed in dranke. Al selc wonder 
van minnen en was daer to voren nie ghhooert. Nu 
es der minnen natuere altoes gheven ende nemen, 
minnen ende ghemindt werden. Ende dit es beide in 
ieghewelken die mint. Cristus minne die es ghieregh 
ende melde: al gheeft hi ons al dat hi heeft ende al 
dat hi es, hi nemt oec weder al dat wi hebben ende 
                                                          
11 ibid. 
12 Bloom, Love and Friendship, 30. 
13 ibid. 
14 See Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 10, Vanden blinkenden steen, ll.554, 556-558: "Ende dit es een hongher 
onghepait....men caent ‹oec› ghespreken noch verswighen, want het es boven redene ende verstaen, ende 
onthghende alle creatueren." 
15 Bloom, Love and Friendship, 20. 
16 See Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 1, Boecsken der verclaringhe, ll. 24-28 (with modification) : "Selke van 
minen vriended begheren ende hebben mi ghebeden, dat ic met corten waerden tonen ende verclaren soude, 
na mijn vermoghen, die naeste ende die claerste waerheit die ic versta ende ghevoelen van alle der hoechster 
leren die ic ghescreven hebbe, op dat minre waerde niemen vererghert en werde maer ieghewelc ghebetert." 
17 See Rik van Nieuwenhove, Jan van Ruusbroec: Mystical Theologian of the Trinity (Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2003). 
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have and all that we are. And He demands of us 
more than we can accomplish. His hunger is great 
without measure: He consumes us thoroughly, 
for He is a voracious glutton and has bulimia 
[mengerael]: He consumes the marrow out of our 
bones. Yet we grant it Him willingly. And the 
more we grant it Him, the better we taste to 
Him....For He wants to change our sinful life and 
consume it in His life that is full of grace and glory 
[....] If we could see the voracious lust Christ has 
for our blessedness, we would not be able to 
restrain ourselves from flying into His throat. 
Even though my words sound wondrous, those 
who minnen understand me well. 
al dat wi sijn. Ende hi eischt ons meer dan wi 
gheleisten moghen. Sijn hongher es sonder mate 
grooet, hi verteert ons al uut te gronde, want hi es .i. 
ghieregh slockard ende heeft den mengerael, hi 
verteert dat margh ute onsen beenen. Nochtan 
onnen wijs hem wel. Ende soe wijs heme meer 
gheonnen, soe wi hem bat smaken....Want hi wilt 
onse sundeleke leven verwandelen ende verteeren 
in sijn leven, dat es vol gratien ende glorien [....] 
Mochten wi sien de ghiereghe ghelost die Cristus 
heeft tote onser salecheit, wi en mochten ons niet 
onthouden, wi en souden heme in de keele vlieghen. 
Al luden mine waerde wonderlec, die minnen die 
verstaen mi wel.
18
 
 
 Retrieving Ruusbroec and situating such a move amounts to the challenge of 
contemporaneously translating the vast applications and width of such a love [wijtheit van minne] 
aided by the depths of its phenomenological and theological fluency, doing so precisely amid love's 
current contextual status as divided and thereby discredited. Divided, as between the narratives of 
eros, in all of its desire, pathos, immanence, and arousal, seen as entirely other and 
incommensurable from the narratives of caritas as completely gratuitous, disinterested, kenotic, and 
blithely transcendent. Such a contemporaneous, divided view of love thus poses the challenge of 
whether or not one can maintain a unified understanding of love, necessarily pairing both asymmetry 
and mutuality. That is, holding in a dynamic unity, the utter gratuitousness of love with the mutuality 
of its desirous exchange and reciprocal demand. For Ruusbroec, by coupling this at times fierce 
dynamism, minne not only immediately confronts current divisions surrounding love, yet it also 
intelligibly and provacatively challenges many of its normitive presuppositions. For such conflicting 
narratives both argue from the very premise and primacy of love's gratuitousness—or "disinterested 
love" [pur amour]—a "pure givenness" and away from what phenomenologist and philosopher of 
religion Jean-Luc Marion and others call such demands as an "economy of exchange". In this case, by 
taking a distinct, theological reading of Ruusbroec and encountering his presupposition of mutual 
indwelling, such a reading is thus able to supplant a more critical capacity in retrieving Ruusbroec's 
minne within contemporary contexts. Namely, by challenging its own presuppositions that the 
demands of love are necessarily extrinsic to the human person and are thus equivalent to the 
imposition of hegemonic power. Legitimate as this critique is, mutual indwelling shifts the very 
terrain and focus of minne's demands to the interiority of the person, thus opening our narratives of 
love: 
 
There we are inactive, and God our Heavenly 
Father dwells in us in fullness of His grace, and 
we dwell in Him above all our works in one 
enjoyment. Christ Jesus lives in us, and we in 
Him. In His life we overcome the world and all 
sins. With Him we are raised up in love to our 
heavenly Father. The Holy Spirit works in us and 
we with Him all our good works. He cries out in 
us with loud voice, without words: 'Love the Love 
Daer sijn wi ledegh ende god onse hemelsche vader 
wooent in ons volheit sijnre ghenaden ende wi 
wooenen in hem boven alle onser werken in een 
ghebruken. Cristus Jhesus leeft in ons ende wi in 
heme. In sijn leven verwinnen wi de werelt ende alle 
sunden. Met heme sijn wi opgherecht in minnen tote 
onsen hemelschen vader. De heileghe ghesst werct in 
ons ende wi met hem alle onse goede werke. Hi ropt in 
ons met luder stemmen sonder waerde: 'Mindt de 
                                                          
18 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 8, Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit, 718-720; 721-738; 739-742. 
Chapter V. Abiding in Minne's Demands. Part I—Context and Retrieval 
113 
 
that loves thee eternally!' His outcry is an inward 
touch in our spirit. The voice is more fearsome 
than thunder. The lightning bolts that come out 
of it open heaven to us and show us Light and 
eternal truth. The heat of His touch and His 
Minnen are so great that they will burn us up 
entirely. His touch in our spirit calls out without 
cease: 'Pay thy debt; love the Love that has 
eternally loved thee!' From this comes great 
restlessness within, and modeless conduct, 
entirely without modes; for the more we minnen, 
the more we lust to minnenne; and the more we 
pay what minne demands of us, the more we 
keep on owing. Minne does not keep silent, it 
cries out eternally without cease: 'Love Love!' 
minne, die u eewelec mindt!' Sijn roepen dat es een 
inwendegh gherinen in onsen gheeste. Die stemme es 
vresseleker dan de donder. De blixenen die daer ute 
comen, openen ons den hemel ende tooenen ons licht 
ende eeweghe waerheit. De hitte sijn gherinens ende 
sijnre minnen es soe grooet, dat si ons te male 
verberren wilt. Sijn gherinen ion onsen gheeste roept 
sonder onderlaet: 'Betaelt uwe scoud; mindt de 
minne, die u eewelec ghemindt heeft!' Hier ave comt 
grooet ongheduer van binnen ende wiselooes ghelaet 
al sonder maniere; want so wi meer minnen, soe ons 
meer lust te minnenne; ende soe wi meer betalen dat 
ons minne eischt, soe wi meer sculdegh bliven. Minne 
en swight niet stille; si roept eewelec sonder 
ophouden: 'Mindt de minne!'
19
 
 
 Hence, retrieval of Ruusbroec's understanding of minne within contemporary theological and 
philosophy of religion discourses on love enables one to gauge the strength (and weakness) of 
contemporary expressions of love by way of their (in)ability to make linkages. More specifically, 
linkages that provactively show this dynamic unity by way of a variety of competing or conflicting 
instances of love within relationships in specific acts, representations, textual narratives, etc. Such 
linkages not only expose and uncover complex instances within love itself: for example, forms of 
desirous yearning and their reciprocal demands within overall gratuitous, charitable acts (and vice 
versa). But furthermore, I contend that these linkages evince love's own intrinsic rationality―as 
Ruusbroec says that minne is "above reason, but not without reason"―as seen in its various, 
dynamic movements. From a theologically committed perspective, such linkages make sense of 
love's abiding simplicity―as a union that rests in God in His "greater dissimilarity" and in others. As 
well as the continual praxis of love's enduring complexity and contextual, situated character as 
continuously unfinished and growing in likeness unto, or "cleaving to" [aencleven] this Image of love 
and its endless, 'abysmal' depths [afgrondigher minne].  
 
 A. THE QUESTION OF THE "PURE" GIFT AND ITS REFUSAL OF ECONOMIC RETURN 
 
 Therefore, guided by my critical retrieval of Ruusbroec's understanding of minne, aspects of 
my research aim at both highlighting, as well as addressing the contemporary need for a both a 
praxis-based, theological conceptuality of love today to convincingly situate, narrate and 
conceptually link love's various modalities (karitas, or active love; affection [or liefde]; erotic love or 
desirous yearning; modeless enjoyment) as well as its various manners (asymmetrical gratuitousness, 
mutual reciprocity). In order to do so, I would like to situate this retrieval of Ruusbroec's minne as 
critically responsive to postmodern  discourses over "the gift" and its theological20 (c.f. Gaudium et 
spes, 24) and philosophical resurgence. These well-known discussions have been advanced  by the 
likes of Jean-Luc Marion and Jacques Derrida—both of whom have inquired over the very 
[im]possibility of a 'pure gift', as well as thinking phenomenological givenness as such, free from any 
and all demands, reciprocity and horizon, all of which would metaphysically determine and predicate 
                                                          
19 Ruusbroec, Van seven trappen VII, ll. 1094-1111. 
20 See Gaudium et spes, 24: "This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed 
for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself." 
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such givenness into a forced "economy of exchange". In response to these discussions and their 
search for a purified transcendence, free from all forms of particularity and immanence, the question 
that my retrieval of Ruusbroec itself demands is whether or not privileging such agapic 
gratuitousness as love's highest reality―or 'purest' [pur amour]―manner of expression can in fact 
respond to love's demands and sustain such seemingly disparate linkages? Or, while maintaining the 
primacy and asymmetry of the gift, does love's unified, yet distinct modalities collapse and only 
further become polarized as a result of such gratuitousness, akin to the largely incoherent and 
divided aesthetic depictions of love discussed earlier? 
 
 In turn, by opting for such a unified understanding of love—while refusing its current 
divisions—one equally confronts contextual views that easily dismiss such an understanding of love 
as naively optimistic, reflecting (as many of the art exhibits attempted to portray) what is seen as a 
largely discredited view of the human nature/condition. One that avoids the terrors of modern 
history, thereby dismissing a presumptive view of love as “overly optimistic” and too much aligned 
with Romantic idealism. To critically confront such contemporaneous views and their normitive 
presumptions, retrieving Ruusbroec is once more a highly interesting move, as the Brabantine 
contemplative often matches his thinking upon the demands of minne precisely within reference to 
our very failures in satisfying such demands. Despite minne's inescapable failure and its resultant 
erotic insatiability, Ruusbroec does not conceptually employ the familiar strategy of dividing love into 
various loves of greater or lesser purity according to their manner, as well as their object of love 
itself. This is not to say that as a moral category, he does not portray distinctions between well-
ordered and disordered minne—that is not at question. Rather, specifically in terms of minne's erotic 
impossibility and necessary failure, for the Brabantine contemplative, such failure (or restlessness) 
does not attest to a division within or dismissal of minne; rather, its positive insatiability only invites 
for greater union and likeness: 
 
The Spirit of God demands of our spirit that we 
minnen, thank and praise God in the measure of 
His nobility and His dignity. In this all loving spirits 
in heaven and on earth fail. They exhaust 
themselves [Si werken hen ute] and they fall into 
a faint before the fathomless sublimity 
[grondelooese hooegheit] of God. And this is the 
noblest and the highest means between us and 
God [....] for above this means we have received 
the Image of God in the very life of our soul, and 
there we are united to God without means; 
nevertheless we do not become God. But we 
always remain like God, and He lives in us, and 
we in Him by His grace and our good works. Thus 
we are united to God without means above all 
virtues, where we bear His Image in the 
uppermost part of our createdness [...] Thus we 
remain eternally like God in grace and glory, and 
above all likeness, one with Him in our eternal 
Image. 
De gheest gods eischt onsen gheeste dat wi gode 
minnen, danken ende loven na sine edelheit ende na 
sine weerdde. Ende hier in ghebreken alle minnende 
gheeste in hemel ende in eerde. Si werken hen ute 
ende vallen alle in onmacht vore de grondelooese 
hooegheit gods. Ende dit es dat edelste ende dat 
hooeghste middel tusschen ons ende gode [....] want 
boven dit middel hebben wi dat beelde gods ontfaen 
in de levendegheit onser zielen ende daer sijn wi gode 
gheeneght sonder middel; nochtan en werden wi niet 
god. Maer wi bliven altooes gode ghelijc, ende hi leeft 
in ons ende wi in hem overmids sine gratie ende onse 
goede werke. Aldus sijn wi gode gheeneght sonder 
middel boven alle dooghde, daer wi sijn beelde 
draghen in dat overste onser ghescapenheit [....] Ende 
aldus bliven wi gode eewelec ghelijc in gratien ende in 
glorien, ende boven ghelijc een met heme in onsen 
eeweghen beelde.
21
 
   
                                                          
21 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 9, Van Seven Trappen, V, ll. 908-912; 915-920; 922-924. 
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 In the above passage, Ruusbroec nicely transitions from the failure and demands of minne, 
its intimate linkage with his anthropology of "mutual indwelling" and how, by precisely gauging this 
theological anthropology, we can understand the nature of minne's demands. Not as some form of 
extrinsic, subjugating, cruel hegemony, yet as a stirring and insatiable restlessness that arises within 
us. One that is due, not to some form of privation and lack, yet as mirroring an abysmal fullness that 
cannot be encompassed.  
 
 It is often said that amid the continuously rapid and expanding consumerism of the global 
markets and our relentless consumption—leaving us to confront ourselves amid an age of 
indebtedness—the parallel rise of (Christian) Spirituality too mirror's such consumption by way of 
people's strong, "spiritual hunger". And regardeless whether one wishes to overall critique or 
support the rise of spirituality, the spiritual thirst of many cannot be denied. However, while 
narratives of economic consumption and its stoking of our endless desires relies upon the basic 
presumption of scarcity22, or that which we lack, retrieval of Ruusbroec begs the question whether or 
not we can also speak of God loving us with such a univocal, desirous love—the ‘voracity of Christ's 
lust for our blessedness’ and  ‘God's desire to be fully ours, if only we will be fully His?’  
 
 For Ruusbroec and the enduring relationality of minne, God's greater dissimilarity is 
repeatedly affirmed, so too the insistence that such strong language of union with God does not 
result in the "creature [...] becom[ing] God, which is impossible. For the essence of God [gods wesen] 
can neither diminish nor increase; nothing can be taken from Him, neither can it be added to Him. 
Nevertheless, all loving spirits are one enjoyment [een ghebruken] and one blessedness with God 
without difference."23 More than simply a metaphysical and dogmatic theological arguement that 
can easily be brushed aside, retrieving Ruusbroec's understanding of minne, in all of its demands and 
erotic insistence, as a univocal love that joins our loving with God's loving, offers the promise of 
further challenging the normitive presumptions we hold towards desire as mirroring our own restless 
finitude. And instead, arguing instead for a more robust, theological  understanding of desire and the 
erotic, not as arising out of any source of scarcity or lack, yet as mirroring the abysmal fullness in 
which we are naturally united to God. A fathomless abundance that demands the work of such love 
responds to, yet can never overtake, precisely because of such greater dissimilarity between Creator 
and creature. From this immanent, abysmal fullness, is precisely wherein we can speak of the 
creatureliness of the human person as a locus capax Dei [place capable of God]. 
 
 Situating love upon such an abysmal grounding can be viewed as analogous to Ruusbroec's 
own mystical anthropology of mutual indwelling. First, Ruusbroec claims that relationship with God is 
fundamentally natural to the human person. This is his exemplarist strain emphasizing that we are 
eternally begotten in the Image of God, the divinity of Christ, 2nd Person of the Trinity, stating : "This 
image is essentially and personally [weslec ende persoonlec] in all people, and every person has it 
whole and entire, undivided [....] And thus are we all one, united in our eternal image, that is God's 
                                                          
22 See William Cavanaugh's “Scarcity and Abundance” in Being Consumed, (New York: Eerdemans, 2008), 89-
100 for a moral theological account of Christian desire, economics, and a distinct mode of consumption out of 
abundance, as seen in light of the Eucharist. 
23 Ruusbroec, Boecsken, ll. 456-459: "Want so worde de creature god, dat onmoeghelec es. Want gods wesen 
en mach menderen noch meerren, noch heme en mach niets niet avegaen noch toegaen. Nochtan sijn alle 
minnende gheeste een ghebruken ende ene salecheit met gode sonder differentie." 
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image and the origin of us all: of our life and our becoming; wherein our created being and our life 
hang [in hangt] without intermediary as in its eternal cause.”24 However, this exemplarism is not to 
be confused with the operation of grace, Christian faith and the works of love as necessary for 
salvation, as Ruusbroec emphatically and repeatedly stresses that "[O]ur createdness does not 
become God, nor (does) the image of God (become) creature.25 Hence, Ruusbroec will equally 
emphasize a soteriological and thus, historical stress, saying that we are also individually “created 
unto the image” like a mirror and that no matter its degree of likeness, a mirror can never be 
confused with the Image in which it reflects, either in likeness, nor sinfully obfuscated by way of 
unlikeness.  
 
 To support this tension of the human person as both eternally in the image as well as the 
representational action of being created unto, and thus receiving and responding to, or cleaving to 
this image, Ruusbroec relies upon minne's erotic logic to support such dynamism. For minne itself 
refuses to simply merge and rest within the identity of such an Image that collapses difference and 
distinction, while bypassing its creaturely reception and desirous response to such a founding 
alterity. Which is to say, minne upholds the intrinsic and implacable desire and violent restlessness 
[oerwoet] to mirror such an Image and the virtuous praxis of growing in likeness and union with God 
in the order of grace. Thus, thinking human autonomy and its seat of individuation in conjunction 
with the primacy of relationality and the very naturalness of union with God, for Ruusbroec, is 
attested by the stress that he places upon the enduring importance of our works of love. The more 
one grows in union and likeness to the otherness of God, the more one becomes distinctly human in 
all of their created particularity. Likewise, eschatologically, if we are to affirm love as dynamic and its 
continuing movements as enduring, ongoing and eternal, this then  invites us to further consider our 
understanding of love and the human person―of whom is imaged in such love―as reflective of the 
praxis of both this desirous, continuing, abysmal depths from which such stirrings arise. Which 
nonetheless―given minne's specific rationale―demands reinsertion [via ghemenye leven] within the 
concrete particularity of the world. To use the Biblical metaphor, as a tree is known by its fruits (or 
the lack thereof), so too shall we be known by the work and the distinction [onderscheet] of our 
desires. Recalling our chapter's prefatory quote,  affirming minne's core incomprehensibility and its 
abysmal grounding can be seen and attested to by way of the very specificity and endurance of our 
ongoing desires. For such desires not only reflect and respond to such depths, yet by virtue of 
minne's own distinct, erotic rationale, such desires meaningfully engage these endless depths as 
well. Not by way of negating nor silencing the indeterminacy of love's restlessness, yet insiting upon 
the superabundant createdness of  its foundational movements. An excess,which both confronts 
such an abyss, while abiding by its demands that cannot but reinsert itself into the very concrete 
praxis of living out and responding to love's stirring call.  
 
                                                          
24 Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 8, Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit, ll. 912-913, 913-917: "Dit beelde es weselec 
ende persoonlec in alle menschen ende ieghewelec mensche heevet al te male gheheel, onghedeilt [....] Ende 
aldus sijn wi alle een, vereenecht in onsen eeweghen beelde, dat gods beelde es ende onser alre orsprong, ons 
levens ende ons ghewerdens, daer onse ghescapene wesen ende onse leven sonder middel in hangt alse in sine 
eeweghe sake." 
25 Ruusbroec, Spieghel, ll. 918-920: "Nochtan en wert onse ghescapenheit niet god noch dat beelde gods 
creature. Want wi sijn ghescapen toe den beelde, dat es: dat beelde gods te ontfane. Ende dat beelde es 
onghescapen, eewegh: de sone gods." 
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 As a provisional conclusion, I have argued that by theologically engaging Ruusbroec and his 
anthropology of mutual indwelling, we can thus make sense of his view on the very intrinsic nature of 
minne's demands as a stirring and erotic insatiability. In short, as the intelligibility of minne only 
becomes fluent by engaging with Ruusbroec's own distinct theological fluency, we are thus able to 
retrieve his thinking anew within a contemporary context ripe for such retrieval. And in doing so, we 
may respond to love demands to “Pay thy debt; love the Love that has eternally loved thee!"26 
                                                          
26 See Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 9, Van Seven Trappen, VII, ll. 1106-1107: "'Betaelt uwe scoud; mindt de 
minne, die u eewelec ghemindt heeft!'" 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
ABIDING IN MINNE'S DEMANDS. PART II— 
PURE GIFT AND PUR AMOUR: 
FRANÇOIS FÉNELON AND THE RETHINKING OF   
LOVE’S DEMANDS BESIDE THE GRATUITOUS GIFT 
 
 
 
 §1. INTRODUCTION AND THEMATIC CONTEXT 
 
 The following analysis builds off continuing research into the late medieval Brabantine 
mystical theologian Jan van Ruusbroec and retrieval of his understanding of love as minne within 
contemporary fundamental theological and philosophy of religion discourses today. This retrieval is 
opened by and in critical-constructive dialogue with Jean-Luc Marion's own turns to love and the 
various mystical theological sources that have in part guided such a move.1 
 
 Marion's definitive turn to love has occurred in tandem with his phenomenological accounts 
of the gift, givenness [donation/Gegebenheit] and its rigorous defense that “implies a perfect and 
pure gratuity, in which it is necessary to give for nothing, without there ever being a return."2 And 
while a significant amount of secondary literature has variably critiqued Marion’s hermeneutical 
renderings of the erotic phenomenon, few have challenged his privileging the singularity of love’s 
univocal giftedness and absolute gratuitousness. In the following, the argument is opened (without 
yet finalizing any claim)3 that by maintaining a univocal emphasis of sameness, with an equal 
emphasis of love’s pure gratuitousness in fact problematizes the very receptivity and active, ethical 
responsiveness of love itself. And instead, by maintaining such 'pure gratuity', such lines of thought 
compel it towards utter passivity—amid a givenness that is so univocally and infinitely excessive, 
seen rather as an imposition and as that which is "over against" in its overwhelming any and all 
response.  Amid this critique of a lack of economy, Marion will however maintain that by placing the 
demands of relationality within more of an economy of exchange and reciprocity  ultimately undoes 
both love’s radical gratuitousness and in turn, love itself as gratuitously given. And yet, as we will 
soon see in the famous historical case of Fénelon and Bousset, there is nothing new about these 
converging lines of argument. 
                                                          
1
  See generally See Jean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance: Five Studies, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2001) 139-195. See also Jean-Luc Marion, ‘In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of 
‘Negative Theology’’, in J.D. Caputo and M.J. Scanlon (eds.), God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1999, 20-53; "What Cannot Be Said: Apophasis and the Discourse of Love", in K. Hart 
(ed.) Jean Luc Marion: The Essential Writings (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013) 325-338; "Words for 
Saying Nothing", Erotic Phenomenon, 143-150. 
2
 See Jean-Luc Marion, “The Reason of the Gift”, S. Mackinlay, N. de Warren, trans., Givenness and God: 
Questions of Jean-Luc Marion, eds. Ian Leask and Eoin Cassidy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 
101-134, 105. 
3
 See infra, Chapter 8, 'Abiding in Minne's Demands. Part IV—Common love and the Univocal' 
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 A. PRIMARY CLAIM 
 
 By way of retrieving Ruusbroec's minne, the hermeneutical position advocated for centers 
upon the need for both a praxis-based, theological conceptuality of love today to convincingly 
situate, narrate and conceptually link a unified account of “distinct” loves, that are distinguished by 
way of their differing objects—caritas; affectionate love [liefde/liebe]; erotic love and desirous 
yearning; and modeless enjoyment—as well as its various manners—gratuitous, reciprocal. 
 
 In particular, this following reflection focuses on the manners of love as its theme. Namely, 
the gratuitousness of love, traditionally viewed in terms of “selfless” love, in contrast with the 
reciprocal demands of “selfish” love. While such manners distinctly yield to well-known typologies of 
love, such as eros and agape (Nygren)4 or “natural” and “ecstatic” love (Rousselot)5, this current 
analysis will bracket such typologies—and their distinct , relational 'objects' of lover, beloved—as 
consequent and secondary to the manner(s) of love, to love’s praxis. And yet, as evidenced by this 
inquiry into the various manners of love itself, this hermeneutical position nevertheless opens in 
conversation with Marion’s own erotic reduction and his phenomenological attempt to lay claim to 
love’s rigorous conceptuality. For the praxis of love to endure—especially amid suffering, when 
absent of any supporting consolation or rationale, as well as to dynamically endure eternally, as an 
unrelenting, “voracious” desire—love can thus never be separate from its intelligibility, as amor ipse 
notitia est”. Hence, a sapiential approach is thus put forward.6 For retrieval of Ruusbroec’s minne in 
contemporary discussion will be tested, not so much along the lines of the plausibility of doing so, yet 
whether it possesses something genuinely constructive and convincing to offer. Thus, in furthering 
such a sapiential approach, the position advocated more broadly attests to mystical theology’s 
diverse needs for a historically-resourced, contemporaneous profile as mystical theology today. 
 
 B. THE PURE GIFT 
 
 However, in terms of the manners of love, the question of the "gift" and its philosophical 
(Marion, Derrida) and theological resurgence7 cannot be ignored. For this immediately brings to 
                                                          
4
 See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros. Part 1: A Study of the Christian Idea of Love, Part 2: The History of the 
Christian Idea of Love, trans. Philip S. Watson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969). 
5
 Pierre Rousselot, The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages: A Historical Contribution, trans. Alan Vincelette 
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2001). 
6
 See Declan Marmion and Rik van Nieuwenhove and their analysis of theology, spirituality and sapientia, An 
Introduction to the Trinity, (Cambridge: University Press, 2011) 2-5, 4: “…a retrieval of a theological perspective 
which is both theological and spiritual, in which theology is not just speculative but also sapiential. In other 
words, the task of theology is not only to teach, but also to delight and to move; to do not only with scientia—
scientific and analytical knowledge—but also with sapientia—the more contemplative knowledge of love and 
desire (Lat. sapor = taste).” 
7
  See Gaudium et spes, 24: “Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the Father, "that all may be one [. . . ] 
as we are one" (John 17:21-22) opened up vistas closed to human reason, for He implied a certain likeness 
between the union of the divine Persons, and the unity of God's sons in truth and charity. This likeness reveals 
that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through 
a sincere gift of himself. 
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question whether privileging gratuitousness as love's highest manner of expression—what will later 
on be argued as a revival of the “disinterested love” or pur amour in the Quietisitc tradition of 
Fénelon and its early 20th Century Modernist retrieval (Tyrell, von Hügel, Bremond et. al)—can in 
fact sustain the linkages of love’s various modalities. Or whether love's unified, yet distinct modalities 
collapse underneath such a pure conceptuality of love that advocates for the primacy of love as 
gratuitous, as over against other such modalities. 
 
 Overall, reflections on “the gift” in fundamental theology and philosophy of religion has been 
a central topic of concern.8 There are many diverse conversations taking place under the banner of 
the gift—from responses to Mauss’s anthropological reflections on the social gift and power 
relations, to readings of Heidegger and Husserl. Highlights of these exchanges include Jacques 
Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion’s well-known exchanges at Villanova in 1997, as well as the 2003 Mater 
Dei conference that specifically reflects upon Marion’s phenomenological and theological readings of 
givenness and the saturated phenomenon.9 While diversely moving from the onto-theo-logical 
critique to the possibility of a donatology as more fundamental, there are certain shared 
presumptions in many of these discussions. In particular, axiomatic to both Derrida and Marion’s 
distinct reactions to Mauss and the [im]possibility of the gift, “as such” is the need to strictly oppose 
it to an economy of relations and exchange. Rather, the possibility for the gift to be 
phenomenologically given is determined whether or not it is “pure”. Purity is thus constitutive of the 
gift as such. In terms of phenomenology, is this criterion so self-evident? Or (as this present essay 
seeks to contend) is there not a history that has contributed in framing such a highly particular 
understanding of the gift, what accedes to its purity, as radically distinct from economies of exchange 
and the diverse motives within such a horizon? 
 
 In George Pattison’s recent monograph, God & Being: An Enquiry, the Oxford systematic 
theologian concisely presents Derrida’s thinking over the pure gift and the conditions of its possibility 
in the following: 
 
A pure gift, by way of contrast, would require that the giver should not give so as to impose on 
the recipient: the giver would have to conceal himself; similarly, the gift would have to appear 
as other than a gift in order not to become an obligation or debt; and, finally, the recipient 
would need absolutely to forget the gift.
10
 
 
By way of such conditions and the understanding the pure gift’s [im]possibility, I find it extraordinary 
how such discussions replicate in so many instances both the logic, the standing controversies of 
“quietism” as well as the intuitions surrounding the Archbishop of Cambrai, Françcois Fénelon (1651-
1715) and his defense of the tradition of mystical theology in terms of the disinterested character of 
pur amour. In the following, I will explore these themes in Fénelon, which in turn will enable future 
to access to what extent Marion’s own thinking of the gift, the givenness of love and the 
                                                          
8
 See generally Robyn Horner, Rethinking God as Gift: Marion, Derrida and the Limits of Phenomenology (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2001). See also John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (eds.), God, the Gift and 
Postmodernism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999). 
9
 See supra note 2. 
10
   George Pattison, God & Being: An Enquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 310-311. 
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[im]possibility of the erotic phenomenon extends and replicates the tradition surrounding pur 
amour.11  
 
 
 §2. THESIS: THE CONTINUING LEGACY OF FÉNELON’S PUR AMOUR 
 
 
 In order to sufficiently bring about such a constructive/critical dialogue between two 
historically disparate figures (Ruusbroec and Marion), the first immediate task is to inquire what lies 
behind Marion’s own position of thinking of love in terms of its pure gratuitousness by way of 
historical genealogy. In this case, it is pivotal to confront the profound impact that the tradition of 
pur amour has had upon the French cultural, philosophical and theological history. And in this 
respect, the exceptional figure of Archbishop François Fénelon and his systematic treatment and 
defense of pur amour in his 1697 work, Explication des Maximes des Saints [Maxims of the Saints] is 
undoubtedly a primary source in the exposition of such views. While in terms of Marion’s own 
intellectual history and his diverse, dialogical partners, it must be acknowledged that Fénelon is not a 
major conversation partner for Marion. Instead, in terms of the Grand scièle of French 17th century 
intellectual history, the more obvious figure in Marion’s oeuvre, beyond of course Descartes, would 
undoubtedly be Blaise Pascal. Nevertheless, a general analysis of key thematics of pur amour, with 
Fénelon as its primary advocate, offers considerable promise. For it helps yield a fundamental 
explanation of why Marion immediately transitions from securing a phenomenology of givenness at 
the end of Being Given as “opening onto” the question of love and its definitive, confessional 
response in The Erotic Phenomenon.12 For F nelon’s thinking of the primacy of gratuitous, 
disinterested love, stripped of all “mixed” forms of self-interest and projection, unveils not only a 
pure manner in which to distinctly think, honor and love God in His greater alterity and 
transcendence. Furthermore, contra the moral rigor and scrupulousness of Jansenism, the influence 
of the Fénelonian pur amour tradition, in its defense of a disinterested, self-less love for God, is as 
much about countering the rise of this intensely introspective modern subject as it is about the moral 
praxis of loving the otherness of God.13 Removed from its immediate, polemically-charged historical 
context, one of F nelon’s enduring contributions is the solidifying of this utterly passive, 
disinterested, donative subject, which is of significant importance, both for Marion’s “gifted” subject, 
as well as overall in terms of Christian views of love. For while the dynamics of “mixed” and “pure” 
forms of love are secured, the question increasingly becomes whether or not such pure love equally 
entails the very impossibility of ever receiving and possessing the gratuitous gift of the Other’s love, 
                                                          
11
 See Marc De Kesel, ‘A Drop of Water in the Sea’: Reflections on Michel de Certeau’s Every Day Life 
Spirituality's. Studies in Spiritualties 21 (2012) 1-25, 22 wherein he reflects upon the violence of Fénelon's pur 
amour: "To be faithful to God, so Fénelon states on so many pages in his voluminous oeuvre, one must be 
aware that he is nothing more than a drop of water in the sea, and that, even to be faithful to himself, he has 
to do everything in order to become such a drop, which is to say that he has to exist in a way that is almost 
similar to disappearing. The one who really loves God (in what Fénelon calls the pur amour, which is the 
absolute opposite of amour propre) knows he is nothing and, consequently, has to do everything he can in 
order to really become nothing". See also Marc De Kesel,  Niets dan liefde: Het vileine wonder van de gift  
(Amsterdam: Sjibbolet, 2012). 
12
 See Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002) 320-324. 
13
 See R.A. Knox, Enthusiasm (Oxford, University Press, 1950), 244-249. The following treatment of Fénelon's 
historical context is largely indebted to Knox's historical account. 
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lest it devolve to an imperfect degree of mixed, selfish love. Hence, a pure love, marked by its 
posture of pure receptivity, thereby equally entails a lack of possessiveness. 
 
 
 A. THE QUIETIST CONTROVERSY AND MYSTICAL THEOLOGY’S LAST BLOW? 
 
 Speaking of the Grand Siécle of seventeenth century France, in his well-regarded church 
history monograph, Enthusiasm, R.A. Knox writes: “But just before and all through the seventeenth 
century […] the mystical genius of the Christian religion came to the surface again; the pools were 
filled with water. Mysticism became, once more, a familiar feature of Christendom; to some minds, a 
peril.” 14 One way to gauge this tremendous growth and renewed interest in Christian mysticism in 
France in the Seventeenth Century can be seen in the distinction between “acquired” and “infused” 
contemplation. For such a distinction entailed both immense, practical consequences, as well as a 
productive, conceptual distinction—analogous to more contemporary discussions on the relationship 
between kataphasis and apophasis.  
 
 Concerning the growth of many popular spiritual devotions and in view of the 
(Counter)Reformation15, Knox strongly argues against ascribing such developments as externally 
oriented between Protestants and Catholics. Rather, by heeding the important distinctions mystical 
theology traditionally makes between meditatio and contemplatio, Knox thus portrays this growth of 
spirituality overall in 17th Century France as primarily an internal ecclesial matter. “What did receive 
official encouragement at the time was the practice of meditation. And it is as a revolt from the 
practice of meditation that mysticism”, at this time at least, thus “ makes its appeal.”16 He then goes 
on to clarify: 
 
But what if you […] had come to feel, after long practice of meditation, that it was not meant 
for you, or was no longer meant for you [….] Was there such a thing as ‘acquired 
contemplation’? The prayer of quiet was something beyond man’s contrivance; it was all 
supernatural. But it had a kind of natural counterpart, usually called the ‘prayer of simple 
regard’. This meant that you deliberately gave up trying to elicit emotions in your prayer; you 
remained simply attentive to God’s presence [….]It was this process, recommended in so 
many ‘short methods’ of interior prayer, sometimes even by Jesuit authors, that led to the 
wide diffusion of mysticism in the seventeenth century.
17
 
 
 From this historical backdrop, one can say that the Fénelonian controversy is framed in 
testing the viability and limits of such distinctions. And thereby in turn, the legitimacy of mystical 
theology itself as a related, yet distinct form of theological reflection. If there “was…such a thing as 
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seventeenth century? How did a single age produce such a spate of monographs on the interior life, 
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‘acquired contemplation’”, then horizontally and in everyday life, the relevance and engagement 
with the mystical theological tradition becomes potentially far more “common” and accessible.18 If 
not, then mystical theology itself increasingly appears as a rarefied discourse that lacks genuine 
integration within the world as created.  Rather it becomes a matter of "piety", with all of its derisive 
and familiar connotations as a spiritual pursuit increasingly separate from and even incompatible 
with the world, history19, while contemplation becomes viewed as highly exceptional, asymmetrical 
and utterly gratuitous—in a word, unnatural. And it is from this lineage and predominant historical 
reception that contemplation and mystical theology, as “mysticism” becomes thus circumscribed 
within an increasingly narrow, limited sphere left remaining to it. What early 20th Century Modernists  
would later on be retrieve and imbue with renewed vigor and importance. That is, what we now call 
asmystical experience. 
 
 For F nelon’s part, while predominant receptions of his work did away with any and all 
nuance by labelling it as “quietism”,in the Maxims itself, we see both, on the one hand, the sober 
defense of “acquired contemplation” as largely distinct from the exaggerated rhetoric of Mme. 
Guyon. While, on the other hand, we also see the defense of pur amour as an asymmetrical, purified 
concept. A pure love, distilled from linkages of “impure” forms of love, as well as the corresponding 
virtues of faith and hope as self-referential and no longer gratuitous. And in turn, by attempting to 
safeguard the gnostic “secret”20 of such “disinterested love”, Fénelon publically argues thatthe canon 
of mystical theology has continuously preserved  a secret, heterogeneous element within the 
otherwise common, theological tradition. Thus, Fénelon  portrays pur amour and mystical theology 
both as equally rarefied, in the hopes of preserving, “without diluting any approved doctrine or 
experience”21 of this canon. Which for Fénelon, means that it is highly exceptional and attainable by 
the few, while  nonetheless equally at the core of human interiority itself. 
 
 Hence, by analyzing these distinct themes immediately linked with F nelon’s pur amour  can, 
in turn permit us to gauge the extent of its influence. From the rigor of its logic of gratuitousness, to 
its highly exceptional and rarefied character—all the while equally setting the standards for all other 
forms of “mixed love”—it is Fénelon's pure conception of love, which I would argue, is intimately 
repeated in more contemporary, postmodern discussions over the pure “gift”, its gratuitousness, its 
[im]possibility, while exempted from all forms of economic reciprocity and return. 
 
 
 B. CUM ALIAS 
 
 The papal brief Cum alias (1699), issued under the pontificate of Innocent XII on March 12, 
1699 and its subsequent reception is certainly as complicated as the political and ecclesiastical drama 
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 See generally Brother Lawrence of the Resurrection, The Practice of the Presence of God, trans. Donald 
Attwatter (London: Burns & Oates, 1977) See also Louis Dupré's essay on "Jansenism and Quietism", in 
Christian Spirituality: Post-Reformation and Modern, (eds.) Louis Dupré and Don E. Salyers, in collaboration 
with John Meyendorff (London: SCM Press, 1989) 121-141. 
19
 See generally Edward Howells, "Relationality and difference in the mysticism of Pierre de Berulle." The 
Harvard Theological Review, 102.2 (2009), 225-243. 
20
 See François Fénelon, Selected Writings, ed. & trans. Chad Helms (New York: Paulist Press, 2006) Art. XLIV, 
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between Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, Archbishop of Meaux and leading French theologian, and the 
Archbishop of Cambrai, François Féneolon. For such a conflict has been called as one of the “epic 
controversies of ecclesiastical history”.22  And yet while the collective stakes were high in this 
polarizing controversy, in the end,  Rome did not simply side with Bossuet’s charges, as it appears to 
have its own voice in this debate. Canonically, this is evidenced in what can easily be interpreted as, 
what Knox argues as the “most lenient course” of disciplinary action at Rome’s disposal, declaring its 
articles of condemnation, not by way of a more severe papal bull, yet that of a brief. Knox later on 
clarifies that: 
 
Through the direct influence of the Pope (Innocent XII) none of the propositions was 
stigmatized as ‘heretical’, or even as ‘bordering on heresy’. The propositions were condemned 
in globo, so that one could not say for certain which of them were erroneous, which were 
merely rash, or offensive to pious ears. The book was condemned in general, not on the ground 
that it betrays the reader into wrong conclusions, but on the ground that it might do so by 
gradual degrees.
23
 
 
 
Knox’s interpretation of the papal brief can clearly be seen in the conclusion of Cum alias itself, 
wherein it states that: “Condemned and rejected as, either in the obvious sense of these words, or in 
the extended meaning of the thoughts, rash, scandalous, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears, 
pernicious, and likewise erroneous in practice.” 24 
 
 In no sense should we make light nor underestimate the severe ramifications that this papal 
brief entailed. Personally, the Archbishop of Cambrai’s close ties to the court of Louis XIV and 
Madame de Maintenon were severely damaged, not to mention the disgraceful absence of even a 
eulogy at his funeral mass.25 Furthermore, Maxims of the Saints would be placed on the Index for 
over a century. Perhaps even more damning is the complex, broad reception the Fénelonian 
controversy has indelibly associated le cygne de Cambrai with the Quietist heresy, typified by figures 
such as Miguel de Molinos, his Guida Spirituale (1675) and his later condemnation and life 
imprisonment. The effects of such an association cannot be underestimated in terms of the damage 
and disrepute this brought upon not only the personal legacy of someone like Fénelon, but 
furthermore, the very tradition, pursuit and cultivation of contemplation and mystical theology itself. 
For it is precisely this tradition that Fénelon claims to be in continuity with (however, the extent to 
this continuity is yet to be seen) and defends in the preface of Maxims. To this canon of mystical 
authors, Fénelon includes: Bernard of Clairvaux, Richard and Hugh of Saint Victor, Theresa of Avila, 
Theresa’s confessor, Balthazar Alvarez, John of the Cross, Ruusbroec, Tauler, as well as figures of the 
French School, such as François de Sales and Cardinal de Bérulle.26 
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 By recalling this diverse array of canonical figures of mystical theology, F nelon’s intention is 
in part to defend the very theological foundations and legitimacy of this distinct canon. Foundations 
to which he rightly had perceived were under severe attack in its various, questionable associations 
with Quietism at large, as well as in particular, the concluding articles resulting from the Conference 
of Issy (1695), in which judgment was passed on Mme. Jeanne Guyon. Thus, keeping in mind this 
volatile context, F nelon argues that he wants to “show how far these holy authors are from harming 
the dogma of our faith or from favoring any falsehood.”27 In turn, Fénelon suggests that such 
canonical figures and their reception were themselves not free from the taint of false, heretical 
associations. In this case, Fénelon cites the need to distinguish this canon amid contemporary 
quietistic currents and its false, exaggerated opinions, broadly drawing parallels with historical 
movements such as the “false Gnostics” of the Patristic era, the “Beghards” of the Low Countries as 
well as the “ Alumbrados” of Spain. 
 
 And yet, F nelon’s own explicit defense of the tradition of mystical theology, as well as 
implicitly—though he never once mentions her name—that of Madame Guyon herself positions 
himself in such a way to then defend his own thinking of the disinterested character of pur amour by 
claiming its own canonical precedence. Such an argumentative and rhetorical maneuver thereby 
significantly complicates things. Just as Cum alias had pronounced its condemnations of F nelon’s 
defense of pure love in globo, where then does this leave the legacy of mystical theology itself in 
which F nelon himself claims to defend? Despite Rome’s leniency towards F nelon himself, 
combining the pronouncements made in Cum alias with those against Molinos in Coelestis Pastor 
(1687), in total amounted to a chilling effect on the viability of continuing the tradition of mystical 
theology itself. Such a historical scenario in many ways is not unlike the results several centuries 
earlier in terms of Eckhart’s condemned theses in In agro dominico (1329)28 Unfortunately, however, 
the dawning eighteenth century lacked figures such as Ruusbroec, Tauler and Suso et.al. to help 
correct and restore the continuing pursuit of mystical theology upon a firm, theological foundation. 
 
 Rather, it is perhaps better to mention what the papal brief explicitly did not say nor 
condemn. In this regard, Cum alias stayed clear from F nelon’s argument of the primacy of pur 
amour. Rather article 23, the last article of Cum alias, condemns F nelon’s conclusion that stresses 
the singularity of such love, in contradistinction to the corresponding virtues of faith and hope seen 
as “mixed” and imperfect. “Pure love itself alone constitutes the whole interior life; and thence arises 
the only principle and the only motive of all acts which are deliberate and meritorious.”29 However, 
this judgment should be viewed as necessarily clarifying article 13 of the earlier Issy conference: 
“within the most perfect prayer the act of charity includes the acts of the other virtues.”30 In short, 
the question becomes to what extent is F nelon’s conception of pur amour divisive and negating the 
legitimacy of other forms of “mixed”, selfish love, as well as the other virtues. 
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 Another issue that Cum alias deliberately avoids is the issue of acquired contemplation—
otherwise known as the “prayer of simple regard”. In this, Knox provides an intriguing reflection on 
the nuanced reasoning of Cum alias and the delicate stance that it takes: 
 
It should be made clear, then, that the prayer of simple regard [“acquired contemplation”], 
with its neglect of ‘sensible images’, was not included in the condemnation; the twenty-fourth 
and twenty-fifth of the propositions originally selected which bear on the subject [by Bousset], 
were deliberately left out….Nor is the charge of ‘Quietism’ well-founded when mystical writers 
venture to suggest that the prayer of simple regard is a prayer suitable to the needs of many. 
On the contrary, the twenty-second of the condemned propositions
31
 was precisely aimed 
against the forty-forth of the Maxims, which taught that the way of disinterested love was a 
mystery jealousy guarded against all but a small élite of highly privileged souls.
32
 
 
However, some contemporary writers who approach quietism, pur amour and F nelon’s concise 
distinctions suggest that such “arcane” terms—for example, between “acquired” and “infused” 
contemplation—were mistakenly entangled in doctrinal controversy for what primarily remained a 
pastoral affair.33 And this is perhaps as regrettable a mistake now—implying that mystical theology is 
at best, an application of moral and pastoral theology, without a proper “object” of its reflection—as 
it was then. For at the time, such confusions were considerably influential, as Knox describes Bossuet 
as not possessing a clear understanding of neither the history nor the technical distinctions within 
mystical theological writings, such as the difference between “acquired” and “infused” 
contemplation.34 The fundamental importance of this distinction within mystical theology, its lack of 
appreciation and engagement by Bossuet is an important recognition that Knox makes of this entire 
ecclesial controversy. In one letter, Bossuet complains that the “Quietists…make extraordinary 
prayer seem so ordinary ‘que tout le monde y soit appelé [that everyone is called]’.35  
 
 While fully recognizing the existence of such confusion over terms between “acquired” and 
“infused” contemplation and their further application, there were nonetheless “dangerous 
tendencies” to be found within this revived appreciation of mysticism in seventeenth century France. 
Fundamentally, this can be traced back to a certain, intrinsic divisiveness of its character and 
temperament, with various figures— De Sales, Bérulle, Olier, Tronson and later on, Mme. Guyon and 
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Fénelon himself—all of whom were far more apt to draw clear distinctions than forge linkages and 
syntheses. In terms of the distinct character of mystical theology and its associations with quietism, 
these divisions are clearly highlighted by both Knox and Henri Bremond, as the differences revolving 
around meditation and contemplation involves more than merely a spiritual technique. Referencing 
Bremond’s strong defense of F nelon in his Apologie pour Fénelon,36 Knox writes that the “real 
issue…is between an anthropocentric and a theocentric type of spirituality.”37 Knox further describes 
Bremond’s characterization of the anthropological model, typified by well-known Ignatian spiritual 
methods such as the Daily Examen and Spiritual Exercises, both of which “treats prayer as a means to 
an end, the end being our own perfection….Whereas, to the mystic, prayer is its own justification; a 
continual attitude of loving attendance upon God is the thing, precisely, we were made for.”38  
Hence, Knox summarizes that “When I meditate about God, I seldom lose sight of what he is for me, 
my Benefactor, my Last End, &c….Whereas, when I use the prayer of contemplation, my mind is 
more easily directed to the thought of what God is in himself, without any reference to my perfection 
or even to my salvation.”39 
 
  
 C. FÉNELON’S TYPOLOGY OF LOVE 
 
 
 In his typology of the gradation of love, from selfish and 'mixed loves', to that of the highly 
distilled40, for Fénelon these include: (1)servile; (2)covetousness; (3)hopeful love; (4) charity;  (5) pur 
amour.  And although he rarely discusses it, F nelon’s basic description of “servile love”—“love of 
God’s blessings apart from God”—which Fénelon calls entirely selfish is to be found the basic 
presupposition that one can entirely bracket the gifts of God from God, as Giver of such gifts. 
Interestingly enough, postmodern discussions on the gift and givenness itself also operates on this 
very foundational presupposition: not only does givenness and the gift not imply a g/Giver, but in 
turn, some have argued (Derrida) that the perfect gift is one in which it is given anonymously.41 
 
 Another feature that appears  in this typology concerns 'selfless love'—distinguished as the 
proper love for God—as clearly extrinsic  and thus unmixed with immanence itself. Such  a line of 
thinking clearly distinguishes human autonomy from that of God, such that loving God as God is 
viewed as having no bearing on the created self. Otherwise it would still remain “mixed” and not 
 ’am   pu . Additionally, Fénelon makes a very telling and interesting initial move in his line of 
argumentation in introducing Art. 1 of Maxims: namely, that concupiscent love is itself 
fundamentally un-natural. Rather, the anthropological argument made is that by seeking one’s 
happiness, rather than God’s glory goes “against the essential nature of the creature…”42. Instead, 
self-abandonment is thereby equated with our full turning to God is itself argued as fundamentally 
natural. 
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 Following from this anthropological basis, a primary form of distinguishing these various 
types of love is the degreeof its self/self-less character, as well as the question of motive. This is 
especially evident in Article IV on Hope and its relationship to Charity, as he argues for their 
distinction. For Fénelon, love is solely voluntaristic and thus, one type of love cannot co-exist with 
another when considering the question of motives. This becomes starkly evident when arguing that 
the virtues of hope and charity are distinct, not only because of their diverse motives, yet because 
their formal objects are different. In this case, the object of charity is God’s goodness, which bears no 
resemblance to humans. While conversely, hope’s object is understood as God’s goodness, defined 
as good as it relates to us.43 For Fénelon, as the object of charity subsists in of itself, without any 
relationship to us, only goes to reaffirm the discussion that the very desire of pur amour is neither 
immanent nor does it arise from the human person, yet is purely extrinsic and “given”. F nelon 
anticipates this problem when he strictly separates the selflessness of charity from the selfishness of 
hope in the following: 
 
The only difficulty that remains is to explain how a totally selfless soul can want God, God being 
defined as her possession. Is this not, one might say, to fall short of selflessness’ perfection? Is 
this not to backtrack in the way of God and to return to a motive of self-interest in spite of the 
tradition of the saints from all centuries who bar from the third state of the righteous any 
selfish motive? It is easy to answer that the purest love does not prevent us from wanting—
indeed, it would have us to want positively—all that God wants us to desire. God wants me to 
want him inasmuch as he is my property, my treasure, my happiness and my reward….The 
object and the motive are different. The object is my self-interest, but the motive is not selfish 
because it is a question of God’s good pleasure.
44
 
 
 
 1. Pur Amour 
 
 Fénelon then goes on to define pur amour as  
 
One can love God with a love born of perfect charity, without any mingling of motive 
or self-interest. At which stage one loves God in the midst of trials and tribulations in 
such a way that one could not love him more even if he showered the soul with 
consolation.45 
 
Fénelon then goes on to clarify the manner and its endurance of tribulations, such that there is 
neither “fear of punishment nor the desire of reward” in such a love, as it is set in a clear 
eschatological horizon.46 Despite its radical insistence, Fénelon then supports the rigor and purity 
(removed from all self-interest) of pur amour by citing the Impossible case as a test of its absolute 
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and pure selflessness.47 Secondly, it is important to note that Fénelon intentionally describes this  
radically selfless type of love as amour, and not as caritas. Hence, there is in fact desire48 in such a 
pur amour, when he says: “A real desire and a sincere expectation of promises fulfilled….This pure 
love [l’amour pur] is not content with not wanting a reward apart from God Himself.”49  
 
 However, keeping in mind the anthropological basis in Fénelon's thinking, the Archbishop of 
Cambrai, in a rigorously consistent manner, notes the utter distinctiveness of desire in pur amour, 
such that “He would desire beatitude for himself only because he knows that God also desires this, 
and that He wants each of us to desire it also for His glory.”50 Here, Fénelon presents the idea that 
beatitude and the natural desire for God are removed from its immanent  creaturely origins. Namely, 
that such a desire does not arise from the very person himself. Rather, one desires such beatitude 
only because it is "given". That is, it is only through revealed Christian faith that one knows that God 
also desires that we desire Himself and His glory. For Fénelon, if it would be the converse—that such 
a desire would emerge naturally from within the human person—then such a love would be deemed 
as ‘mixed’ and therefore, not pur. Therefore, it needs stress once more. This is indeed amour, yet it is 
now a purified amour—desire in the pure exteriority of its givenness, without any admixture of the 
self. Hence, this subtle, yet definitive turn that such a mystical theology expresses is not only a 
rupture, yet it demonstrates a clear extrincism, in that the subject can no longer give an immanent 
account for its desire and love for God. Instead, its logic and appeal must come from God and not 
from creation’s natural attunement and disposition towards God.51 This further reinforces the 
intrinsic linkage between pur amour and the impossible case and why Fénelon would cite such an 
“impossibility”, beyond highlighting the rigor and extent of its selflessness. Arguably, for what the 
impossible case emphasizes are both its basic voluntaristc and fideistic dimensions of love as pur 
amour,  accentuating that such a desire to love God  is not native to the human person. Rather, it 
must be secured from elsewhere. 
 
 
 2. The Impossible Demand 
 
 
 While for Rome, this distinction between charity and hope did not in of itself prove 
problematic, the application of its strict divisiveness did, especially as Fénelon expounded upon this 
distinction in his understanding of “holy indifference”, which received four separate condemned 
theses in Cum alias.52 For F nelon, “holy indifference” is “nothing more than the selflessness of love” 
wherein one “no longer wants anything except for God alone and in the way that God wants her to 
want him by this attraction.”53  And in its “most extreme trials”, F nelon calls this holy indifference 
“abandonment”.54 While the Council of Trent’s position on created grace and human  “cooperation” 
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clearly hangs over these discussions55, we can also see Cum alias furthering this interpretative line 
specifically in terms of desire itself. Namely, that our desire for beatitude cannot be merely elicited 
from and informed by God, independent of nature itself. Rather, such desire must come from the 
specificity of the human person himself, if indeed the integrity of the human as cooperative with 
God’s grace is to be upheld. And yet, Fénelon cannot be found as wanting of subtlety and nuance, as 
he clarifies later on in Article V that holy indifference is not an “absolute determination on our part 
to desire nothing,” which he states is not “selflessness, but rather the extinction of love that is a true 
desire and will.”56 Rather, F nelon insists that holy indifference is the “positive and constant 
determination to want and to want nothing.”57 Why does Fénelon insist upon such a distinction? He 
does so, since an absolute determination to “desire nothing” is in fact a negative self-desire. It 
remains a desire, for it remains a want insofar as it desires  to absolutely not want, thus negatively 
remaining inscribed within a selfish desire itself. 
 
 The impossible demand  [demande impossible], otherwise referred to as the “impossible 
case” [cas impossible] is an important, reoccurring theme that Fénelon notes throughout Maxims. 
Generally conceived, the impossible demand is understood as the passive soul’s  willingness, via pur 
amour, to suffer damnation if this would be most pleasing to God.  In article II of Maxims, Fénelon 
writes: 
 
If, imagining an impossible case, given God’s purely gracious promises, in which God would 
wish to annihilate the souls of the righteous at the moment of their corporeal death, or seek to 
deprive them of his vision and keep them eternally in the temptations and miseries of this life, 
as Saint Augustine postulates, or even would wish to have them suffer far from him the pains of 
hell for all eternity, as Saint John Chrysostom postulates, following Saint Clement, the souls 
who are in the third stage of pure love would neither love God less nor serve him with any less 
faithfulness.
58
 
 
Immediately thereafter, F nelon clarifies the very “impossibility” of this demand, as he enjoins that: 
“Again, it is true that this supposition is impossible because of God’s promises, because he gave 
himself to us as a Rewarder.”59 Thus, while clearly maintaining the impossibility of such a demand, 
Fénelon clearly states that for some, such an “impossible case seems to her to be possible and 
real”.60 The consummation of the impossible demand then takes on an explicit Christological 
dimension, resulting in the tenth condemned thesis by Cum alias:61 
 
It is at this point that the soul is conflicted. She dies on the cross with Jesus Christ; saying, ‘O my 
God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’ In this involuntary gesture of despair, she makes 
the absolute sacrifice of her own self-interest for the sake of eternity […]
62
 
 
As such, one can reasonably ask why is such an “impossible” supposition at all important for F nelon 
as a key to his thinking of pur amour? All the more so, considering the very first words of Maxims in 
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F nelon’s preface, whereby distancing himself from the exaggerated and incautious rhetoric of 
someone such as Mme. Guyon, he clearly states: “I have always believed that one should speak and 
write as soberly as possible concerning the interior paths” and that “this subject demands extreme 
discretion.”63 Arguably, in a treatise that is at pains to abide by such discretion, the rare moments of 
metaphorical and literary flare occur with regard to the topic of the “impossible demand”. So why 
does Fénelon risk further derision and potential accusation on what remains a sheer impossibility? 
 
 First off, it needs to be clarified that the earlier articles of the conference of Issy, which made 
pronouncements on the works of Mme. Guyon—and to which, in its immediate historical context, 
F nelon’s Maxims are written as an immediate response—includes in article thirty-three the 
allowance to “acquiescence in our own damnation on an impossible supposition”. 64 From this 
opening initiated at Issy, it can be generally said that Fénelon makes ample usage of the impossible 
demand to thematically illustrate the very limits and boundaries of selfless love and in turn, the self 
qua self. Furthermore, the very logic of the impossible demand shows pur amour to be conceived 
along largely voluntaristic lines, hence “illogical“ with regards to the bounds of normative reason.65 
For as F nelon earlier describes, that which is regarded as “reasonable” is directly tied with “mixed”, 
selfish intentions. The unique logic of the impossible demand thereby drives a fideistic point that 
what God desires has no intrinsic connection to creaturely desires. God, in this case, is enshrined and 
safeguarded as totally Other by way of admitting the paradoxical nature of the “impossible demand”. 
 
 With attention to his earlier definition66 notice how F nelon’s thinking of the impossible 
demand is intimately linked with the pure gratuitousness of God’s love and His promises. In this case, 
a pure gratuitousness in which nothing is owed then opens up to the exceptional logic and limit of 
this impossible demand. This provides a unique take also on our overall question of the manner(s) of 
love, and whether the passive receptivity of pur amour entails any degree of possessiveness.  While it 
is traditionally held that it is impossible to separate beatitude itself from the love of God, the 
Archbishop of Cambrai innovates this claim by also stating that while the “object” and “end” of our 
love cannot be separated, they 
 
[…] can very well be separated with respect to motives. God cannot fail to be the beatitude of 
the faithful soul, but the soul can love him with such selflessness that the beatific vision of God 
would not increase in any way the love she bears him without any thought for herself, and the 
soul would love him just as much even if God were never to be her beatitude.
67
 
 
While principally, we see here Fénelon referring to the absence of beatitude as not impacting upon 
the motives of pur amour and not the object nor end of such love, nevertheless this also suggests 
that there is in fact no inherent possessiveness to such a love and perhaps such possessiveness—
even in our eternal beatitude—would risk downgrading the purity of such love. In this respect the cas 
impossible remained highly controversial, as Bossuet claimed that it negated the virtue of Christian 
hope in salvation. In turn, we can see that Fénelon attempts to respond to this fundamental criticism 
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with the “love of Hope”, his third out the five types of love. Namely, that charity is the perfection of 
hope, while remaining distinct from such hope.68 
 
 
 3. Without a Trace 
 
 As it has been presented, in order to argue for pur amour, the instinct of F nelon’s overall 
thought, in a decidedly Cartesian manner, is always one of dividing and distinguishing ideas, 
relations, as well as motives, in order to arrive at that singular love wherein “all interior paths tend” 
and is the “highest degree of Christian perfection.”69 In Fénelon, there are generally three principal 
divisions that guide his work: (1) love, as divided within itself, between “mixed” and “pure” forms of 
love; (2) humanity, in its relation to God, the basis of which justifies the exclusive figure of 
selflessness and gratuitousness within pur amour; and lastly, (3) the human person as divided within 
itself.  
 
 Strongly linked with the impossible demand, it is this third division that is evident in 
F nelon’s intriguing reflections upon “suffering” in article XIV of Maxims.70 In this article, Fénelon 
argues that when those who suffer the “final trials leading to the purification of love”—purified, that 
is, from all selfish, mixed motives—there is a “separation of the superior part of the soul from the 
inferior inasmuch as the senses and the imagination have no part in the peace and communications 
of grace that God grants…in a simple and direct manner that surpasses all meditation or reflection.”71 
For F nelon, this separation is attested by what he calls “physical traces”, such that while “simple 
and direct, acts of the mind’s understanding and will…leave no visible, physical trace behind”, these 
simple acts are juxtaposed with “meditative, reflective acts that, leaving a physical trace, 
communicate themselves to the imagination and the senses, that which we call the inferior part…”.72 
By this argument of “traces”, F nelon is implicitly rendering a more modern, and epistemological 
subject-centered account of what, earlier on, someone like Ruusbroec would term “images” 
[beelden].73 However, unlike the Brabantine contemplative, for F nelon, the concept of the “trace” 
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fully refers, not to the image itself, yet to the self-reflexive subject, as simple acts can take place with 
little to no recognition or awareness itself—hence, without a trace. Such acts are in turn 
differentiated from discursive, image-based acts of the will and understanding that are 
communicated to the senses, imagination and are thus, characterized by their embodied forms of 
knowing and acting.  
 
 Following this conception of “traces” and the division of the “superior” from the “lower” 
parts of the soul, Fénelon draws a Christological parallel, stating that given such a separation in the 
midst of suffering, “It is thus that Jesus Christ, our perfect model, was happy on the cross inasmuch 
as he enjoyed heavenly glory through the superior part of his soul while he was still suffering in the 
inferior part with a feeling of rejection by his Father.”74 This statement was carefully condemned in 
Cum alias, not on the supposed grounds of Christ’s ”happiness” while on the cross, yet on F nelon’s 
suggestion that the division within such suffering entailed that the “inferior part [i.e. Christ’s 
embodiment] was not communicating with the superior part…its involuntary anxiety”.75 Interestingly 
enough, Rome does not find fault with the converse statement that Fénelon thereafter makes, 
regarding the absence of “peace or its beatitude” communicated from the “superior part” to its 
“inferior”. Rather, one can legitimately interpret Cum alias as appearing keen to maintain the very 
real linkage, from bottom-up as it were, of Christ’s embodied humanity and the role that His 
suffering had played on his overall understanding, will and consciousness, as both fully-human, fully-
divine.  
 
 Rome’s insistence on this part, however is not solely Christological in nature, yet stands at 
the matrix between Christology and the Church’s various spiritual devotions oriented to Christ’s 
Passion. Amid this backdrop, in this somewhat unique, condemned article, Rome appears keen on 
fully addressing F nelon’s own problematic lack of linkages—immediately recalling Bossuet’s own 
seminal charge that the very singularity of the idea of pur amour annuls the Christian virtue of hope 
in salvation. Hence, the epistemological separation between the “superior” and “inferior” parts of 
the soul is made explicit in the more central issue at stake, the relationship between discursive 
meditation and contemplation. For Fénelon, what he principally has in mind here is to draw the strict 
distinction between the imageless or traceless character of contemplation and its “peaceful 
selflessness of perfect love” from that of discursive meditation, which at times can leave very 
definitive “traces” in its emotive, “hurried and anxious excitement”.76 Thus, the thirteenth article of 
Cum alias, I would argue, proclaims its condemnation with a eye on defending the great variety of 
the Church’s tradition of discursively meditating upon the image-rich events of Christ’s Passion and 
their often emotive, thoroughly embodied character that (in some cases) does indeed leaves a trace. 
Therefore, the influence of Article XIV Maxims and F nelon’s thinking of “traces” is further 
developed  at various points, as he likens meditation to a more embodied, discursive form of prayer, 
“inherent to the exercise of selfish love”77, while contemplation is aligned with a “simple or loving 
look” or pur amour.78 
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 As it is with pur amour, it is critical for Fénelon to clearly distinguish meditation from 
contemplation, for the “passage from meditation to contemplation is like the passage from selfish to 
pure love.”79 Fénelon depicts meditation as revolving around a discursive logic of independent “acts 
that are easy to distinguish one from the other….because they derive a conviction about a truth from 
a conviction of another truth already known”.80 By F nelon’s estimate, the limiting factor of such 
discursive prayer is the manner in which it revolves around the self and as such, is “commingled with 
self interest”, most importantly the “selfish motives of fear and hope”.81 And yet, Fénelon is at pains 
to maintain the legitimacy, albeit imperfect, of such forms of selfish prayer as the “ordinary 
foundation of the interior life and the exercise of love for all the righteous who are not yet in the 
state of perfect selflessness.”82 
 
 4. Acquired and Infused Contemplation 
 
 Recalling our introduction to the Fénelonian controversy and pur amour, one of the central 
issues at stake is the viability of the linkages within Mystical theology, both between meditation and 
contemplation, and more specifically, between “acquired” and “infused” contemplation. This strong 
distinction between meditation’s “discursive acts” from that of contemplation is made explicit in Art. 
XXVII of Maxims concerning “pure and direct contemplation”.83 In this article, Fénelon treats the 
issue of “acquired” contemplation and interestingly enough, avoids any explicit mention or reference 
to pur amour. Instead, the “simple and amorous look” of this directly acquired mode of 
contemplation concerns that of "pure faith”, which, F nelon argues is itself “negative”, or 
apophatic.84 The apophatic dimensions of “pure faith” are in turn supported by appeal to Denys the 
Areopagite, wherein the apophatic “[…]does not have to do voluntarily with any noticeable image 
and distinct and qualifiable idea, as Saint Denis says […] but it goes beyond all that which is distinct 
and perceptible (that is to say comprehensible and limited)”.85 Later on in the same article, Fénelon 
clarifies that the apophatic character of pure faith does not, however, exclude any and all images 
whatsoever. For to hold such a position, Fénelon argues, is to: 
 
[…]create a fanciful contemplation that has no real object and that can no longer distinguish 
God from nothingness. It is to destroy Christianity under the pretext of purifying it. It is to 
invent a type of deism that falls directly into atheism, wherein any real idea of God, as 
distinguished from his creatures, is rejected.
86
 
 
Avoiding such a position, Fénelon thereby relies upon a strong metaphysical turn as a way of 
balancing the simplicity of acquired contemplation’s “amorous look” with the necessary distinction 
pure faith holds towards God. Thus, while the apophatic register of pure faith “goes beyond all that 
which is distinct and perceptible”, instead it “only limits itself to the purely intellectual and abstract 
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idea of being, which is without limits and restriction.”87 Unfortunately, Fénelon does not elaborate 
further on his thinking of such unlimited being, which such pure faith is founded upon. Instead, he 
cites other standard, metaphysical positions, such as the relation between essence and attributes in 
order to secure that the simplicity of such contemplation does not forego necessary dogmatic 
distinctions. Hence, once again, it is more a question of the viability of F nelon’s linkages that are at 
stake, this time between the simplicity of apophatic pure faith and the “distinct… attributes of God 
[Trinity and Unity]” as well as, via the Incarnation, the “distinct view of the humanity of Jesus Christ 
and of all his mysteries”.88 Such lack of linkages once more proves problematic for Fénelon in the 
following article, Art. XXVIII—which contains condemned article 17 of Cum alias—wherein he 
positively affirms that: 
 
Contemplative souls are deprived of the distinct, sensible, and thoughtful view of Jesus Christ in 
two different times [….] First of all, in the incipient fervor of their contemplation [….] Second, a 
soul loses Jesus Christ from sight in the final trials [i.e. the “impossible demand”] because God 
then removes from the soul the possession and the thoughtful knowledge of all that which is 
good in her, in order to purify her of all self-interest.
89
 
 
 
 Thus, we see a disjunction in F nelon’s account between his more acceptable theoretical 
defense, often contrasted by its more problematic, pastoral application. In this case, it is the very 
particularity and distinctly embodied humanity of Jesus which is considered “deprived”. And in turn, 
the very historicity of Jesus and the discursive framework in which the Church’s spiritual devotions 
have as their focus in meditating upon His incarnate mysteries. For Fénelon, he defends the simplicity 
of such acquired contemplation and its apophatic pure faith as “nevertheless very real and very 
positive.”90 Recalling his anthropological assertion in Art. XV regarding the enduring happiness of 
Christ suffering on the Cross, F nelon writes: “The simplicity of this purely immaterial idea, which has 
not passed by the senses or by the imagination [….] admits of all the objects that pure faith can 
present to us. With respect to divine things, it only excludes perceptible images and discursive 
operations.”91 Thus, analogous to the separation between the lower and higher parts of the soul 
during Christ’s suffering, so too do we see a similar move in the pure faith of acquired contemplation. 
For the immediacy of such contemplation, without any trace, bypasses the senses and imagination of 
discursive meditation that “considers the mysteries of Jesus Christ by a methodical and perceptible 
working of the imagination in order to etch the traces of them in the mind and to be moved by 
consolation.”92 
 
 Noticeably absent in the presentation on acquired contemplation is that of pur amour itself. 
This distinctly changes with Art. XXIX of Maxims, wherein Fénelon describes passive contemplation as 
infusing “into souls the purest and most perfect love.”93 Fénelon then immediately clarifies this, by 
arguing against a naïve, simplistic argument that would presume the passivity of such infused love as 
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“miraculous”. Recognizing that while “several mystics have supposed that this contemplation was 
miraculous because within it we contemplate a truth that has not passed by the senses of by the 
imagination,” F nelon argues that such views—although he does not mention anyone specifically—
are to be attributed to the “philosophy of the Scholastics, with which these mystics were imbued.”94 
The position that he takes in this regard is hermeneutically astute, recognizing the sources and 
intellectual heritage that had previously informed such mystical theological treatises. As a counter 
argument, Fénelon first claims that “grace without miracle is sufficient for the most lively faith and 
for the most purified love.”95 In turn, by siding against the understanding of passive, infused 
contemplation as extraneous and “miraculous”—or “mystical experience”—Fénelon rightly turns to a 
more anthropological field in accounting for the “naturalness” of such passive, infused 
contemplation. 
 
 D. DISCONTINUITY IN MYSTICAL THEOLOGY—A MATTER OF ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
  In this anthropological vein, Fénelon begins by asserting that those earlier mystics who 
understood infused contemplation as ‘miraculous’, such figures also “recognized a depth of the soul 
that was active in this contemplation without any distinct operation of the physical senses.”96 Here, 
Fénelon recalls a standard theological anthropological model prevalent amongst (late)medieval 
mystical treatises, which posits a lower, bodily unity that includes the five senses, reason, desire; the 
“higher” unity of memory, understanding and will; and finally (especially for Rhinish and Low 
Countries late-medieval mystics) the “ground” of the soul, or its wesen, as a place of mutual 
indwelling between God and the human person.  
 
 Fénelon strongly distances himself from this Augustinian-based, Trinitarian anthropology, 
and instead signals towards a far more modern anthropological depiction, wherein “the core of the 
soul is not really distinguishable from its properties”.97 This statement, although Fénelon himself 
does not further elaborate upon it directly, nevertheless has immense consequences for F nelon’s 
thinking of pur amour. By leveling away the earlier, tripartite anthropological structure (i.e. body—
soul—spirit), the efficacy of human acts of knowing (apophatic, pure faith) and willing (pur amour) 
become totalizing of the human person in distinctly bearing the imago dei.  Therefore, by rendering 
indistinguishable the   u ’       f  m     p  p      , this modern take on the founding identity of 
human act makes sense of what later on become commonplaces in speaking of an anthropological 
portrait as either positive (in this historical context, typified along Quietist lines), or more negative, 
(as typified by Jansenism). 
  
 By collapsing the abiding relationality of the Trinitarian structure of the human soul that 
earlier on, mystical theology in varying degrees upheld, for F nelon, ideas such as “mutual 
indwelling” or differentiated union—the greater one’s union with God, greater one becomes 
uniquely a human person—are no longer tenable. Thus, when later on speaking of traditional 
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mystical theological themes such as the soul’s transformation into God—though explicitly not 
deification, which Fénelon immediately conflates with the hypostatic union98— or its “annihilation”, 
given such an anthropology, we are able to understand his insistence on the utter passivity of pur 
amour. For, given the primacy of such identity—which stands at the basis of his anthropology—unity 
with God thus entails annihilation of all that is “mixed”, self-reflexive, and thus impure. With this 
anthropological framework we are able to  understand F nelon, when he summarizes that “the more 
a soul is passive with respect to God, the more she is acting in respect to what she must do”.99 In this 
regard, Fénelon claims that such passive, infused contemplation has nothing explicitly ‘miraculous’ 
about it, rather the pure acts of “faith and love [are] so simple, so direct, so peaceful so uniform that 
they seem to form only one sole act, or even seem to be no act at all but rather the tranquil repose 
of pure union”. Or, what De Sales would term as “pure unity.”100 And it is this “single act”, which 
encompasses the entirety of the human soul, that F nelon will call the “prayer of silence or 
quietude”.101  
 
 In this respect, F nelon’s pur amour is deeply tied to the distinct reception he makes of the 
imago dei tradition, no longer regarded as a natural, ontological union, yet as a moral union. That is, 
one of similitude and "referral"102 and thus solely within the realm of grace. Speaking of the state of 
pure passivity and its receptivity of grace within contemplative prayer, Fénelon gives a provocative, 
anthropological metaphor: 
 
Water that is disturbed cannot be clear, nor can it reflect the image of neighboring objects, but 
still water becomes like the pure glass of a mirror. It received without alternation all the images 
of various objects, and it keeps none of them. The pure and tranquil soul is the same. God 
imprints on her his image and that of all other objects that he wishes to imprint. Everything is 
imprinted; everything is erased. This soul has no proper form, and she has equally all those that 
grace gives her. Nothing remains to her, and everything disappears as in water as soon as God 
wishes to make new impressions. Only pure love gives this peace and this perfect docility.
103
  
 
 
Fénelon clarifies and develops this line of thought more explicitly when discussing his distinct, imago 
dei theological anthropology and the subject of moral transformation: 
 
The state of transformation of which so many of both the ancient and modern saints have so 
often spoken is none other than the most passive state, that is to say, the state that is the most 
exempt from all selfish activity or worry [….] In this state a soul has only one love and she only 
knows how to love. Love is her life. Love is her being and her substance, because it is the sole 
principle of all her affections. Since this soul makes no anxious movements, she makes no 
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resistance to God’s hand, which pushes her. Thus she only feels a single movement, which is to 
know him that is imprinted on her [….]Therefore, the image of God, obscured and nearly erased 
in us by sin, is redrawn more perfectly and a resemblance is therein renewed—a resemblance 
that is called transformation.
104
 
 
Such an anthropological conception of the imago dei, “nearly erased in us by sin” is highly 
discontinuous with early mystical theological figures—i.e., Ruusbroec’s view on the very naturalness 
of mutual indwelling—which again, restates the question to what extent was there continuity within 
this tradition of mystical theology that Fénelon himself was proclaiming to defend? Was mystical 
theology distinctly recognizable at this stage, or was Fénelon simply appealing to this canonical 
tradition in order to fend off Bossuet’s growing criticism of his perceived quietist views? 
 
 Such questions in part provide a genuine look into the spiritual temperament of the age and  
the preceding figures of the French school of Spirituality. At issue is the interpretation of the 
humanity’s sole reliance upon God as no longer opening onto the question of “natural mysticism” 
and the exaggerated claims of autotheism (as it had in earlier centuries), yet as a source of existential 
anxiety at the creaturely self’s lack of autonomous “necessity”. While discussing the topic of God’s 
absolute freedom, entailing that “Grace is never owed to us; otherwise it would not be grace”, 
Fénelon aptly depicts this mood of existential anxiety in stating: 
 
  
Nor does He [God] owe to our soul the right to exist after this life. He could let her fall back into 
nothingness from her own weight. If it were otherwise, God would not be free to determine 
the duration of his creature, and it would become a necessary being.
105
 
 
 
In line with the logic of the “impossible demand”, a critical theme at stake in F nelon’s defense of 
mysticism, is his insistence that the creature’s contingency and lack of necessity in its absolute 
dependency upon God in no way impinges upon God’s freedom. However, as a productive contrast, 
while a figure such as Ruusbroec would not formally disagree with Fénelon on this point, the 
Brabantine’s accent is nonetheless entirely different, as seen in the following: 
 
  
[...]we find a triple unity in all people naturally, 
and in good people also supernaturally. The first 
and the highest unity is in God; for all creatures 
hang in this unity with (their) being [wesene], life, 
and subsistence [onthoude]; and if they should be 
cut off in this way from God, they would fall into 
nothingness and be annihilated. This unity is in us 
essentially [weselijc] by nature, whether we are 
good or evil, and it renders us neither holy nor 
blessed without our effort. We possess this unity 
in ourselves, and in fact, above ourselves, as a 
principle and support [onthout] of our being 
[wesens] and our life. 
[…]drierhande eenicheit vintmen in alle menschen 
natuerlijcke, ende daer toe overnatuerlijcke in goeden 
menschen. Die eerste ende die hoochste eenicheit es 
in gode, want alle creatueren hanghen in deser 
eenicheit met wesene, met levene ende met 
onthoude; ende scieden si in deser wijs van gode, si 
vielen in niet ende worden te niete. Dese eenicheit es 
weselijc in ons can natueren, weder wij sijn goet 
ochte quaet, ende si en maect ons sonder ons 
toedoen noch heylich noch salich. Dese eenicheit 
besitten wi in ons selven ende doch boven ons  
[selven], als een beghin ende een onthout ons wesens 
ende ons levens.
106
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While more in-depth analysis of Ruusbroec is still to come, for now, the productiveness of this brief 
comparison is to show how earlier on, for someone like Ruusbroec, the conflict is not one of God’s 
freedom, human contingency and necessity, nor of preserving the gratuitousness of the beatific life. 
Rather, it is how natural this fundamental relationship is between God and the human person, 
though in no way rendering the person naturally blessed. Thus, the dynamism for the Brabantine 
contemplative—as it was for many contemplative theologians in late-medieval Northern Europe—
revolved more around ideas of relationality and autonomy and their lack of mutual exclusivity 
between God and the human person. 
 
 
 E. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Speaking of the condemnation of Fénelon's Maximes amid both its ecclesial and social 
context, Louis Dupré interestingly summarizes this unique and highly influential moment in the 
history of Western Christian spirituality and the modern fate of mystical theology specifically when 
noting:  
 
 
 And yet, one cannot escape a certain discomfort in reading theories in which everything is 
 'pure' and the imperfect but commonly attainable is barely granted a right to exist. In the 
 end, the 'heresy' of Quietism may have consisted in nothing more than the all-too-
 deliberate decision to leave the ordinary. It is a heresy which it shares with its natural 
 adversary, Jansenism, but one which has prevented neither movement from training some 
 of the most spiritual minds of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Jansenism and 
 Quietism should be seen as attempts to perpetuate the Christian spiritual tradition in a 
 culture that was breaking away from the basis of that tradition, rather than as separatist 
 drives.
107
 
 
 
 As it is well known within a contextual-fundamental theological standpoint, amid various 
societal pressures, the theological option of discontinuity and in turn, seeking out a more "pure" 
tradition, religious identity and communal praxis is a well-known strategy that the Church has 
employed at various times in her history. And yet, it is often less-acknowledged that the search for a 
more 'pure' and less "contextually-contaminated" tradition is an endeavor that itself is always-
already contextually mediated. In endeavoring to defend the mystical theological canon from 
repeated attack and derision via the disinterested love of pur amour, Fénelon cannot help but in 
some sense reconstruct a tradition for which, if we contrast him with Ruusbroec, shows himself in 
key areas to be in greater discontinuity with that same tradition. A discontinuity, which we can in 
part attribute to Fénelon himself, as we have shown in this analysis, all the while equally realizing a 
certain inevitability that such was bound to occur. For in short, amid its seeking for greater 'purity' 
and, in following Dupré's assessment—the intended return to an earlier, mystical theological 
tradition that was quickly departing—the fascinating works of Fénelon and others in the 17th Century 
school of French Spirituality generally attest to the departing of the "createdness" of the world itself 
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that facilitated mediation between the anthropological and the theological. While in its place, we can 
see modernity's familiar construction of nature, the world, the mathesis universalis and its natura 
pura.108 In a felicitous reference, Frans Jozef van Beeck provides a  fascinating note on Pierre Cardinal 
de B rulle’s relationship as a spiritual advisor to René Descartes:  
 
 The Christian affirmation of God’s incomprehensibility has even less in common with Ren  
 Descartes’ resolve to prescind from the Christian faith in order to attempt, by dint of sole 
 reason methodologically applied more mathematico, to place God outside the reach of all 
 skeptical and atheistic doubt and denial. The result of his reasoning was an abstract God, 
 whose transcendence in relation to the universe was shorn of all immanence, and thus 
 became a matter of mere  remoteness. No wonder that this God was to turn out, ultimately, to 
 be nonessential to the world. What makes all of this doubly disquieting is the fact that 
 Descartes’ personal intentions in undertaking this line of argument were entirely pious, and 
 that the spiritual director who encouraged him to pursue it, Cardinal Pierre de Bérulle, had   
 a reputation for saintliness.
109
 
 
 
 This remarkable quote alone should make one reconsider "piety" as purely a "private" affair.  
Hence, we can well summarize that while the various shrewd, political maneuvering in Fénelon's 
political and ecclesiastical controversy remains but a fascinating, historical curiosity, the effects and 
long-standing influence of pur amour, however, remains strongly with us today. For in short, by 
seeking to distill various 'mixed-loves' to love's more original, pure essence, Fénelon's pur amour 
brings together a convergence of various ideas that I contend not only are replicated in various 
modern approaches to love. Furthermore, such convergences are in turn replicated in more 
postmodern discussions on the gratuitity of the pure gift and its [im]possibility.  
 
 Recalling Pattison’s reformulation of the pure gift and the four conditions of its 
[im]possibility, we can now schematically map these criteria to the various pertinent themes 
concerning what we have seen in Fénelon and pur amour. (1)The first condition, gratuitousness: “[…] 
that the giver should not give so as to impose on the recipient” accords well with theme of hope and 
its “mixed”, selfish motives, from which F nelon strongly distinguishes from his conception of pur 
amour. It is this strict separation made between hope and the singularity of pur amour that F nelon’s 
adversary, the Archbishop of Meaux, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet repeatedly cited as negating the 
Christian theological virtue of hope in one’s salvation. Recalling Bossuet’s charge that pur amour  
none other annuls the Christian virtue of hope in salvation is a charge that has become recast and 
reiterated in Postmodern discussions on the anticipation of the gift as precisely demoting the gift—in 
its purity—into an economy of exchange. Hence, expelling the very gratuitousness of the gift is none 
other than the expelling of the gift itself.  (2) The second condition, anonymity: “the giver would have 
to conceal himself”. The logic here concerns maintaining the anonymity of the giver “as such”, lest 
one receive a certain consolation in the giving itself, and thereby once more condition the gift, doing 
away with its gratuitousness and instead, situating it within an economy of exchange. Such a logic is 
directly implicated in F nelon’s own “five types of love”, that have as their gradation competing 
selfish and selfless motives that ultimately leads to pur amour itself as distilled from any and all self-
reflexive motives. (3) The third condition, other than a gift: “the gift would have to appear as other 
than a gift in order not to become an obligation or debt”. In this, we see F nelon’s strident defense 
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of the then well-known, controversial theme in various mystical literature in 17th Century France: 
namely, the “impossible demand”. Pushing the boundaries of such self-less love, enthusiastically 
even entailing one’s annihilation, F nelon actively maintains that those who practice pur amour 
would continue to do so, (as the popular maxim goes) even when suffering eternal damnation, if such 
would be pleasing to God. The impossible demand as a hypothetical, yet seemingly necessary test 
case in determining the radical selflessness and aporetic logic of pur amour is similarly inscribed 
within postmodern definitions of the gift as a distinct, self-referential logic, foreign to any sense of 
extrinsic horizon as none other than a reduction to its economy of exchange. (4) Finally, the fourth 
condition, forgetfulness of the gift and its debt: “The recipient would need absolutely to forget the 
gift”. This forgetfulness of the gift, and ultimately the self as well, amid passively receiving and 
contemplating God and God’s grace is repeatedly thermalized by Fénelon. This is explicitly explored 
in terms of the simplicity of pur amour, infused contemplation and its anonymous, passive reception 
as occurring without a trace. The utter passivity and "quietism" of acquired contemplation—away 
from any semblance of its infused and miraculous character—and combined with its explicit, 
apophatic character, are themselves thinking patterns that are replicated in the postmodern 
anonymity of the gift and its pure givenness as a givenness, “without a trace”. That is to say, the 
[im]possibility of the postmodern gift refuses to become reified as a ‘thing’ and thereby in turn, 
recognized ‘as such’ as a gift that would place an obligation upon the recipient to return such a gift 
and thus, compromise its pure gratuitousness. 
 
 Following, therefore, this conceptual mapping and the reading of the gratuitousness of 
Fénelon's pur amour and its "impossible demands" with that postmodern discussions on the 
[im]possible gift and its phenomenological  givenness, in the following chapter, we now turn to a 
more direct engagement between Jean-Luc Marion and Ruusbroec over the question of the 
[im]possible itself. 
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CHAPTER VII 
ABIDING IN MINNE'S DEMANDS.  PART III— ENJOYING THE 
[IM]POSSIBLE WITH JAN VAN RUUSBROEC AND JEAN-LUC MARION 
 
 
 
His Spirit draws us inwards to love Him 
according to His worthiness. His worthiness 
demands our spirit to love without measure, 
for He Himself is without measure, for He loves 
us with Himself as He is. And His minne is so 
terrible, and so magnetic, and so all-consuming 
of everything that it touches that if we feel this 
[ghevoelen], which is above reason, then our 
minnen is modeless and without manner. 
[A]lsoe trecht ons zijn gheest inne hem te 
minnenne na sine weerdicheit. Ende sine 
weerdicheit eyscht onsen gheeste minne sonder 
mate, want hi es zelve zonder mate ende hi 
mint ons met hem zelven alzoe hi es. Ende sine 
minne es soe gruwelijc ende soe intreckende 
ende zoe verterende al dat zy gherijnt; ende 
daer wi des ghevoelen, dat es boven redene, 
daer es onse minne wiseloes ende zonder 
maniere.
1
 
  
 
 §1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY REVIEW  
 
 In my ongoing retrieval of the fourteenth century Brabantine contemplative, Jan van 
Ruusbroec and his understanding of love, or minne, and situating such a retrieval within 
contemporary discussions over love in theological and philosophy of religion quarters, I must equally 
bring into consideration that which minne presupposes, so as to gauge its theological relevance, 
accountability as well as its contextual plausibility, as a fundamentally meaningful retrieval. Hence, I 
have contended that the contemporary reception and possible critical retrieval of Ruusbroec  hinges 
more upon the plausibility of his mystical anthropology of mutual indwelling and the various 
consequences stemming therefrom, more so than the question of 'mystical experience' as a 
determining criterion of legitimacy and hermeneutical engagement. Here, the argument is 
maintained, that the question over the possibility of “mystical experience” as passive and immediate, 
is itself a discourse that inescapably displays the underpinnings of its autonomous, modern subject. 
Which, in the tradition of the Enlightenment, is certainly discontinuous with pre-modern thought. 
Rather, so as to gauge, in fundamental theological terms, the contextual plausibility of retrieving 
Ruusbroec in terms of continuity, one must contend explicitly with Ruusbroec’s distinct theological 
anthropology and the primacy it holds towards relationality as a constructive/critical interlocutor 
amid current efforts in rethinking human relationality. 
 
 In what follows, these perspectives are in part strengthened by the French phenomenologist 
and philosopher of religion, Jean-Luc Marion, who in search for a more robust and radically pure 
sense of thinking the radical alterity of God, maintains that phenomenologically, 
"Transcendence―the concept will not take us very far, nor truly 'beyond'."2 In phenomenological 
terms, transcendence is defined as that which surpasses intentional consciousness, yet is regarded as 
never apart from such consciousness. Hence, it inexorably remains dependent upon human 
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consciousness and is thus enclosed within an immanent frame. Instead, in calling upon the aid of the 
docta ignorantia, Nicolas Cusanus in his article, “The Impossible for Man—God”, Marion suggests 
that we consider the proper region for the possibility of God's transcendence as beginning precisely 
wherein we as humans encounter barriers that cannot be transgressed—that which remains 
inescapably impossible for us. Without condition and measureless, the infinity of God's 
transcendence is precisely upheld in terms of radical possibility, the “impossibility of impossibility, 
and therefore his possibility.”3 As a kataphatic statement unflinchingly maintaining God’s 
incomprehensibility, this affirmation of God thereby entails the impossibility of God's 
phenomenalization. An impossibility, which “has meaning only for us, who alone are capable of 
experiencing the impossible.”4 Radical possibility thus endures for God, while for us as creatures, God 
remains the impossible phenomenon, since God, as God, cannot be intuited in space and time, nor 
conceived as such. 
 
 And yet, while Marion clearly restores a more rigorous and radically pure approach to 
transcendence, from a (mystical) theological stance, his account is constructive, yet insufficient on its 
own. For it is not only how we are to conceptually affirm the transcendence and greater dissimilarity 
of God as radically other. Instead, the mystical theological tradition of Ruusbroec precisely inquires, 
in an equally robust, immanently participative frame, how are we to receive and respond to, 
doxologically praise and ultimately love such a radically other God within history and its concrete 
particularity, amid our relations to God and others. In short, it is precisely a question of the enduring 
role of the economy of salvation in its mutuality to the asymmetrical priority of doxological 
givenness. For what is impossible for man, which, in theological terms is uniquely and most perfectly 
expressed in the Incarnation―'wherein God, remaining God, became man'―can at the same time be 
said to be likewise impossible without man. That is, in the Incarnation's prolongation of the "whole 
Christ"5 [Christus totus] in its ecclesial and personally deified ends: 'so that we might become God'. 
And this, a more robust and dynamic immanence, is continuously supported by Ruusbroec's mystical 
anthropology of mutual indwelling, which likewise underlays the very dynamism of minne itself.  
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   u   3 R      va       y    A  u   a     T  p y h-C      Pa    (1432) 
 
 In terms of receiving and responding to God, with whom “nothing will be impossible” the 
Incarnational, Marian narrative of the Annunciation remains paradigmatic.6 This is seen both in terms 
of illustrating the dynamism of Ruusbroec’s thought, as well as the radical divergence and “difficulty” 
that Marion himself rightly acknowledges that this narrative poses in terms of his highly apophatic, 
asymmetrical thought. Namely, for Marion, Mary’s fiat―'Be it  done to me according to Thy 
word'7―is viewed not so much as an exemplary act of faith itself— fides qua creditur; an act that 
likewise unveils creation’s “native attunement” and dynamic openness towards God, as seen in 
Mary's exemplary response. Instead, Marion will avoid all forms of nature’s dynamic openness to 
participating in God’s grace and instead, as the unseen and unanticipated “event of… advent “, 
asymmetrically and unilaterly opens onto the fides quae. Namely, “In what therefore does she really 
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have faith?”8 To which Marion replies: in God’s unwavering fidelity itself. “The point is not to 
acknowledge simple omniopotence”.9 That is, the efficiency and act of God’s power and might, which 
Marion himself is explicitly trying to avoid by elevating the primacy of possibility over that of 
actuality.10 Later one, we will explore in greater length the basis for such views.Yet for now, Marion 
reads Mary’s assent as one of “hav[ing] faith in God’s good faith.”11 This echoes the well-rehearsed 
neo-scholastic argument, whereby such assent is in God and His Revelation “who can neither deceive 
nor be deceived.” Thus, by way of Mary’s consent to God’s fidelity, in Marion's reflection, the 
carrying out of the [im-]possible (i.e. virginal birth ) “open[s] up a proper possible for God alone—the 
Incarnation”.12  
 
 The contrasts are immediately evident for the Brabantine contemplative, whereby in first 
reflecting upon Gabriel and his greeting—affirming Mary as “full of grace”—Ruusbroec characterizes 
the utter sapiential dimension of Mary’s response as an exercise in humility, such that "God lifted her 
up in the highest, then she put herself lowest".13 Ruusbroec's provocative, "ecclesiotypical" sense of 
creaturely mutuality likewise unfolds in his explicit, "Christotypical" Mariology of co-redemptrix, 
"mediatrix" and "advocate"14—poignantly reflected in his explanation of Mary's fiat as having 
"pleased the love of God [bequam der minnen gods] so well that it sent Christ into Mary's chamber, 
who redeemed us of all affliction. Behold thus we are taught by Mary and by the angel, how we have 
received the Son of God in our nature."15 
 
 Hence, this is to say that in terms in Marion's 'impossible' and the inseparable possibility that 
emerges from this impossibility―namely, human redemption from affliction in Christ as a further 
partaking in both His nature and thus, our own―well demonstrates, in a contemporary contextual 
setting, the dynamism of Ruusbroec's mystical anthropology. That is to say, an anthropology, which 
in turn underlies his equally dynamic understanding of minne. Utilizing Marion’s language of 
'impossible-possible', minne's dynamic unity is here affirmed in two primary modes: (1) 
asymmetrical, gratuitous love in all its graciousness and radical alterity, (2) yet mutually reciprocal, 
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demanding and often characterized by an unlimited, voracious desire. Or, as in the Annunciation, 
while safeguarding the gratuitousness of the Son's Incarnation, the humility of Mary’s fiat is recalled 
by Ruusbroec as having mutually pleased [bequam] God’s minne in such a manner that it freely 
compelled God's gracious and redemptive act, “sen[ding] Christ into Mary’s chamber”. Herein, one 
can say that for Ruusbroec, a lot hinges on such pleasure in both bearing witness and attesting its full 
adequacy—theological, as well as phenomenological—in conveying this profound, yet subtle balance 
between its gifted character, as asymmetrically gratuitous, while equally noting pleasure's mutual 
reciprocity of purified eros and the endless, desirous abandon of her fiat. 
 
 Considering such pleasure, this introduces us to a third mode of minne, namely Ruusbroec’s 
reflections upon loving contemplation as a modeless, abysmal enjoyment—or the “touch of the Holy 
Spirit” [gherinenne des heilichs gheests].16 Similar to the profound approach to "pleasure" as none 
other than upholding the delicate balance between the asymmetrical gratuitousness of God's grace, 
with that of the mutual reciprocity of the creature's unyeilding desire, Ruusbroec will often appeal to 
the more technical language of "modelessness" [wiseloos] as demonstrative of this tension. Herein, 
Ruusbroec states, “mode[s] cannot attain to modelessness” for they are “two things that never shall 
be one, for they must remain distinct from each other”. Yet in a highly dynamic way, much like his 
Mariology, Ruusbroec equally clarifies that “The one [i.e. ‘modes’] may not drive away the other 
[‘modelessness’]”17, a critical point that underscores the following reflection. 
 
 
 §2. SUSPENDING THE ECONOMY 
 
 
Thus, it is only fair to admit that even among Christians that breaking up or dislocation of 
wisdom [...] is increasingly taking place [....] It is true that there always remains to very pure 
and lofty souls the resource of disregarding all of this, of escaping upwards as it were into 
the hope of obtaining to mystical union. This indeed is the supreme gift, the supreme 
realisation; but in relation to wisdom it is a beyond. Besides, even here it is difficult not to 
feel a certain apprehension, for should not holiness and mysticism (which are not the same 
but have between them a most complex relationship) have a sort of human foundation of 
natural wisdom and morality? And where this foundation is threatning to collapse, is there 
not a danger of an element of error or at least of illusion finding its way into this most pure 
and lofty work?
18
 
 
 Christian Mysticism, like much of religious faith within modernity in the West, has suffered 
from many divisions. In the above quote from the mid-20th Century French Existentialist philosopher 
Gabriel Marcel, we here see a variety of divisions mentioned, a result of which Marcel broadly 
characterizes as the "breaking up or dislocation of wisdom". Among these divisions, we see 
asceticism and mysticism (when mentioning the complex relationship between 'holiness and 
mysticism'), as well as the absence of a view of mysticism that accords with a philosophical 
foundation of "human" or "natural wisdom and morality". Let us recall that Marcel is a philosopher 
and not surprinsingly, within a 20th Century Western European (and especially French) philosophical 
context, when reflections veer towards that which is broadly termed as "mystical", such veerings had 
often occured far more frequently in literary and philosophical contexts than they had in theological 
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ones. To us today, this may seem in part odd and fairly curious, yet in more ways than one, it simply 
highlights another division implicit within Marcel's text: the division between mysticism and 
theology. Or conversely, the near total absence in contemporary reflection of what has traditionally 
been termed as mystical theology.19 And yet, how can we account for this seemingly massive lacuna 
within theology proper, while at the same time well-note the sustained reemergence of interest in 
mysticism within various ecclesial, academic and societal contexts today? While certainly, we can in 
part attribute such a reemergence to the very obliquness and frequent imprecision of what it is that 
we are commonly refering to when speaking of "mysticism" or "spirituality".20  Nevertheless,  I think 
that Marcel has a very acute sense of our contemporary situation in noting (albeit, a half-century 
earlier) the dissolution and "dislocation" of wisdom that is operable today, "even among Christians", 
as fundamentally linked with a somewhat spurious and illusory presentation of mysticism. 
"Mysticism",21 is here understood as too easily transcending (i.e. disembodied) as well as too 
privatized and individualistic. Herein, such 'mysticism' easily mistakes the unspeakable for the 
idiosyncratic; or the "desire for alterity", as none other than the plastic, thinly abstract and tirelessly 
banal consumer capitalist narratives of identity and desire; or futhermore, a banal escapism that is 
divorced from the creaturely, the publicly accountable, the immanent. That is, in fundamental and 
theo-anthropological terms, when mysticism―much like grace―no longer accords its asymmetrical 
gratuitousness with an equal and inseparable sense of  created mutuality, of what is fundamentally 
                                                          
19
 In support of this general historical and theological assessment, See generally Mark McIntosh, Mystical 
Theology: The Integrity of Spirituality and Theology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998). See also the International 
Theological Commission, Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles and Criteria (2011), nr. 86-99. ITC, Theology 
Today: Perspectives, Principles, and Criteria (March 8, 2012), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_doc_ 
20111129_teologia-oggi_en.html. as accessed on 04.11.13. Here, the International Theological Commission's 
most recent text aims to correct legitimate theological pluralism from illegitimate specialization―no longer 
able to be mutually enriched and sufficiently conversant with other distinct theological areas―by way of a 
renewed stress upon the dogmatic, Trinitarian and Christological foundations of 'unity in theology'. In this 
sense, the ITC saw fit to include discussion upon mysticism and theology's sapiential character. And while 
adequate discussion was made in affirming the necessity of combining, for example, kataphatic and apophatic 
manners of speaking of God (see nr. 97), as a fruit of the mystical theological tradition, nonetheless, in the 
remaining sections of this document, mysticism retains a certain spurious stereotype, suspect of its theological 
credentials, as nothing other than a personal and decidely private form of piety that must remain distinct and 
not to be confused with ‘public’ forms of theological reflection (See esp. nr. 92) 
20
 In particular, I am thinking of Cardinal Newman’s offhanded remark that mysticism “begins in mist and ends 
in schism”. 
21
 While I will maintain that this spurious form of mysticism is distinctly pronounced within modernity, there 
are nonetheless very evident, historical precedents that have gradually led to this common understanding. In a 
fascinating historical citation that announces the increasing divisons between speculative theology and 
mystical theology, See St. Francis De Sales’ masterful Traité sur l'amour de Dieu, trans. V. Kerns (London: Burns 
& Oates, 1962) 217-220, 218-9 wherein the “Gentleman” doctor of the Church identifies Mystical Theology as 
“another name for prayer” as he writes: “But what do we talk about in prayer? What is our topic of 
conversation? God, Theotimus; nothing else. After all, what does a lover talk about but his beloved? Prayer and 
mystical theology, therefore, are identical. Prayer is called theology, because it deals with God as speculative 
theology does; only there are three differences […] First of all, speculative theology deals with God as the 
supreme being—the divinity of the supreme goodness; mystical theology deals with Him as supremely 
loveable—the supreme goodness of the divinity. Secondly, speculative theology is concerned with God and 
man, mystical theology with God alone. Thirdly, speculative theology leads to knowledge of God—turning its 
pupils into learned scholars and theologians; mystical theology leads to love of God—turning out intensely 
affectionate lovers [….] Prayer is called mystical, because of the hidden nature of the conversation: God and 
the individual speak heart to heart, and what passes between them can be shared with no one else. So 
personal is lovers’ talk, it has no meaning outside the two who engage in it.” 
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human and "natural", it then either becomes somewhat violent in its fideistic, two-tiered 
"extrincism". Or, because it fashions itself as rarefied and extraordinary, it fails to possess any 
intrinsic linkage to either our common sense of humanity nor any theological account of Revelation. 
Thus, by way of its sheer marginalization, it alone accounts for its current "dislocation" within 
theological reflection. Which is a bit of a roundabout way to say that such a supurious "mysticism" 
understood as such, is indeed (and correctly so) seen not to be properly theological. 
 
 However, such a critique is still a bit too easy. Instead, in a more nuanced and theologically 
profound manner, a way in which to account for mysticism's own dislocation from modern 
theological reflection is to consider another division that has plauged modern theology, what the late 
Dutch Jesuit theologian Frans Jozef van Beeck  argues: 
 
The Reformation's decision to replace doxology with soteriology―the doctrine of 
humanity's sin and its salvation by divine grace―as the focus of the Christian faith, at the 
expense of (a) humanity's consciousness of its radical participation in the infrahuman 
universe and its silent doxology, and (b) the Great Tradition's stress on the imago Dei as the 
heart of humanity's abiding vocation to mediate between God and the cosmos […]
22
 
 
For van Beeck, the loss of such a doxological vocation summarizes, what has contributed to another 
equally important loss or dislocation within Christian theology, namely the near total absence of 
theological exemplarism, seen instead at interminable odds with the modern consciousness of 
humanity as innately historical: "[T]he resulting loss of the deeply traditional Jewish and Christian 
understanding of creation as eternally and ideally pre-existent with God (specifically in the Torah, in 
God's Wisdom or the divine Logos) and thus, as inalienably loved by God"23 
 
 While the description here is inescapably broad and general in presenting the modern 
theologial separation of doxology and soteriology, as well as the similar forgetfulness of the 
Tradition's earlier regard for theological exemplarism, what I would like to stress at present is that 
one cannot simply retrieve the purity of these ideas24 over and against their historical discontinuity 
from ongoing theological reflection. To do so, would be to once more, albeit unwittingly, imitate a 
more supurious form of "mysticism", by attempting to reinsert such intrinsic and "inalienable" ideas 
by way of imposition that is totally alien, disembodied, non-historical, extraordinary and utterly 
extrincist. Rather, for the possibility of such a retrieval itself to be both meaningful and 
fundamental―one which recognizes both the inalienability of such perspectives in their enduring 
relevance, as well as various intellectual and historical discontunities that make a simple return both 
impossible and crudely ideological. Such retrievals, instead, must be incarnated, which in Marcel's 
own very profound reading of the times, he argues: 
 
[B]y what is only seemingly a paradox, the practical and the metaphysical problems merge 
into one. I mean that it will not be enough to exhume this or that general principle once 
elucidated by a secular thinker or a doctor of the Church; such a principle will be valuable 
towards reconstruction only if it becomes incarnate, and this kind of incarnation [... ] can 
                                                          
22
 See Frans Jozef van Beeck S.J., “Trinitarian Theology as Participation”, Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall S.J., 
Gerald O’Collins S.J. (eds.) The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity (Oxford: University Press, 
1999), 295-325, 321. 
23
 Frans Jozef van Beeck S.J., “Trinitarian Theology as Participation”, 323. 
24 See supra our discussion of Fénelon in this regard, "Chapter 6 Abiding in Minne's Demands. Part II—Pure Gift 
and Pur Amour François Fénelon and the Rethinking of Love's Demands Beside the Gratuitous Gift" 
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only take place at the humblest and most intimate level of human life: the level at which a 
few men of good will meet to work at a common task.
25
 
 
 
 Common, or in Jan van Ruusbroec's middle-Dutch terminology, “ghemenye”, can equally be 
said to be in many ways (though not exclusively) synonomous with what Marcel is refering to with 
wisdom and its contemporary dislocation and disolution.26 Equally so, with regards to van Beeck and 
his reflections upon modern divisions within religious and theological reflection, as the prospects of 
retrieving Ruusbroec, by maintaining that which is "common" offers in principle a profoundly 
stimulating retrieval in constructively reengaging with these distinctly modern, conceptual divides. 
  
 The wealth of the Brabantine contemplative's perspective and its contemporary relevance 
was earlier recalled by David Tracy, who in contrasting the German Dominican Meister Eckhart's 
radically detached apophaticism of a "Godhead beyond God", instead finds himself, "in Christian 
theological terms, more with Jan Ruysbroek than with Meister Eckhart."27 The eminent retrievability 
of the Christian mystical tradition, especially "and above all, Ruysboreck"28, is mainly due to what 
Tracy rightfully gauges in Ruusbroec as critically aiding us today in relocating the reconstruction of 
such modern divides and "dislocations", by way of direct appeal to the synthesis of Ruusbroec's 
mystical theology and his "direction for understanding the Christian God in terms of both spirituality 
and theology."29 Such a location, a where, is none other than the unending dynamism of a 
relationality, which for Ruusbroec, is best described by the "common life" [ghemenye leven]. Which  
again, Tracy states: 
 
[C]ontemporary Christian theologians are attempting, now in contemporary terms, to 
relearn [....] the need for a fully mystico-prophetic contemporary Christian theology where 
the mystically transformed self, reflecting on the profound implications of the one God as 
essentially Triune, returns to the world free for life in all its earthiness and all its search for 
justice and love.
30
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Gabriel Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, 55-56. 
26
 If anything, such a dislocation is analogously relayed in the historical evolution of the term of “ghemenye” 
itself, aptly denoting in modern Dutch, "gemeen" is something which is "nasty", "mean" [boosaardig] 
“wretched” or "malicious" [laag, verachtelijk]. Evidently, while such connotations are far from Ruusbroec’s 
understanding, a certain semantic continuity is nevertheless present is so far as reinforcing that that which is 
“common” is by no means “luxurious” nor “privileged”. If anything, by way of semantic and linguistic evolution, 
perhaps modern Dutch is indicating precisely wherein to reclaim such an understanding, in and amid a 
sensitivity for the marginalized and a more profound degree of “commonality” that underlines pleas for 
solidarity. 
27
 See David Tracy, Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1990), 91. 
28
 Tracy, Dialogue with the Other, 103. 
29
 Tracy, Dialogue with the Other, 91 (my emphasis). 
30
 Tracy, Dialogue with the Other, 82-83. See also Mysticism and Social Responsibility in Frans Jozef van Beeck, 
God Encountered: A Contemporary Catholic Systematic Theology, Volume 2/4B. The Revelation of the Glory. 
Part IVB. The     a   y  f D p av  y. M  a  L v       G  ’  P        (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 
2001) §148, 4, 87-8. By engaging Ruusbroec’s thinking of “common life” [ghemeyne leven], van Beeck asserts 
that “In Ruusbroec’s mind, the theonomous life is nothing if not socially engaged, even if the particular shape 
which this social dimension will take is as unpredictable as the gift of the explicitly theonomous life itself.” 
Here, van Beeck is recalling Ruusbroec’s dynamic thinking of union with God, ghemeyne leven and particularity, 
such that by living a more common life of deeping in union with God and others, one becomes more distinct 
and particular. 
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Here, the dynamic synthesis of Ruusbroec’s minne as ghemeyne leven—one in which sees minne’s 
asymmetrical gratuitousness equally entailing the mutually insatiable, erotic demands, or the 
reciprocity of economy—is inseparable from its view of God’s grace and our liturgio-doxologic praise. 
This dynamism is strongly contrasted by Marion’s distinct approach to a univocal understanding of 
love.31 In its avoidance of an economy and exchange, while preferring the asymmetry of of the 
saturated phenomenon absent of any and all demand, Marion’s phenomenological approach to love 
has been variously criticized as joyless or a love-less and “chauvinistic” understanding of love itself.32 
Staying clear of the cultural wars and predictable feminist critique, I have stated the position that the 
absence of reciprocity and possessiveness in Marion’s reflections upon love is due in considerable 
part to the continuing legacy of Fran ois F nelon’s pur amour and the replication of many of its 
foundational tenets within contemporary, postmodern approaches in thinking the pure gift. This 
absence of economy, reception, return and reciprocity—as fundamentally lacking in Marion’s erotic 
phenonomenon—can well explain its linkage with his phenomenology of the gift and more 
profoundly, the  frequent charge as lacking a sufficient ethical dimension.33 Here, we can attribute 
this precisely due to his very asymmetrical thinking of the gift, secured by way of the possibility of a 
pure gift, which, as totally gratuitous, foregoes any degree of economy and reciprocity, demand or 
exchange. In short, the saturated phenomenon of the gift is utterly doxological, performative—as 
well as possesses characteristics that are in short, spuriously “mystical”. While at the same time, 
Marion argues for the possibility of a pure, asymmetrical gift and its givenness, precisely by way of a 
radical negativity in our ability to receive and respond to the gift as such. Rather, it is and thus 
remains, an “impossible gift”, purely gratuitous and free from any and all demands, return, or mutual 
exchange. It is, in short, despite Marion’s frequent reference to Dionysius Aeropagite and the Greek 
Patristics34, a very modern suspension of the economy (following van Beeck’s characterization) 
between doxology and soteriology—that is, between givenness and return, between exitus and 
reditus.35 Despite this divided perspective and my sustained critique, Marion’s contributions are 
nonetheless quite valuable, especially in returning us to a very robust sense of transcendence and its 
view of 'experience', as seen in terms of the “impossible possible”. 
 
 
                                                          
31
 See Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, (trans.) Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), 215-222, 217: “Love is said and is given in only one, strictly univocal way. As soon as one 
multiplies it into subtle and differentiated acceptations, to the point of equivocality, one ceases to analyze it 
better: one disolves it and misses it entirely….A correct thinking of love is marked by its capacity to sustain for 
as far as it is possible the essential univocality of its one way.” 
32
 See Jonna Bornemark, “ The Erotic as Limit-Experience:  A Sexual Fantasy” in Phenomenology of Eros, (eds.) 
Jonna Bornemark & Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback, SÖDERTÖRN PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 10 (Södertörn: 
Södertörn University, 2012),  247-266. 
33
 See Brian Robinette,“A Gift To Theology? Jean-Luc Marion’s ‘Saturated Phenomenon’ in Christological 
Perspective’ Heythrop Journal XLVIII (2007), 86-108. 
34
 See Tamsin Jones, A G   a   y  f Ma    ’  Ph     phy  f R         Appa     Da k     (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2011). 
35
 See Robinette’s apt reference to Gustavo Guti rrez in this regard: “Mystical language expresses the 
gratutiousness of God’s love; prophetic language expresses the demands this love makes. The followers of 
Jesus and the community they form—the church—live in the space created by this gratutiousness and these 
demands. Both languages are necessary and therefore inseparable; they also feed and correct each other.” On 
Job: God-talk and the Suffering of the Innocent, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), 
95, as quotted from Robinette ,“A Gift To Theology? Jean-Luc Marion’s ‘Saturated Phenomenon’ in 
Christological Perspective’, note 68. 
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 A. LOVING KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
 Amid this discussion of Marion and the question of God's [im]possibility, my overall critique 
of the phenomenalization of God and its purported value surrounding the "possibility of mystical 
experience" as both "passive" and "immediate"—over and beyond the theological critique of its 
historical discontinuity—receives a strong philosophical support from Marion, which I will soon 
explore more explicitly. But first, to be clear, in no way am I arguing against the richly prevalent, 
'experientially' felt dimensions generously attested to within mystical theological texts, and in 
particular, those of Ruusbroec. "Feeling" [ghevoelen]36 is unambiguously a multi-faceted, central 
mode of reflection for Ruusbroec upon the mystery of God's grace.37 And yet, Ruusbroec's ghevoelen, 
stemming from the primacy of our relationality to and natural desire for God and His grace, is 
certainly contra various Modernist positions that upheld mystical experience in tandem with the 
"turn to the subject". These latter historical developments have contributed to theology's frequent 
understanding of 'mysticism' as extraneous to, and at times mutually suspicious towards the nature 
of revealed, Christian faith in the former's own emphasis upon the subjectivity of "religious" or 
"mystical experience" as somehow "adding to" the depositum fidei.  
 
 Rather, I would like to suggest that Ruusbroec's ghevoelen can well be seen in the vernacular 
mystical theological tradition as a variation of the "traditional Scholastic notion of connatural, or 
sympathetic knowledge".38 What, in modern theological terms, Pierre Rousselot termed as "loving 
knowledge" [la connaissance amoureuse]—as steming from Gregory the Great's own well-known 
admonition, amor ipse notitia  est [love itself is knowledge].39 For Rousselot, such loving knowledge 
constitutes the entirity of the creature's fundamentally dynamic relationship to God. A dynamic 
relationship, which a generation later would be historically ressourced by Henri de Lubac's famously 
controversial Surnaturel and his account of St. Thomas' desiderium naturale visionis beatificae. 
Herein, Rousselot writes that the "[I]ntelligence itself is the expression of a natural appetition [….] 
[as] every affective habit define[s] a vision of love [….] reason itself is nothing other than a pure love 
                                                          
36
 On this point, it is necessary to state that 'ghevoelen' is often misleadingly translated, though not always, as 
'experience' in some of the critical editions in the Opera Omnia series. 
37
 See Ruusbroec, Boecsken der verclaringhe, ll. 304-310,  323-328: "As long as man continues this exercise, 
then he is able to contemplate and to feel [ghevoelne] union without intermediary. And he feels the touch of 
God in him that is a renewal of his grace and all his virtues. For you must know that the grace of God flows 
down to the lower powers, and touches the heart of man, and from that comes heartfelt affection [liefde] and 
sensitive desire for God [….] And for this reason man must at times pass through this bodimy feeling to a 
spiritual feeling which is rational, and through the spiritual feeling pass to a divine feeling which is above 
reason, and through this divine feeling sink away from himself into a feeling of motionless beatitude." "Alsoe 
langhe alse de mensche in deser oefeninghen blivet, soe es hi hebbelec te scouwene ende eninghe te 
ghevoelne sonder middel. Ende hi ghevoelt dat gherinen gods in hem, dat ene vernuwinghe es sijnre gratien 
ende alle sijnre doghede. Want ghi selt weten dat die gratie gods dorvloeit tote in die nederste crachte ende 
gherijnt des menschen herte. Ende daer af comt heteleke liefde ende ghevoellec lost te gode [....] Ende hier 
omme moet de mensche overmids dit lijfleke ghevoelen biwilen doreliden in een geestelec ghevoelen, dat 
redelec es; ende overmids dat geesteleke gevoelen doreliden in een godlec ghevoelen, dat boven redene es; 
ende overmidts dat godleke ghevoelen hem selven ontsinken in een onbewechlec salech gevoelen." 
38
 Pierre Rousselot, The Eyes of Faith, trans. Jospeh Donceel, introduction John M. McDermott, (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1990) 16. 
39
 See generally, Pierre Rousselot, "Appendix 2. The Formal Identification of Love and Understanding in William 
of St. Thierry", in The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages: A Historical Contribution, trans. Alan Vincelette 
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2001), 223-234. 
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of Being."40 He then later on adds "Thus the rectitude of our intelligence, when it knows with 
certainty, comes entirely from the fact that God has inspired it with a natural inclination to the First 
Truth, that is, to Himself insofar as He is the End of all spiritual beings. Because of the inclination 
intellection is natural to us, and when truth dawns on us, we experience pleasure."41  
 
 For the Brabantine contemplative's views of minne as a "loving knowledge", as well as the 
enjoyment [ghebruken] of knowing that stems from its fundamental naturalness, such views are 
clearly and repeatedly seen in Ruusbroec. Noteworthy in this regard, in De vera contemplatione, 
Ruusbroec ends his treatment upon contemplation [scouwen] with a long presentation of minne as 
"perfect[ing] a genuinely contemplative life"42 whereby "all the faculties of the soul answer and say 
to one another: 'Let us love the fathomless love [grondelose minne] which has loved us eternally.'43 
In a similar vein, Ruusbroec in Vanden seven sloten further explains this dynamic orientation and 
persistent endurance between knowing and loving as equally and ontologically indicative of the 
inherent dissimilarity and relationality between Creator and creature in the following: 
 
 
Should knowledge and love [minnen] perish in 
God, so also would perish the eternal birth of the 
Son and the gushing forth of the Holy Spirit, as 
well as Trinity of Persons; and so there would be 
neither God nor any creature, and that is 
altogether impossible and an insane stupidity 
(even) to think (of it). For the loveliest and noblest 
thing that God made in heaven and on earth is the 
ordering and distinction [onderscheet] of all 
creatures [….] according to his hunger, thirst, and 
craving after God. It is according to this same that 
he may feel [gevoelen], savor, and enjoy [….] Just 
as the stars of heaven differ from one another in 
brightness, in loftiness of their positions, greatness 
of their size, and in their powerful workings on all 
creatures here below, so also there exists a 
distinction in all who love God: in clarity of 
understanding, in loftiness of life, in greatness of 
love, and in the power of the works flowing out 
(from them). 
Want verginge kinnen ende minnen in gode, soe 
verginghe oec die ewege geboert des soens ende uut 
vloete des heileghen geest; ende alsoe verginge 
driheit der persoene; ende alsoe en ware noch god 
noch creature: dat altemale onmogeleec es ende ene 
verwoedde sotheit te peinsene. Want dat scoenste 
ende dat edelste dat god gemaect heeft in hemel 
ende in erde, dat es ordenen ende ondersceet in 
allen creaturen [....] na dat hem hongert ende dorst 
‹ende› gods gelust, daer na mach hi gevoelen, 
smaken ende gebruken [....] Ende geliker wijs dat die 
sterren des hemels ondersceet hebben in 
claerheiden, in hoecheiden van state, ende in 
groetheiden van mate, ende in vermogenden werken 
in allen creaturen die hier beneden sijn, ende alsoe es 
oec een ondersceet in allen den ghenen die gode 
minnen: in claerheiden van verstane, in hoecheiden 
van levene, in groetheiden van minnen ende in 
crachte van uut vloeyenden werken.
44
 
 
 Nevertheless, despite the advances seen in various theological scholarship in thinking this 
dynamic relationship between love and knowledge, in a far more nuanced manner, the continuing, 
modern legacy of 'mystical experience' remains prevalent. Such views are evidenced in the otherwise 
superb historical theological scholarship of Rob Faesen. In his article, "What is a Mystical Experience? 
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 Rousselot, The Eyes of Faith, 52. 
41
 Rousselot, The Eyes of Faith, 54. 
42
 Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, 1, ll. 542-543:" [...] een ghewarich scouwende leven volmaect [...]". 
43
 Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, 1, ll. 560-562: "Ende alle die cracht‹e› der zielen, si antworden ende 
spreken onderlinge: 'Minnen wij die grondelose minne die ons eewelijcke ghemint hevert.'" 
44
 See Ruusbroec, Vanden seven sloten, ll. 700-720. 
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History and Interpretation"45, Faesen generally presents his views upon the unique, extraordinary 
nature of mystical experience, in the tradition of the Ruusbroecgenootschap, as both "passive" and 
"immediate". Herein, the primary difficulty that I have with this argument is two-fold. (1) The implicit 
argument presented is that by recognizing, and thereby valuing the 'experiential' dimension amounts 
to legitimizing them as "mystical" texts. Such an approach primarily renders these texts  as "mystical 
literature" moreso than "mystical theological" treatises.46 Herein Faesen argues that:  
 
 First, as I have already emphasized, we are talking here about an experience, which is, 
 obviously, different from, for example, a thought, a reasoning, a memory, a fantasy, an 
 observation [….] On this point, the texts describing a mystical experience are very 
 different from other texts which, for example, present the exposition of a religious 
 doctrine. Explaining a doctrine is something other than describing an experience.
47
  
 
As a generous reader (who is by no means neutral, nor impartial), such a description of course does 
not exclude doctrinal, theological reflection. Nevertheless, the point emphasized is that while texts 
such as Ruusbroec's are by no means lacking in theological content, they are in fact largely absent of 
speculative and doctrinal reflection that was unquestionably more pronounced at the various 
Cathedral schools at this time. In this perspective, I would argues that the synthesis of love and 
knowledge in a figure such as Ruusbroec remains unheeded, preferring instead to appeal to the 
experiential dimensions of such mystical texts that can account for its distinct character.  
 
 Consequent to this approach to mystical theological texts seen more along the lines of 
'mystical literature' (2) is the view that as 'immediate' and 'passive', "mystical experience can be 
specified by the 'object' of the experience".48 For Faesen and his primary scholarship upon late-
medieval mystical texts in the Low Countries, this 'object' is of course the Trinitarian God, as 
reflected upon in the Christian mystical tradition. However, the (unintentional) removal of mystical 
theological texts from their broader theological moorings excludes more speculative and internal 
constructive/critical theological input. Which, in view of the unity of theology—as derived from the 
person of Christ and the hypostatic union, fully divine, fully human—would rightly call into question 
any and all appeals of passive, immediate experience without first necessarily welcoming a variety of 
philosophical and theological perspectives (dogmatic, fundamental,  historical, ethical, pastoral, 
ecclesiological, liturgio-sacramental, etc.) in better accessing the total repercussions of such a claim. 
Undoubtedly, the longstanding historical "divorce"—intensified by nominalism, and sealed by 17th 
Century Quietism—between theology and spirituality cannot be underestimated, as Faesen's 
esteemed mentor, the late Belgian Jesuit Albert Deblaere declared.49 By heeding the irrefutable 
historicity of such a divorce, I would once again argue that it is precisely in the theological retrieval of 
figures such as Ruusbroec, which not only assists contemporary theology reconstruct such modern 
divides. Yet furthermore, such a reconstruction must come from within a renewed appreciation and 
recognition of mystical theology, as properly theological. In which case, I would suggest, amongst 
                                                          
45
 See Rob Faesen, S.J. "What is a Mystical Experience? History and Interpretation", Louvain Studies 23 (1998) 
221-245, esp. 225. 
46
 See "Introduction" for my appeal in treating mystical texts precisely in terms of "mystical theology". 
47
 Faesen, "What is a Mystical Experience", 225. 
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 ibid. 
49
 See Rob Faesen, S.J. "Albert Deblaere on the Divorce of Theology and Spirituality", Faesen R. (ed.), Albert 
Deblaere, S.J. (1916-1994) . Essays on Mystical Literature, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum 
Lovaniensium, 177, (Leuven: Peeters, 2004) 407-425. 
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other things, entails a more sustained reflection upon the synthesis of love and knowledge in 
Ruusbroec's mystical theology and its broader implications. As David Tracy notes, heeding such a 
synthesis can indeed assist our contemporary "direction for understanding the Christian God in terms 
of both spirituality and theology."50 
 
 Turning once again to Marion and his views upon the [im]possibility of God and His 
phenomenalization, it is not so much the particularity of religious identity that is called into question, 
yet the necessary delimitation of the knowable 'object' as stemming from none other than the a 
priori conditions of experience itself that are rigourously challenged. 
 
 
 §3. MARION AND THE [IM]POSSIBLE 
 
 A. THE [IM]POSSIBLE QUESTION OF GOD 
 
 Jean-Luc Marion's essay, "The Impossible for Man—God" can well be seen as a mature work 
by the French radical phenomenologist, revisiting themes in his earlier works (such as God Without 
Being as well as Being Given), while 'impossibly' crossing the Rubicon once more (pace Falque), by 
returning to a more explicit, theologically informed reflections. Most notable in this regard are 
publications such as his Erotic Phenomenon (2003/ ET 2008) and In the Self's Place: The Approach of 
Saint Augustine (2008/ ET 2012).51 No longer is Marion insisting upon the neutral status of his 
phenomenological reflections in relation to the purely philosophical possibility of Revelation. Rather, 
after years of continued defensiveness, Marion's rhetorical position has evolved alongside his 
philosophical position, with a more forceful response towards transcendence in terms of the 
impossibility of God. To avoid any unnecessary confusion, Marion asserts that "[B]y recognizing God's 
privilege—God, and God alone, lets himself be defined by impossibility as such."52 Herein, Marion 
claims that in spite of such "impossibility", we cannot deny the paradox that both culturally, as well 
as in the history of philosophy, "The question of God has the characteristic feature of always making 
a comeback, of being incessantly reborn from all attempts to put it to death, in theory as well as in 
fact."53 
 
 Rather, Marion argues that taking seriously the "impossibility of God has meaning only for 
us".54 Here, Marion takes the position that the "impossible" is a concept that is (in this case, unlike 
the univocity of love) not univocal. Rather, the impossible is only possible for us within an immanent 
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horizon, whereby we experience the radical possibility of the "impossible". As an example, Marion 
cites this possibility of the impossible in the natural events of our birth and death in its concrete 
facticity. "Birth, or rather my birth" Marion will argue, "precedes any thought of my own [….]  [as well 
as] all possibility as defined by concept and representation."55 That is to say, the event of one's 
birth—the radical possibility of the impossible—is fundamentally prior to any and all interpretation 
or conceptualization that we may provide. Rather, it is a factual, ordinary phenomenon that is 
thoroughly "saturated". Relating this experience of the impossible back then to the question of God, 
Marion's position mitigates against any and all psychological and/or sociological reductionist views of 
our "need" for God. Such reducionistic views, Marion persuasively argues, can not explain how the 
"question of God survives the impossibility of God"56. Rather, such impossibility gives a positive 
determination to God re the question of God itself. A question, that in part asks, "how the thought of 
the impossible remains, in the end, possible."57 
 
 Critically, while Marion's thinking on [im]possibility counters more reductionistic views, it 
similarly initiates (unforeseen?) problems that were earlier discussed in terms of his strongly 
asymmetrical approach to creation and Incarnation. More specifically, as evidenced by the event of 
my birth as the experience of the radical possibility of the impossible, Marion will likewise apply this 
position of radical possibility to creation itself. For creation itself, starting from the factual and the 
concrete, "always and only with my birth", is understood as arising out of the [im]possible event 
wherein "we receive ourselves".58 Such a factual, common experience thus gives "access" to 
constructively and conceptually reflect upon the question of God and its intimate relation to us, as 
created. And yet, precisely due to this access, as emerging from a view of radical [im]possibility, such 
a heteronymous account of the creature in no way shows any form of intrinsic, "native attunement" 
towards, nor any sense of desiderium naturale for God Himself. For such a latter view would recast 
the creaturely within a certain intrinsic, dynamic tension of heteronomy and autonomy. A 
counterweight,59 for which Marion's project—in securing the radical possibility of pure 
transcendence—simply cannot balance by way of creaturely response. Instead, the elevation of 
unlimited radical possibility, as over against actuality, in theological terms prohibits a view of created 
nature as prefigured by grace, as well as its graceful reception of the Incarnation. Rather, by way of 
the [im]possibility of my birth, Marion is here (unintentionally?) radically discarding a view of 
creation's potentia obedientialis—an integral historical, philosophical/theological thesis that was 
hard won by Rouselot, Blondel, as well as De Lubac and others in the following generation of 
ressourcement theology—and  instead, by way of seeking a radically pure transcendence, is equally 
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initiating a philosophical return of a radical extrincism60 operative under terms such as the "event of 
creation" and its "impossibility".  
 
 Constructively, however, Marion's thinking upon the [im]possible does indeed evidence a 
development of his overall thinking of givenness and the "saturated phenomenon". In an 
introduction to the 2003 collection of essays, Mystics: Presence and Aporia61 Marion deliberately and 
fittingly signals (given the nature of the publication upon "mystics") this forthcoming development by 
first pleading that "we must never despair of reason".62 Rather, "we must have faith in reason to 
make thinkable what, without the patient labor of the concept, would have remained unthinkable."63 
Marion's confidence in the possibility of reason should always be viewed in tandem with his well-
known "saturated phenomena". That is, the very possibility of reason largely attests to the belief that 
various phenomena, precisely due to their excess of given intuition—rendering asunder the 
adequacy of our available concepts—are not themselves "irrational". Yet any form of philosophical 
realist optimism is undercut with a mea culpa uttered in view of Port Royal, such that "we are unable 
to be rational enough to produce concepts matching the intuition that is nevertheless given."64 Our 
persistent failure to be reasonable enough, Marion later on clarifies in "The Impossible for Man—
God", is largely due to our turning away from the question of the [im]possibility of God by way of an 
anthropological reduction, "seek[ing] an answer outside of the question itself."65 That is, we 
idolatrously and reductively seek an answer in ourselves, and not in God and His primacy. Which 
paradoxically (as we shall soon see), it is precisely by not turning towards God and His primacy—by 
way of a radical phenomenology in its privileging of the donative and the [im]possible, over against 
the certain and the actual—that Marion will argue results in creating "idols of myself". 
 
 Such a paradox generally shows the contours of a natural, created relationality between 
Creator and creature, albeit more so in terms of an a posteriori than the creature's intrinsic 
orientation, or "natural desire" as earlier discussed. However the extent of the saturated 
phenomenon (in explicit theological terms) shows, in the adventious event, an overwhelming 
absorption of nature by the donative givenness of grace, leaving only a "negative certitude" more so 
than a presupposition and perfecting of nature [gratia non destruit, sed supponit et perficit naturam]. 
This in turn characterizes Marion's thinking of [im]possibility and its lack of univocity, entailing that 
the "impossible delineates only a region of finitude—namely ours—and indicates this region alone."66 
While for God and amid the unbridgeable distance of His radical dissimilarity, not only does the 
impossible hold no "sway over God"67. However, shorn of a sacramental worldview naturally oriented 
towards facilitating the asymmetry of grace alongside the redemptive economy between God and 
creation, for Marion, "God begins where the possible for us ends, where what human reason 
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comprehends as possible for it comes to a halt".68 And yet, given his earlier admonition that 
saturated phenomena are themselves not 'irrational' entails that the [im]possibility of God does not 
annul the very possibility of the question of God. Rather, the [im]possible functions as the very 
"threshold, beyond which the question posed can actually be about God—transcending, by the same 
token, what does not concern him in the least."69 That is, Marion argues that the radical 
[im]possibility of God correspondingly entails a blithe indifference to "impossibility" itself. However, 
such indifference is not translated into a nominalist form of Enlightenment Deism, as it is in the 
question of God itself and its erotic, unyielding resolve—"always making a comeback"—wherein 
genuine contact between transcendent and immanent orders converge, "in theory as well as in fact". 
 
 
 B. THE [IM]POSSIBLE PHENOMENON OF GOD 
 
 As earlier argued, for Marion the "impossible" is by no means a univocal concept. That is 
why, by way of shorthand, I refer to this concept as bracketed—the [im]possible—as succinctly 
denoting the heteronymous dissimilarity of God; the [im]possibility of God for us. Which in turn, as a 
form of radical negative certitude that announces the complete caesura between God and creature, 
the [im]possible possesses an equally radical denomination for God: the 'impossibility of 
impossibility'. This is another way of affirming the radical possibility of God, entailing that the 
possibility of God remains radically indifferent to impossibility as such. Albeit radically apophatic, the 
two orders of transcendence and immanence nonetheless do converge—"in theory as well as in 
fact". In "theory", such a convergence is precisely evidenced in the irrepressibly recurring question of 
God and the aporia of the impossible refusing to collapse in upon itself.  
 
 While in terms of "fact", similar to his thinking upon the concrete event of one's birth, 
Marion insists upon the primacy of phenomenological donation as none other than according the 
historical facticity of Revelation and the Incarnation as a concrete, historical reality. This position 
thereby grounds and sets in motion an 'infinite' hermeneutics as a necessary, though secondary 
discourse. Recognition of this view builds upon, while repositioning certain theological critiques of 
postmodernism's turn to religion as a reinstatement of Enlightenment natural theology, of a "religion 
without a religion". Which is to say, a religion of utter indeterminacy that is absent of particularity 
and historically-concrete truth claims. Rather, specifically in the case of Marion, recognition of the 
role of the primacy of the factual givenness of Revelation, to which his radical phenomenology seeks 
to open itself towards, is positioned to offer a more balanced theological assessment of particularity, 
rather than attributing such an assessment solely upon a reading of his radically apophatic thought. 
This is to say that for Marion, particularity is indeed concretely ensured, first and foremost, as 
something given, rather than something seen, produced or interpreted as such.70 
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 Returning to the initial starting point, how then can such a radically apophatic approach to 
God's pure transcendence as [im]possible nevertheless explain the question of God as continuously 
reemerging? Herein, we can see that an equally important innovation that Marion's saturated 
phenomenon provides for ( especially for mystical theology) is his stress upon the historical facticity 
of Revelation and the priority of its heteronomous giveness. In general, this position reinforces the 
view that such saturated phenomenon are neither private, nor are they necessarily rare, despite the 
dazzling brilliance of Revelation, which Marion himself has repeatedly argued is the ultimate case for 
the saturated phenomenon. Rather, Marion correctly maintains the view that such saturated 
phenomena "are not so rare", yet are indeed common.71 And as I have repeatedly argued in other 
contexts, such a "common" orientation, distinctly for mystical theology, is indeed a much needed 
corrective in better securing its validity and integrity as a theological sub-discipline. In contrast, that 
is, to founding its legitimacy over and against the supposed rarity of "infused" or immediate and 
passive mystical experiences, which I have argued, has led to the privatization and marginalization of 
this distinct branch of theological reflection and praxis. 
 
 This "common designation" is implicit in Marion consistently taking aim at the very 
presuppositions that ground a more radical hermeneutics. Marion phenomenologically (as well as 
theologically) maintains that we do not linguistically "constitute" these saturated phenomena that 
escape our rational conceptualization. The task of the givenness of an infinite Eucharistic 
hermeneutics remains only insofar as to ensure an interpretative "plurality". In the interest of 
doctrinal orthodoxy, particularity and historicity, such a position maintains that we are given and 
receive ourselves by way of such saturated phenomena. As given, we do not in any way possess 
conceptual mastery over the saturated phenomena, as evidenced by the plurality of such an 'infinite 
hermeneutics".  And while Marion's phenomenological position contra a more radical hermeneutics 
is well known, it is often overlooked that Marion himself will join this position to an adamant 
adherence to the utter givenness of Revelation by way of its historical facticity. Hence, the 
interpretative plurality of hermeneutics no more than demonstrates the continual "luminous 
darkness" of our failing concepts, thereby signaling somewhat of a 'purified transcendence' and 
singularly apophatic, universalizing tendency. The utter particularity of Revelation and the concrete 
of Incarnation are nonetheless secured by this equal stress upon historical facticity, as well as the 
very public nature of the saturated phenomenon, secured in terms of its common designation. 
  
 In turn, as I have argued in the brief excursus on "loving knowledge", there is a need for 
mystical theology, as a theological sub-discipline, to indeed establish greater legitimacy amongst 
various related discourses so as to better substantiate its distinct theological claims (most notably, as 
it pertains to deification) and modes of reflection. As Marion attests, the saturated phenomena are 
not themselves 'irrational'; it is rather we ourselves and the status of current philosophical discourse 
as not 'rational enough' to patiently produce concepts that adequately reflect what has nonetheless 
been given by these saturated phenomena—namely ourselves. In this regard, Ruusbroec similarly 
will speak of that which is "above reason, yet not without reason" [boven redene maer niet sonder 
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redene]72, which implicitly entails the necessity to engage in philosophical reflection in both 
upholding the enduring value of "mediation", as well as to properly substantiate what we mean 
when we discuss that which is given to understanding specifically in terms of "unknowing": that 
which "reason can neither comprehend nor understand".  
 
 Herein, we explicitly encounter Marion's critique of claims of mystical "experience", 
understood as the "immediate" and "passive" experience of God as objectivizing and idolizing what 
amounts to the radical alterity of God and His transcendence as [im]possibile. Here, Marion clarifies 
that the terms themselves—"possibility" and "impossibility"—first and foremost "refer to 
experience", namely to the a priori conditions of experience itself, what it permits  and excludes—
"therefore, to what may or may not appear and let itself be seen, the phenomenon."73 For Marion, 
he maintains that there is "no intuition at my disposal" of God and His phenomenalization that is 
"susceptible to be experienced within the parameters of space and time".74 Hence, in terms of the 
immediate and passive experience of God is nothing other than an [im]possible phenomenon. 
Marion clarifies that such a condition does not rest upon "any doctrinal preference nor on any 
arbitrary negativity"; rather, it emerges from the "simple possibility" of God and His impossibility for 
us.75 Here, the "most speculative theology agrees with the most unilateral atheism" Marion recalls, in 
that if the eternality and infinity of God is to be radically possible and not subject to finitude and its 
'impossibility', "then there can never be any intuition of God".76  
 
 In this regard, as an aid to understanding the thrust of Marion's phenomenological argument, 
it is helpful to recall the ramifications of what "possibility" itself more generally signifies, so as to 
better assess its critical function. Earlier on in Marion's phenomenological turn, in an essay entitled, 
"Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A summary for Theologians"77, Marion provides a general, 
systematic account for his well known provocative thesis of God without Being as securing and more 
specifically orienting his later foray into phenomenology in particular. While I will not presently 
consider this essay at length, it is nonetheless quite instructive, especially in view of Marion's more 
recent, historical critique of the question of Being  (metaphysica specialis) in positioning the aporia of 
St. Augustine as having come before such metaphysics. As Marion undoubtedly casts himself by 
assuming the mantel of continuing the historical lineage of the great Latin Father, this precisely 
entails somewhat of a blurring of lines between grace and nature, between theology, philosophy and 
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history such that we can neither "approach" St. Augustine—and thus, in turn, Marion as well—in 
exclusive terms as either a philosopher or a theologian.78 To do so would both result in a historically-
contested, dubious caricature, Marion argues, as well as inscribes us specifically within a 
predetermined metaphysica specialis itself. That is, conditioning the [im]possible univocally, by way 
of the possible itself.  
 
 Marion's argument against metaphysics can be approached by way of his then nascent 
thinking of [im]possibility, as that "which renders 'metaphysics' intelligible also enables us to imagine 
that it might become impossible. The delimiting of the possible necessarily implies these two 
postulates [….] The overlapping grounding of onto-theology offers a working hypothesis for the 
historian of philosophy—and, in my view, the most powerful one. It also enables us to understand 
why we have been able to talk of the 'end of metaphysics'", as Marion recalls Nietzsche's critique of 
philosophy "as a Platonism to be overturned and subverted, [which] in fact fits in perfectly with the 
Heideggerian hypothesis."79  
 
 More concretely, this entails that for Marion, his positioning of a radical phenomenology and 
the impossibility of impossibility—hence its possibility as a  "going beyond metaphysics"—is "no 
longer limit[ed] to sensible intuition, but admits all intuition that is primarily donative."80 Two 
principal consequences of this unlimited, radical phenomenology and its approach to the 
[im]possible God—contra core concepts within metaphysics and ontology—are as follows: the (1) 
primacy of possibility over and against actuality; (2) the primacy of donation over and against 
"certainty as a privileged mode of the truth".81 Marion will reiterate this first consequence in the 
"The Impossible for Man—God" in historical terms as none other than a contrast between Aquinas 
and the primacy of actus essendi with that of Nicholas van Cusa and his thinking of possest. Herein, 
Marion clearly sides with the German cardinal in drawing out the Creator-creature distinction as one 
centered "less by act (relative to essence) than by the privilege in God of possibility, of the possibility 
of actualizing infinite possibility [….] in short, by an uncreated possibility."82 Hence, in view of God's 
pure transcendence by way of radical uncreated possibility, we are thus reminded of how such a 
strong asymmetrical view is then related to the creaturely as an adventious event, as seen in our 
opening discussion of the Annunciation. 
 
 In terms of the second consequence, Marion familiarly argues against idolatry in the form of 
conceptual objectivation—"that which the ego defines according to the limits of what it sees"83—
which he considers as neglecting the [im]possibility of God and His "privilege" in "lett[ing] Himself be 
defined by impossibility as such."84 First of all, Marion recalls a central thesis of God without Being, 
that is the idol and the icon, such that "the concepts that I assign to God, like so many invisible 
mirrors, send me back the image that I make up for myself of divine perfection".85 Not only is this 
                                                          
78
 The extent to which the aporia of St. Augustine and its continued lineage as countering the charge of a 
philosophical return of a certain extrincism remains to be explored. 
79
 Marion, "Metaphysics and Phenomenology", 282. 
80
 Marion, "Metaphysics and Phenomenology", 286. 
81
 Marion, "Metaphysics and Phenomenology", 287. 
82
 Marion, “The Impossible for Man—God”, 29. 
83
 Marion, "Metaphysics and Phenomenology", 287. 
84
 Marion, “The Impossible for Man—God”, 25. 
85
 Marion, “The Impossible for Man—God”, 22. 
Chapter VII. Abiding in Minne's Demands. Part III—Enjoying the Impossible 
161 
 
idolatrous to God and His [im]possibility, but furthermore, they are equally "idols of myself". This 
horizontal critique of idolatry is then extended more broadly to the a priori conditions of modern 
science and rationality. By marking the "primacy of the knowing mind over what it knows", Marion 
recalls that according to contemporary scientific rationality, "no phenomenon can be given to 
knowing, or be admitted into the limited field of knowledge, if it does not accept being made into an 
object".86 And not just any type of object, yet a distinctly possible object, which indeed underscores 
Marion's univocal ontology that  situates such a clear and distinct 'object' as one amongst the many. 
Yet wherein are we to situate the "possibility" of such an object, especially in view of the claims of 
passivity of immediate, mystical experience? 
 
 Recalling both Kant and Husserl, Marion will precisely define a phenomenon according to the 
"adequacy of an intuition (which gives and fulfills) to a concept or meaning (which is empty and to be 
filled and validated)."87 "It matters little", Marion will then elaborate, whether this adequacy is 
achieved inductively or deductively, since the crucial stress of his phenomenology of givenness 
argues that either way, this adequacy is "internally conjugat[ed]" within the givenness of the 
phenomenon itself, without resting upon an extrinsic hermeneutical horizon as limiting its 
phenomenological constitution as such.88 To support his radically apophatic stance, Marion in turn 
notes the congruence between the epistemological a priori with that of the general conditions for 
experience itself. "Stated succinctly, we only know objects; our experience applies only to objects 
because it fixes the a priori conditions of their possibility as its own."89 Thus, from a rigorous 
phenomenological perspective, claims to 'experience' inherently and inescapably objectivize the 
given intuition, matched with the adequacy of its concept. 
 
 Avoiding reductionism, and in the interests of positively affirming the radical possibility of 
saturated phenomena itself as "incomprehensible" (rather than the immanetization of such 
incomprehensibility, or 'mystery', as contingent upon our lack of comprehension), Marion also rightly 
notes that the "history of spirituality" both affirms this incomprehensibility, as well as tells a different 
story. That is, it attests to "encounter[ing] phenomena that cannot appear according to the a priori 
conditions that a finite mind imposes on experience—and yet, undeniably, do appear."90 Amid this 
incongruity, there is no phenomenological adequacy between the given intuition and the available 
concept so as to render intelligibility. For example, in recalling the "dazzling", blinding white light on 
Mt. Tabor, as celebrated in the Feast of the Transfiguration, Marion approaches these instances of 
Revelation's historical facticity as evidentiary of the saturation of intuition to the point of 
unintelligibility. Which in turn, preserves an uncrossable distance as intrinsic to the saturated 
phenomenon. Marion sees this instance of the Revelation of Christ's divine glory as instituting an 
impossible caesura, such that in feebly attempting to apply a concept to the given intuition, "Peter 
could only chatter about three booths, because 'he did not know what to say'." (Mk 9, 7)91 In view of 
this von Balthasarian approach to glory, Marion's major innovation in thinking the saturated 
phenomenon is the manner in which it acts as a corrective to the objectivizing and delimiting views 
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inherent in Modernity's turn to the subject. Herein, Modernity's view of "mystical experience" is 
sufficiently problematized by the saturated phenomenon in the latter's privileging the primacy and 
excess of God's asymmetrical revelatory givenness. A givenness, which for Marion, is such that it 
leaves its "gifted" [l'adonné] "overwhelmed, dazzled, and submerged by his glory," such that "we no 
longer see anything. The light plunges us into blackness—with a luminous darkness."92  
 
 Rather, in order to safeguard the primacy, alterity and the excess of such intuition, Marion 
argues that such intuition none other than saturates the otherwise limiting concept itself, thereby 
resisting the adequacy of both the constitution and synthesis of given intuition and concept itself. 
That is, it refuses phenomenalization itself. There is always semper maior, which in turn, "defies the 
possibility (and all impossibility)"93 of its existence as such.  Herein, recalling Marion's initial argument 
against transcendence as never apart from immanence, a view which "will not take us very far, nor 
truly 'beyond'"; being as a horizon or transcendental, Marion argues, and in turn, the questioned 
"existence" of such saturated phenomena similarly does not offer a privileged access to the question 
of the [im]possibility of such a phenomena itself. For existence, Marion argues, imposes upon the 
saturated intuition to such a degree as to delimit its saturation itself. Or conversely, the question of 
existence as assigning an adequate meaning to the saturated phenomenon itself is seen by Marion as 
domesticating and hence, robbing it of its alterity itself.  
 
 
 C. THE IM[POSSIBILITY] OF A DYNAMIC METAPHYSICS? 
 
 
 Similarly, the [im]possibility of such saturated phenomena engenders an infinite Eucharistic 
hermeneutics precisely given its excess and incomprehensibility. Nonetheless, the [im]possibility of 
such phenomena should also be regarded "seriously as a positive concept".94 And by 'positive', 
Marion means phenomenologically adequate, as well as theologically kataphatic. Likewise, by way of 
Marion's appeal to the end of metaphysics, the radical purity of God's incomprehensibility is seen not 
only as adequate and legitimately kaptaphatic. But furthermore, the saturation of our concepts, by 
way of God's incomprehensibility is likewise contextually suitable or appropriate. For the grand 
hermeneutic of the 'death of metaphysics' largely entails, as a result of radical cultural pluralization, 
"that we can no longer take for granted that our metaphysical concepts may outline the possible 
pattern of the intellectual and real world."95  
 
 While Marion's rigorous defense of a radically pure transcendence indeed problematizes, 
amongst other things, claims to 'mystical experience', nevertheless such a position, in a (mystical) 
theological angle, remains insufficient. Briefly, by following David Bentley Hart's theological 
aesthetics96 and his plea for a dynamic retrieval of analogia entis (Przywara)97, Hart announces a 
fundamental distinction, "nothing less than the difference between two ontologies", between the 
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philosophical predication of divine attributes  (metaphysica specialis) and the theological praise of 
the divine names.98 By this, Hart generally understands the modern metaphysical aspiration of 
predication—to which Marion repeatedly takes aim at—as nothing other than a "'univocal' ontology, 
which understands being as nothing but the bare category of existence, under which all substances 
(God no less than creatures) are severally placed".99 Such an undifferentiated, univocal ontology is 
thus set in contrast to what Hart generally pleads for in the retrieval of analogy and a "metaphysics 
of participation, according to which all thing are embraced in being as in the superemininent source 
of all their transcendental perfections".100 Herein, such a participative, theological naming is viewed 
as intrinsically analogical. That is, analogy's intrinsic acknowledment that the transcendentals 
instantiate an "abyss between God and creatures" that both praises and names, yet in no way 
conceptually confines God's  greater alterity, nor ensures God's infinite transcendence intrinsically 
upon the transcendentals themselves.  
 
 In part, what Hart's critique largely raises once again is the question of how to approach to 
this "abyss" between God and creature. While for someone like Ruusbroec, out of theological 
orthodoxy, the abiding otherness and greater dissimilarity between Creator and creature is 
consistent and clear. And yet, the uniqueness of his radically mutual participative thought likewise 
maintains that “[t]he one may not drive away the other". While for Marion and the Cartesian basis 
for his default view of metaphysics, the seeming benefit of such univocity is that it allows a "direct 
proportionate similitude…with far greater certainty"—albeit, a negative certitude—as well as far less 
"ambiguity".101 Nevertheless, so as to preserve God's greater alterity—and not lapse into idolatry—
Marion is compelled to phenomenologically and theologically depict (as earlier discussed in The 
Annunciation narrative) God's adventious otherness as "over against" creation in a "dialectical 
opposition".102 Such an observation well accords with what was earlier termed as  the radically pure 
transcendence of the gift and its "suspended economy" that permits approaching "otherness" solely 
in terms of gratuitousness that is purely asymmetrical, while entirely absent of either mutuality nor 
economic return. While as a strong alternative, Hart's retrieval of analogy maintains that the 
transcendentals, contra Marion, do not limit God's radical alterity precisely because of the analogical 
structure of being itself. Of course, Marion is fully aware of Hart's general critique, as seen in the 
former's admission that the "Transcendentals, of course (as opposed to predication by categories) do 
not speak of God as belonging to genus", though such a difference, Marion will insist "does not 
suffice to set it free, since it remains coiled within the chasm of essence and esse and therefore 
definitively within the horizon of being."103 While for Hart, his dynamized view of analogy puts forth 
the more distinctly theological participative view that "In him we live and move and have our being. 
Every creature exists in a state of tension (as Przywara likes to put it) between essence and existence, 
in a condition of absolute becoming, oscillating between what it is and that it is."104 Herein, taking 
serious such oscillation refuses the analogical "abyss" between Creator and creature to resolve itself 
in terms of a two-tiered, "naïve 'natural theology'". Rather, one could say that such theological 
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naming attempts to safeguard such oscillation, or desire, precisely as stemming not from a lack, yet 
as continuously inclined and oriented towards the creature's relationality with God as semper maior. 
That is, a participation, or "being wrought" and "undergoing" the loving otherness of God—
perspectives, with which we shall once again turn to  Ruusbroec. 
 
 § 4. MINNE—MODES AND MODELESSNESS  
 
 Primary argument has been sustained in previous essays by exploring the strengths of 
Ruusbroec’s theological account of minne—its asymmetrical gratuitousness,mutual reciprocity and 
the voracity of its unquenchable demands —as a theologically relevant, textually accountable, as well 
as a contemporaneously plausible rendering of love. I have done so, in contrast with a more radically 
pure, transcendent and singularly asymmetrical account in Jean-Luc Marion’s thought. Secondly, I 
have argued that a hermeneutical theological engagement with Ruusbroec’s minne is best 
encountered with recourse to his mystical anthropology of mutual indwelling, wherein as creatures 
created in the Image of God and unto His Likeness, such an exemplarist and historical dynamic (or 
maintaining the economy between the doxological and soteriological) underpins and informs 
Ruusbroec’s mystical theological reflections upon minne itself. Time and again, the revelatory 
communication of God’s minne—within the Trinity of Persons, gushing out, or “overflowing” 
[uutvloeyen]—within creation is depicted as a gratuitous gift of God’s self, which for Ruusbroec is 
met by a fundamental openness—or to use Ruusbroec’s terminology, nature’s ‘inclining’ [neygen]—
towards God. Creation itself, which includes a view of humanity as a fundamental unity, as well as 
our human nature bear out, in exemplarist terms, this natural union with God : 
 
 
We are all one life in God in our eternal image 
above our createdness. We are also one humanity, 
which God has created, and we are one human 
nature, on which God has impressed His image of 
threeness and which He has taken on out of love, 
so that with us He is God and man. This is 
something that all human alike receive, both the 
bad and the good; for this is the nobility and 
greatness of our nature. 
Wij zijn alle een leven in gode, in onse eewighe beelde 
boven onze ghescapenheit. Wi sijn oec een 
menscheit, die god ghescapen heeft, ende wi sijn 
eene menschelijcke natuere, daer god zijn beelde der 
drieheit inne ghedrucht hevet ende die van minnen 
ane ghenomen hevet, alsoe datti met ons es god ende 
mensche. Ende dit hebben alle menschen ghelijc 
ontfaen, quaede ende goede, want dit es edelheit 
ende hoocheit onser natueren.
105
 
 
 
 Joined to the nobility of our common nature, as human persons, we are equally created unto 
His likeness. Within history and our diverse cultural contexts, for Ruusbroec, we are uniquely and 
individually created in terms of receiving such an Image, as well as responding (or not responding) 
virtuously, ethically, with charity, faith and hope—actions with which we uniquely “cleave” 
[aencleven] to such an Image. And this cleaving is nothing other than a question of redemption and 
the economy of salvation. Hence, this dynamic unity of both the asymmetrical and mutuality of 
minne ultimately seeks to convey both the gratuitousness of God’s love for creation, while depicting 
the openness to respond to such love is itself fundamentally natural, as supported by Ruusbroec’s 
mystical anthropology of mutual indwelling. In this regard, the eternal dynamism of minne—as both 
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gratuitous gift, yet nonetheless reciprocal, demanding and voracious [ghierighen/oerwoet]—is so 
because it fundamentally mirrors ourselves, both in the Image and unto His likeness. The dynamism 
of minne accords with who we are and our fundamental, creaturely inclining towards both God and 
others. And since it is creaturely, we can speak of this dynamism of minne in terms of various modes 
[wise] of loving God and others: charity, or active love; affectionate love [liefde]; voracious yearning 
[eros]. As well, we can speak of such creaturely minne in terms of its various manners [maniere]: 
gratuitous gift, reciprocal and mutual demands. These diverse modes and manners of minne are 
themselves indispensable, since the praxis of minne is in part, creaturely. That is, by way of our 
fundamental union and relationality with God, humanity’s equally fundamental otherness [anderheit] 
to God and personal distinction [onderscheet] emerge in accord with the manner in which we live 
and bear out the likeness of such an Image. Here, the critical importance of the unending praxis 
[oefinghe] of minne’s distinct modes and manners reflects one of the fundamental convictions of 
Ruusbroec’s mystical theology: that deepening in our union with God and others accords with who 
we fundamentally are as creatures. Or, as van Beeck argues in specific reference to Ruusbroec’s 
thought that well accords with his own formulation of “native attunement”, the Dutch Jesuit argues 
that human integrity “turns out to be union with God, and this union turns out to be reunion”.106  
And thus, by way of a creatio continua, the praxis of such minne—according to diverse modes and 
manners—renders us more and more distinct and particular as human persons, as “[E]ach is 
dedicated to God and cleaves to Him to a greater or lesser degree according to his hunger, thirst and 
craving after God.”107 
 
 However, there is another mode of minne, that which is  “supper-essential” [overweselijc] for 
us, while weselijc for God and is thus entirely the work of the Holy Spirit that is itself modeless—the 
contemplation [scowen] or enjoyment [ghebruken] of God. As it was briefly previewed in Ruusbroec’s 
reflection upon the Annunciation and the “pleasure” [bequam van minne gods] that resulted from 
Mary’s fiat, such modeless enjoyment is still marked by a sense of continuity and mutuality within an 
anthropological view.108 And yet, it is an entirely gratuitious and uncrossable barrier, or in 
Ruusbroec’s terminology—“modeless” [wiseloes] that is itself transcendent and radically other. It is 
over-weselijc, which given our fundamental union and created relationality with God, can in turn be 
said to be weselijc, in so far as it itself is over-weselijc.109 In turn, with Ruusbroec’s typical, proto-
phenomenological acumen,  we can more generally speak of the suddenness or event-like character 
of joy that no action on our part can anticipate or mechanically bring about. And it is with this in 
mind that Ruusbroec will write, in De vera contemplatione, that “mode cannot attain to 
modelessness”.110 Rather, they are “two things/That never shall be one/For they must remain 
distinct from each other”.111   
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 And so, the fundamental question, once again, is to consider how these two distinct 
understandings of love—Ruusbroec’s minne and Marion’s saturated, erotic phenomenon—respond 
to this impossible border. What, for Marion remains [im-]possible, for Ruusbroec remains equally 
“distinct from each other”, though the Brabantine quickly adds that “the one may not drive away the 
other.”112 For Marion, given his read upon the history of modern metaphysics’ “perfect hegemony”—
treating God as causa sui and the transcendentals as “establish[ing] God’s transcendence, but at the 
price of giving it a definition.”113 For Marion, this modern history narrates the height of conceptual 
idolatry, which ever since his early days he has steadfastly affirmed the necessity to move away from 
such totalizing thought requires a radical and pure differentiation between that which is impossible 
and possible. While for Ruusbroec, the threshold between modes and modeless minne is none other 
than abiding within the impossible demands of Christ’s love—impetuous,  at times voracious  and 
ultimately, an erotic impossibilty wherein “there remain for us hunger and thirst and eternal lust to 
follow the One, to reach the One who is without measure; this is impossible for us. This is why we 
must […] strive and always remain hungry and thirsty in our work.”114 In short, we can only begin to 
appreciate Ruusbroec’s reflections upon being “wrought” by the Holy Spirit and the modeless 
enjoyment of minne when we first recognize the utter imposibility from which such modelessness 
emerges. Not, as Marion would have it, as a pure differentiation and conceptual separation,yet that 
which Ruusbroec eloquently reflects upon as the “exhaustion of minne” [uutminnen]: 
 
And between unity with God and otherness that 
we ourselves are, there lives our eternal 
exhaustion in loving [uutminnen], in which our 
blessedness consists. For the Spirit of God 
demands of our spirit that we exhaust ourselves 
in love of Him. And our spirit wants to give itself 
over, and be one love with God. But exhaustion 
in love and otherness between us and God are 
eternal works that we cannot control. This is why 
we have to eternally remain created creatures in 
ourselves. We are to exhaust ourselves in love in 
the Holy Spirit, who has eternally loved us; and 
we shall exhaust ourselves in giving to our 
heavenly Father, who has created us in our 
beginning; and we are to exhaust ourselves in 
living in the eternal Wisdom of God, in which, 
without beginning, we are eternally imaged. And 
by means of these three points, we have a 
flowing out of ourselves and a flowing inwards 
into God, and a flowing-back into ourselves. And 
these works are always renewed without cease. 
Ende tusschen eenheit met gode ende anderheit die 
wij selve sijn, soe levet onse eewighe uutminnen, daer 
onse zalicheit in gheleecht. Want die gheest gods 
eyschet onsen gheeste, dat wij ons uutminnen in hem. 
Ende onse gheest wilt hem selven laten ende eene 
minne sijn met gode. Maer uutminnen ende anderhiet 
tusschen ons ende gode, dat sijn eewighe werken, die 
en connen wij niet verdriven. Ende hier om moeten wij 
eewelijc in ons selven ghescapen creatueren bliven. Wij 
selen ons uut minnen in den heilighen gheest, die ons 
eewelijc ghemint hevet; ende wij selen ons uut gheven 
in ons hemelschen vader, die ons in onsen beghinne 
ghescapen heeft; ende wi selen ons uut leven in die 
eewighe wijsheit gods, daer wi sonder beghin eewelijc 
inne ghebeelt sijn. Ende overmids desen drie poenten 
hebben wij een uutvlieten uut ons selven ende 
invloeyen in gode ende weder vloeyen, in ons selven. 
Ende dese werken vernuwen altoes sonder 
onderlaet.
115
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 A. CONCLUSION—UNDERGOING MODELESS ENJOYMENT 
 
 As it has been argued, 'modelessness', for Ruusbroec, can be spoken of in similar terms of 
Marion. Namely, as an “impossible-possible”, or [im-]possible. It is, like joy, inescapably tied to the 
gift of loving. No modes or practices can bring about such modelessness. For when the modelessness 
of contemplation looses its gift character and is definitely seen as something that is possible for us, 
then it turns into “deception”, a false sense of modelessness—to which Ruusbroec will frequently 
counter against in citing the errors of the Free Spirits.116 Here, amid this confusion and fusion of 
modes and modelessness, Ruusbroec will see the direct linkage with an autotheism and the loss of 
distinction between Creator and creature. So too joy is lost, amid such confusion. For Ruusbroec, this 
false sense of modelessness—deemed as distinctly possible for us—Ruusbroec will in turn speak of in 
terms of a radical sense of negation or nothingness. “[A]nd they say that God is nothing; and that 
they themselves also are nothing.”117 A pure nothingness wherein distinction, difference and 
otherness collapse. Here, amid this nothingness, it is conceived where “There is nothing saved nor 
damned, nothing active or inactive, nothing God nor creature, nothing good nor evil. See, here they 
have lost their created wesen, and they have become nothing […. ]that God is nothing; and in that 
nothingness, you find everything.”118 Again, Ruusbroec’s fundamental critique here is not so much 
this radically apophatic language—a language, in which he himself will similarly employ.119 Rather, it 
is the view of how difference, distinction and ultimately otherness itself between God and creature 
both endure and emerge within the particularity of the Image itself—that which, in citing the 
Johannine Prologue: “’All that is made, is living in God.”120 This is to say, the dynamism and the 
inseperability between the activity of modes and the gratuitousness of modelessness is continuously 
stressed by Ruusbroec and subsequently forms the critical test from which he assess the 
(il)legitimacy of such modeless contemplation. Seen here in terms of whether or not it affirms our 
greater particularity, distinction and otherness as human persons, or if such modeless contemplation 
purports to collapse such difference. This relationship equally reflects minne’s dynamism as 
asymmetrical, yet mutually inseperable.  
 
 Instead, Ruusbroec reflects upon the [im-]possible crossing of this border as undergoing a 
fundamental, modeless enjoyment, such that “This touching mediates between us and God; we 
cannot intervene. For we cannot know what this touch is in its ground, and what minne is in itself.”121 
Rather, by undergoing God’s minne—in the tradition of Gregory the Great, amor ipse notitia est—
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Ruusbroec is implicitly clarifying the meaning of such a claim. Not so much in terms of the immanent 
Trinity. Rather precisely in terms of its economic sense; its meaning for us, and reflective of minne's 
abiding, insatiable eros.Namely, to “comprehend God in an incomprehensible manner” [gode 
begripen on begripelijckerwijs]122, such that: 
 
  
Next, there follows the fourth point: by the touch 
of the Holy Spirit, we are altogether moved from 
within, and we receive an insatiable desire and a 
voracious lust that neither reason nor any creature 
can restrain or pacify. For the Spirit of God 
demands of our spirit that we give ourselves 
totally out of ourselves into God and that we 
entirely embrace and hold God in ourselves. For 
we cannot come out of ourselves into God, and 
lose our createdness; and so we must eternally 
remain other than God and a created creature. For 
no creature can become God, nor God a creature. 
We also cannot comprehend God in us, for He is 
greatness without measure. We can also neither 
attain nor overtake, for He is length without end, 
depth without bottom, height above all that He 
has created. But what is impossible to us, is 
possible to Him, for where our spirit and all our 
faculties fail in their work the Spirit of our Lord 
works above our faculties and above our works. 
And there we are wrought by the Spirit of our 
Lord, and we undergo His works above all our 
works; and in undergoing, we comprehend Him. In 
our works we always fail and cannot comprehend 
Him; and above our works, where He works and 
we undergo, we comprehend, in undergoing, 
above all our works. This is what it means to 
comprehend God in an incomprehensible manner, 
that is: undergoing and not comprehending. 
Hier na volghet dat vierde poent. Uten gherinenne 
des heilichs gheests werden wij te male beweecht van 
binnen, ende wij ontfaen een onghepayde begherte 
ende eenen ghierighen lost, die redenen noch ghene 
creatuere dwinghen noch saten en mach. Want die 
gheest gods eyscht onsen gheest, dat wij ons altemale 
uut ons selven in gode gheven ende dat wij fode alte 
male in ons bevaen ende begripen, ende dit es ons 
beyde onmoghelijc. Want wij en moghen uut ons 
selven in gode niet comen ende onse ghescapenheit 
verliesen, ende alsoe moeten wij eewelijc een ander 
van god werden, noch god creatuere. Wij en moghen 
oec gode in ons niet begripen, want hy es grootheit 
sonder mate. Wij en moghen den oec niet hervolghen 
noch herhalen, want hy es lancheit sonder inde, 
dieptheit sonder gront, hoocheit boven al dat hy 
ghescapen heeft. Maer dat ons onmoeghelijc es, dat 
es hem moghelijc, want daer onse gheest ende al 
onse crachte in haer werke ghebreken, daer werct die 
gheest ons heeren boven onse crachte ende boven 
onse werken. Ende daer werden wij ghewracht 
vanden gheest ons heeren, ende wij ghedoeghen sijn 
werken boven alle onze werken, ende in 
ghedoeghene begripen wij hem. In onsen werken 
ghebreken wij altoes ende en connen hem niet 
begripen, ende boven onse werken daer hy werct 
ende wij ghedoghen, daer begripen wij ghedoghende 
boven al onse werke. Ende dit es gode begripen 
onbegripelijckerwijs, dat es ghedoeghende ende niet 
begripende.
123
 
 
 
 For Ruusbroec, the impossibility of these demands does not evidence something ruthless or 
cruel, nor do they evidence an intolerable portrait of a domineering and unjustly insatiable, 
hegemonic God. Rather, by way of its distinctly 'mutual' univocal love, it is the recognition that God 
cannot but love us with Himself—the 'charity of the Holy Spirit poured into our hearts' (Rom 5, 5). 
Which, in terms of His utter otherness, Ruusbroec in part seeks to uphold in describing the 
monstrosity of God’s abysmal minne. This utter impossiblity is seen in the procession of the Holy 
Spirit as both from the Father and the Son, as well as its return—in the Son—and towards the Father 
in the bande van minne. Herein, this procession and return directly entails both a radical 
transcendence and equally radical immanence, both of which are impossible for the creature to 
comprehend. Rather, such impossiblity establishes the setting in which Ruusbroec precisely situates 
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our undergoing such modeless enjoyment and its incomprehensible comprehension. That is, we 
comprehend God’s radical immanence within us by way of our failure to know Him, which 
paradoxically spurs further the persistance of our hunger and desire for God. Such is what it means, I 
would contend, in terms of Ruusbroec’s minne, what it in fact means to lovingly comprehend God 
amid unknowing. It is in our failure to meet love’s demands amid love’s continuing persistance in 
demanding more, as well as our craving for Love itself. A persistance that leaves us exhausted in 
ourselves, while inexhaustably abiding in the Other. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
ABIDING IN MINNE'S DEMANDS. PART IV—COMMON LOVE AND THE 
UNIVOCAL 
 
 
 
He has eternally called us, and wants us to open 
our inward ears and hear the inward speaking of 
His grace [….] And He loves [mindt] us and has 
eternally loved us, and He bids us to love eternally 
in return [eewelijc weder minnen]; this is justice. 
Lover united with beloved: then the scales stand 
in balance and alike. Minne is eternal: it begins in 
God, and touches our spirit, and demands [eyscht] 
us to love in return. Thus is love practiced 
between God and us, like a golden ring that has 
neither beginning nor end. Our love begins in God, 
and in Him it is brought to perfection. He gives 
Himself in our spirit, and we give ourselves in 
return in His Spirit: then the scale of love is stilled; 
there we bear the image of God in our spirit; and 
thus we live from God to God, and in God and as 
one with God. There we are wise merchants, for 
we have given over our all for His all, and we 
possess and obtain our all totally in His all. There 
we are sons, and bear in our spirit the image of 
God, to which we were made. This life is above 
order, above reason, and above sense. There we 
are one with God, without loss or gain. 
Ende hy heeft ons eewelijc gheroepen, ende wilt dat 
wy onse inwindighe ooren o‹nt›pluken ende hooren 
dat inspreken sijnder ghenadicheit [...] Ende hy mindt 
ons end hevet ons eewelijc ghemint, ende hy ghebiet 
ons dat wyne eewelijc weder minnen; dat es 
gherechtticheit. Lief met lieve vereenicht, daer steet 
de waghe effene ende ghelijc. Minne es eewich: sy 
behint in gode ende gherijnt onsen gheest, ende 
eyscht ons weder minnen. Ende alsoe wert minne 
gheoefent tusschen gode ende ons, als een gulden 
ring die beghin noch inde en heeft. In gode beghint 
onse minne ende in hem wert sy volbracht. Hy gheeft 
hem selven in onsen gheest end wy gheven ons weder 
in synen gheeste: daer es der minnen waghe ghestilt; 
daer draghen wy dat beelde gods in onsen gheeste; 
ende alsoe leven wy uut gode, toe gode ende in gode 
ende een met gode. Dan sijn wy wise coepliede, want 
wy hebben onse al am sijn al [over] ghegheven, ende 
onse al in sijn al te male beseten ende vercreghen. 
Daer syn wy soenen ende draghen dat beelde gods in 
onsen gheeste, daer wy toe ghemaecht zyn. Dit leven 
es boven ordene, boven redene ende boven se. Daer 
sijn wij een met gode, zonder verlies ochte ghewin.
1
        
 
 
 
 §1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 In inceptum finis est. Here, the well-known Latin phrase is appropriate in beginning, what the 
prefatory quote from Ruusbroec announces as the eternality of minne: that 'Our minne begins in 
God, and in Him it is brought to perfection'. And in like manner, these following reflections will in fact 
end from where they have started. The passage comes from the collected volume, Vanden XII 
Beghinen, which apart from its well-crafted first text, De Vera Contemplatione, can otherwise be 
realistically seen as various conference notes gathered loosely together in its existing form. While 
Beghinen itself arguably lacks a central, unified composition, the passage above nevertheless nicely 
encapsulates Ruusbroec's overall understanding of minne. Herein, the fundamental exitus/reditus 
structure of our graced life, 'from God to God and in God and as one with God' is concisely and fully 
visible in this preceding quote. A fundamental issue thus comes to the fore, one in which is 
consistent throughout Ruusbroec's texts: how to understand the univocity of minne. That is, what 
the Magister Sententiarum, Peter Lombard (1096-1164) himself famously and unambiguously states 
in Book 1, Distinction 17: 
 
                                                          
1
 Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, 2b, ll. 2411-2413; 2414-2429 (slight modification, my emphasis) 
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 It has been said above, and it has been shown by sacred authorities, that the Holy Spirit is the 
 love [amor] of the Father and the Son by which they love each other and us. It must be added 
 to this that the very same Holy Spirit is the love or charity [amor sive caritas] by which we love 
 God and neighbor. When this charity is in us, so that it makes us love God and neighbor, then 
 the Holy Spirit is said to be given to us; and whoever loves the very love by which he loves his 
 neighbor, in that very thing loves God, because that very love [dilectio] is God, that is, the Holy 
 Spirit.
2
 
 
 
Noted Lombardian scholar Philipp Rosemann observes that not only does the Magister make use of  
predominant Vulgate terms of love such as caritas and dilectio, yet he interchangeably mentions 
amor as "synonymous", noting that the seemingly "'low', sensual connotations [of amor] does not 
seem to bother him."3 In addition to this important observation, undoubtedly the most stunning and 
important claim made however is that despite such terminological (or 'modal') differences, Peter 
Lombard is not merely claiming a view of human love said to be analogously similar to Divine love. 
Rather, he goes much further in claiming that when we love both God and neighbor, our love is 
univocal. That is, the profound, scriptural claim (Rom. 5, 5) that the Lombard makes when speaking 
about human 'love' and identifying it as the 'very same Holy Spirit [as] the love […] by which we love 
God and neighbor.'  
 
 Given the historical importance of the Sentences, the Lombard's "bold paradox" of univocity 
was thus an unavoidable segment of theological education for several centuries to come. It 
stimulated various commentaries, often of which attempted to analogically resolve the relation 
between the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit with that of the created gift of human charity. 
Attempting toclarify how it is that the human love of God and neighbor is in fact the same love by 
which the Father loves the Son, and the Son the Father, one way in which this was done was 
scholastically phrased in terms of “procession” and "mission". Here, the Holy Spirit is discussed as an 
intra-Trinitarian "procession", while economically within creation it is termed as a “mission or 
donation […] by which He [Holy Spirit]is invisibly sent into the hearts of the faithful.”4 Similarly, we 
can see the question of the Gift and the origins of its importance in this theological discussion. Again, 
the Lombard himself clarifies his position, arguing that “when this charity is so great in us, that it 
makes us love God and neighbor, the Holy Spirit is said to be given [donation] to us.’ Thus, we can 
safely surmise that it is from this identity of the Holy Spirit as the univocal love with which we love 
both God and neighbor that situates this theological discussion of the gift and how it is given, which 
is precisely why the Lombard then turns to the question of the Holy Spirit as “Gift” in his following 
distinction 18 in Book 1 of the Sentences.5 
                                                          
2
 See Book 1, Distinction, 17, Chapter 1 in Petrus Lombardus, The Sentences. Book 1: The Mystery of the Trinity, 
Medieval Sources in Translation 42, trans. Gulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2007,) 
88-97 (my emphasis): "Dictum est quidem supra et sacris auctoritatibus ostensum quod Spiritus Sanctus amor 
est Patris et Filii, quo se invicem amant et nos.His autem addendum est quod ipse idem Spiritus sanctus est 
amor sive caritas, qua nos diligimus Deum et proximum; quae caritas cum ita est in nobis ut nos faciat diligere 
Deum et proximum, tunc Spiritus Sanctus dicitur mitti vel dari nobis, et qui diligt ipsam dilectionem qua diligit 
proximum, in eo ipso Deum diligit, quia ipsa dilectio Deus est, id est Spiritus Sanctus." 
3
 See Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (Oxford: University Press, 2004) 85. 
4
 ibid, Book 1, Distinction, 18. 
5
 See Book 1, Distinction, 18, Chapter 1 in Petrus Lombardus, The Sentences. Book 1: The Mystery of the Trinity, 
98. Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, 319-321: "Hic quaeritur, 
cum Spiritus sanctus, per quem dividuntur dona, ipse sit donum, utrum concedendum sit, quod per donum 
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 In distinction 18, chapter 1 specifically, the Lombard makes a very interesting move. By 
having identified such charity with the Holy Spirit, via the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit as Gift, 
the challenge that the Master now faces is in maintaining the unity and indivisibility of the Holy Spirit 
as Gift. Doing so while equally affirming the various, divided gifts with which humans are said to love 
God and neighbor. Hence, the question before the Lombard equally is one of the univocity of love 
itself and how it can maintain its claim to "sameness" amid plurality and distinction. Addressing this 
challenge immediately, Peter Lombard thus asks: “Whether it is to be granted that gifts are given 
through the gift."6 To which, the Master then replies, while citing support from Augustine's De 
Trinitate7 that both the indivisible unity of the gift amid the multiplicity and distinction of gifts given 
is upheld by the designation of the Gift—that is, the Holy Spirit—as "common": "[S]pecific gifts are 
given to individuals through the gift which is the Holy Spirit, and all who are good have him in 
common."8 Thus, it is evident, that by maintaining the position of univocity between human charity 
and the Holy Spirit, the Lombard likewise opts to stress a greater continuity between the Holy Spirit 
as Gift and the economy of gifts given by the specific designation of this continuity as "common". 
Therein, speaking of the univocal Gift 'commonly' given amid a diversity of gifts, the Lombard argues,  
best accounts for the Holy Spirit’s 'invisible mission into our hearts.' Similarly, by relating these two 
related designations of greater continuity, the intrinsic logic in the position equally allows for us to 
better qualify not only the thesis of univocity in Distinction 17, but also qualify that thesis precisely 
by way of the multiplicity and distinction upheld by such univocity, as stated in Distinction 18. 
 
 The Lombard's "bold paradox" of univocity  nevertheless had many important detractors. 
Accepting such a thesis literally, Aquinas himself famously protested, "was tantamount to denying all 
personal activity in the practice of Christian charity."9 While Bonaventure's similar analogical stance 
nonetheless appears to have shifted the gravitas of this debate away from distinction seventeen 
itself and more towards the Lombard’s important linkage with distinction eighteen concerning the 
question of the gift and its manner of its donation as gratuitous. A shift, which for Pierre Rousselot in 
his historical study The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages concisely states: "And through the second 
of these locutions [i.e. love as 'gift'] it is continued, in the thirteenth century, in the theory of the 
early Franciscan School, which makes 'gratuitousness' or 'liberality' the principal perfection of love."10 
Herein, the logic of analogy is deployed by way of distinguishing and thereby isolating the Gift qua 
Gift (the Holy Spirit) from the very creaturely manner of its givenness—the manner of Holy Spirit’s 
invisible mission into our hearts. That is to say, the Lombard's 'bold paradox' increasingly appears to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
dividantur ac dentur dona. Ad quod dicimus, quia per donum, quod est Spiritus sanctus, singulis propria 
dividuntur, et ipsum communiter omnes boni habent. Und Augustinus in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate ait: 
<<Per donum, quod est Spiritus sanctus, in commune omnibus membris Christi multa dona, quae sunt 
quibusque propria, dividuntur. Non enim singuli quique hqbent omnia, sed hi illa, alii alia, quamvis ipsum 
donum, a quo cuique propria dividuntur, omnes habeant id est Spiritum sanctum>>. Ecce aperte dicit, per 
donum dona donari. 
6
 See Book 1, Distinction, 18, chapter 1,  Lombardus, The Sentences, 98. 
7
 Augustine, De Trinitate, bk. 15 c19 n34: "By the gift, which is the Holy Spirit [given in common to all the 
members of Christ, many other gifts, which are specific to each one, are shared out. For individuals do not have 
all the gifts, but some have some, and others have others, although all have the gift itself, that is, the Holy Spirit 
[…]". 
8
 See Book 1, Distinction, 18, chapter 1,  Lombardus, The Sentences, 98. 
9
 See Piet Fransen, The New Life of Grace, trans. Georges Dupont (Tournai: Desclee Company, 1969) 88. 
10
 See Pierre Rousselot, The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages: A Historical Contribution, trans. Alan Vincelette 
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2001) 160. 
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fade away and in its place, it increasingly becomes a question of  both ensuring and approximating 
the gratuitous manner of the gift itself.   
  
 However, there is another perspective that certainly demands attention—as echoed by the 
moral theologian and Leuven Personalist Piet Fransen, summarizing—that while Aquinas' analogy 
solved the bold paradox in a "masterly way", he did so "from too narrow a point of view."11 By 
contrast, while Fransen admits that he too shall "remain true to St. Thomas' fundamental intuition"12 
of analogy, he also addresses the need to dynamize this notion, by closely linking it with another 
historical tradition. A "small minority", to be sure, yet continuously rediscovered, especially in the 
Low Countries; a tradition that "deliberately based themselves on the teaching of Scripture, or on the 
doctrine of the ancient Fathers and the mystical tradition of the Middle Ages".13  In short, a historical 
linkage that was cemented in an implicit, dynamic reading of the Lombard's Distinction 17, entailing 
the view that such a univocal love esteemed, rather than degraded the active and ongoing practice of 
human charity itself. However, to make such a claim involves various other contingent ideas, 
including that of a distinct theological anthropology, both central in framing one's approach to the 
Lombard's 'bold paradox', without neither giving way to a passive, literal interpretation, nor 
singularly emphasizing a "narrow" interpretation of the 'created' dimensions of grace by cutting it off 
from its divine source. While conversely, to lack such an anthropology—as was indubitably the case 
amid the growth of Nominalism in the following centuries—while equally emphasizing the various 
Thomistic and Bonaventurian positions of charity's specifically creaturely dimensions—dubiously 
resulted in created grace indeed appearing more and more as something akin to a "personal 
possession, some sort of capital that could be treasured up or put to use at will". A distortion, which 
the Reformers continuously—and at times rightfully—protested.14 
 
 But first, before we get into these outstanding, historical conflicts and their ongoing 
relevance,  greater attention is needed concerning the specificity of Ruusbroec's own understanding 
of the univocity  of minne. In particular, his understanding of desire [begheren] and its relation to the 
demands of justice within the economic. That is, to 'balance the scales' in likeness to the Son. Thus, 
by better engaging with Ruusbroec's overall synthesis and his own distinctly univocal understanding 
of minne can we likewise account for how such a love esteemed and continuously ignited the more 
prophetic dimensions of his thought and his frequent social and ecclesiastical critiques. In various 
critiques Ruusbroec had made in response to a variety of ecclesiastical abuses, the Brabantine 
contemplativeprofoundly differs from figures such as Luther in that such abuses are depicted as 
nothing other than a perversion of our natural desire for God. That is to say, abuses from which an 
increasing unlikeness prevails wherein the scales stand unbalanced and completely dissimilar. In turn, 
by developing the intrinsic connection between minne's eternalized desire and its unyielding 
                                                          
11
 ibid. 
12
 ibid. 
13
 Fransen, The New Life of Grace, 97: "We may point out Leonard Lessius and Cornelius a Lapide […. ] During 
the seventeenth century, we meet two great patrologists, Denys Petau and Christian Thomasius. During the 
nineteenth century, we have the theologian M.J. Scheeben and the patrologist Théodore de Régnon. At the 
turn of this [20
th
] century, G.J. Waffelaert, Bishop of Bruges, rediscovered Ruysbroeck, and by his writings 
initiated a renewal of mystical theology in the Netherlands. These theologians were few and far between, and 
were as a rule considered unsafe by the professionals of their day. As it happened, their authority and their 
evidence prevented the doctrine of grace from straying into a blind alley." 
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 Fransen, The New Life of Grace, 89. 
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demands for justice, we can thereby sufficiently contrast Ruusbroec's account with a more literalist 
reading of the Lombard's thesis as famously seen in the highly particularized, a-contextual account 
given by Anders Nygren's agape as well as more recently, by the renewed attention to love's 
univocity in the erotic in the Jean-Luc Marion. 
 
 Previously, a theological conceptuality of Ruusbroec's unified understanding of minne has 
been presented in such a way as depicting the life of grace (as well as his speculations on a life of 
glory) and the rhythms of the spiritual life by way of the various manners and modes of minne. For 
the Brabantine contemplative, his thought succinctly juxtaposes, in a dialectical, erotic unity of 
tension, a dynamic rhythm of exteriority and interiority (or mediation and immediacy) between God 
and the human person. Such a dynamic rhythm I termed elsewhere as an 'elegant, dance of grace'; 
one in which both the Father and Son initiate in the loving bond of the Holy Spirit that proceeds from 
them both. Wherefrom, the fruitfulness and excess of such a Trinitarian bond is acknowledged as an 
overflowing [utevloeyen] mission within created nature, which is itself intrinsically open to such an 
asymmetrically heteronymous, yet nonetheless mutual exchange.15 In turn, I grounded this approach 
to a dynamized understanding of minne in view of Ruusbroec's theological anthropology of mutual 
indwelling, an anthropological portrait that resembles minne's dynamism with a similarly dynamic 
juxtaposition of a universal theological exemplarism ('in the Image') with a strongly particular, 
incarnational, soteriological and historical counter account of the unrepeatable distinction 
[onderscheet] of our moral and ethical life: our works of charity and virtue ('unto His likeness'). 
Herein, such an exitus can be seen as the basis of Ruusbroec's early Christian humanism unveiled, 
such that a furthering of human dignity and particularity proceeds from and hinges upon a 
fundamental, natural relationality with God. Conversely, it is the inviolability of such a relationship, 
which explains what Ruusbroec means (in the prefatory quote) when he says that such a unity with 
God is 'without loss or gain'. But furthermore, in terms of reditus and the economy of salvation—a 
salvific drama that very much entails either a loss or a gain—understanding this relational dynamism 
highlights the residential character or locus of minne's strong desire [begheren] and the "healing" 
rather than the "disciplining" of its natural erotic sense16.  
 
 
 A. CRITICAL INTERLUDE: THE BANAL IMMANENTIZATION OF NATURAL HUMAN 
DESIRE IN CONSUMER CAPITALISM 
 
 
 Briefly, so as to better understand Ruusbroec's portrayal of begheren and the intrinsic nature 
of its "demands", it is important to further emphasize this point by strongly contrasting it with more 
familiar notions that we have, of what I would argue as the banal gratuitousness of desire today. 
Herein, I maintain that retrieval of Ruusbroec's regular portrayal of minne's "voracious" [ghierighen] 
desire strongly counters familiar narratives that consumer capitalism provides for us today. That is, 
the latter's increasingly bald and overt attempts to continuously reinvent, rejuvenate and 
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 See supra Chapter 4, "Frans Jozef van Beeck, Native Attunement, and the 'admirabile commercium'", 3.4. 
16
 For this distinction between "healing" our desires, rather than "disciplining" them via the gratutious, yet 
reciprocal participation of the divine economy and the radical reinstitution of the works of mercy proper for a 
"Christian economy of desire, See generally the excellent work of Daniel M. Bell Jr., The Economy of Desire: 
Christianity and Capitalism in a Postmodern World (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 187-215. 
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"instrumentalise"17 our natural desires, manipulating them in an anonymous, consumer marketplace 
of limited goods, all the while promoting such consumer desire as continuously reflexive and self-
seeking. In this familiar, market-based, banal immanentization of desire, the movement of desire 
proceeds from the subject characterized by a certain lack or privation, while desires themselves—as 
desires-of-lack—are gauged in terms inversely proportionate to the relative scarcity of the object in 
demand. Yet how can we make sense of the unbridled, "limitless desire" of consumerism as 
proceeding from and oriented towards such fundamentally limited sources and ends? 
 
 Subsequent to this fundamental contradiction of desires-of-lack—one that equally and 
inescapably belies various degrees of frustration, despair and impossible satisfaction—is the cultural 
fact that such views have become vastly accepted as intrinsic to the cultivation and formation of 
consumer desire itself. A concern, Vincent Miller rightfully points out, which likewise implicates 
Christianity in its own formation of desires as similarly insatiable, yet radically other then 
consumerism's "limitless desire". Recognition of this basic overlap, however necessarily cautions any 
form of cultural-based, social-critique from all too easily falling back upon and exclusively opposing 
such an economic order simply in terms of desire's "object" (i.e. the Augustinian dichotomy of the 
"two cities") without an equal and critical attention to issues of praxis and the forming of desire 
itself.18  
 
 This dilemma arguably has been exacerbated as the postmodern marketplace is no longer 
organized by a consistent, rationalistic set of ideological principles (i.e. the Scottish economic 
tradition of Adam Smith). Instead, it has been repeatedly argued19 that the rational self-interested 
homo economicus has instead been thrust into the dense pluralism and marketing irrationality of 
much of postmodern consumerism. An immersion that shows capitalism's amazing degree of 
elasticity, adaptability and recapitulation, all the while demonstrating it as  "endlessly capable of 
turning critique into a marketing hook."20 This, Miller contends, is in part due to the 
"commodification" of religion—one in which attests to the increasing inability within global 
capitalism for religion to synthesize and integrate everyday life with religious practice and teachings. 
Such inability is not simply due to the rise in secularism, though this cannot itself be ignored. Rather, 
it is how religion itself is mediated within contemporary capitalism and its state of affairs wherein 
consumption, the fluidity of identity and non-committal practices well-mark the anonymous, singular 
playing field 21 of the market. As seen, for example, in the marketing of spirituality today and its self-
seeking for meaning, "experience" and "authenticity". 
 
 Recently in his work, The Economy of Desire: Christianity and Capitalism in a Postmodern 
World, Daniel M. Bell Jr. has provocatively critiqued this common-place understanding of desire as in 
part, stemming from an implicit, capitalist theology and its historic merger between Luther's 
nominalist-driven, Deus Absconditus with that of Adam Smith's invisible hand in the "hidden God of 
the Free Market".22 Such arguments can be situated amid a renewed interest in Carl Schmitt's thesis 
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 See generally Rik van Nieuwenhove, "The Religious Disposition as a Critical Resource to Resist 
Instrumentalisation," The Heythrop Journal 50 (2009): 689-696. 
18
 See generally Vincent J. Miller, Consuming Religion (New York: Continuum, 2004) 107. 
19
 ibid. See also  William Cavanaugh Being Consumed (New York: Eerdemans, 2008). 
20
 Miller, Consuming Religion, 2. 
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 Herein, I explicitly use a term that Marion similiarly uses, and for which I will treat later on in this chapter. 
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 Bell, The Economy of Desire, 110-112. 
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that "All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts"23, as various theological economic critiques have similarly applied Schmitt's thesis to 
economic life. Similarly, Bell maps out the reflexivity of postmodernism's fluid, identity construction 
as situated with reference to the frenzied agony of consumer choice and self-assertion,  thereby 
coming to furnish a space for its reflexivity as rooted in late modernity's continuing project of 
autonomous individualism. Not only are capitalist narratives of freedom explicitly negative in that 
they construct "freedom as a kind of private space where the individual can act (or not act, as the 
case may be) without the intervention of any authority".24 But furthermore, it endlessly seeks to 
ensure such a private space of autonomy and identity by way of continuous consumption. Such a 
formation of desires, I would argue, does not so much reflect this 'ficticious, autonomous space', but 
instead refracts the infinitely positive insatiability of our creaturely desires—to which Ruusbroec 
would more attest of—by way of converting its theo-centric non-possessiveness instead as a seeming 
paradox of human finitude. How else can we account for such a negative space of reflexivity of the 
postmodern consumer as a "being of unlimited wants" as nothing other than a perversion that 
justifies the necessity of unbridled capitalism, its reductive anthropological vision and assertion that: 
'Because human desires are unlimited, consumer capitalism and its "complete marketization of life" 
is therefore necessary.25 
 
 
 B.  COMMON RULE  FOR A COMMON LIFE 
 
 
 Although the various mechanisms and social realities of such consumer capitalism that we 
are awash with are largely particular to our own historical context, the moral dimensions that are 
inseparably joined to such economic life—to which the Church in her social teaching bears 
witness26—are certainly continuous with Ruusbroec's difficult and tumultuous Brabantine context of 
mid to late-14th Century in the Low Countries.27 Upheaval and widespread corruption—both in 
secular and ecclesial contexts—provided ample occasion for Ruusbroec's frequent, prophetic critique 
that such abuses none other than de-humanize us by way of perverting our natural desire for God—
our "taste for God", as he frequently puts it. While continuing a line of thought both from the biblical 
prophetic tradition28 and various patristic sources29, Ruusbroec's strong critique of various societal 
abuses of fraudulence and greed30, which were likewise mirrored within Church institutions in the 
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 See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. G. Schwab (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005) 36. 
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Bell, The Economy of Desire, 98. 
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 See Bell, The Economy of Desire, 24. 
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 See Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, Liberia Editrice 
Vaticana, (London: Burns & Oates, 2004) n. 330-335. 
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2007). 
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 See Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, n. 323-327. 
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 For an excellent article on strong Patristic critiques of usury and interest, See generally Brenda Llewellyn 
Ihssen, "'That which has been wrung from tears': Usury, the Greek Fathers and Catholic Social Teaching", 
Reading Patristic Texts on Social Ethics: Issues and Challenges for Twenty-First-Century Christian Social Thought, 
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 See Ruusbroec, Tabernakel, Bk. 5, ll. 5449-5458: "Now, greediness, falsity and cunning have multiplied to 
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forms of usury,31 simony32 and the selling of indulgences33 are in part reflective of a more traditional 
Christian understanding and its defense  of private property and charity. For in brief, such an 
understanding regards charity not as somehow extrinsically added to the acquisition of wealth (i.e. 
philanthropy) that likewise can be regarded as perpetuating unjust conditions. Rather, a proper 
understanding of Christian charity, while always acted upon with moral freedom, is viewed as 
intrinsically responsive to both the poor as "ambassadors of God"34 and icons of the order of 
creation.35While the reception and distribution of material goods likewise possess an inherent 
disposition that bears the debt and reciprocal demands of justice inherent within such a graced 
nature. Hence, in such a view and line with the Tradition, we can well understand Ruusbroec when 
he states that "Everything that God gives, and everything that one has beyond one's needs rightly 
belongs to the poor."36 
 
  I find it highly appropriate to recall the frequency and the distinct nature of the social critique 
present not only in Ruusbroec's works, yet by various figures from the mystical theological 
tradition.37 Herein, the intimate connection between a distinctly univocal, superabundant view of 
love inseparably joined to the critical consciousness of its moral and social critique to which such an 
understanding love inspires, for Ruusbroec, stems none other than from his  synthesis of ghemeyne 
leven itself. That is, the more one grows in union and likeness to the otherness of God, the more one 
becomes distinctly human, more particular, as lived out in commitment with and in solidarity 
towards others.38 Hence, Ruusbroec will frequently draw the connection between rampant, external 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
view temporal gain, he forgets God, and his fellow-Christian [evenkerstens], and virtue, and all good that might 
be his after this time. And from this there comes fraud, that is (false practices) in weights, in measures, in 
accounting, usury, hoarding, placement, guarantees, borrowing, lending money-changing for profit; and many 
another falsity that people now practice in business, and in everything people go about doing with each other." 
31
 See Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, Bk. 2b, ll. 1543-1561, 1553-1561: "They enrich their family with goods 
that belong to the poor. They put up with all manner if sins, if only they can thus gain earthly goods. The usurer 
may offer and serve at the altar, if he has much money to give. When he dies, and if he wants, they will bury 
him before the altar. People would rather have his money than great penance for sins. Any sinner can remain in 
adultery and in sin year after year if he pays, depending how rich he is. But if he is going to leave his sins and 
come to the ways of the Holy Church, then he has to buy it with money or he cannot have it." 
32
 See Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, Bk. 2b, ll. 1336-1349. 
33
 See Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, Bk. 2b, ll. 1535-1542. 
34
 For this much beloved title, See generally Peter Maurin, "To the Bishops of the U.S.A.: A Plea for Houses of 
Hospitality", Easy Essays (Eugene, OR: WIPF & STOCK, 2003) 8-11, 8. 
35
 See Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, n. 324: "When sought or accept with a religious 
attitude, poverty opens one to recognizing and accepting the order of creation[….] Poverty takes on the status 
of a moral value when it becomes an attitude of humble availability and openness to God, of trust in Him. This 
attitude makes it possible for people to recognize the relativity of economic goods and to treat them as divine 
gifts to be administered and shared, because God is the first owner of all goods." 
36
 Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, Bk. 2b, ll. 1462-1463: "Al dat god gheeft ende al da‹t› men boven noetdorft 
heeft, dat es na rechte der armere." 
37
 See generally the "retrieval" of mystical theologians, with an implicit reference to Ruusbroec and the 
'common life' in Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, Introducing Liberation Theology, trans. Paul Burns 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1986) 36-37. 
38
 For a distinctly lyrical presentation of this familiar theme of relational identity and modeless contemplation, 
see Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, Bk. 2b, ll. 1187-1193: "I make thee free; remain with Me. Lose thyself in 
Me, and then thou findest thyself in Me and Me in thee and all the loving spirits lifted up with thee and united 
in Me.  Be free in thyself and be freedom in Me. Be blessed in thyself and blessedness in Me. I give thee simple 
clear knowledge of Myself in thee and I (also) give thee a fathomless impenetrable unknowing of Myself. Lose 
thyself and die to thyself in thyself, and be without distinction [onderscheet] a simple blessedness with Me." "Ic 
make dy vri, blive met my. Verliese dy in my, soe vinstu dy in my ende my in dy, ende alle minnended gheeste 
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abuses within the Church and its flagrant injustices as equally and profoundly blunting the Church's 
interior life and our lived sensitivity towards God's greater dissimilarity and its "spiritual feeling" in 
the interior stirrings of His grace.  
 
 By no means, however, should we be misled by the unfounded claim that Ruusbroec's at 
times profoundly stark critique of ecclesiastical abuses as somehow lending credence to the 
thoroughly modern antimony between between Ruusbroec the "mystic" and  the ecclesiastical 
corruption of the "dogmatic" Church.39 Equally outlandish is the supposition that figures such as 
Ruusbroec are simply forerunners to Luther himself. Rather, it is just the opposite, as Ruusbroec's 
continuous societal and ecclesiastical critiques40 stem not only from his deep commitment to the life 
of the Church. But furthermore, his ecclesiological thought is to be seen as largely inseparable from 
his thinking upon the multi-facetedness41—both vertically and horizontally—of the ghemeyne leven 
itself.  For, as he writes: 
 
 
Christ with His apostles erected and founded the 
holy Church in Christian faith; and they have left 
us a common rule as to how we should live [….] 
The breadth of the rule is all goods common to 
the poor in need. The height is God loved and 
practiced steadfastly unto death. This is the rule 
that Christ taught and gave to those who want to 
come to Him in His Father's bosom. Those who 
received the rule of our Lord and did profession in 
Christian faith are all baptized in His death, 
purified of sin and filled with the Holy Spirit. 
Cristus met sinen apostelen, die fondeerde ende 
stichte die heilighe kercke in kerstenen ghelove, ende 
si hebben ghelaten eene ghemene regule hoe wij 
leven souden [….] Die breidde der regulen, dat es: al 
goet ghemeyne den armen inder noot. Dit hoochde, 
dat es: god ghemint, gheofent, ghestadich al totter 
doot. Dit es de regule die Cristus leerde ende gaf den 
gheenen die met hem comen willen in sijns vader 
scoot. Die de regule ons heeren ontfinghen ende 
professie daden in kerstenen ghelove, die worden alle 
ghedoept in sine doot, reyne van sonden ende vervult 
metten heilighen gheeste.
42
 
 
 
 Herein, such a "common rule", as instituted by Christ and the apostles in founding the 
Church, with its clear scriptural basis (Acts 2, 44) is quite important insofar as it provides a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
verheven met dy ende gheeincht in my. Wes vri in dy ende vriheit in my. Wes salich in dy ende salicheit in my. 
Ic gheve dy eenvuldich clear bekinnen [ende] van my in dy, ende een grondeloes onvervolcht onweten mijns 
selfs dat ghevic dy. Verniete ende versterve dijns selfs in dy, ende wees sonder onderscheet eenvuldighe 
salicheit met mi.'" 
39
 See John Arblaster and Rob Faesen, "Mysticism with or without the Church? John of Ruusbroec's Conflict 
with the Clergy", International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, 74.1 (2013), 18-32. 
40
 Which appear to become far more pronounced in his later works, especially lengthy sections in Tabernakel in 
which transitions from a general economic critique of unethical business practices of usury and greed within 
society (See Ruusbroec, Tabernakel, Bk 5, ll. 5846-5867) as well as sexual promiscuity, sloth and gluttony (See 
Ruusbroec, Tabernakel, Bk 5, ll. 5892-5923) to a more pointed critique not only the mirroring of such behaviors 
within the clergy and professed religious within the Church, but at times, the exacerabtion of its abuses. See 
Ruusbroec, Tabernakel, Bk. 5, ll. 5963-6184, wherein Ruusbroec at one point is extremely critical of yearly, 
eccelsiastical courts held in each parish on "public gross mortal sins" whereby those found guilty were required 
to give money as "penitence […] for their sins". However, Ruusbroec notes the corrosive legalism of this 
procedure, whereby the entire matter has become a simple "affair of money" [omme den penninc] where he 
colorofully remarks, "And thus each has what he desires: the devil the soul, the bishop the money, the fool his 
brief pleasure. See, these are the incomes upon which bishops live with their household." (Tabernakel, Bk. 5, ll. 
5974-5986, 5983-5986) 
41
 See generally Satoshi Kikuchi, "Ruusbroec's Concept of gemeen (Common) Reconsidered" Ons Geestelijk 
Erf, 83.2 (2012), 97-121. 
42
 Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, Bk 2b, ll. 1569-1571, 1574-1579. 
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foundational standard of moral perfection. Herein, not only did Ruusbroec apply such standards 
simply and exclusively to those clergy members who  professed vows in the counsels of perfection 
(i.e. chastity, poverty and obedience). Rather, Ruusbroec shows at various times a willingness to 
relatively apply such standards to laity as well, evidenced for example in his preserved letter to the 
"Lady widow Mechtild".43 Hereby, "common" by no means is synonymous with the 'collective sum', 
thus  functioning as a normative descriptor and thereby denoting a movement towards moral laxity. 
Again, quite the opposite is shown, placing in tension a certain rigorism intrinsic within the demands 
of the common life, while refusing to associate and identify such standards to an enclosed, spiritual 
elite. In this regard, it is certainly instructive to see how the mystical theological tradition has strongly 
contributed and influenced,44 what Lumen gentium45 would later on seal as the "universal call to 
holiness". Similarly, the "catholicity" of the common life supports, first and foremost a greater view 
of the mutuality of those united in Christ within the Church, while equally preserving particularity 
and distinction of their works in responding to such a common rule set down by Christ and the 
Apostles, as seen in the following : 
 
 
For the right intention for our life should be 
mutual minne and fidelity each to the others, and 
that we should intend and desire God's honor in 
all our works. And this Christ Himself has taught 
us by words and works….[and] has ordered unto 
the glory of God, and to the benefit of all people. 
That is why it is common to all good Christian 
people, just as the Mass is, and all the service of 
holy Church, and also all the good works done in 
the world. For the priest says his Mass and the 
farmer sows his grain and the sailor sails the sea; 
and so each one serves the others. Although the 
Want de rechte waeromme ons levens dat soude sijn 
underlinghe minne ende trouwe ieghewelc toe den 
anderen, ende dat wi gods eere meinen ende 
begheren souden in al onsen werken. Ende dit heeft 
ons Cristus selve gheleert met waerden ende met 
werken....toe der eeren gods ende tote alder 
menschen orbore. Ende hier omme eest ghemeine 
allen goede kerstenen menschen, gheliker wijs dat de 
messe es ende alle de dienst der heilegher kerken 
ende oec alle goede werke die men doet in al der 
werelt. Want de priester sprect sine messe ende de 
ackerman sait sijn coren ende de scepman vaert ter 
                                                          
43
 See Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia X, Tweede Brief, ll. 4-8 (my emphasis): "Together will all those in our monastery 
who fight with me for Christ I wish you great salvation in the Lord, My Lady, and by the grace of God and as far 
as we are able to, we make you a participant not differently from ourselves in all prayers, masses and good 
works offered through us by God's benevolence and grace. " " Veel heil in de Heer wens ik u, vrouwe, te zamen 
met al degenen die in ons klooster met mij voor Christus strijden; en met de genade Gods en voor zover wij 
kunnen, maken we u, niet anders dan ons zelf, deelgenoot aan de gebeden, missen en alle goede werken die 
dankzij de goddelijke goedgunstigheid en genafe door ons geschieden." 
44
 See the following papal encyclical on St. Francis de Sales, Pius XI, RERUM OMNIUM PERTURBATIONEM, n. 2-
3:  http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_26011923_rerum-omnium-
perturbationem_en.html, as accessed on 4.11.2013:"This work of sanctification is of the very genius of the 
Church, since she was made by Christ, her Founder, not only holy herself but the source of holiness in others 
[….] As St. Paul says, "This is the will of God, your sanctification." (I Thess. iv, 3) Christ Himself has taught what 
this sanctification consists in - "Be ye therefore perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect." (Matt. v, 48)We 
cannot accept the belief that this command of Christ concerns only a select and privileged group of souls and 
that all others may consider themselves pleasing to Him if they have attained a lower degree of holiness. Quite 
the contrary is true, as appears from the very generality of His words. The law of holiness embraces all men and 
admits of no exception." 
45
 See Dogmatic Constitution, Lumen Gentium, n. 40-41: "Thus it is evident to everyone, that all the faithful of 
Christ of whatever rank or status, are called to the fullness of the Christian life and to the perfection of charity" 
(40), as well as the following statement, which Ruusbroec could have easily written himself, and which 
distinctly recalls the influence of the common life: "The classes and duties of life are many, but holiness is 
one—that sanctity which is cultivated by all who are moved by the Spirit of God, and who obey the voice of the 
Father and worship God the Father in spirit and in truth. These people follow the poor Christ, the humble and 
cross-bearing Christ in order to be worthy of being sharers in His glory." (41) 
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works are varied and dissimilar, the fruit of the 
works is common. And whoever desires most of 
all the glory of God, and the common profit of 
humanity shall be rewarded the most by God. 
see, ende hier dient ieghewelc den anderen. Al sijn de 
werke ghedeilt ende onghelijc, de vrocht der werke es 
ghemeine. Ende so wie dan alder meest begheert de 
eere gods ende ghemeinen orbore der menschen, hi 
sal van gode meest gheloent sijn.
46
 
 
 
 Furthermore, as the "common rule" seeks to synthesize both the active life and the interior 
life lived in loving obedience to the Church, Ruusbroec's ecclesial thought is equally evidenced by his 
frequent and strong critique of the "quietistic" tendencies of the Free Spirits. Herein, Ruusbroec 
often provides a sapiential analysis of their lack of charitable, external works as stemming from a 
"deceitful inactivity which they themselves feel"47 the "inactive blind simplicity of their own wesen" 
and its fusion with the "indwelling of God in themselves".48 The created naturalness and inviolability 
of such divine indwelling—the principal and abiding source of our human dignity—however becomes 
disfigured in a "greater unlikeness". As a "hellish fruit", it is at once indicative of a loss of such 
otherness whereby the restlessness of our graced desires becomes increasingly "fused" with the 
"wish to become blessed within the limits of their own nature".49 In such an heterodox 
understanding, Ruusbroec portrays such a disposition and its frequent, moral laxity not so much as 
an occasion to "discipline" such wayward desires of the Free Spirits themselves. Rather, signaled by 
virtue of its desired emptiness or "inactivity" [ledegheit], Ruusbroec—in going beyond a 'mere' moral 
theological description—instead presents such dispositions as an increasing indifference towards the 
more ecstatic and outflowing nature of desire itself. "[I]nwardly assailed by images…they lose their 
vacant turning-inward in repose and fall into despair".50 Instead, by the immanentization of such 
desire and the subsequent desire to be rid of desire itself—'desire' herein viewed as an interruption 
upon a certain restful, self-sufficiency—Ruusbroec's steadfast critique of the Free Spirits in fact can 
be reinterpreted as an interesting precursor not only to early-modern views of the self. But 
furthermore, amid its deep-seated, heterodox aspirations of becoming God—absent not so much of 
the gratuitousness of grace, yet by its complete gratuitousness, to the detriment and utter lack of 
relational mutuality, reciprocity and the demands of community—Ruusbroec similarly critiques the 
inversion of gratuity and reciprocal demands by what we commonly know of  today in terms of the 
agony of consumer desire. That is, an understanding of 'demands', not as originating in, and destined 
towards our relationship with God and others, yet as self-reflective and indicative of the privation of 
the self and its absence of self-sufficiency. In other words, that which is "in demand" is largely 
indicative of that which one lacks, and thus desires. With such an understanding, the gift and 
gratuitousness, in turn, loses its asymmetrical primacy and instead, increasingly comes to 
characterize the negativity of freedom explicitly in terms of the self-interested and non-committal 
nature of our economic exchanges. This inversion of the order between gratuity and reciprocal 
demands, amid the promotion of a self-sufficiency that fuses, and thereby relinquishes the 
                                                          
46
 Ruusbroec, Tabernakel, Bk. 5, ll.5812-5815, 5821-5828. 
47
 See Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 1, Boecsken der verclaringhe, ll. 119-120 (with slight modification): "…in de 
valsche ledecheit die si ghevoelen." 
48
 Ruusbroec, Boecsken der verclaringhe, ll. 90-91; 93 (with slight modification): "Siet, dese menschen sijn 
verdoelt in ene ledeghe verblende sempelheit haers eighens wesens"; "[...] ende den inwesene gods in hen". 
49
 Ruusbroec, Boecsken der verclaringhe, ll. 91-92: "[...] ende willen salech sijn in bloeter natueren." 
50
 Ruusbroec, Boecsken der verclaringhe, ll. 153-155: "[...] dan werden so verbeelt ende ontsaet ende verveert 
van binnen, ende verliesen haren ledeghen inkeer in rasten, ende vallen in meshopen". 
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dissimilarity and particularity of relationship itself is herein depicted by Ruusbroec in highly 
precautionary terms: 
 
 
They are self-willed and subject to none; and this 
is what they call spiritual liberty [….] For the divine 
light has not shown itself in their darkness and 
that is because they have not sought it with active 
minnen [werkeleker minnen] and supernatural 
freedom. And for this reason they have fallen 
away from the truth and from all virtues in a 
perverse unlikeness (to God). For they hold that 
the highest holiness is for man to follow his nature 
in every way and to live unrestrained so that he 
may dwell within in emptiness, with inclined spirit 
and turn outwards to follow every prompting of 
his body's desires and appease the flesh, in order 
that he may be speedily relieved of the image and 
return unhindered to the bare emptiness of his 
spirit. 
Si sijn eighens willen ende niemene onderdaen, ende 
dat achten so geesteleke vrieheit [….] Want dat 
godleke licht en hevet hem niet vertoent in haeren 
deemsterheit. Ende dat es daeromme, si en hebbent 
niet ghesocht met werkeleker minnen, noch met 
overnaturleker vriheit. Ende hieromme sijn si der 
waerheit ontfallen, ende alle doegheden, in ene 
verkeerden ontghelijcheit. Want si setten daer in die 
hoechste heilecheit, dat de mensche in alre wijs sijnre 
naturen volghe[n], ende onbedwonghen si, alsoe dat 
hi in woenen moghe met gheneichden gheeste in 
ledecheit, ende ute keren na lost des lives in elker 
beweghinghen ende den vleessche ghenoech doen, 
op dat hi haesteleke des beelds ontcommert werde, 
ende onghehendert weder in kere in die bloete 
ledecheit sijns geests.
51
 
 
 
 C. UNIFY, SO AS TO DISTINGUISH 
 
 By strong contrast, rather than mirroring an autonomous subject denoted by a privatized lack 
by goods themselves deemed lacking and scarce, Ruusbroec depicts minne's intrinsic, insatiable 
demands—to further taste and thereby know, in a sapietial manner, the Trinitarian God—as an 
overflowing desire that erupts from the greater dissimilarity between Creator and creature. And yet, 
in view of minne and the creature's continuous, erotic impossibility to reciprocate, that which it has 
so immensely and gratuitously been given, Ruusbroec thereby accents a view of greater dissimilarity 
itself as emerging amid this utter impossibility. 
 
 
God's minne is voracious [ghieregh]. It demands 
of the soul all that it is, and all that it can do. And 
the soul is rich and generous, and wants to give 
everything to voracious minnen that it demands 
and desires; but it cannot fulfill it, for its 
createdness must last forever [….] Furthermore, 
the minne of God is also fathomlessly 
[grondelooes]  generous. It offers and shows the 
soul all that it is, and it wants to give that to the 
soul all freely. Now the loving soul [minnende 
ziele] is particularly greedy and voracious, and 
yawns wide, and wants to have all that is shown 
to it; but it is creature and cannot devour nor 
grasp the allness of God. And therefore it must 
yearn and yawn, and remain thirsty and hungry 
for ever. 
Gods minne es ghieregh: si eischt der zielen al dat si 
es ende al dat si vermach. Ende de ziele es rike ende 
melde, ende wilt al gheven der ghieregher minnen 
dat si eischt ende begheert. Maer si en maechs niet 
volbringhen, want hare ghescapenheit moet eewegh 
bliven [....] Vooertmeer, de minne gods es oec 
grondelooes melde. Si biedt ende tooent der zielen al 
dat si es, ende dat wilt si hare al vrilec gheven. Nu es 
de minnende ziele sunderlinghe gulsegh ende 
ghieregh, ende gaept wide ende wilt al hebben dat 
hare vertooent es. Maer si es creatuere ende en 
mach die alheit gods niet begapen noch begripen. 
Ende hier omme moet si ghieren ende gapen, 
dorstegh ende hongheregh eewegh bliven."
52
 
 
                                                          
51
 Ruusbroec, Boecsken der verclaringhe, ll. 131-132; 140-150. 
52
 See Ruusbroec, Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit, ll. 2084-2087; 2091-2097. 
Chapter VIII. Abiding in Minne's Demands. Part IV—Common Love and the Univocal 
182 
 
 
Such a forceful passage upon the "failure of minne" and the creature's erotic impossibility, as 
creature, recalls the general thrust of Ruusbroec's erotic thought—one that seeks to "unify, so as to 
distinguish".53 Here too, this distinctly shows that his metaphysical approach problematizes recalling 
the onto-theological critique inherent in his otherwise unavoidably associated Christian Neo-
Platonist views of exitus and reditus. The fundamental response to such a critique is three-fold: first, 
the recognition of an eternal otherness and greater dissimilarity between the Creator and creature in 
the exemplarism of the "image" and the created particularity of "unto His likeness"; a referential 
difference that lies at the heart of minne's robust, erotic sense. Second, and following from minne's 
intrinsic erotic difference, the onto-theological critique's lack of fecundity is here to be squarely 
situated within the Brabantine's refusal to cast the creaturely and its historical particularity as simply 
"contingent"54 and provisional. Rather, in the economy of grace, the view is precisely held that 
                                                          
53
 See generally Henri De Lubac S.J., Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man, trans. Lancelot C. 
Sheppard and Sr. Elizabeth Englund, OCD. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988) 329-333.  
Furthermore, I would like to fully recognize—(although as a footnote and its poor irony), that in terms of my 
retrieval of Ruusbroec's ghemeyne leven, as one that facilitates a dynamic "double tension"—the very 
"common" pursuit of thinking itself, as well as the contextual specificity of my work, as unmistakably having its 
emergence in Leuven. For, in brief, one can summarize the 'double tension' of ghemeyne leven as follows: (1) 
When thought from creation itself and Ruusbroec's theo-anthropology of 'mutual indwelling', "in the image", it 
deploys a thinking pattern from "sameness" that leads to greater particularity (i.e., the principle "unify, so as to 
distinguish"); (2) And yet, when thought specifically in terms of "unto His likeness", history and the economy of 
salvation, amid the created order of grace and glory, then Ruusbroec's thought dynamically inverts the former 
principle, such that his thought proceeds from an asymmetrical givenness, that nonetheless intrinsically 
demands a mutual reciprocity that is itself an erotic impossibility. (3) Hence, the unyielding dynamism of these 
inseparable, converging axes, that "cleave to" [aencleven] one another, yet shall eternally remain distinct and 
other both concretize and implicate the dynamism of Ruusbroec's thinking of ghemeyne leven, and likewise 
minne, as both utterly concrete, yet ultimately modeless and without manner. Specifically, therefore, I fully 
recognize that William Desmond's "metaxological metaphysics" and his thinking of the "between" is at times 
lurking and haunting various positions that I am making in terms of Ruusbroec's ghemeyne and thus, in the 
immediate future, clearly demands a more explicit engagement with his thought. See generally, William 
Desmond, Being and the Between (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 44: "If metaphysical 
thinking, as I claim, takes shape in the milieu of being, the question of transcendence has nothing to do with a 
leap out of being into the void, but with the deepest mindfulness of what is emergent in the middle itself. 
Again, the double meaning of meta is relevant. "Meta" is being in the midst; "meta" is also reference to what is 
beyond, what is transcendent. Metaxological metaphysics must think the doubleness of this tension between 
being in the midst and being referred by self-transcendence to the transcendence of what is other, what is over 
and above." 
54
 See generally, Joeri Schrijvers, ‘Ontotheological Turnings?’ in Modern Theology 22 (2006) 221-253: “Broadly 
speaking, the ontotheological endeavour seeks an ultimate reason that can account for the totality of beings. 
Its point of departure - beings - forbids that ontotheology encounters anything other, at the end of the chain of 
beings, than a being. Ontotheology proclaims that a being is what it is only insofar as its contingent mode of 
being corresponds, and is thereby grounded by, the essence of this particular being. This essence of a being, 
however, stands itself in need of a foundation, since the essence of a being, in one way or another, is 
dependent upon the (material) existence of the being of which it is the essence (in the same way as one 
abstracts a unified essence from diverse empirical tables ). For this, ontotheology has recourse to God as the 
one who supposedly un-founded or founded in and through Godself, grounds the essence of beings, by simply 
thinking them or by creating these (imperfect) beings of which God is said to have the perfect idea eternally. 
‘God’ can thus only appear here in the light of a correspondence theory, as that being, be it the highest, who 
assures a perfect fit between the essence or the ‘being’ of a being and the empirical being itself. 
Ontotheology’s obsession with objects decides in advance how God will enter philosophical discourse; 
historically, God is that infinite instance that grounds and accounts for the contingency of particular beings. 
This ‘God’, then, is often modelled after causal and mathematical theories - as much as each house requires an 
architect as its cause, the totality and diversity of beings requires a ‘prima causa’, a First Being. God is an 
Chapter VIII. Abiding in Minne's Demands. Part IV—Common Love and the Univocal 
183 
 
particularity itself is that which emerges from the primacy of relationality to God and others—or, in 
other words, the creatio continua of the world itself, ex nihilo. Ruusbroec's theology of minne 
precisely avoids such an onto-theological charge as his reflections  never depart from speaking out 
from the continual praxis of himself  as a lover of God—which is profoundly recalled in the previous 
quote. Lastly, and subsequent to this more performative stress, God's greater dissimilarity is 
erotically attested—though by no means contingent upon our response as such55—not only by 
minne's insatiable demands for justice, yet our unavoidable failure in 'balancing the scales' (recalling 
the prefatory passage) and justly responding to God's gracious, salvific love. A failure that 
continuously regenerates anew the rhythm of the spiritual life—in terms of outward and interior 
works—as well as predisposes one for the gift of contemplation and its loving perfection as 
ultimately rendering the praxis of loving God a modeless and mannnerless affair of rest and 
abandon—to be not mine, but His enjoyment and blessedness [salicheit]—amid our continual 
strivings.  
 
 Advancing upon my previous treatment of contemplation as a modeless love,56 Ruusbroec 
will occasionally speak of enduring or "striving in failure" as none other than "swim[ming] against the 
current".57 Citing one of Ruusbroec's more well-known statements, such a failure occurs within the 
rushing stream of God's uncreated grace, the overflowing gift of the Holy Spirit itself and its stirring 
touch [gherinen] that likewise demands a return―a demand, which for the creature alone is 
impossible. 
 
 
This flowing of God always demands a flowing 
back, for God is a flowing, ebbing sea, which flows 
without cease into all His beloved, according to 
each one's needs and dignity. And He is ebbing 
back in again, drawing all those whom He has 
endowed on heaven and earth, together with all 
that they have and can do. And of some He 
demands more than they can do. For He shows 
Himself as so rich and generous, and so 
fathomlessly good and in this He demands minne 
and honor in proportion to His dignity [….] and in 
this all spirits fail; and thus their minne becomes 
modeless and without manner [….] And therefore, 
minne always begins again from the beginning, so 
that God may be loved [ghemint] according to His 
demand and according to their desire. 
Dit vloeyen gods eyschet altoes een wedervloeyen; 
want god es eene vloeyende ebbende zee die zonder 
onderlaet vloeyt in alle sine gheminde, na elcs 
behoeven ende weerde. Ende hi es weder ‹in› 
ebbende alle die ghegavet sijn in hemel ende in 
eerde, met al dat si hebben ende vermoghen. Ende 
selcken eyschet hi meer dan si gheleysten connen. 
Want hi toent hem soe rijcke ende soe milde, ende 
soe grondeloes goet, ende in desen toene eyschet hi 
minne ende eere na sijn weerde [....] ende hier inne 
faelgeren alle gheeste, ende aldus wert de minne 
sonder wise ende zonder maniere [....] Ende hier 
omme wert de minne altoes van[den] eersten 
begonnen, op dat god ghemint worde na sinen eysch 
ende na hare begherte.
58
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
instrument used, by philosophy, to ground finitude and to give reasons for it. God must be a foundation. God 
cannot be anything else than that instance that saves the finite system from its own contingency and 
incoherency. And yes, this is what we all call God or, rather, this is what we all called God” 
55
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Herein, the failures of minne and its continual reversion back to its origins, 'beginning again from the 
beginning' can in no way be accredited to that of the supposed 'finitude of the subject' as we earlier 
critiqued in terms of consumer capitalism. Nor can its claims to 'eternality'—like the myth of 
Sisyphus—be reduced to an infinite, horizontal banality of repetitive sameness, as it is recalled by 
Marion. Later on, I will more substantially turn to Jean-Luc Marion's profound, reinvigorated 
articulation of the univocity of love later in this essay. Yet presently, it is tremendously helpful to 
contrast Ruusbroec's reflections of minne's infinite failure with that of Marion's erotic phenomenon, 
to which I quote at length: 
 
 
Thus, I will receive myself, in the end, from the other. I will receive my ipseity from the  other […] 
my flesh in the eroticization of her flesh, and even my own faithfulness in her declaration, 'You 
truly love me!' But what I never cease in this way to receive from elsewhere I must still and 
always try to receive at the next moment, and at each new moment thereafter. In order to 
continue the same erotic reduction, it is necessary for us to start all over again from the 
beginning, unceasingly. We only love one another at the price of a continued re-creation, a 
continuous quasi-creation, without end or rest. We will only love one another on the condition 
that we endure repetition and carry the weight of the oath, like a rock that is too heavy, back up 
to the summit of eroticization […]
59
 
 
 
Marion here gives a stark portrait of the drudgery associated with the infinite failure between two 
lovers, from which Marion will phenomenologically attest the need for a third—at first, the child, 
then God—to  witness and help bear the weight of such a burdensome oath between two lovers. In 
Marion's description, this oath requires continual reaffirmation, so as to once again continually 
ascend 'the summit of eroticization'. A demand, which binds the lovers mutually together in a erotic 
temporality of fidelity. Such a continual ascending, in turn defines their irrevocable particularity of 
the lovers as such. Their mutual failure gives and bestows upon the other their very particularity, 
their ipseity as lovers—a banalized infinity that is both strikingly similar, and yet profoundly different 
to what Ruusbroec here has in mind. The comparison between these two renderings of the infinite 
failure to justly balance the scales of love's weight cannot, however, be simply resolved by a facile 
account of one being 'positive' or an optimistic account, while the other is decidedly 'negative' and 
pessimistic. In no way do I intend to insinuate such a reading. Marion himself—and myself in turn—
would rightly refuse such a caricature.  
 
 Rather, Ruusbroec's paradoxical esteem for the failure of love and its continual return to the 
beginning—both in grace and in glory—profoundly articulates the primary nature of the demands of 
minne and its exemplarist basis, to which our equally endless desires are spurred-on, set in motion 
and regarded as a response. In short, such a profundity is ensured in Ruusbroec's univocal 
understanding of minne itself as a thinking of love's excess. Contrasted by the view wherein the 
infinite, continual failure of erotic love proceeds from a profound lack, for Ruusbroec, neither the 
intrinsic demands [eisch] nor desires [begheren] of God's love and our return—without confusion, 
without separation—can be uncoupled from the other. The refusal of such an uncoupling is akin to 
the metaphor of the sea, which cannot bear separating either its ebbing out nor its flowing return. So 
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too, the theological conviction that God Himself cannot but love Himself and creation with anything 
but Himself—"for He loves us with Himself as He is".60 
 
 
 §2. NYGREN'S A-CONTEXTUALITY   
 
 
 Predictably, whenever love is accented in a more "divine key" within a current theological 
and/or philosophical context, confronting the modern-day influence of the Reformed Swedish 
theologian, Anders Nygren61 is largely unavoidable. One "easily receives the impression", Finnish 
theologian Risto Saarinen remarks, that "Anders Nygren's old vision of eros and agape stubbornly 
refuses to die. No one agrees with Nygren", Saarinen aptly observes―at least explicitly—though 
without fail, the "dichotomies he created" persist and continuously reemerge.62 In fact, historically, 
such dichotomies extend far beyond Nygren's immediate reach. Nevertheless, Nygren's creative 
historical "motif" research, in-between both dogmatic and historical theological methods, has had a 
profound impact upon modern understandings of this "central" Christian idea. That is, Nygren's sharp 
division between "vulgar" Platonic eros and "heavenly" Pauline/Christian agape has radically set the 
modern standards for the treatment of the divine character of human loving precisely as an attack 
upon the importance of contextual difference, human subjectivity and freedom.63 For Nygren, divine 
love/agape is a highly particular, distinctly Christian form of loving, in which the Reformed bishop of 
Lund at one point describes as a 
 
 [S]mall stream which, even in the history of Christianity, flows along an extremely narrow 
 channel and sometimes seems to lose itself entirely in its surroundings; but Eros is a broad river 
 that overflows its banks, carrying everything away with it, so that it is not easy even in thought 
 to dam it up and make it flow in an orderly course. When the Eros motif invades Christianity, 
 however, its endeavor is to drive out and supplant the Agape motif […]
64
 
 
 Here, in this pure 'small stream' (vividly recalling what we saw earlier in Fénelon's pur amour) 
that always runs the risk of becoming too-contextually contaminated, there are no merited acts of 
faith and charity as an erotic return and "flowing back" [wedervloeien] to God. A position, evidently  
contra Ruusbroec, who insists upon the economy of salvation as the creature's graced reditus, in the 
Son and with the Holy Spirit. But furthermore, in terms of literary metaphor alone, as well as in its 
theological context, Ruusbroec's minne is likewise entirely other than the trickling, 'narrow channel' 
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of Nygren's agape, as Ruusbroec's—admittedly, at times woody and largely didactic lyricism65, which 
pales in comparison to his richly textured prose—nonetheless strongly proclaims: 
 
 
For Minne is an ebbing flood 
And it is useful above all virtues. 
Its activity is a burning glow 
That burns up everything in its encounter. 
Want minne is eene ebbende vloet 
ende si es boven alle duechden spoet. 
Hare werc es eene bernende gloet, 
diet al verbernt in hare ghemoet.
66
 
  
 
 For Nygren, the aspiration for any 'ebbing', 'burning' return, is of course, squarely set within 
the contrasting motif of vulgarized Platonic or purely human eros, one that is original to man (hence 
pagan and non-Christian) and reflects its anthropological origins in its eschewed desired ends for the 
good as utterly self-seeking. Interestingly enough, Nygren is well-familiar with the tradition of what 
he calls medieval "minne piety"67 as well as its "passion mysticism". Herein, Nygren broadly remarks 
upon the original development of sensual and thoroughly "secular" courtly literature and its "Minne 
poetry", while also recognizing the development that these cultural and secular motifs then had 
upon the then religious understanding of love at the time. Conversely, he contextually recognizes the 
mutual fecundity that such courtly literature likewise displayed, as it similarly bore influence by 
"ideas taken over from Christian theology".68 However, for the Reformed theologian, such mutual 
fecundity—which indeed, historically is the case for various figures in the Low Countries—is nothing 
but a red flag, as the  
 
blending of the sensible and super-sensible [i.e. 'spiritual'] which is characteristic of Minne-poetry 
comes to set its impress, especially in certain circles among the mystics, upon the conception of 
Christian love, giving it a trait of sensuality which hitherto had been in the main alien to it [….]The 
Christian relation to God is now conceived in its entirety as Gottesminne, [and the human as] 'die 
minnende Seele', can be portrayed as the beautiful queen for whom God and Christ have a 
yearning desire.
69
 
 
Here, Nygren's generalized understanding of minne and its "bridal mysticism" is roughly accurate, 
though for him, such historical developments signal nothing but an "enthusiasm" as well as a 
"reinforcement of the Eros motif, with a certain tendency towards vulgar eros."70 Here, vulgarity is 
understood in terms that certainly include, though are by no means primarily moral. That is to say,  
the "vulgarity" of minne is not exclusively reflective of an explicit sensuality and sense of desire 
attached to this form of Christian love. Rather, Nygren finds the tradition of minne piety both vulgar 
and dangerous because it strongly combines a univocal view of love with an "alarming proximity" in 
its " love for Christ that [is] all too human."71 Hence, unlike the tradition of minne, for Nygren, the 
univocity of love as divine agape, thoroughly distilled from the contrasting eros motif, entails both a 
radical a-contextuality and tendency towards "purity" in its resistance to cultural contamination, as 
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well as a radical dissimilarity of divine agape as juxtaposed against self-seeking natural eros as "all 
too human". 
 
 As Jean-Luc Marion argues, for Nygren, the difference between eros and agape, is not so 
much in "kind"—what I have termed as the 'manners' [manieren] of minne, as gratuitous outpouring 
and reciprocal demand—yet in the contending motifs of its 'object'.72 And by object, this entails both 
its contrasting origins (immanent eros/transcendent agape) and its subsequent movement, from high 
to low, or vice versa. Hence, one can easily surmise Nygren's 'small stream' of transcendent, divine 
agape as an overly-spiritualized, a-contextual and highly particular form of univocal love. This is at 
times represented with the much maligned image of a "siphon" or a "tube" and its naïeve literalism, 
wherein the Holy Spirit is directly and immediately 'poured' into our passive hearts as none other 
than a fundamental assault upon autonomous, human subjectivity.73 Here too, as an inheritor of the 
Reformed tradition and its sola gratia, Nygren easily claims agape as "displaying a heavenly character 
from the beginning; it needs [contra eros] no spiritualizing or sublimation to be recognized as divine 
and heavenly agape."74 
 
 In keeping with these somewhat cliquéd, hardened ecumenical positions, the typical Catholic 
response to this radically polarized view of divine and human love, it is to react against Nygren's 
views on several accounts. One counter traditionally upholds a view of caritas more in terms of a 
synthesis that accounts for both love's self-seeking (or 'physical', to use Rousselot's typology75) with 
that of its self-denial (or 'ecstatic' love). A 17th Century response is similarly framed—despite the fact 
that it was an internal-ecclesial controversy—in Bossuet's polemic against Fenélon's pur amour as an 
assault on the theological virtue of hope. Which, for the Eagle of Meaux, the purely gratuitous and 
"quietistic" aspects of pur amour was nothing but an outright rejection of love's more meritorious, 
self-seeking aspects.76 Such a response is likewise seen in Benedict XVI's Deus Caritas Est (2006), 
which can well be seen as sealing the Catholic response to Nygren's sharp distinction by what 
Benedict calls for as a renewed assessment and appreciation of eros, while fully acknowledging its at 
times marginalized and demoted status during certain historical periods of Christian Tradition. 
Advancing Benedict's call for reassessing a more visible and assertive account of eros within Christian 
understandings of love can well situate in part my own theological retrieval of the "alarming 
proximity" of Ruusbroec's minne and the theological anthropology of its restless stirring—interior 
intimo meo—while exploring the rhythm and synthesis of its various modalities as a unified 
understanding of love.  
 
 Another basic Catholic response to Nygren's divergent motifs is to highlight the absence of a 
foundational theology of creation—one that is 'natively' oriented to fundamentally receive, respond 
and mutually cooperate with such an asymmetrical outpouring of God's gratuitous love and the 
drama of salvation. Herein, Nygren's soteriological, purely 'extrinsic', divine 'siphon', in addition to his 
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read upon interiority, completely does away with any notion of "creation" and the fundamentally 
graced-nature of the world, as created and its resident anthropological dynamism, seen in terms of 
potentia obedientialis.77 Such a view of creation and its receptivity, or 'natural desire for God', is of 
course a fundamental perspective in someone such as Ruusbroec, as particularly reflected in his 
dynamic, exemplarist thought. 
 
 However, while Ruusbroec's minne offers an alternative to more divisive accounts of love 
that root their high-particularity upon an equally asymmetrical, a-contextual basis, this does not 
specifically address the question of love's univocal or analogical character. That is, of the 
uncreated/created nature of such love. In fact, Catholic responses in countering this divisive 
approach, as typified by Nygren, regularly portray any emphasis upon the univocal, divine character 
of love and/or grace as indeed an extrinsic imposition and attack upon "history" and the relative 
autonomy of human subjectivity and the creaturely pursuit of the virtuous good. Hence, such views 
too hastily become framed within outstanding Reformation/Counter-Reformation divides, such that 
the more "the Protestants attacked created grace, the more they [Catholic Counter-Reformationists] 
themselves had to fix their attention on created grace."78 And yet, the late Leuven Jesuit moral 
theologian Piet Fransen (†1983)79 writes, a "small minority among the theologians kept protesting 
through the centuries"—of which, we can include Fransen amongst these ranks—"against the latter 
assumption [….] [who] deliberately based themselves on the teaching of Scripture or on the doctrine 
of the ancient Fathers and the mystical tradition of the Middle Ages."80 Citing Fransen, we can also 
enlist in this camp the philosopher of religion Louis Dupré and his long fascination with Christian 
mysticism as stemming against this 'latter assumption'. Starting with his initial ground-breaking work, 
The Other Dimension, Dupré broadly reads the mystical theological tradition of the West (with strong 
emphasis upon Ruusbroec) contra the "unfortunate" Scholastic "attempts to classify grace 
somewhere in the Aristotelian category of accident" and efficient causality.81 Such a position draws 
from the De Lubac's thesis in Surnaturel and the approach to issues of nature and grace as somehow 
a "gratuitous 'addition' to human nature."82 Not only does such a mystical approach offer an 
alternative to the 'fateful separation'―what he would later on develop in Passage to 
Modernity83―seen, for example, in the increasing view of 'nature' as an autonomous whole and 
increasingly 'profane concept'. The traditions of mystical theology are thus read as countering such 
views by concentrating upon the view of grace's intrinsic dimensions, rather than solely as an 'added 
transcendence'.84 Herein, the stress upon univocity appears once more, as Dupré notes that 
"mystically oriented theologians continued to speak" well after Trent, "of an indwelling of God 
himself, rather than a created grace, in the soul."85 Therefore, to address this counter perspective, 
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we now turn more extensively to Piet Fransen and the ongoing, historical legacy of this mystical 
theological counter perspective.  
 
 
 § 3. PIET FRANSEN, RUUSBROEC AND LEUVEN PERSONALISM  
 
 
 Coming out of the mid to late-20th Century Leuven personalist tradition, the moral theologian 
Piet Fransen is generally regarded—alongside fellow Jesuits Karl Rahner and his "supernatural 
existential", as well as Juan Alfaro—for helping coin the idea of a 'fundamental option'.86  In an early 
essay "Towards a Psychology of Divine Grace", Fransen speaks about this option as a "fundamental 
liberty" as well as an "existential and totalizing option" whereby "I express wholly all that I wish to be 
in this world and before God."87 Herein, such a fundamental option is regarded as distinct, yet 
inseparable from what is traditionally regarded as our free voluntarily actions wherein we decide 
upon specific actions as well as our concrete experiences.88 For Fransen, such a fundamental option 
is envisaged as something far more intrinsic and interior than our everyday moral actions, as he at 
one point describes it as the "soul of our daily actions" or the ground in which this total commitment 
is inextricably "implied in every truly human and free action".89 Speaking as a Jesuit, and with the 
unmistakable language of a spiritual director, Fransen is adamant that we cannot isolate such a 
fundamental option and speak of it directly and concretely "except by a long process of maturation in 
time" as it becomes incarnate in concrete actions "in which man is no longer alone in bearing the 
responsibility of his life."90 Rather, concretely discerning such a fundamental option and its 
disposition91 towards God and others is distinctly personal precisely insofar as it leads us to a 
fundamental alterity and relational encounter with God's indwelling in the human person. Hence, 
distinguishing these two primary liberties within the human person is of "capital importance" 
Fransen writes, "in order to understand human behavior in general, and especially to detect the 
incidence of divine grace in us."92  
 
 Once more, we are reintroduced to our theme of univocity, this time specifically in the 
language of divine, or "uncreated" grace as intricately linked to the idea of fundamental option. And 
yet, such a fundamental option is not to be unilaterally confused with grace itself. Rather, the density 
of this total commitment is both fully ours, and fully God's. In Ruusbroec's idiom, the distinction 
between "natural contemplation" [natuerlic scouwen] and the loving gift of graced, "supernatural 
contemplation", (which he too well makes in his early student work, Dat rijcke der ghelieven93) in 
many respects well accords with Fransen's description of the fundamental option. For Ruusbroec, 
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such natural contemplation accounts for the human person's natural inclination—apart from distinct 
actions and external occupations with objects of the world (or ‘images’)—to turn-inward and rest in 
its bare, unimaged [onghebeeldt] ground. By this mannerless, imageless turning inward (which is to 
say without any particular technique), Ruusbroec thus depicts human autonomy resting in such a 
ground as the natural, albeit limited, encounter with God in the human person. Here too, for both 
Ruusbroec and Fransen, the stirring touch of divine grace is a reality at the "very centre of my 
personality" and one of "existential density", which "gently urges me, from inside, to a fundamental 
option: this time a supernatural one, because divine, struck in the image of the Son by the seal of the 
Holy Ghost."94 
 
 Herein, I deliberately make this connection to Fransen's fundamental option, not only with 
Ruusbroec himself (which is entirely warranted, as we will soon see) but furthermore, specifically 
within the language of contemplation and mystical theology as clearly needed to help corroborate—
within a predominantly modern, moral theological context—what in fact Fransen is getting at with 
his idea of "fundamental option". In this regard, primarily as a moral theologian, it is interesting to 
note how even early on, this idea of "fundamental option" generated significant confusion. Fransen 
unequivocally states, 
 
 Note well: these two forms of liberty have no separate existence. We have often noticed that 
 we are not understood on this point. The fundamental option is not one particular action, more 
 important than others, following or preceding the more specialized choice of some concrete 
 action. It is not a matter of determining in the first instance a 'fundamental option', and then 
 freely developing all the concrete implications, as does an architect who first designs the sketch 
 of the house to be built, and then carries out the plan down to its last details […]
95
 
 
 
 However, Fransen's admonitions seem to have gone unheeded, as the reception of this view 
of a 'fundamental option' in the years after the Council became increasingly divisive within Catholic 
moral theology. Attesting to such divisive readings, John Paul II's papal encyclical Veritatis Splendor 
(1993)96 presents proponents of a 'fundamental option' largely in a critical light as driving a wedge 
between the basic, existential  decision of fundamental orientation of life itself and the efficacy of 
specific moral acts. For such a fundamental option, the encyclical states, can be "radically changed by 
particular acts" and that to maintain such a separation in favor of the greater primacy of the 
fundamental option itself "thus involves a denial of Catholic doctrine on mortal sin."97 While the 
breadth and complexity of the specific moral theological ramifications clearly extends beyond the 
boundaries of this present work, for Fransen, the central import of this issue—which in of itself, 
extends beyond moral theology—is unmistakably clear when he states:  
 
 
 If grace is indeed love, then it means freedom. There is nothing so personal, so spontaneous, so free 
 as love. Love is the soul of freedom. But we are able to grasp this only when we do not conceive of 
 grace as a 'thing' in us, some sort of directionless energy. Neither may we think it apart from the 
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 divine indwelling. Grace originates from the indwelling, is bred in the indwelling and leads to a more 
 complete indwelling.
98
 
 
 
 Herein, Fransen maintains the central importance of this relational theological anthropology 
of divine indwelling in his resourcing an older, and more genuine depiction of the life of grace, while 
noting that by the "time of Scotus," and the onset of Nominalism, " the notion of grace had become 
more like an object".99 Furthermore, its object status, treated at times exclusively within view of 
Aristotelian efficient causality, was viewed as an "accidental object", thereby sealing its "extrincist" 
view of nature and grace. While as a strong precaution, Fransen warns that "no sooner do we detach 
created grace from the living mystery of the divine indwelling than difficulties will crowd upon us 
thick and fast. For then we no longer see grace as a life in God but somehow as a life before God. And 
thus grace is misconstrued."100 
 
 Given this strong emphasis upon a theological anthropology of divine indwelling, it should be 
thus no surprise that this Flemish Jesuit was also, unmistakably, a very keen and perceptive reader of 
Ruusbroec himself. An influence, unmistakably seen throughout his major works, Gods Genade en de 
Mens (1959) [ET: Divine Grace and Man101] as well as its further revised 1969 edition, The New Life of 
Grace.  In his early essay on the "Psychology of Divine Grace", Fransen acknowledges this profound 
indebtedness to the Brabantine contemplative wherein concluding his initial section on the 
"fundamental option" and its strong reliance of a theological anthropology of divine indwelling—a 
freedom that extends from " the depth of himself, man reposes in the hands of God and God sustains 
him in existence"—Fransen goes on to boldly attribute his positions as a modern retrieval of 
Ruusbroec. "In writing these pages we desire nothing more than to express in modern language one 
of the most profound thoughts of the anthropology of Blessed John Ruusbroec."102 In turn, we can 
situate Fransen's retrieval of Ruusbroec in his equally "profound conviction, a conviction shared by 
most of the north-western European theologians […]that there is no possibility at all for a sound, 
religious reflection on dogma without a prolonged and extensive study of the Bible and the Church's 
tradition."103 For such a ressourcement, Fransen maintains, leaves theologians with a "real 
renovation of their Speculative Theology, whereas when they shut themselves up in their very 
learned reflections and speculations, they are left with dreary and empty human abstractions, which 
convince nobody but themselves."104 
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 Given such an indebtedness, the question remains to what extent Fransen's "modern" 
conceptual framework, in the context of Leuven personalism, could permit a genuine retrieval of 
Ruusbroec. In this regard, it is important to remember that Fransen was certainly influenced and 
associated with the theological milieu of Leuven personalism of his day.105 Though, in view of much 
its present-day critique for this school of thought as being largely incapable of either thinking a 
'relational self' nor adequately responding to an overly-individualistic account of the human person 
as alien to community—it is therefore quite interesting to hear Fransen relate the social and 
embodied character of the fundamental option as a "communal philosophy of the person".106 
Similarly, in 1969, Fransen reacts to such views by distinguishing between 'person' and 'personalistic':  
 
 Before we pass on to considering created grace, conferred on us by the divine indwelling, we 
 should  free ourselves once and for all from individualistic conceptions. We do not say 
 'personalistic', for that is quite another thing. God's indwelling produces a true solidarity in 
 us, one which achieved its living expression in God's people, the Church, the body of Christ, His 
 Bride in heaven and on earth [….] Our attempt should produce a unified vision of the Church 
 and grace, two inseparable aspects of redemption
107
 
 
 
 Here too, in a similar instance, Fransen draws an interesting linkage between Ruusbroec 
himself and the well-known theologian of the Mystical Body, fellow Leuven Jesuit, Emile Mersch, 
when Fransen writes, "Six centuries later, in the Netherlands by the sea, of which Ruysbroeck spoke 
so willingly, Father Emile Mersch, the well-known theologian of the Mystical Body, renewed the 
theology of grace and summed it up in the striking title of his article 'Filii in Filio': grace makes us, 
each one individually and all in common, 'sons of God in the Son'."108 While in a chapter entitled 
"Christian Humanism", Fransen similarly echoes this when exclaiming that in the life of grace, "our 
newness of life, far from separating us from human kind, intensifies our common human 
solidarity."109 
 
 From this brief overview of Fransen's thought and the influence of figures such as Ruusbroec 
have had upon his thought, it therefore becomes increasingly clear why this Leuven theologian insists 
that "created grace has no existence as a distinct actuality, but that by its inner dynamism it connects 
us with the Trinity."110 To speak as we traditionally do, in terms of a 'state of grace', such a state, 
Fransen reminds us, is not to be viewed as a distinct 'thing' that can be possessed, wielded and at the 
disposal of one who either receives or administers such grace. However, Fransen rightly points out 
that the Church in her history has at times tremendously suffered from a lack of nuance and subtlety 
and instead often presented a truly "crude notion of what grace is", especially by way of the 
"miserable traffic in indulgences" that was at the heart of Luther's initial and "justifiable protest", as 
well as recalling Ruusbroec's own at times severe critiques of similar such abuses. 111  However, we 
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will now see that such protests by no means originated in Luther himself, as Ruusbroec's critiques in 
ecclesiastical abuse are quite severe at times. Likewise, we will explore such critique precisely as it 
emerges from and intersects with a univocal view of love, as put forth by Peter Lombard and 
inescapably colored by the legacy of outstanding (Counter) Reformation disputes. 
 
 
 A. MAINTAINING THE DYNAMISM OF UNCREATED/CREATED GRACE 
 
 
 Similar to the previous observation concerning the persistence of Anders Nygren's 
influence—despite, what Saarinen observes as the fact that 'hardly anyone agrees with him anymore' 
(which is indeed an interesting remark, especially coming from a Reformed Scandinavian theologian 
nonetheless)—in the following, we can now more substantially consider the reasons behind this 
'stubborn' re-occurrence. In short, as Piet Fransen presents the Lombard's thesis concerning univocal 
love and the Holy Spirit and its reaffirmation within the mystical theological tradition, consideration 
of this ongoing legacy cannot bypass outstanding divides between the Reformation and Counter-
Reformation and in particular, its views upon uncreated and created grace. For the reception of the 
Magister Sententiarum view that the charity with which we love God and neighbor is none other 
than the Holy Spirit is indubitably framed by such outstanding conflicts, which are in turn replayed in 
responses to Nygren's asymmetrical, a-contextual agape. 
 
 While proceeding from the bold paradox of the Lombard, Fransen regularly raises the 
important, yet propaedeutic question of how does one "remain" in a state of grace, for it is "evident 
that we do not uninterruptedly make acts of faith and charity".112 In a related context, such a 
question poses deep relevance to the mystical theology of Ruusbroec, who's thinking of union with 
God is characterized not in terms of religious and/or mystical experience, the latter of which are 
generally presented as momentary, successive finite acts. Rather than depicting such a union with 
God exclusively in terms of a "moral union" comprised of specific acts and "experiences", the views 
of the Brabantine contemplative in this sense are clearly more ontological, akin to what Fransen 
denominated as the "fundamental option". That is, as a totalizing commitment and disposition that is 
distinct from, yet inseparable from our concrete life in the world. Thus, we can speak of such a union, 
without succumbing to an "overly spiritualized reading", precisely in terms of a life. A life, which 
"without confusion, without separation", continuously demands anew a reintegration into the 
concrete particular, a continuous life, a ghemeyne leven. Thus, created grace is "at once the fruit and 
the bond of the indwelling" to which Fransen then demands that we thus need a "dynamic concept" 
to hold in tension with the uncreated life of grace that is, univocally, "none other than God 
himself".113 
 
 To arrive at such a dynamic concept of the very life of grace, Fransen thus affirms, contra the 
a-contextuality of Nygren's agape motif, that the locus of such uncreated grace and its creaturely 
bond is none other than the concrete particular of the world.114 "We are called to follow Christ in this 
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world, in this human situation, as real human beings, brothers and sisters of every man."115 Such 
particularity is rooted in the work  of redemption that grace impels us towards, while in the spirit of 
Christian humanism, Fransen repeatedly refers to a central point of Ruusbroec's own thinking upon 
the intrinsic dynamism of grace: 
 
 
Now, the grace of God which flows out of God is 
an inward impulse or prodding of the Holy Spirit, 
Who impels our spirit from within and stokes it 
towards all virtue. This grace flows from within, 
not from without. For God is more inwards to us 
than we are to ourselves, and His inward impulse, 
or working, within us, naturally or supernaturally, 
is nearer and more inner to us than our own work. 
And therefore God works in us from within 
outwards, and all creatures  [work] from without 
inwards. And this is why grace and all divine gifts 
and God's interior speech comes from within, in 
the unity of our spirit, not from without, in the 
imagination, by sensory images. 
Nu es die gracie gods, die ute gode vloeyt, een 
inwindich driven ochte jaghen des heylichs gheests 
die onzen gheest drivet van binnen ende stoecht in 
alle duechden. Dese gracie vloeyt van binnen, niet 
van buyten. Want god es ons inwindigher dan wij ons 
selven sijn, ende sijn inwidich driven ochte werken in 
ons, natuerlijcke ochte overnatuerlijcke, es ons 
naerre ende innigher dan ons eyeghen wercken; ende 
daer omme werket god in ons van binnen uutweert, 
ende alle creatueren van buten inwert. Ende hier 
omme comt gracie ende all godlijcke gaven ende gods 
inspreken, van binnen in eenicheit ons gheests, niet 
van buyten inder fantasien, met senlijcken 
beelden.
116
 
 
 
 In this formidably profound passage, we clearly hear the Brabantine contemplative draw 
from St. Augustine's well-known “             m  m       up       umm  m  ” [higher than my 
highest and more inward than my innermost self].117 In this view,  God's greater dissimilarity and 
transcendence is affirmed, not as "standing outside us, as one like us; He is within us," Fransen 
writes, while remarking that we must "constantly correct our instinctive way of conceiving God's 
working in us."118  Thus, such a corrective view that Fransen favorably retrieves in the work of 
Ruusbroec's rich theological immanence strongly counteracts views of 'extrincism' that would 
thereby conflate the demands and debt of minne119 as nothing other than a violent and external 
imposition upon the autonomous, human subject.  And therefore, in this sense, this is indeed a 
strong corrective to readings that would otherwise insist that a certain intrinsic violence occurs to the 
human subject amid discussion of love's univocity as not entirely originating from the self. Rather, as 
a view of minne's continual desire cannot be uncoupled from the inexhaustible and impossible 
plentitude of its demands, such demands are instead spoken of in terms of intrinsically impelling us 
and "stok[ing] it towards all virtue" [stoecht in alle duechden]—what Ruusbroec similarly states in 
another work, that "God's touch, which flows out to us, fans our restlessness and demands our 
action, namely that we love the love eternal." [minnen die eewighe minnen]120 
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 As a moral theologian, the appeal of retrieving Ruusbroec's theological immanence is evident 
at this juncture, for indeed it presents a view of moral normativity away from the extrincisit language 
of "law" and "imperative". Instead, Ruusbroec's intrincist views enable Fransen to articulate that 
instead of "binding and determining us to do what is good", the insistence of divine indwelling posits 
that "As Creator, He stands at the well-spring of our existence, at the point where it flows 
uninterruptedly [….] He alone can reach our freedom right at its source and yet do it no violence."121 
In this sense, Fransen is indeed sound in his interpretation of Ruusbroec, yet his retrieval at this 
instance also colludes with a far more modern sense of freedom as equated with moral autonomy, in 
addition to a view of conscience that is altogether foreign to Ruusbroec in this sense.  For indeed, for 
Ruusbroec, to 'know thyself' and continuously discern "ourselves from falling into grievous sins" we 
must therefore "turn inward into ourselves […] and keep our dwelling with God's speaking in us."122 
Herein, while Ruusbroec will speak of this turning inward to the indwelling word of God as an 
"inleading food [inleidende spise] in which God tastes better to him than all things".123 Yet, he will 
also equally stress that the cultivation of such a taste will none other that reaffirm that "our life shall 
be in agreement with holy Scripture and with all the saints. And through love of virtue and real 
humility we shall desire to be admonished and taught by the Scriptures and all men."124 Herein, we 
can say that Ruusbroec interestingly combines this view of divine indwelling with an equal desire in 
responding to such an indwelling by way of self-negation, virtuous obedience, mortification and self-
abandon, which he himself readily admits is "very annoying to hear and know for all those who do 
not deny themselves completely and do not willingly abandon all of their own selfness".125  
 
 To understand this, it is crucial to keep in mind that in fact, for Ruusbroec, the divine 
indwelling (or 'mutual indwelling') by no means foreshadows what we have come to know as the 
strong modern subject. In fact, it is quite the opposite, as his relational thinking instead points to a 
very strong non-foundationalist view of the self—accenting not so much Charles Taylor's pre-modern 
"porous self" set in contrast with modernity's "buffered self" as much as one of internal irruption and 
erotic destability that is continuously marked by a restlessness of alterity.  
 
 However, the greater relevance of this discussion explicitly is the very real temptation to 
present this understanding of theological immanence, divine indwelling and ultimately, the univocity 
of love as none other than an occasion to present a very strong, modern subject. One in which is 
largely guilty of an anthropological reduction that fails to think a theological anthropology based 
primarily upon the difference and the greater dissimilarity of God and the order of grace to which, 
gratuitously, we are invited to share in. In responding to this challenge, I have argued at several 
places that in fact Ruusbroec can critically aid in such a renewed anthropology, both in terms of a 
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renewed approach to relationality, as well as a theology of love, as he situates the otherness and 
uncreatedness of minne as actively emerging within the very distinction and particularity of 
individuals in and through our loving works.126  For Fransen, however, while he too appreciates the 
Brabantine's dynamic between the gratuitousness of God's grace and our reciprocal, economic 
exchange as the "finest unfolding of ourselves", the utter distinctiveness and particularity of minne 
and its strong, erotic sense underlining the life of grace as a life of continuous demands and desires is 
surprisingly absent from his retrieval. Herein, I wish not to simply advance my own overall thesis in 
my research into Ruusbroec as a counter to Fransen. Instead, by emphasizing divine indwelling's rich, 
theological immanence amid the strong absence of attention towards minne's characteristic desire 
[begheeren] and its continual praxis [oefinghen] in both exterior and interior works, ultimately, the 
greater dissimilarity and otherness of God Himself becomes eclipsed in Fransen's account. 
Repeatedly, both in Ruusbroec's speculative thought, as well as, from what we can surmise to be his 
more practical, spiritual guidance itself, the question of desire itself regularly functions as indicating 
whether one's love is primarily theocentric, or anthropocentric. The criterion of desire is thus: 
whether, what we desire is ultimately similar to and coincident to ourselves, thereby ultimately 
seeking an "end" or a "rest from" such desire. Or, is such desire primarily dissimilar, modeless and 
irrupting from beyond ourselves and thus ultimately foregoing such rest in view of its 
incomprehensible and impossible origins and ends itself.  
 
 Absent of the utter distinctiveness of minne itself at the very heart of Ruusbroec's dynamic 
thought, it is indeed evident that Fransen's personalism too readily falls into an anthropological 
reduction in his stress of divine indwelling, which  increasingly shows an inability to account for the 
utter alterity, dissimilarity and gratuitousness of the order of grace and God's love. For such emphasis 
is utterly essential to uphold, especially when putting forward a strongly univocal view of love and 
divine grace. Such an anthropological reduction dramatically appears, as Fransen exclaimed to a 
group of religious nuns in New York, on the 'eve of the Council', when he stated: "Supernatural life is, 
according to Christ's image of it, the more human as it is the more divine. Every form of spirituality 
which estranges us from the common simple duties of humanity is an illusion, an act of dishonesty 
and insincerity".127 Hence, as a corrective to this removed and destructive spirituality, Fransen then 
exhorts: "This is our vocation and calling: to find God in our human life. We have to change it from 
within, as Christ did, through our full and sincere dedication to all men".128  
 
 To a significant degree, I would fundamentally join Fransen in agreement with his 
exhortations and yet, in his language of sanctification and deification129, there is a profoundly serious 
inversion that he makes of Ruusbroec's writings on deification [overforminghe] and the common life. 
Namely, while for Ruusbroec, it is the paradox of deification that only by deepening in a relational, 
loving union (or 'encounter') with the otherness of the Trinitarian God that one becomes more 
radically human, radically particular and thereby "common" to both God and others in the world. 
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Hence, there is nothing ordinary about being "common". Rather, it is distinctly a mark of holiness. 
While Fransen insists on quite the opposite, as he writes that it is by one's extensively committed 
action of freely becoming myself, "that centre of personal density in which I am most myself, and, by 
reason of that, most in God."130 In various contexts, Fransen will speak of this personal core of divine 
indwelling in terms of "density". Hence, the Augustinian metaphor, "my love is my weight"131 [pondus 
meum amor meus] returns once again. First off, we see it in Ruusbroec, in terms of balancing the 
"scales" of God's gratuitous love. Similarly, we see it in the Sisyphean drudgery of Marion's 'oath' and 
its erotic temporality of banal sameness. And now again, the "density" of such pondus takes on a 
significant new turn in the modern retrieval of these ideas in Fransen. For such an "existential density 
that these features of the divine image are diffused through all levels of my existence" is at the core 
of his influential views of "fundamental option". For it is precisely this density that allows Fransen to 
distinguish such a core as more primary and fundamental to our specific moral acts.132 While equally 
important, Fransen contends, it allows for us "to detect the incidence of divine grace in us" as 
intrinsically linked to the density of this fundamental option. Therefore, for Fransen, working within 
the tradition of Leuven personalism, the image of "density" becomes one of concentration in one's 
person itself: 
 
 The Relation of God is Love. The image of God in us will therefore also be love: the force of love 
 of God, of others and of myself in God. This fundamental power of love constitutes my  person. I 
 am in fact a person because I am spirit. Because I am spirit, I am liberty and therefore love. 
 For liberty is above all a power of spontaneous gift from one person to another, before being 
 choice, election, judgment and free will.
133
 
 
 
 Again, in so many respects, Fransen's writings can well be viewed as significant and 
contextually appropriate for his time, though we can already see the necessary post-modern counter 
of difference and alterity (which, in this instance) is a going beyond the tradition of Leuven 
personalism. Likewise, questions of particularity, contextual plurality and religious identity come to 
the fore as a necessary counter. Here, Fransen's humanizing principle, in its universal appeal, accords 
with the ambition for 'unity' that characterized his times, wherein he writes: "Our period looks for 
totality".134 Hence, such an impetus is profoundly contrary to older spiritualities that translated 
sanctity as necessarily entailing a removal from life in the world, as a renouncing of life as somehow 
"too human". With its call for universal holiness, as rooted in our common baptism135 the Council has 
rightfully and strongly corrected such exaggerated views. And yet, amid such a humanizing instinct, it 
is equally the loss of all particularity that is immediately evident, as a "common life" loses its 
necessary Incarnational and Trinitarian source and instead, becomes more blandly translated as co-
insiding with more universal, human aspirations. Which, as we saw earlier, is far removed from the 
traditions of mystical theology itself as a major contributor to this view of "common life", understand 
as the universal call to holiness.  
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 Furthermore, and at a historical remove, when Fransen targets these outdated spiritualities 
that he seeks to correct on the 'council's eve', predictably, it is the more distinctive elements within 
such spiritual traditions, such as questions of "sacrifice" and the "redemptiveness of suffering" that 
are immediately targeted as crudely medieval, offering a far too "materialistic" depiction of grace, as 
suffering itself is nothing but a "neutral" reality. 136 Hereto, questions such as redemptive efficacy of 
the Cross, or Schillebeeckx's view of salvation, "despite the Cross"137 become increasingly framed in 
terms of the coincidence of grace with the world and its elimination of particularity and otherness in 
view of of this desire for "totality".  
 
 
 § 4. MARION AND THE UNIVOCITY OF LOVE  
 
 
 It is precisely in view of these critiques of an anthropological reduction138 that we thus now 
turn to Jean-Luc Marion's asymmetrical thought of confessio in his reading of St. Augustine as 
offering a postmodern corrective view of the "bold paradox" of the univocity of love itself. 
Concerning various modern and contemporary approaches to the univocity of love, the thought of 
Jean-Luc Marion and its emphasis upon givenness of the "weight of love" or pondus amoris certainly 
stands out as rigorously provocative. It makes perfect sense that Marion would more explicitly turn 
to Augustine in his work, In the Self's Place (2008/ ET 2012), as he has given various hints throughout 
the years that the Bishop of Hippo was never too far from his thought on a range of themes.139 Thus, 
as Fransen's modern translation of Ruusbroec's thought emphasized a personalist anthropology of 
"divine indwelling"—a divine core of the human subject, which in turn grounds the freedom and 
intentionality of the subject's "fundamental option" to respond in its moral and existential character, 
we see the radical inverse in Marion's approach. Namely, by way of thinking love's radical 
givenness—that is, its excess and absolute anteriority of its call, that which "comes over me from an 
other" is thereby primary to the secondary order of one's meaning and intentionality as a response, a 
"chiasmus"140, akin to the opening words at Lauds: "O Lord, open my lips, and my mouth shall declare 
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your praise" (Ps. 51, 15). Hence, by way of this confessio, Marion's Augustian commentaries 
accelerate and further refine his attempt to obliterate any "type of subjectum" as autonomous, while 
positing a contrasting portrait of the gifted [l'adonné] creature's endless erotic search for the place of 
the self in God.141  
 
 Venturing towards such a place, for Marion, is one that attempts to think after metaphysical 
closure and its onto-theological critique (Heidegger) by way of a 'historical' figure142 (Augustine) who 
arrives  decidedly before the distinction between theology and philosophy. Marion exemplifies the 
clear difficulty Augustine posed within early 20th Century debates upon the question of Christian 
Philosophy143, such that we do not know when he is speaking as a philosopher or as a theologian 
(Gilson's critique);144 or as one who insufficiently fails to distinguish grace from nature (Garriou-
Lagrange's critique).145 In this regard, Marion is in fact making a highly clever argument. Tactically, by 
way of seeking protection under the mantle of the Latin Father, Marion is thus able to further 
continue his own position, while deflecting any existing criticism of his phenomenological credentials 
(if there is still anyone leveling this critique at this point). Equally, while distancing himself from 
various other postmodern philosophical re-readings of figures such as Paul 146 and Augustine147, 
Marion audaciously sets out to both engage a sufficient range of various historical sources and 
commentaries, while conceptually undercutting any approach of historical critique. Similar to various 
philosophical and theological 'mis-readings' that attributes a fortiori a metaphysical distinction within 
Augustine himself, Marion similarly holds that Church historians will often inadequately read his 
works. In particular, Marion has in mind the Confessions and the historian's mistake of assigning it 
the "status of an autobiography, without worrying about the autos, the self of the question."148 
Rather, given its confessional structure itself and its logic of praise or "confessio" (which we will soon 
explore), such a work—exemplary, but by no means limited to this work alone—is not about 
anything in fact. It does not presuppose a stable reference point, but instead invites performative 
and participatory readings as confessional.149 Marion will even severely apply this hermeneutic 
standard of confessio in claiming that approaches that do not integrate such a primary 
"interpretative criterion" of Augustine and in particular, the confessio structure of the Confessiones 
are "worth nothing".150 
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 Secondly, and more fundamentally, Marion's aggressively tactical approach in turn opens 
onto the proper "aporia of Saint Augustine" as amounting to the question of access. Namely, what 
gives access, and furthermore, a privileged access, both to Augustine himself and more so, to behold 
my very own ipseity itself? On the one hand, we see the radical separation and equivocal dimensions 
in Marion's thought oscillate between the utter facticity of my  existence and its manifest distance to 
the gifted, "to the self's place"—the "distance where I see my self so to speak come upon me [….] as 
he who receives himself".151 As Marion boldly proclaims, this certainty of erotic givenness destabilizes 
the basis of the modern subject seen in Descartes' cogito and its unshakable, ontological certainty 
[certum est et inconcussum] such that the "cogito, sum is carried away toward the interior intimo 
meo".152 Conversely, this in turn ushers forth Marion's similar emphasis upon love's givenness as a  
univocal, unmediated sameness deployed under the figure of an infinite distance : "as I am (myself, 
ego) that which I seek (the self's place), since I am what I love, it follows that I will never cease 
coming to the self's place, to the degree that I bury myself in the incomprehensible into whose image 
I understand myself." 153 Hence, as these radically divergent poles within Marion's phenomenology of 
givenness are read in the aporetic shadow of the great Latin Father, he whose thought was "before", 
and thereby "after" metaphysics, the question that we will immediately address is whether or not 
the radical difference of the self and its "incomprehensible image" can well indeed maintain the 
performativity of the confessio and its never-ending desire of lack. More specifically, does Marion's 
univocity of love preserve an infinite distance and not forego collapsing a greater dissimilarity 
between Creature and creature—due, not as a result of some sort of pantheistic fusion, yet by way of 
banal indifference.  
 
 A. THE INVERSE OF PRAISE 
 
 Marion's extensive engagement with Augustine in his work, In the Self's Place can well be 
seen not merely as an applied historical reading from his previous conclusions in his phenomenology 
of givenness, yet as a further refinement and continuation of his phenomenological and theological 
thought. While in the Erotic Phenomenon, for example,  Marion's draws upon St. Augustine's Sermon 
34 in his prefatory remark, "nemo est qui non amet"[There is no one of course who doesn't love]. In 
our introductory essay154, we noted how Marion's erotic reduction functions in addressing human 
"erotic determinacy" in terms of an impossibility of our neutrality towards love (and conversely, by 
way of predication—hate). And yet, in this highly abbreviated quote, we likewise showed criticism 
towards Marion's highly partial citation of Augustine as encapsulating his then seeming refusal  to 
address, what Augustine himself stated is the "real question": "There is no one of course who doesn't 
love, but the question is, what do they love." In his recent work, not only does Marion cite the 
original quote in full155, but in turn, he does indeed show a fuller development into the various 
modalities of loving and their various "objects" that nonetheless accord with one of the principal 
insights into univocity itself, namely:  
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 Such a transcendental determination of love implies that, formally at least, it is put into practice 
 in the same way and according to the same logic, however different its object and occasion 
 appear. Whatever I love, I always love for the same reasons and in the same fashion, which vary 
 no more than love itself ever ceases to love—dilectio vacare non potest [love cannot go on 
 vacation].
156
 
 
 
 This development underscores the fact that Marion has made good on several earlier 
promises in previous works that he currently brings to conclusion. Not only do we see a fuller 
statement on a rigorous conceptuality of love in the "weight of love" (which we explore later on) 
originally set out in Idol and Distance157 and in turn given a programmatic basis and demand for 
conceptuality in the opening essay of the Erotic Phenomenon, the "Silence of Love". Similarly, we see 
a greater expansion and development in his thinking of "praise" and a performative language 
pragmatics158—praise, as a speaking towards and in response to an always already anterior call that 
comes from "elsewhere". The language of praise is thus antithetical to language that is about 
something and the predicative duality of kataphasis and apophasis, which Marion attempts to either 
elide, or at least, largely avoid altogether. However, in this case, criticism has been upheld that the 
very performativity of praise itself is severely lacking and utterly unconvincing (both 
phenomenologically, as well as theologically) when bracketed from concrete particularity that can 
only also be found and affirmed by a subsequent kataphasis as well.159 In view of this standing 
critique, Marion has formulated a thorough response by way of the "meaning of praise" in 
Augustine's confessio. A response, to which we now turn. 
 
 Marion's hermeneutical engagement with the Confessiones begins—as we briefly indicated—
with the aporia of St. Augustine coming before metaphysical distinction (typified by the categories of 
"faith and reason", or Theology and Philosophy) and thus raising the question of "access". Hence, by 
excluding specific theological and philosophical engagement, Marion instead opts for his starting 
point in none other than a very close,  textual account itself. (And in this move, given this "aporia" we 
can only applaud him for doing so.) By his close analysis, Marion not only refuses routine sub-
divisions made of the text between that of the autobiographical, the philosophical treatment of time, 
creation, etc. Rather, Marion asserts a greater unity to the text, noting its thematic organization of 
each chapter such that it begins and ends in praise. Which in turn, Marion observes that "confessio 
constitutes the first thought of the Confessiones, their place and therefore, their starting point."160 
From this, however, Marion clarifies that there is a double movement to the logic and performance 
of confessio in Augustine's thought. That is, not only does confessio give an adequate starting point 
to the text itself, but more broadly,  as a "disposition" it  opens up a place for accessing the self. For 
Augustine, Marion contends that this entails a double movement of confessio. This principally entails 
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a confessio laudatio: a praise towards, and in response of the excessive, asymmetrical anteriority of 
God's call. From which inseparably, corresponds a movement of inversion: the confessio peccatorum. 
That is, a confession of sin and turning away from, wherein one's self is assessed from the vantage 
point of praise. That is, where I am not and of which I necessarily lack. In recognizing the greater 
continuity of Marion's thought, it is herein helpful to note that this evaluation of the self, as seen 
from the place of praise, is itself a theo-logical move, recalling for example the site occupied in 
Marion's earlier work, such as his "Eucharistic Site of Theology"161 
 
 Secondly, it is in this double movement of confessio (of laudatio and peccatorum) that the 
"meaning of praise" and its performativity are disclosed. Namely, as the necessity of praise when 
approaching God: "The approach of God can happen only by praise [….] For if praise is not called for, 
then it is no longer a matter of Him, God. Praising does not designate one speech act among others 
[….] Praising offers the sole way, the sole royal road of access."162 Here, while we see that in no way 
has Marion lessened his insistence upon the via eminentiae, to the obvious detriment and abandon 
of kataphasis. And yet, it is his emphasis upon the necessity of praise and its theo-logical character 
that evidences a maturing perspective in contrast to earlier thought in its close linkage of conceptual 
thought—thinking about something—to that of a reified idolatry of God's infinite 
incomprehensibility. This necessity of praise, rather, is set in a clear erotic tone—a necessity, linked 
not to a principal, yet as an erotic demand. That is, as an irresistible obligation:  
 
 
 For, in contrast to all the other cases in which it is always necessary to measure the degree 
 to which the candidate for my praise deserves it […] in the case of God the question is by 
 definition no longer posed (if not, it would not be God, but an idol), such that here praising and 
 therefore confessing this praise has nothing optional about it [….] If I did not feel this obligation 
 irresistibly, if it depended therefore on my decision  to praise or not, that would signify that in 
 fact it is no longer a matter of God but of another myself, more or less comparable, therefore 
 commensurate to myself—in any case, not God.
163
 
 
 
 Thus, as a double movement and the radical disjunct and dissimilarity in its two-poles, 
Marion identifies the confessio as "one single linguistic act"164 which mutually implies the other. "I 
can praise God only if I discover myself already a beneficiary of his mercy, therefore only if I 
acknowledge myself first a sinner against him."165 Which, given such an inseparability of praise and 
guilt, Marion does not so much focus upon sinful acts as such nor the propensity towards such 
distorted love for the "earthly city" as a result of original sin. Rather, it is the limitation of creation its 
"finitude" that alone  occasions such a confession: "Therefore, even before confessing my sin, in fact, 
it is my finitude I must confess, so as to praise God on that basis."166 Thus, the creature stands in the 
inverse of the necessity of praise itself: "Inversely, if I praise and therefore confess God as such, I also 
recognize myself as such, as creature that can truly neither speak to Him as coequal nor say anything 
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whatsoever about him, but that admits him."167 For Marion, the creature is indeed defined by the 
inverse of praise that attests to the "incommensurability between God and myself".168 And yet, as 
'one single linguistic act', such an incommensurability sustains the access to either the approach of 
God and its creaturely inverse as itself, the basis for the infinite approach amid distance of the 
confessio itself. That is to say, by refusing  a hermeneutic of partiality in selecting themes of either 
the laudatio or the peccatorum in Augustine's corpus—a familiar hermeneutical strategy for many 
Augustine readers that attempt to isolate one separate strand from his thought— for Marion and his 
approach to Augustine, it is the incommensurability itself and the creaturely inversion to praise, 
which Marion roots as the site of infinite confessio. Praising God is not to attribute something to Him 
or about Him; rather, it is motivated by the radical caesura and dissimilarity of its inverse. In other 
words, we praise that which we are not. Therefore, it is by maintaining these two terms of confessio's 
singular act that thus combines the asymmetrical anteriority of love's univocal givenness with its 
indivisible inverse, that of desire's lack, which we shall now consider. 
 
 
 B. DESIRES OF LACK AND CERTAINTY 
 
 
 Principally, Marion develops his position of confessio in part, so as to strongly contrast such 
an Augustinian-based, confessional opening to that of Descartes' cogito ["I am thinking, therefore I 
am"]. Not only is such a contrast an obvious one for Marion himself as an eminent Cartesian scholar. 
Moreover, given the particularity of his reading of Augustine, Marion is thereby compelled to make 
this strong contrast, since historically,"comparison with Saint Augustine seems all the more 
inevitable since, in Descartes' lifetime", the strong affinity between the two figures "had already 
seemed obvious to many."169 In fact, Marion historically cites that "Descartes takes advantage" of 
such a comparison to the authority of the great Latin Father, while at the same time, the "banality of 
'cogito sum' is "forever widening the gap between his argument and Augustinian reasoning."170  To 
understand this principal contrast is none other than to understand the logic of the confessio itself. 
Namely, on the one hand, the Cartesian Meditations posits a "'truth so solid and secure' in that it 
would open an access of the self to itself in and through thought."171 While conversely, Marion 
argues (with a bit of a flourish) that "The cogito, sum is carried away to the the interior intimo 
meo"172 by the space accessible through confessio such that, in Augustine: 
 
 Self-certainty thus leads self-consciousness back to the inner consciousness of God, which is 
 found to be more essential to consciousness than itself. For the si fallor, sum  ["If I am  mistaken, 
 I am"] 
173
 does not aim at the ego, nor does it come to a halt in the res cogitans, seeing as the 
 interior intimo meo transports it, as a derived image, toward the original exemplar [….] On the 
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 contrary, si fallor sum forbids the mind to remain in itself, exiled from its truth, in order to send it 
 back to the infinite original.
174
 
 
 
 Marion is entirely correct to radically insist upon the utter dissimilarity between Augustine 
and Descartes' respective thought and the grounding of the subject by the 'banal cogito, sum'. 
However, one can well critically respond to Marion's opposition by inquiring precisely how then does 
such an exemplarism free Augustine from the same principal movements that he rightly attributes to  
Descartes: namely, that 'access of the self to itself in and through thought'? Is this not a basic onto-
theo-logical move that essentializes and grounds the 'contingency of beings' upon the necessary 
ground of God, as the 'exemplarity' of beings' contingency? Similarly, one can likewise make this 
argument to my overall retrieval of Ruusbroec himself and its concentration of "mutual indwelling" 
and Ruusbroec's theology of "image and likeness". Which, in this context, it is helpful to recall both 
its Cistercian and Augustinian roots.175 Regarding Ruusbroec, I have repeatedly responded to this 
critique.176 Similarly for Marion, his response revolves around the question of desire. And more 
specifically, how the opening towards the self, in and through the necessity of the confessio of praise 
and its creaturely inverse are themselves, movements that are grounded upon the universal 
certainty, or "first principal" of desire itself. 
 
 At various sections of In the Self's Place and more explicitly, in the chapter "The Ego or the 
Gifted" do we see some of the most explicit reflections that Marion has endeavored on the question 
of desire, as principally reflected in his commentarial thought on Augustine. Such themes include: (a) 
the asymmetrical "weight" of desire, that comes not from me, but "elsewhere";177 the individuation 
of desire and its assurance of my particularity;178 the erotic reduction as the universal desire for 
happiness and its inseparability from beatitude;179 and lastly, the non-possessiveness of desire and its 
anteriority translated not in terms of Being, but that of life.180 For Marion, these themes are 
interrelated—culminating somewhat in the thought of life itself—by what he calls the central 
paradox of desire. That is, desire alone "knows and thinks the vita beata" both with "erotic certainty" 
and equally "without any theoretical representation of it".181 Hence, the very "contradiction" of 
desire itself is that it roots its certainty within the performance of desire qua desire, while equally 
sustained by the absolute uncertainty and ultimately inconceivability of its object. The univocal 
universality of our natural desire for life—even more so, for happiness, as the vita beata is none 
other, Marion will argue, a life of beatitude and God—is secured precisely at the cost of any form of 
knowing—let alone certainty—of its object itself. The object of certainty is a question of Being itself 
precisely as that which "neither desires nor could desire182". The architecture of radical apophasis is 
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thereby set up (a familiar construction for Marion) as the guarantor for a turn towards a  universal 
certainty as the impossible object, deployed in givenness that is both anterior to me and my 
intentionality, coming from "elsewhere", which thereby makes possible my desire itself.183  And yet, 
Marion deliberately extends these familiar lines within his overall thought, such that as a first 
principal distinctly other than a conceptual or "theoretical first principle", nevertheless the 
impossible-possibility of such a universal desire both "assumes and deserves" such a status, "insofar 
as it is a desire, not knowing or comportment."184 Hence, the certainty of Marion's desire indubitably 
remains a desire of lack as the inverse of the necessary confessio laudatio, is (as we just presented) 
one that substantiates praise of God primarily due to the "finitude" of the creaturely itself as 
incommensurable with God. 
 
 Interestingly enough, however, Marion secures the universal certainty of this [im]possible 
desire of lack precisely as a univocal givenness, which in no sense should be confused with having any 
"native origins". Rather, the weight of such an [im]possible desire in its utter givenness is 
asymmetrically anterior and thereby comes upon from "behind me", as stemming "from the vita 
beata, of which it [the mens, cogitatio] is ignorant […. ]We should not speak here of a desire (or of a 
love) for the principle, but of a principle of desire—or, better, desire as principle."185 Marion thus 
once more extrapolates the givenness of this 'desire as principle' and its native lack in undercutting 
Descartes' 'banal cogito, sum' and its "unshakable foundation" [fundamentum inconcussum]186 of 
thought, such that the "inconcussum is desire, therefore a lack, not self-possessed knowledge." 187 
Rather, amid the certainty of this unshakable desire of lack, which thinks itself, "while not knowing 
itself" as anything other than "receiving itself from the one who excited it as desire. For the vita 
beata does not mark an exception to the reception of life but consecrates it."188 Hence, Marion 
radicalizes this Cartesian ontological certainty, positing this principle of desire as foregoing both 
ontological and epistemic certainty and instead, executes it  as an erotic reduction itself.  
 
 Here, Marion's approach forestalls any facile comparison between Augustine and Descartes 
as the desire-as-principle not only dislodges the latter's 'unshakable certainty' of any ontological 
and/or epistemic weight, yet it does so precisely by attesting to the erotic certainty of the self's 
inaccessibility. This inaccessibility, Marion will argue, is confirmed amid his repeated appeals to 
Augustine's well known read of interiority as interior intimo meo. Herein, Marion is quite right to take 
the position that he does, for it is indeed the case that traditionally, various problematic readings of 
Augustine can well be attributed to a rather deceiving Cartesian influence, which is quite well at odds 
with Augustine's thought. Interiority, for Augustine, does not refer to an autonomously secured, self-
enclosed space, as it does for Descartes. Rather, for the Latin father, interiority points both to a 
divine indwelling and in turn, a relational opening onto the created world itself.  
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 However, by accentuating a strong incongruence between Augustine and Descartes, Marion's 
reading of the interior intimo meo itself functions in a very peculiar manner, such that it reflects the 
radical disjunt and dissimilarity of the confessio itself. At first, in the mode of laudatio, Marion affirms 
a perspective such that is regularly found in the dense personalism of someone such as Fransen, 
where Marion states: "From the outset the creation of the ego is thought in the figure of the gifted" 
such that the "ego comes from the given self, and not the self from the ego's consciousness."189 
However, the peculiar reading of Marion's interior intimo meo then takes the radical inverse of 
Fransen's personalism, such that it dislodges and heightens the incommensurable inaccessibility 
resident with the self: "From this distance of the given to self from the self there obviously follows a 
still more radical separation of the ego from what gives it to itself and the self to it. Distance, that can 
be be understood […] as a gap in which I remain on the outside of my own center, cut off by God."190 
In other words, for Marion, recognition of Augustine's interior intimo meo secures less an affirmation 
of "God within" as it is traditionally interpreted and instead, emphasizes far more one's displacement 
as "myself without"—desirous and lacking. A figure of givenness that points neither to an 
"imprisoned" and possessive subjectivity, as in Descartes, nor to a rich theological immanence;191 
rather, for Marion, the displacement and non-possessiveness of the interior intimo meo points 
towards life and the site of creation. Life, as neither ontologically prior to nor oriented towards the 
confessio of praise and salvific return, but a view of creation a fortiori that responds to the givenness 
of the call, while itself incapable of any reciprocal, economic response. 
 
 
 C. CREATION WITHOUT NATURE 
 
 
 As Marion approaches Augustine's depiction of interiority as precluding any form of 
enclosed, autonomous subjectivity, Marion will instead read the interior intimo meo as indicative of 
Augustine's confessio and its giving access to the self as radically dislodging any form of subjectivity. 
By way of contrast, Marion will instead point towards the non-possessiveness of life as distinctly one 
of creation. Immediately following, I will thus consider Marion's reading of various cosmological and 
anthropological lines of thought and their specific convergence in terms of the question of desire and 
whether or not it retains any sense of 'native origins' and capacity. These considerations are 
necessary and in turn, preparatory in considering both the creation-based, univocal understanding of 
love as the pondus amoris. 
 
 By appealing to Augustine's writings, Marion argues that creation is an "infinite site" 192 of 
heaven and earth which is itself opened up by the rhythm of the confessio itself: the givenness of its 
anterior call and response, of praise and privation, laudatio and peccatorum. In this sense, it is contra 
the Greek cosmos, as creation for Augustine is 'almost never' synonymous with the 'world'.193 Marion 
thus presents an interesting alternative approach to Creation, one that fully admits to the rather 
feebly "inept, or rather in-apt, response" to the ontological question that often obscures the point 
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itself.194 Marion will first draw upon the Heideggarian critique of Biblical accounts of creation as 
failing to adequately address the primary metaphysical question—"Why is there something, in 
general, rather than nothing?" While in a secondary move, Marion positions Augustine as inverting 
such a critique. Responding to Heideggar's principal critique, Marion cites the famous  ohne warum 
from Angelus Silesius195 as itself evidence of an intrinsic theological hermeneutics of faith that blunts 
such a critique. Creation does not, Marion contends, "respond to the question why concerning the 
world". Rather, in view of Augustine's confessio, creation is already the response itself.196 
Subsequently, Marion positions an Augustinian account of creation contra the commonplace notion 
within Neo-Scholastic Thomism concerning the cosmological proof for the existence of God based 
upon motion. And although Marion does not dwell further upon this contrast as anything other than 
a "rational cosmology"197, which Marion addresses is alien to Augustine himself, it is very important 
to mention. If anything, because its contrast opens upon the principal theme (that I will shortly also 
consider): namely, Marion's erotic reduction as leading to the "weight of love" [pondus amoris]. It is 
thus quite helpful to keep in mind the figure of creation, and subsequently, desire, and how they 
operate in a clear, secondary position to the primacy of love's univocal weight, which Marion 
considers with admirable clarity : "Motion follows weight, like desire follows love, to the point that 
the loving drive of the desiring soul becomes the paradigm for movement, even in things."198  
 
 Hence, as radically other than an ontological cosmology, Marion instead suggests that there 
is a 'liturgical ordering' of creation that stands prior to any ontology and instead, serves as the site, or 
place, of the confessio itself.  Such a view of creation is thereby in accord with Marion's thinking the 
certainty and possibility of desire and its uncertain and ultimately impossible object. Marion thereby 
completes, what he set out in discussing the 'desire-as-principle', when arguing that "Creation does 
not render confessio possible […] but it itself becomes possible only starting with confessio."199 Here, 
creation is removed entirely of its ontological character, as a posteriori of the liturgical itself. 
Furthermore, Marion evacuates any and all native dimensions of such desire. Marion instead posits 
the 'unshakable certainty' and universality of such an intrinsic desire for life, beatitude and God, 
though in no way is this a natural desire itself. For, in Marion's thought, if creation was considered in 
any sense prior to the rhythm of the confessio and its liturgical ordering of praise, then the purely 
asymmetrical and the anterior givenness of such a certain desire would be compromised of its 
gratuitous purity and instead, would be drawn into the economic, and the prospect of a reciprocal 
exchange. Instead, the possibility of desire is precisely such that its object remains impossibly 
incapable for the creature—God as radically [im]possible.  
 
 Marion thus shows a rigorous consistency when he likewise inquires of the utter impossibility 
of thinking of a place, i.e. myself, prior to, as an 'open place for God'.200 Hereby, the self is radically 
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rejected as a locus capax dei, and instead, Marion argues that one's similitudo resides upon the basis 
that "I take place in Him".201 Indeed, in Marion's account, there is fundamentally a lack of space for 
praise resident within the specificity of creation itself, and in the human in particular, as Marion 
denies an "opening for us a place to receive God."202 And as we explored previously203, the strong 
asymmetry and pure transcendence thus render Incarnational narratives such as the Annunciation to 
be 'difficult'. Not only does such a view remove any form of agency or cooperation on Mary's part, 
obscuring her fiat amid such an adventious givenness. Furthermore, it similarly removes from her—
and thus in turn, the Church—by way of a flattened particularity that undercuts the utter receptivity 
of the incarnational paradox that the Church herself praises amid unknowing: "With what praises to 
extol thee we know not, for He whom the heavens could not contain rested in thy bosom."204 Hence, 
in thoroughly obliterating the natural and any form of native opening or inclining desire towards 
God, Marion instead situates the place of the self and the site of creation's confessio as not in itself, 
but always already exceeding itself in God. 
 
 Marion will in turn similarly apply this same approach to questions of a specifically 
anthropological nature, while distinctly clarifying that it is on the basis on humanity's similitudo as 
created in the image and likeness, that thus "Man is defined by the very fact that he remains without 
definition."205 This is entirely consistent and in keeping with the dislodgement and de-centering of 
the self in Marion's reading of the interior intimo meo such that the human is properly non-
essentialist—as discarded by the "impracticable" designation as created in the image.206 And instead, 
is inextricably denoted by a "reference to another to himself, who more intimate to himself, occupies 
the essential place on loan to him."207 That is to say, an indebtedness (or givenness) that excessively 
accumulates and can never be repaid. However, there is a dire bleakness in Marion's description that 
is unavoidable. The human's radical indebtedness and subsequent displacement is coupled with the 
insistence that it is the "privilege of man" to be without definition. We are given "access" to man's 
privilege by the logic of the confessio, here emphasizing our similitudo to God's incomprehensibility, 
such that the human similarly bears such incomprehensibility. However, the abiding paradox in 
Marion's formulation—and subsequently, that which preserves distance from collapsing into 
pantheism—is precisely that which is on "loan to him", as the 'privilege of man' is similarly that which 
displaces and alienates the human by way of dissolving one's utter particularity. For the creaturely 
inverse of the weight of love and its confessio laudatio towards God is seen as a weight of 
indifference. That is, a burdensome weight, which in the following, we can see utterly belies the 
oppressively fallen weight of the "earthly city" itself. 
 
 D. THE WEIGHT OF LOVE 
 
 Despite my critique of Marion's dire approach to Augustine and his reading of confessio—one 
that maintains distance and foregoes relational collapse between the Creator and creature by way of 
a certain schizophrenic self displaced and lacking by the interior intimo meo—such deficiencies are 
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counter-balanced by an otherwise fascinating, constructive and  renewed approach towards love's 
univocity itself. That is, one that matches his earlier, provocative erotic reduction with an elegant 
reading of and rigorous re-conceptualization of Augustine's "weight of love" [pondus amoris]. In this 
manner, Marion lays out the constructive relevance of what specifically the univocity of love 
specifically entails, in which case he evinces several important developments from his earlier position 
in the Erotic Phenomenon which we shall now explore. 
 
 Marion begins by arguing that while Augustine takes over the natural law philosophy of his 
day in describing love as "weight", the real "innovation of pondus meum only begins when Augustine 
starts not with cosmology, yet the non-ontological plane of confessio."208 Here, as we saw earlier in 
terms of the a posteriori of creation to that of the confessio, in a similar manner the laws of motion 
are in turn presented as coming after the weight of love itself, as was earlier presented contra the 
rational cosmology of Neo-Scholasticism. 209 Similarly, Marion further solidifies his anthropological 
claim as to the "impracticable image" of the imago dei, such that this image risks resembling nothing. 
Namely, that the weight of love and its motion is explicitly set against the contrasting weight of 
nature. The weight of love, always anterior in its givenness is thus "directed" towards the "originarily 
eschatological" designation of creation, such that "This place, for man without definition, is found in 
nothing less than in the rest of God himself".210 In Marion's reading, this eschatology is marked by 
both restlessness and rest, a "principle" in which the confessio "has, since the beginning, put into 
operation."211 We can understand this eschatological operation of love as set against a competing 
weight when, for example, Marion adapts Augustine's well-known two loves: of the earthly city and 
the heavenly city. For that which weighs downward is a love of "nature" and the earthly city, while 
that which weighs nothing is directed towards the heavenly city. Here, grace works as a 
"counterweight" that is set against the various objects of one's restlessness that weigh down upon 
the human.212 Grace thus counteracts and works against humanity's sinful inclinations, while equally 
confirming that the exitus-reditus structure of such weights is that one's eschatological place is one 
of return—a place that is impossible for me. In the following Johannine text, Marion refers to 
Augustine's citation of this text as principally indicative of love's weight and its singular force towards 
the eschatological [im]possible: 'Nobody comes to me, if the Father has not attracted him."213 Here, 
it is clear that given how such a counter-weight counter-acts the weight of nature, whereby the 
purpose is by no means to "balance the scales" as Ruusbroec so implores. Rather, in Marion's 
approach to Augustine, the objective is to fully allow for this counterweight to exert a full 
disequilibrium, to weigh down and press upon, without the least resistance. Hence, for the human, 
"to love" is to not prevent nor obstruct, yet permit it to take place. 
 
 In summary fashion, Marion concisely defines this weight and the singularity of its exertion as 
follows: "Love weighs, therefore, with a weight that rises as well as falls, because it exerts a pressure, 
which pushes only of itself."214 Here, the volitional aspects of love are not entirely elided in Marion's 
reading. However, the voluntary by no means intensifies (or de-intensifies) the pressure and the 
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degrees of givenness of love's weight. Love happens, in Marion's approach to Augustine. One cannot 
so much will to love as one can neither desire an object more or less. In fact, formally speaking, there 
are in fact no "works" of love in Marion's account—rather, there is a "working upon". In this sense, 
the volitional in Marion is one of location: "At best, he can direct it" in either its theocentric or 
anthropocentric orientation. The asymmetrical anteriority of love is hence conceptually sealed for 
Marion as a weight, as that which "pushes, from the outset and forever behind me", a weight that 
knows no impossibility in its "absolute and unconditioned transcenden[ce]."215  
 
 Arriving upon this concise conceptuality of love as weight, Marion is able to better clarify the 
specific parameters of what a univocal love entails, such that "[I]t is put into practice in the same way 
and according to the same logic, however different its object and occasions appear."216 The 
difference in love, Marion affirms—and citing agreement with Anders Nygren on this point217 
concerns not so much various "kinds" of love. Rather, it is one of "object", in which Marion applies 
Augustine's hermeneutic of the two cities and their contrasting weights.218 And yet, given the strict 
antinomy between these two cities, their strife amid radical dissimilarity—both in Augustine and in 
Marion—the challenge that Marion rightly confronts is how to understand the claim to love's 
univocity "all the while being perfectly capable of being distinguished in different modes."219 Herein, 
we very clearly recognize a logical consistency in the univocal, as the same question appears to Peter 
Lombard in Book 1, Distinction 18, in which he addresses the challenge of maintaining the unity and 
identity of the Gift (Holy Spirit) amid the multiplicity and distinction of gifts given. However, unlike 
the Lombard, Marion does not posit a "common" solution to the problem. Rather, he inverts the 
challenge by inquiring whether or not it is at all possible (i.e. any creaturely object itself) to enjoy and 
take rest in any thing else than God alone. Marion clarifies that what is strictly under consideration is 
a phenomenological question over "possibility"; it is not a question whether or not such loving 
enjoyment is or is not morally 'licit'.220 Here, Marion's familiar construction of God's purely 
asymmetrical transcendence as a radical [im]possibility reemerges: namely, the 'impossibility of 
impossibility, and therefore God's radical possibility'221 Thus, since the question of love and its 
destination is one ultimately of 'place',  Marion opts for a clear, theological prioritization, such that 
"enjoyment is possible only of God, who alone does not disappoint, because he alone stays in 
place…".222  
 
 Subsequent to this asymmetrical prioritization, Marion's construction of [im]possibility 
appears well-suited in providing a greater philosophical hermeneutic and emphasis upon—and 
thereby away from its conventional, moral theological stress—of Augustine's similarly well-known 
'uti'/'frui' distinction.223 That is, it is only "possible" to enjoy others propter Deum, or in view of God 
                                                          
215
 Marion, In the Self's Place, 274. 
216
 Marion, In the Self's Place, 272. 
217
 Marion, In the Self's Place, 272-3. 
218
 ibid. 
219
 Marion, In the Self's Place, 275. 
220
 Marion, In the Self's Place, 276. 
221
 See Supra, "Abiding in Minne's Demands 2.0" 
222
 Marion, In the Self's Place, 276. 
223
 Herein, Marion's reading of the 'uti/frui' distinction in terms of [im]possibility finds a similar coralate in Rik 
van Nieuwenhove's reading that Augustine's distinction exemplifies a genuine religious disposition to others 
and the world as 'non-instrumenltalist'. See supra. note 17. 
Chapter VIII. Abiding in Minne's Demands. Part IV—Common Love and the Univocal 
211 
 
and the ultimacy of His place as one of rest. "In all cases it is an issue of love" Marion clarifies, 
"univocal, declined by its modes, intrigues, and wills. It is never about not loving nor loving only God, 
but of knowing how to love each and all in the appropriate mode, God and the gifts of God."224 Here, 
Marion provides an important adaption and moderated position from his earlier argument in the 
Erotic Phenomenon and its insistence that grounded univocity as consisting of "one way".225 Instead, 
Marion now accepts the legitimacy of reconciling the univocal with a "plurality of meanings and 
modes", as none other than articulating, not so much love's 'one way', yet instead its "singular 
playing field".226  
 
 However, as Marion indeed offers a rigorous, constructive re-reading of Augustine's weight 
of love's and its univocity via phenomenological givenness, the erotic reduction and the [im]possible, 
its profound hindrance of creaturely estrangement and displacement of the human—resident in the 
confessio and the interior intimo meo as rendering one incapable of reception, incapable of action—
remains inextricably joined as an obstacle to this otherwise admirable approach. Intrinsic to the 
rhythm of the confessio and the 'unshakable certainty' of its principle of desire is thus deployed in 
Marion's approach not so much in terms of the transcendentals themselves. Instead, the radical 
dissimilarity and disjunct between God's incomprehensibility and that of the human's 'lack of 
definition' thus renders the performative meaning of praise indubitably inscribed as a desire of lack. 
Among this 'singular playing field' of love's givenness and the weight of its deployment, the univocal 
establishes relationality between Creator and creature as one of radical dissimilitude amongst 
infinite distance. "For I am what I love", Marion first affirms alongside Augustine, yet he alone 
singularly concludes: 
 
 Never will I find the self's place as an essence, because an absolute and infinite place can only 
 draw near to the infinite and unbounded. My place, never will I attain it as to a finite essence 
 since it is found unto the image and in the image of the infinite. But of the infinite, I will not 
 become in any way the image, because no image can bind in the absolute. Therefore, my place  in 
 God that I love will be accomplished unto the image endlessly referred to the infinite [….]
227
 
 
 
 In the approach of praising the infinite givenness of God, the univocal demands a reciprocal 
like unto likeness so as to 'draw near to the infinite and unbounded'. And yet, the asymmetry of 
God's infinite place is set over against the creaturely finite, such that it disables any form of 
economic mutuality and reciprocal return. That is, before and approaching such an infinite place, the 
creature is rendered imageless. Rather, the confessional structure is quite evident in this  greater 
similitudo and its endless referral, which is at once joined "to the degree that he abandons any 
likeness to himself"228 in this collapse of the creaturely. And instead, is measured by "the degree to 
which I bury myself in the incomprehensible into whose image I understand myself."229 Again, does 
Marion's univocal approach necessitate God's asymmetry as over against the creaturely and thereby 
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rendering it imageless; or is this not rather the 'unshakable certainty' of a desire of lack in its infinite 
referral as itself the meaning of praise? 
 
 And so, by way of a strong contrast that nonetheless retains a great similarity, we thus return 
back to beginning  in once more quoting Ruusbroec amid his own univocal description of minne that 
nonetheless retains the dynamism resident in mutual indwelling as one of both eternally in the image 
(seen here following in the "third way") and unto His likeness of perpetual similarity and dissimilarity 
(as seen in the "fourth way"): 
 
And now follows the third distinction in feeling, 
that is that we feel ourselves one with God. For 
through the over-forming [overforminghe] we 
receive from God we feel swallowed in the 
fathomless abyss of our eternal bliss where we 
can never again find a distinction between 
ourselves and God [….] all our faculties stand 
empty in an essential enjoyment, but they are not 
reduced to nothing, for then we would lose our 
creatureliness [….] 
 
Yet at the moment we want to test and examine 
what it is we are feeling, we fall back into reason 
and then we find distinction and otherness 
between ourselves and God, and we find God 
outside ourselves in the incomprehensible. And 
this is the fourth way in which we feel both God 
and ourselves. For here we find ourselves 
standing before God's presence. And the truth we 
receive from his countenance bears witness to us 
that God wants to be completely ours and that he 
wants us to be completely his. And in the moment 
we feel God wants to be completely ours, there 
arises in us a gaping, voracious lust, so hungry, so 
deep and so empty that even if God gave us all he 
could, except Himself, we would not be satisfied 
[….] For we feed on the measurelessness of God 
which we cannot swallow, and we yearn in his 
endlessness we cannot reach, and that way we 
cannot come into God, nor can God come into us 
for we cannot renounce ourselves in restlessness 
of minne [….] for minne desires what remains 
impossible for it and reason bears witness that 
minnen is right but it can neither advise minnen in 
this case nor forbid it [….] for God's touch, which 
flows out to us, fans our restlessness and 
demands our action, namely that we love the love 
eternal [dat wij minnen die eewighe minne]" 
Ende hier na volcht dat derde onderscheet van 
ghevoelne, dat es dat wij ons met gode een 
ghevoelen. Want overmids die overforminghe gods 
ghevoelen wij ons verswolghen in een grondeloes abis 
onser eewigher zalicheit, daer wij tusschen ons ende 
gode nemmermeer onderscheet venden en moghen 
[.... ]soe staen alle onse crachte ledich in een weselijc 
ghebruken, maer si en werden niet te nieute, want 
soe verloren wij onse ghescapenheit [....] 
 
 
Maer inden selven oghenblicke dat wij proeven ende 
merken willen wat es dat wij ghevoelen, soe vallen wij 
in redenen; ende dan venden wij onderscheet ende 
anderheyt tuschen ons ende gode; ende dan venden 
wij gode buten ons in ombegripelijcheiden. Ende dit 
es dat vierde onderscheet daer wij gods ende ons in 
ghevoelen. Want hier venden wij ons staende voer die 
jeghenwoordicheyt gods. Ende <die> waerheit die wij 
ontfaen uten aenschine gods, die tuycht ons dat god 
te male wilt onse sijn, ende dat hi wilt dat wij te male 
sine sijn. Ende inden selven oghenblicke dat wij des 
ghevoelen dat god te male wilt onse zijn, soe 
ontsprinct in ons eene gapende ghierighe ghelost die 
alsoe hongherich ende alsoe diep ende alsoe idel is, al 
<gave god al> dat hi gheleisten mochte, sonder hem 
selven, het en mochte ons niet ghenoeghen [....] Want 
wij teren op sine ongheintheit, die wij niet hervolghen 
en moghen. Ende aldus en connen wij in gode comen 
noch god in ons. Want in ongheduere van minnen en 
connen wij ons selfs niet vertijen [....] want minne 
beghert dat haer ommoghelijc is. Ende redene tughet 
dat der minnen recht es. Maeer si en can der minnen 
hier toe gheraden noch verbieden [....] Want dat 
uutvloeyende gherinen gods stoect ongheduer ende 
eyscht ons werc, dat es dat wij minnen die eewighe 
minnen." 
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 As seen in the above quote, Ruusbroec profoundly synthesizes the coupling of both the 
intrinsic demands and desires of minne and its enduring praxis as none other than the dynamism of 
mutual indwelling itself. Likewise, Ruusbroec is able at once to maintain both the same origins of 
such demands, as well as the fact that our responding desires are themselves creaturely indefinite 
and distinctly particular [onderscheet] in their inevitable failure to satisfy minne's demands. In no 
way can the naturalness of humanity's desire for God be reduced to an anonymous, magnetic 
'tracking device',  as Frans Jozef van Beeck once colorfully put it. Rather, it is distinctly 'our minne' 
that reflects the uniqueness of encounter. And yet, in view of minne's demands, one's desires are 
never apart, isolated and self-reflexive so much as they stem from a relational givenness that always 
already precedes their particularity. As in the above quote, the exitus structure of minne is such that 
'God's touch flows out to us,' as an implacable, restless stirring or touch [gherinen] that similarly 
demands of our "action". All the while recalling its strong scriptural basis, "[B]ecause God's love has 
been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us." (Rom. 5, 5) While in 
the freedom of its reditus response, our minne indeed retains the particularity of our desires. And yet 
such a response is always already a graced response. And thus in turn, despite our own unavoidable 
failures and the impossibility of a just response, these debts are mutually shared in the whole Christ, 
in which the Body commonly partakes and is inseparably joined to its Head.231 It is never ourselves 
alone, who in 'being wrought' by the Holy Spirit, lovingly respond to such a gracious love. Rather, our 
love, if we are to be 'wise merchants', deepens in perfection in unity and solidarity with and towards 
others, as a movement none other than that of the Son's own loving return to the Father, where we 
become servi in Servo et filii in Filio232 as we 'give ourselves in return in His Spirit'.  
 
 This is to say that in the main, Ruusbroec's understanding of minne's univocity—in its created 
origins; its enduring, everyday individual and communal praxis; and the deified perfection of such 
love—is that it is one, and the same, mutually reciprocal amid an asymmetrically dynamic, greater 
dissimilarity between Creator and creature. It is a "double minne"233 that is both fully ours and fully 
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geeste....Ende dese werkeleke minne heten wi karitate, doe onsen geest leven ende wassen doet in der 
genaden. dese enege bant der karitaten die gevet ons minne ende hi eischet ons dat wi minnen, ende hi es 
selve minne, want hi maecht dat minleke ingeesten tusschen ons ende gode, dat altoes werken moet. Want dat 
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daer onse geesteleke leven inne besteet." 
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God's—a common love. "This minne that is God is common to us all and to each one in particular and 
(belongs) totally to those who love."234  Subsequently, and in accord with the axiom of the deified life 
[overforminghe]—that union with God and others renders one more human, more particular—
minne's univocity holds that particularity and distinction are the result of, and not the precondition 
of loving as relationally common to us all. Minne is thus a particularizing movement in its insistence 
upon the distinctiveness of our charitable works and interior desires precisely because it is 
ghemeyne. It thus reconfigures modernity's prioritization of the self-enclosed autonomous subject, 
who in turn loves as an extension of their identity itself—or absence of one, as we see in Marion.235 
  
 Further reflecting upon such a common love in both its universal breadth and its particular, 
deified, admirable exchange, Ruusbroec remarks: "Now we are all merchants by nature" that is, 
"buying and selling, that is exchanging, giving something good for something still better."236 For 
Ruusbroec, recognition of this gratuitous gift of God bestowed upon all of us, by virtue of creating us 
ex nihlio sets in motion the impossible challenge of responding to such a gift. "For the nature of 
minne is always to give and to take",237 yet this very impossibility that fuels the irreducible 
particularity of minne's desire [begheren] is at the same time that which invites us to become more 
fully creaturely, more particularly human by way of becoming further united to God in His loving 
unity—without difference or distinction [sonder differencie ochte  onderscheet]. For "giving and 
taking are eternally distinct [eewich onderscheet] in the practice of minnen."238  
 
 Herein, the principle to 'unify, so as to distinguish' is deeply helpful in explaining Ruusbroec's 
unflinching insistence in maintaining minne's univocity as common. In his rich theological synthesis 
that is at once rigorously prophetic and profoundly contemplative, Ruusbroec challenges us time and 
time again as he announces: whether or not, by way of our active loving, our desires, our works, will 
our human distinctiveness and personal uniqueness emerge from the graced nature of creation 
itself? Will we respond to such giftedness and “Pay thy debt; love the Love that has eternally loved 
thee!"239 Which, in this case, we can see clearly echoes the Lombard's infamous distinction such that, 
'whoever loves the very love by which he loves his neighbor,' so too 'loves God'. In the life of grace ( 
and glory), Ruusbroec continuously puts forth the moral imperative of whether or not will we indeed 
mirror and grow in likeness unto and "cleave" to such impossible demands or not. Either way, this 
economy of exchange in its varied destinations will proceed regardless. In both its daily concreteness 
and Trinitarian and Christological heights and depths,240 the width of the common life attests that 
                                                          
234
 Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, book 2b, ll. 662-664: "[Dat] Dese minne, die god es, die es onser alder 
ghemeyne ende yeghewelcs sonderlinghe, ende al ‹ghe›heel die mint." 
235
 For specific application of this position, see supra, Chapter 3, "We will see God with the eyes of our body",  
236
 Ruusbroec, XII Beghinen, 2b, ll. 2349-2350 (with slight modification): "Nu zyn ‹wi› alle coepliede van 
natueren [....] Coopen ende vercoopen, dat es wisselen, lief om noch lievere gheven." 
237
 Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, book 2b, ll. 674: "Minnen natuere es altoes gheven ende nemen [...]" 
238
 Ruusbroec, Vanden XII Beghinen, book 2b, ll. 675-676: "Gheven ende nemen, dat es een eewich 
onderscheet der minnen pleghen." 
239 
See Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 9, Van Seven Trappen, VII, ll. 1106-1107: "'Betaelt uwe scoud; mindt de 
minne, die u eewelec ghemindt heeft!'" 
240
 Here too, in an analogous vein, we hear Ruusbroec and the distinct force of the mystical theological 
tradition and its ardent social critique that flows from its distinct, theological position when more recently, 
Rowan Williams boldly proclaimed (in 2012, as then acting Archbishop of Canterbury) to the Roman Synod of 
Bishops: "[C]ontemplation is the only ultimate answer to the unreal and insane world that our financial systems 
and our advertising culture and our chaotic and unexamined emotions encourage us to inhabit.  To learn 
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while the economic itself and its impossible demands are inescapable, the scales of minne similarly 
deny themselves recompense, as they stand in a suspended balance, eagerly awaiting for our graced 
return. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
contemplative practice is to learn what we need so as to live truthfully and honestly and lovingly. It is a deeply 
revolutionary matter." See Rowan Williams, Archbishop’s address to the Synod of Bishops in Rome Wednesday 
10th October 2012, 
  http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/2645/#sthash.eIFmOB2z.dpuf, as accessed on 
03.01.2014. 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
IN THE PLACE OF CHRIST:  
RETRIEVING THE LOCUS OF RUUSBROEC'S 
CHRISTOLOGY WITHIN CONTEMPORARY 
CHRISTIAN SPIRITUALITY 
 
 
 
§1. INTRODUCTION—SPIRITUALITY AND                     
ENVISIONING  THE PUBLIC REALM 
 
A. PROFANE SPIRITUALITY 
 
 
In a recent thematic edition of Spiritus focusing specifically 
on Christian spirituality within a contemporary European 
context, Philip Sheldrake assesses Christian spirituality's 
"most fruitful path" in the immediate future as one marked 
by resourcing more traditional Christian humanist values and 
their social engagement, while aiming at a collaborative approach amongst a plurality of spiritualties 
for a greater "humanization of the world".1 This position both dialogically recognizes more general 
assessments on the very fluidity and often ambiguous understandings of 'spiritualties' within 
contemporary settings, while inserting distinctly public-oriented Christian spiritualties into such 
social locales. Especially those particularly attentive to their foundational theological, incarnational 
underpinnings in which "no part of the material world or of human activity is inherently profane, 
although it may be profaned by sinful human action. The everyday world is an authentic theological 
locus."2 While drawing heavily on De Certeau in rejecting a "polarization of [the] sacred and 
profane"3, Sheldrake's recent assessment of the fruitfulness of such a Christian spiritual engagement 
within a pluralistic European social context was voiced in positive reference to Luk Bouckaert's own 
plea for a humanist-inspired, "profane spirituality".4  
 
 Both as founder of the Leuven-based European SPES Forum5 (Spirituality in Economics and 
Society) and a philosopher and economist by training, Luk Bouckaert's article, "The Search for a 
Profane Spirituality" explains the frequent intersection and mutual interaction today between 
economics and spirituality as "linked to the process of globalization deconstructing existing national, 
ideological and religious boundaries". Which in turn, by virtue of its fluid adaptability, spirituality 
understood as a "transconfessional good" is poised at responding to questions of "meaning" and 
"discernment" in a manner far better than more traditionally bound and contextually rooted 
                                                          
1
 Philip F. Sheldrake, "Spirituality in a European Context", Spiritus, vol. 11, 1, Spring 2011,1-9, 8. 
2
 Philip F. Sheldrake, Explorations in Spirituality: History, Theology and Social Practice (New York: Paulist Press, 
2010), pg. 10. 
3
 Sheldrake, Explorations, 11. 
4
 C.f. Luk Bouckaert, "The Search for a 'Profane Spirituality'", Spiritus, vol. 11, nr. 1 Spring 2011, pg. 24-37. 
5
 C.f. http://www.spes-forum.be/spes/index.php, as accessed on 06.12.2011. 
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ecclesiastical participation.6  How so? Bouckaert claims that the current appeal of spirituality is that it 
opens up a "free, post-modern space for the personal quest for meaning, connectedness and 
transcendence" that both draws from, as well as moderates the otherwise excessive positions of 
both outdated liberal secular viewpoints that conceive of such religious and/or spiritual identities as 
exclusively private as well as pre-modern, religious exclusivist positions as closed, hegemonic and 
thus poorly equipped at engaging pressing social demands within a pluralistic context.7 Claiming 
spirituality's link as mediating a space wherein the public realm distinctly emerges is primarily 
explored in economic terms, as Bouckaert argues that spirituality today clearly demonstrates its 
value within the larger, public sphere as "indivisible" (i.e. non-possessive) and a "public good", 
especially in terms of its ability to "foster compassion, trust, non-violence, and a sense of meaning 
and purpose in life."8 Thus conceived, a "profane spirituality" today is poised at becoming freed from 
both its privatized sphere and instead, is recognized economically as contributing to a "new type of 
homo economicus"9 by subverting private/public polarized opposition and instead, integrates such 
competing interests and demands by virtue of promoting its public character. Critically, what 
precisely is such a public character that Bouckaert claims spirituality mediates other than a 
multiplicity of individual pursuits? By this orientation is spirituality transforming public spaces or 
rather eviscerating them? 
 
 While Bouckaert's defense of a contemporary spirituality very much stresses its 
discontinuous character—as pursued within a secular idiom that resists lapsing back into explicit 
religious categories―he nonetheless also relies upon a certain level of continuity in his indebtedness 
to the tradition of Christian humanism and its post-war revitalization at the basis of informing his 
view of spirituality and its postmodern public engagement. By first distinguishing both the thoroughly 
Jewish prophetic spirituality of Jesus of Nazareth as well as the Pauline-based, Christocentric 
spirituality in affirmation of the divinity of Christ and the "exemplary function of his life (imatatio 
Christi)"10, Bouckaert draws the link between his current 'profane spirituality' with the modern 
Christian tradition as institutionally embodying a 
 
more secular meaning of Christian spirituality expressed by the term Christian humanism. Its 
focus is not the worship of Christ and identification with his life and presence but the 
humanization of the world. A Christian humanist is not looking to Christ but is looking with Christ 
at the problems of the world. The Christian humanist's concern is how to realize peace and 
justice in the world, how to save the planet from ecological disaster, how to restore social trust 
and communication, how to respect the dignity of life [....] The existing network of Christian 
organizations in political, social and cultural life is still inspired by this third form of Christian 
humanist spirituality.
11
 
 
 
 
 B. IN THE PLACE OF CHRIST 
 
                                                          
6
 Bouckaert, "Profane Spirituality", 25. 
7
 Bouckaert, "Profane Spirituality", 26. 
8
 Bouckaert, "Profane Spirituality", 27. 
9
 Bouckaert, "Profane Spirituality", 32. 
10
 Bouckaert, "Profane Spirituality", 35. 
11
 ibid. 
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 The implications, however, of such a secular Christian humanist spirituality are quite 
illuminating when noting the shifting relationality towards Christ―and more specifically, the place of 
Christ amid its public engagement―that becomes operative within its institutional praxis. Such shifts 
are attested in that any and all doctrinal foundation is intentionally avoided and instead, emphasis is 
given from the outset of a relational mutuality with the prophetic, ethical vision of Jesus of Nazareth. 
By situating himself firmly within this tradition, it is indeed curious to gauge more specifically 
Bouckaert's thinking of spirituality's institutionally-based, public engagement today fundamentally as 
a pluralistic enterprise, especially when considering an organization such as SPES, rooted as it is 
within this Christian humanist trajectory, nonetheless opts to "leave the institutional sphere of 
Christian organizations".12 By Bouckaert's own reflections, we are given an opportunity to consider 
such a development, the pressure of which is becoming increasingly common with Christian 
organizations in Western European societies―at the intersection of both discontinuity and 
continuity. Not primarily in response to issues of plurality and otherness, nor ideological pressure 
that marks the contemporary, European public sphere, yet primarily out of pragmatic, economic 
reasons that arise within its public involvement. Citing the influence of the early 20th Century French 
personalist philosopher, Emmanuel Mounier13 on the identity and mission of SPES, Bouckaert relates 
a historical example from Mounier's moral commitments to a "more frugal and spirit-centered life" 
as distinct from those "who celebrate materialism and consumerism" while concluding that such 
competing values "did not correlate with the distinction between believers and non-believers."14 In 
turn, Bouckaert states that "Mounier was convinced that the Christian commitment to the poor and 
a more just society could only be realized if Christians left their ghettos and searched for allies of 
good will to overcome the structures of fear, exploitation, and self-interest."15  
 
 While recognizing the formative influence of Mournier's personalism on SPES, is such a 
characterization at all contextually relevant today? Instead of being inhibited by an overtly 
exclusivist, ghetto-mentality, do not such publically-oriented Christian organizations―schools, 
hospitals, charitable organizations, Christian political organizations, etc.―suffer more from the 
opposite pressure of maintaining any and all affirmation of particularity in their Christian identity, 
invariably seen in tension both ad intra as well as ad extra? Are not the common assessments made 
by Sheldrake and Bouckaert's otherwise divergent positions of spirituality's distinctly public-vocation 
in continuity with its Christian humanist values naïvely optimistic? While failing to address the very 
real institutional pressures that various organizations face pertaining to their Christian identity, it is 
not at all self-evident that by adopting such a position would be Christian spirituality's "most fruitful 
path" within Europe in the following decades.    
 
 Recalling Bouckaert's description of a secular, Christian humanist spirituality as no longer 
directed "to Christ", yet "with Christ" and towards the world, by shifting away from a Christocentric 
spirituality inevitably portrays the latter as dogmatically obtuse that thwarts spirituality's more 
socially relevant, transformative potential. However, such a position, I would argue, draws spirituality 
only further afield and mutually impoverishes attempts at renewing its theological engagement with 
                                                          
12
 Bouckaert, "Profane Spirituality", 36. 
13
 Bouckaert makes several mentions of the principled influence Mournier has had upon the formation of the 
SPES forum, see especially Bouckaert, "Profane Spirituality", 32, 35-6. 
14
 ibid. 
15
 ibid. 
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the mystical/contemplative tradition in view of a contemporary mystical theology. Critically, does it 
not follow that the theological estrangement incurred by such a secular Christian humanist 
spirituality—admittedly, which is indeed at the heart of many Christian social organizations—has 
robbed its ability to speak for why it opts to stand "with" Christ in the world in the first place, other 
than to deflect such pressures as ultimately a question of respecting the heritage of its self-reflexive 
identity, the benchmark for such discussions today. Subsequently, not only do such responses result 
in a flattened particularity. Moreso, their social engagement is equally blunted, as the institutional 
"identity" in question does not affirm with whom we are standing with, nor does it answer towards 
those we are committed, as a response to our affirmation. Rather, it seeks to clarify our own 
identities and the collective institutions of which we are apart.  
 
 Contextually mindful of both the positive contributions of (Christian) spirituality's role within 
well-established and emerging, communicative public spheres in fostering new idioms for meaningful 
expression as well as the institutional pressures that such publically-oriented Christian organizations 
are now facing, such a critical position that I take however does not implicate me in necessarily 
adopting a more dualistic, culturally confrontational position. Rather, by admitting of these various 
contextual difficulties, such challenges illustrate the greater task of thinking concrete particularity as 
anything other than at the expense of alterity within a fluid, pluralistic social context such as Western 
Europe today. And yet, such a difficulty of affirming particularity within committed relationality, I 
would argue is hardly in line with the Christian Humanist tradition itself, especially by one of its 
earliest proponents, the Brabantine mystical theologian, Jan van Ruusbroec.  
 
 Such a perspective extends from current research into the Admirable Doctor and the 
retrieval of the primacy of Ruusbroec's relational understanding of minne within a contemporary, 
fundamental theological context. Minne, a unitive, dynamic concept of love that is differentiated 
from, yet incorporates dimensions of both caritas/agape and eros—has a critical potential to both 
expand and give further depth to our rethinking of love, as well as its distinct promise to do so from 
the seat of its own embodied primacy. As a unitive concept both "above reason and yet not without 
reason"16, Ruusbroec’s theology of minne, I propose can enable us to refine, nuance and provide a 
unique alternative to otherwise polarized, contemporary theological discussions over the competing 
priorities of caritas and veritas, resultant in part by the failure to think love beyond what metaphysics 
has thus divided. While maintaining its unity, love by necessity needs a third term to think such 
primacy beyond the current impasse between self-possessive and self-denying love. Furthermore, in 
approaching a 'profane spirituality' no longer directed towards Christ, yet with him and together, 
towards the world, such a relational shift only further illustrates one of the fundamental challenges 
in upholding a unified understanding of love today, namely that charity―beyond all moralism, 
historical redresses of guilt and passionless responsibility―is indeed far more than something we 
                                                          
16
 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 3, The Spiritual Espousals, (trans.) H. Rolfson, (ed.) J. Alaerts (Tielt: Lannoo, 
Turnhout: Brepols, 188) b, ll. 1481-1485: "In the unity of spirit, in which this vein wells, one is above activity 
and above reason, but not without reason; for the enlightened reason, and especially, the faculty of loving [de 
minnende cracht], feels this touch, and reason can neither comprehend nor understand the mode or manner, 
how or what this touch might be." "In eenicheit des gheests, daer dese adere walt, es men boven werken ende 
boven redene, maer niet sonder redene; want die verlichte redene, ende zonderlinghe de minnende cracht, 
ghevoelt dit gherinen, ende redene en can niet begripen noch verstaen wise noch maniere, hoe ochte wie dit 
gherinen si." 
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simply "do" as reflective of our self- identity, but it too bears the marks of a loving encounter17 of the 
other, of Christ. An encounter that is met in an impossible desire for justice and its demands, from 
which we cannot but continually flow out towards others without exclusion, gratuitously and seeking 
nothing back in return. 
 
 Currently, I wish to explore Ruusbroec's distinct, mystically-based approach to otherwise 
traditional Christological themes and their mutual influence at the intersection of minne. More 
specifically, issues of particularity and human autonomy as strongly upheld in the various manners of 
union with Christ. For in approaching the very particularity of our desirous, loving union towards and 
in Christ and the expressions of such an underlying, relational mutuality that minne ushers forth, 
Ruusbroec invariably describes these manners as the following: as mediated with distinction in and 
through the external activity of our loving; as immediate in the work of our desirous yearning and 
praise; as well as without difference or distinction [onderscheet] in terms of minne's loving 
enjoyment. Accounting for Ruusbroec's at times strong expressions of union language, while equally 
attentive to the relational alterity that such minne entails, it is Ruusbroec's distinctly Christian 
humanistic perspective that comes to the fore in these considerations, wherein the particularity and 
autonomy of the human person well-endures such radical language of union and transformation. 
Thus, Ruusbroec's position emphatically maintains the very humanness of union, rather than a more 
Eckhartian understanding of union as a full merging wherein all created particularity flows away. The 
endurance of minne and its continual renewal of mutual love refuses easily collapsing distinctions of 
greater dissimilarity between Creator and creature, while equally admitting of the praxis of such 
transformative loving "with which we fight against the terrifying, tremendous love of God, which 
wants to burn up all loving spirits and devour them in its Selfhood."18 And yet, in the face of this 
voracious and excessively unrestrained abysmal love [afgrondiger minne], so too is there an endlessly 
gratuitous modality of minne that Ruusbroec will also stress, wherein Christ "[W]ants to live and 
dwell in you; and He Himself wants to be your life, God and man, and be altogether yours, if you 
want to be altogether His and live in Him and dwell in Him like a heavenly divine human being 
[hemelsch, godlec mensche]."19 In this way, by precisely integrating more traditional Christological 
reflections as resourced within their distinctive mystical theological idiom, Ruusbroec's Christology 
necessarily converges with his mystical anthropology  in continual reference to our own deification in 
Christ as "sons of God, by grace, not by nature"20, understood as further redeeming our own human 
nature and becoming more fully human in and through loving, spiritual praxis. 
 
 
                                                          
17
 See generally, the Motu Proprio of Benedict XVI, "On the Service of Charity", wherein such an "encounter" is 
recalled as forming the continual basis of the Church's works of charity, which at the same time distinguishes 
her from "[…] becoming just another form of organized social assistance." See 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/motu_proprio/documents/hf_ben-xvi_motu-
proprio_20121111_caritas_en.html, as accessed on 21.01.13. 
18
 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 8, Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit, trans. A. Lefevere, ed. G. de Baere 
(Tielt: Lannoo, Turnhout: Brepols, 2001) ll. 1818-1820: "Siet, dit sijn de wapene daer wi mede striden jeghen de 
vreeseleke, onghehiere minne gods, die alle minnende gheeste wilt verberren ende verslinden in hars 
selfsheit." 
19
 Ruusbroec, Spieghel, ll. 40-43: "Want hi wilt in u leven ende wooenen, ende hi wilt selve uwe leven sijn, god 
ende mensche, ende al te male uwe sijn, eest dat ghe te male sine wilt sijn ende in hem leven ende wooenen 
alse .i. hemelsch, godlec mensche." 
20
 Jan van Ruusbroec, Spieghel,  ll. 1884-5: "[...] daer sijn wi sonen gods van ghenaden, niet van natueren." 
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For He shall show you the way of minne to His 
Father which He Himself walked and which He 
Himself is. And in it He shall show you how His 
Human nature is a worthy offering to His Father. 
And this human nature He has given you with all 
that He has suffered, that you may confidently 
come to court with it before His heavenly Father. 
Want hi sal u wisen den wech der minnen te sinen 
vader dien hi selve ghing ende die hi selve es. Ende 
daer in sal hi u vertooenen hoe sine menscheit eene 
weerderghe offerande es sinen vader. Ende dese 
menscheit heeft hi u ghegheven met al dien dat hi 
gheleden heeft, dat ghe coenlec daer mede te hove 
comt vore sinen hemelschen vader.
21
 
 
 
 Thus, Ruusbroec's balanced, integrated approach, I would like to argue, thoroughly 
challenges both contemporary views on the limiting role of dogma and the legacy of the Christian 
humanist tradition in particular, arguing instead for a mystical theology that allows us to dwell both 
with and in Christ amid the otherwise inaccessibly profound and unfathomable sufferings that He 
continuously opens access to and bears alongside others within creation and in His Body, the Church. 
 
 By raising the challenge previously illustrated of thinking concrete particularity as affirming, 
rather than excluding radical alterity, such a perspective presupposes  a view of Christian spirituality 
in general, and in particular, the writings of Ruusbroec as indelibly marked by and thoroughly 
dependent upon its theological basis. By recognizing its theological basis and dependency, Christian 
spirituality need not however explicitly nor implicitly return us to the presuppositions of the manual 
tradition as inaugurated by Scaramelli and later on typified by Tanquerey's immensely popular The 
Spiritual Life22. Sheldrake himself has argued for the distinctiveness of a contemporary "spirituality" 
as clearly distinguished from that of "spiritual theology", noting that spirituality today is "not simply 
the prescriptive application of absolute or dogmatic principles to life."23 And yet, such an identity in 
discontinuity, I would cautiously assert is still more shaped by its distinctly modern heritage and 
tradition―as typified by the manual tradition and the discussions surrounding the relations 
invariably between asceticism, seen as preparatory and theologically-based to that of the 
extraordinary and overtly experiential character of mysticism. Hence, while this has led many to 
clearly assert spirituality's autonomy from that of theology, especially in its institutional application 
and academic study, such counter-movements nonetheless owe much to the modern manual 
tradition's characterization of "mysticism" by both over-emphasizing spirituality's new self-
understanding to the clear detriment of more classical spiritual texts disengaged from their 
hermeneutically grounded, theologically-engaged religious context.  
 
 Readdressing this imbalance may be seen in the fruitful, mutual engagement between 
Christian doctrine and its speculative, theological reflection with that of spiritual praxis is well 
attested to in Ruusbroec's overall mystical theology. Such a perspective is readily accessible in the 
opening sections to a shorter work of Ruusbroec's, Vanden Vier Becoringhen, which was a "farewell 
to Brussels"24  before leaving for Groenendaal and the Sonian Forest, where he would spend the 
remainder of his life in the emerging community that would eventually adopt for itself the rule of St. 
Augustine. Ruusbroec gives a strong portrait in the following citation of his spiritual praxis itself as 
                                                          
21
 Ruusbroec, Spieghel, ll. 69-73. 
22
 A.A. Tanquerey, The Spiritual Life: A Treatise on Ascetical and Mystical Theology, trans. Herman Branderis 
(Tournai: ET, 1930). 
23
 Philip Sheldrake, Spirituality and History (London: SPCK, 1995), pp 58. 
24
 See Paul Mommaers' Introduction to Vanden Vier Becoringhen, Opera Omnia X, Brepols/Turnhout, 223. 
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both grounded in as well as providing for a mystical theological hermeneutic that receives and 
evaluates its relationship to its foundational Christian sources: 
 
 
Whoever is more inwardly inclined to the God's 
speaking in him than outwardly inclined to the 
words of man, and rather listens to the word of 
God to live by than to know, and for whom the 
word of God is an inleading food in which God 
tastes better to him than all things [... ] that is the 
one who has ears to hear, for he is able to 
understand all the truth God is willing to reveal to 
him [.... ]For if we want to remain standing and 
save ourselves from falling into grievous sins we 
must learn to know ourselves and observe 
ourselves and turn inwards into ourselves, 
onefold, and keep our dwelling with God's 
speaking in us. And then our life shall be in 
agreement with holy Scripture and with all the 
saints. And through love of virtue and real 
humility we shall want to be admonished and 
taught by Scriptures and all men. And we shall 
always want to hear and see sound doctrine and 
holiness of life. These things reveal a good man. 
For all these things are very annoying to hear and 
know for all those who do not deny themselves 
completely and do not willingly abandon all of 
their own selfness in things present and to come 
through the practice of mortifying their nature, 
their flesh and their blood, their senses and their 
rational activity in whatever way they are 
admonished, taught and spurred on by God and 
his holy friends. 
So wat mensche die meer inweert neycht tot den 
insprekene gods dan uutwert tot den woorden der 
menschen, ende dien meer lust te hoorne dat woort 
gods omme leven dan om weten, ende dien dat 
woort gods es een inleidende spise daer hem god in 
smaect boven alle dinc […] dat es de ghene die ooren 
heeft te hoorne. Want he es hebbelijc alle waerheit 
te verstane die hem god vertoenen wilt [....] Want 
zelen wij staende bliven ende behuedt werden dat 
wij niet en vallen in groven sonden; soe moeten wij 
ons zelven leeren kinnen ende ons selfs waer 
nemen, ende eenvoldich inkeren in ons zelven, ende 
inwoenende bliven biden insprekene gods. Daer 
zelen wij hooren ende leeren rechte waerheit ende 
leven. Ende dan sal onze leven concorderen metter 
heyligher scriftueren ende met allen heylighen. Ende 
overmids minnen der duecht ende rechte 
oetmoedicheit, zoe selen wij begheren berespt ende 
gheleert te sine vander screft ende van allen 
menschen. Ende ons sal altoes lusten te hoorne 
ende te siene ganse leere ende heylicheit van 
levene. Ende dese dinghe toenen eenen goeden 
mensche. Want alle dese dinghe sijn herde 
verdrietelijc te hoorne ende te wetene ammde den 
gheenen die hem selven te male niet en laten, ende 
alre eyghenheit haers sels <willichlijcke> niet en 
vertien, in jeghenwoordighen dinghen ende in 
toencomenden dinghen in eender stervender 
oefeninghen haerrer natueren, haers vleeschs ende 
haers bloets, harer sinnen ende harer vernuftigher 
werke na alder wijs dat si van <gode> ende van sinen 
heilighen vrienden vermaecht, gheleert ende 
ghedreven werden.
25
 
 
 
 
 Here, Ruusbroec introduces us to several key elements that highlight the intersection 
between spiritual praxis and Christian faith that are at the basis of his synthesized, mystical theology. 
This primarily includes a strong emphasis on the needed basis for distinguishing and privileging an 
interiority marked by a sustained, desirous affectivity and its willful inclination towards "God's 
speaking in him [...] in which God tastes better to him than all things", in contrast to being 
"outwardly inclined to the words of man". Such a perspective by no means devalues our more 
communal-based relationships with and responsibilities towards others. Quite the opposite is the 
case, as we shall soon see. For well within an Augustinian trajectory, it is only by first recognizing the 
particularity of God's primacy and lovingly inclining towards such primacy, a desirous inclining of 
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 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 10, Vanden Vier Becoringhen, (trans.) A. Lefevere, (eds.) G. de Baere, Th. 
Mertens, and H. Noë, (Tielt: Lannoo, Turnhout: Brepols, 1991) ll. 5-12, 28-44. 
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which admits of difference and distinction, are we then able to respond by a love that overflows 
[uutvloeyn] gratuitously and without return.  
 
 Ruusbroec expands upon this affective interiority and its desirous inclining by further 
describing the manner in which this is practiced, highlighting the one who "rather listens to the word 
of God to live by than to know". Such a sapiential emphasis upon which prepares the claim that we 
will be able to "understand all the truth God is willing to reveal" shows Ruusbroec's orientation 
towards Christian Revelation, namely that through its lived, loving praxis do we come to further 
understand Christian faith as a living faith. Interestingly enough, Ruusbroec's thinking of minne 
distinctly comes to the fore, affirming that by virtue of such spiritual praxis of desirous inclining and 
receptivity to God's interior speaking that we shall be both in "agreement with holy Scripture" as well 
as the tradition of the communion of saints, having cultivated a genuine taste for "real humility [...] 
want[ing] to be admonished and taught by Scriptures and all men", rather than primarily wishing to 
teach others instead. The approach here to "sound doctrine" is affirmed not as a contested object 
through dispassionate argument, yet by cultivating our very desire for the unfathomable depths of 
our interiority and God's indwelling in which the soundness of Christian doctrine are rightly affirmed 
as protecting, giving further access towards as well as helping sustain our taste for this "inleading 
food". Hence, not only is Ruusbroec challenging the very deductive/inductive typologies in which we 
traditionally gauge the intersection and relationships with mystical texts and their theological 
foundations. But furthermore, Ruusbroec openly challenges another well-known typology, that of 
the three ways of purgation, illumination and union, upon which the manual tradition so heavily 
emphasizes and its view of moral and dogmatic theology that founds ascetic theology as preparatory 
for the more extraordinary and explicitly experiential character of mysticism as its result.26 In a 
subtle, yet remarkable contrast, while Ruusbroec by no means aims at denying the importance of 
ascetic practices as such, Ruusbroec rather shows, a fortiori these practices of self-denial as more 
consequential of this more primary, desirous inclination towards God's interior speaking from which 
such actions are thus seen as responding to this interior calling. While the consequences of this 
position demands further reflection, in short we can see that not only does Ruusbroec challenge the 
bases of these well-used typologies, yet he creatively does so in and through an appeal of the praxis 
of desirous inclination that opens onto and is given further depth by way of its taste for "sound 
doctrine and holiness of life". 
 
 
 §2. TOWARDS A DESIROUS CHRISTOLOGY  
 
 
 It is argued that the intersection of Christian doctrine and spiritual praxis within Ruusbroec's 
writings offer a challenging alternative to certain well-established typologies as typified within the 
manual tradition. Following from this, the mutual interaction of kataphasis and apophasis―in 
specific Christological terms at the intersection of both affirming concrete images of His humanity as 
well as the continuing imagelessness of His divinity―offers a more productive avenue of approaching 
Ruusbroec's distinct treatment of otherwise tradition-based, Christological formulations. This is 
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c.f.  Tanquerey's "Introduction"(pgs.1-27) in The Spiritual Life where he clarifies the object and method of 
"spiritual theology" as specifically determined by both dogmatic and moral theology. 
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developed in a preserved letter27 that Ruusbroec addressed to Margareta van Meerbeke, a "rich" 
Clare nun in Brussels, for whom Ruusbroec had well known, having also composed for her the book 
Vanden seven sloten.28 The letter comes as a response to a previous visit that he had made to the 
Brussels' convent, addressing the letter both to Margareta specifically, as a letter of consolation to 
what he perceived in her as her sadness29, as well as to her "fellow sisters, indeed for all men who 
are willing to hear and learn to avoid sin and live for God."30 Noting the epistolary form of his address 
as more than simple literary convention, Ruusbroec instead immediately delivers us to the core of 
the issue itself in this reflection―namely, the affirmation of kataphatic particularity in view of 
promoting, rather than collapsing alterity. Or, in this specific instance, transforming our approach to 
alterity, away from that of multiplicity and towards that which is "common" [ghemeyne].  
 
 Ruusbroec's letter begins upon somewhat of an urgent tone, arguing that Margareta should 
remember and keep her religious vows and to "deny yourself out of minne and to abandon yourself 
into the hands of the Lord [....] possess[ing] him in love with the reverence you have for Him and He 
in return shall possess you in Minne with all the benevolence with which he pursues you."31 He then 
immediately joins the beginnings of his plea with a clear, doctrinal reference to Chalcedon, 
elaborating her union with Christ as modeled upon and exemplified by the person of Christ himself as 
both without separation, without division: "And nobody shall be able to separate or divide you from 
Him, or even to create any impediment between you and Him."32 By first encouraging mutual 
possession in and through such active love seen as the basis of, and thus wholly consonant with the 
maintaining of Margareta's religious vows, the Chalcedon language of without separation or division 
functions as critical reference in this discussion for Ruusbroec's spiritual guidance to both Margareta 
as well as the other religious in the Brussels' convent. Namely that in the face of factionalism, rivalry 
and discord within a religious community―of which, Ruusbroec clearly elaborates upon as the 
"worst evil I know these days among those who should be living the life spiritual 
everywhere"―Ruusbroec upholds a strong vision of union with Christ and the particularity of its 
desirous, loving possession as without separation that acts as a corrective to any and all 
"impediments" of which lay at the heart of Margareta's sadness. This in part can be seen in more 
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 Jan van Ruusbroec, Brieven 1, Opera Omnia X, Brepols/Turnhout, 518-539. For more on Ruusbroec's 
relationship to Margareta, c.f. Helen Rolfson, "Ruusbroec and the Franciscan Tradition", in 14
th
 Century English 
Mystics Newsletter, vol. 8, no. 4 (December 1982), pp. 163-173. In this article, Ruusbroec scholar and translator 
Helen Rolfson situates Ruusbroec's correspondence, as well as his Seven Enclosures within a distinct Franciscan 
tradition in both its literary and religious aspects, likening Ruusbroec's relation to Margareta in a manner 
similar to that of Francis and Clare. 
28
 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 2, Vanden seven sloten, (trans.) H. Rolfson, (ed.) G. de Baere, (Tielt: Lannoo,    
Turnhout: Brepols, 1981). 
29
 Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia 10, Brieven (trans.) A. Lefevere, (eds.) G. de Baere, Th. Mertens, and H. Noë, (Tielt: 
Lannoo, Turnhout: Brepols, 1991) 1, ll. 8/ *43-46: "Recently when I was in your convent you seemed a little sad 
to me. And so I thought you had been abandoned by God or by a special friend you had put great trust in, or 
that you were tormented by temptations that saddened you from outside and inside, which way ever. That is 
why I wanted to write you this." "Lestent doe ic in u cloester was, doe dochti my wat bedroeft sijn. En zo dacht 
il dat gij door God of door een bijzondere vriend, in wie gij zeer veel vertrouwen hadt, in de steek gelaten waart 
of dat gij gekweld werdt door bekoringen die u van buiten en van binnen op enigerlei wijze bedrukten. Ende 
hierom wilde ik u dit schrijven." 
30
 Ruusbroec, Brieven 1,  ll. *67-69 : 'Dit wilden ik schrijven aan u en uw medezusters en ook aan alle mensen 
die willen horen en vernemen op welke manier zij de zonden moeten vermijden en voor God leven." 
31
 Ruusbroec, Brieven 1,  ll. 15-16, 18-20. 
32
 Ruusbroec, Brieven 1, E. ll. 20-1. 
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exclusive relations grounded not upon self-abandonment in minne, yet more out of a strategic 
reciprocity wherein "everyone wants to have a staff to rest on"33 that leads to anything but a view of 
religious communal life as one without division.  Ruusbroec writes, "And you shall also feel that you 
have been exalted by God beyond yourself and beyond all things and that he wants to be your very 
own. And you will respond to this that you want to be his very own in return, and that you want to be 
in the lowest place under all creatures."34 It is thus in this context of both strongly maintaining the 
significant value of loving desire for mystical union with Christ, as unique, particular and without 
separation, while recognizing the complicated and fragile state of current religious life (prior, of 
course, to the monastic reforms of the pre-Tridentine era) as fraught with conflict and competing, 
ideological interests that Ruusbroec's specific words of consolation emerge: 
 
 
When you are exalted or raised up by God you 
must abase and humiliate yourself. For that was 
the answer the most blessed Mary ever Virgin 
gave when the archangel Gabriel brought her the 
message that she would become the mother of 
God: 'Behold the handmaid of the Lord'. And also, 
when Christ's soul was united with the eternal 
Word so that he was both God and man, he made 
himself a servant and submitted himself to the 
whole world. And he is not particular to anyone 
but common to all who desire Him. And if you also 
want to be his and not your own, as you 
promised, you shall be common to all people in 
their need, and not particular to anyone. That way 
you shall not be inordinately sad when your friend 
dies or abandons you for another. 
Wanneer gij verheven of opgericht wordt door God, 
moet gij u zelf vernederen en verootmoedigen. Zo 
toch ook, toen bericht was door de aartsengel Gabriël 
aan de gelukzaligste Maria altijd maagd dat zij de 
moeder van God zou worden, aantwoordde zij: 'Zie de 
dienstmaagd des Heren.' En evenzo [...]Doe die ziele 
Cristi was gheenicht den ewighen woerde alsoe dat hi 
was god ende mensche, doe maecte hi hem selven 
knecht ende onderwerp hem alder werlt. Ende hi en is 
nyemant sunderlinghe, met gemeyn enen yegelicken 
die sijns begeert. Mer wildi oec sijn sijn ende uwes 
selves niet, soe als ghi geloeft hebt, soe suldi 
ghemeyn sijn enen yegelicken in sijnre noet ende 
nyemant sunderlinge. Soe en werdi nyet 
onordynierlick bedroeft als u uwe vrient af sterft, of 
enen anderen verkiest ende u begeeft.
35
 
 
 
 In this intriguing passage, with its strong Incarnational basis, Ruusbroec links both the very 
particularity and possessiveness of "all who desire Him"  as thoroughly in concert with and mutually 
supporting a depiction of charitable love as "common to all people in their need, and not particular 
to anyone" as exemplified by Christ. The foundational basis for such a "common" plea is thus none 
other than the Christological image as mediating these tensions within his very person―without 
confusion, without change― that grounds Ruusbroec's advice, responding both to Margareta's own 
sadness as well as the threat of internal division and separation within the Rich Clare convent in 
Brussels. Interestingly enough, in a brief comment in the Introduction to the Letters in the critical 
edition of Ruusbroec's works, we see in nucleo the contrary position, namely that of maintaining the 
opposition between particularity and commonality―and by extension, the place of Christ as 
consequential to such an understanding―wherein it states that "Ruusbroec wants to make it clear to 
her [Margareta] that her sadness is the result of the fact that she is not 'common' but 'particular'."36 
While in fairness, no further reflection is given on this comment and therefore we should not deduce 
too much from it, nonetheless such an opposition shows a tendency towards more of a 
dissassociative reading, refusing to read both the erotic desirous dimensions of mystical union (in all 
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 Ruusbroec, Brieven 1, E. ll. 57-9. 
34
 Ruusbroec, Brieven 1, E. ll. 27-31. 
35
 Ruusbroec, Brieven 1, ll. *38-42/1-7, my emphasis. 
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 Ruusbroec, "Introduction" to Brieven, 478. 
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of its "particularity") in relation to its gratuitous, communal/social ethical response (as "common") as 
mutually reinforcing the other. For Ruusbroec, in order to sustain such a continuous, overflowing 
charitable love, it therefore must be nourished and nurtured by a love that sustains it. More 
specifically, a love that affirms the very possessiveness and particularity of its mutually-shared desire, 
while at the same time expressing itself in an overflowing common love towards others from within 
the "bottomless depths of [its] humble abandon"37 giving itself without preference and without 
seeking its return. And yet we can only see these necessary links―of which forms certain core 
aspects of Ruusbroec's understanding of minne―if we both engage with the very dogmatic positions 
that underpin Ruusbroec's writings, as well as their spiritual praxis of union with Christ without 
separation or division. 
 
 And yet, how do we specifically respond to such a Christological image that both admits of 
the particularity of our desires, while refusing their possessive exclusivity at the same time? For the 
tendency to dwell solely on one aspect, to the detriment of the other, indeed forms another 
"impediment" that otherwise stands in the way of union with Christ without separation nor division. 
In this current letter, Ruusbroec gives us an example of how best to respond to such linkages, both 
fundamental to the unicity of minne itself, and its Christological image as commonly preserving the 
autonomy and relatedness of both particularity and alterity with the model of John the Baptist. 
Ruusbroec writes: 
 
St. John the Baptist left his father and his mother, 
his father's priesthood that was his right, the 
honor and riches of the world and fled into the 
desert [...] And he did not attract anyone to 
himself but led his disciples and all creatures to 
God. And he himself did not go there [the 'desert'] 
because he was afraid of his affection and desire, 
that he might cling too much to the human nature 
of our Lord with his senses so that he might be 
hampered by images in the free and pure ascent 
of his spirit into God. 
Ende hier om liet sunte Johan Baptista vader ende 
moeder, sijns vaders bisdom, dat hem van rechte 
toebehoerden, eer ende rijcheit der werelt, ende vloe 
in die woestijn [….] Ende hi en toech oec nyemant aen 
hem, mer hi wijsden sijn discipulen ende alle 
creatueren tot gode. Nochtant en ginck hi daer selven 
nyet, want hi ontsach sijn affectie ende sijn geluste 
dat hi te zeer cleven mochte myt synlickerwijs aen die 
menscheit ons heren, alsoe dat hi gehyndert ende 
verbeeldet mocht werden aenden vryen pueren 
opganc sijns geestes in gode.
38
 
 
 
 This is certainly an original portrait that Ruusbroec provides of John the Baptist and it is quite 
plausible that more is being referred to than simply the prophet, who feasted on locusts and wild 
honey. For after all, both the Groenendaal monastery itself―located in the Sonian forest, a northern 
desert given its isolation and removal from any and all comforts such that Brussels could give―as 
well as Ruusbroec himself had St. John the Baptist as their patron saint.39 Thus, we may safely 
presume that Margareta too would have easily made similar such connections, in addition to the self-
referential implications that Ruusbroec is making with this statement. With these contextual features 
in mind, Ruusbroec's portrait of his patron saint becomes quite interesting, especially in his thinking 
of "affection and desire" and the role of the "desert" in the spiritual life. Here, the 'desert' is not to 
be confused with pursuing a hardened asceticism and abnegation of such a desirous self, yet as 
imaging the very bareness of human nature that continuously thirsts for God. For in another work, 
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 Ruusbroec, Brieven 1, ll. 34 -35: "[…] en ook in u zelf vernederd en neergedruckt in ootmoedige gelatenheid 
zonder enige grond". 
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 Ruusbroec, Brieven 1,  ll. 32-34; 36-41. 
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Mirror of Eternal Blessedness, of which historical scholarship suggests (though is certainly debatable) 
was also quite possibly written for Margareta and the rich Clare nuns of Brussels40, Ruusbroec clearly 
and repeatedly refers to the metaphor of the "desert" as describing the desirous core of our human 
nature and its natural desire for God as a "wild, waste unimaged bareness, which always responds to 
eternity".41 In another passage, Ruusbroec also uses the metaphor of the 'desert' and its 'modeless 
character' as none other than preserving human dignity, created particularity as well as greater 
dissimilarity to that of the Creator, such that, "If our essence [wesen] came to naught, we would not 
know, or love, or be blessed. But our created essence is to be beheld as a wild, waste desert, wherein 
God lives who reigns over us. And in that desert we must wander modelessly and without manner."42  
 
 Therefore, returning back to the letter, it is thus quite consistent and fitting that in this sense, 
Ruusbroec would link such desire and the desert as not only imaging our own human nature, yet as 
equally responding to the "human nature of our Lord" and our union with Him. However, as we have 
repeatedly stressed, for Ruusbroec, to focus simply upon the humanity of Christ creates an 
impediment in our union with Him, both in terms of separation and division. For just as John the 
Baptist did not "attract anyone to himself but led his disciples and all creatures to God"43 so too are 
we separated from Christ when focusing exclusively upon His humanity, for Christ "also attracted 
nobody to Him, for He Himself walked ahead and led His disciples and all creatures to His heavenly 
Father."44 Furthermore, while by no means denying our possessive desire for His humanity, 
Ruusbroec also indicates that such desire alone renders us divided from Him in our inability to 
"contemplate His high divine nature by His noble human nature interposing itself, creating images for 
them and coarsening them [...] impeded and assailed by images caused by sensual affection for his 
worthy human nature."45  
 
 Contrasting these impediments, Ruusbroec offers both Margareta and the rich Clare's of 
Brussels a firm alternative image, one in which is responsive both to the very humanity and divinity 
of Christ himself, while distinctly articulated in and through its primary attention towards spiritual 
praxis. By this, Ruusbroec firmly articulates his spiritual council that aims at further deepening the 
Rich Clare's own particular spiritual union with Christ without separation, from which in turn may 
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 c.f. Rik van Nieuwenhove, Jan van Ruusbroec: Mystical Theologian of the Trinity (Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2003), pg. 24-5: "After his profession in 1350 Ruusbroec wrote the remainder of his 
works, usually with a female audience in mind [....] The highly attractive work Een Spieghel der Eewigher 
Salicheit (The Mirror of Eternal Blessedness) was written in 1359 with the same Clare nun [Margareta} in mind. 
It focuses on the role of the Eucharist in the spiritual life [....] The exact status of the work is not entirely clear: 
perhaps it is as much a letter as a treatise in the proper sense, and therefore it does not have the intricate 
structure of most of the other major works of Ruusbroec." 
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 Ruusbroec, Spieghel, ll. 2065-2066: "Daer en venden wi anders niet dan welde, wuste, onghebeelde 
blooetheit, die altooes antwerdt der eewecheit." 
42
 Ruusbroec, Spieghel, ll. 2153-2157: "Ghinghe oec onse wesen te niete, soe en souden wi niet kinnen noch 
minnen noch salegh sijn. Maer onse ghescapene wesen es an te siene alse eene welde, wueste wustine, daer 
god in leeft, die ons regeert." Ende in dese wustine moeten wi dolen wiselooes ende sonder maniere." 
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 See supra, note 39. 
44
 Ruusbroec, Brieven 1, ll.  41-43: "Jhesus Cristus, die levende gods soen, die en toech oec nyemant aen hem, 
want hi ginck selven voer ende wijsden sinen discipulen ende alle creatueren tot sijnen hemelschen vader." 
45
 Ruusbroec, Brieven 1, ll. 87-88; 91-94 (slight modification): "Ende doe worden si vermyddelt ende vergravet 
ende verbeeldet in sijn edel menschelike natuer, dat si nyet verheven en mochten werden in horen geest te 
beschouwen sijn hoge godlicke natuer [....] om dat si vermyddelt ende verbeelt waren mit synlicker lieften in 
sijn weerde menscheit." 
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overflow throughout the entire convent as a corrective to the threats of rivalry and factionalism in 
view of religious community as a whole, without division. Such a religious ideal, Ruusbroec describes 
in the following with a fascinating synthesis of Christ's humanity and divinity, the person's outward 
and inward life and its correspondence to kataphasis and apophasis as a 
 
 
[…] heavenly life, for Christ lives in them, God and 
man. And for this reason they live both with 
images and without. They have the images of the 
life of our Lord, His suffering and His death and all 
virtue. And in their spirit they are free and idle 
and empty of all things. And for this reason they 
are without images and overformed [over formt] 
in divine clarity. And so they can go out and in and 
find living nourishment always. They go out with 
the image of the humanity of our Lord in good 
conduct, holy practice and all virtue. They go in 
without images with the Spirit of our Lord where 
they find and possess eternal clarity, 
unfathomable wealth, taste and comfort more 
than they can grasp or comprehend. 
Dese hebben een hemels leven want Cristus levet in 
hem god ende mensche. Ende hier om sijn si 
gebeeldet ende ongebeeldet. Si sijn gebeelt mitten 
leven ons heren, myt sijnre passien ende mit sijnre 
doot ende mit allen doechden. Ende si sijn nu los 
ende ledich [ende ledich] ende ongebeelt van allen 
dingen in horen geest. Ende hier om sijn si 
overbeeldet ende over formt in godlicker claerheit. 
Ende aldus moegen si uutgaen ende ingaen ende 
altoes levende spise vynden. Si gaen uut gebeelt 
mitter menscheit ons heren in gueden zeden, in 
heiliger oefeninge, in alle doechden. Si gaen in 
beeldeloes mitten geest ons heren daer si vynden 
ende besitten ewige claerheit, grondelose rijcheit, 
smaeck ende troest, meer dan si begripen of 
ghevatten moegen. 
46
 
 
 
 A. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 From the proceeding reflections, the need for a continual balancing between particularity 
and alterity has been raised if indeed one is to approach such alterity as common as well as retaining 
the particularity of their own relational loving. This position has been situated within the trajectory of 
the Christian Humanist tradition and reengaging its challenges today. For indeed, by way of retrieving 
Ruusbroec's thinking of minne and its relationality―contra contemporary understandings of erotic 
possessiveness―we are invited to critically reflect upon the diminished cultural range of mediating 
the immediacy of desire within religious categories whereby such an intensely unique, desirous and 
embodied commitment to the very particularity of Christ understands itself as both particular and 
mutual, yet by no means exclusive. Instead of tempering or scaling back our desires for Him, so as to 
'make room for others' and thereby becoming more hospitable towards both Him as well as others—
which can be regarded as somewhat of the default position within more 'profane spiritualities' and 
its neutralizing tendencies. Ruusbroec instead encourages us to think from within such a desirous, 
erotic particularity that cannot but express itself as common, non-exclusive and common to others, 
as Christ is towards us. 
 
 By this critical retrieval of Ruusbroec's mystical theology and his thinking of minne that 
privileges claims of relationality as prior to that of identity, the convergence of doctrine, spirituality 
and the public realm contextualizes the current challenge in affirming the strong particularity of 
cultural identities, while equally non-possessive. This is to say, an "unceasing" particularity, not at the 
expense of plurality, yet at preserving and transforming our approach to such plurality as 
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inexhaustibly and "indivisibly" that which is "common".47 Therefore, spirituality's current role within 
public reflections regarding the "common good" has the potential to transform the very manner in 
which we engage with the public at this very time―transforming both public spaces themselves, as 
well as how we conceive of the public itself, especially in its current, fluid plurality. By retrieving 
mystical theological figures such as Ruusbroec within contemporary theological reflection, not only 
does this continue to challenge predominant misunderstandings of mysticism as inherently private 
and thus incapable of speaking towards the public at large. Yet it further challenges the continuing 
legacy of the manual tradition that increasingly isolated mysticism and contemplation as rare and 
extraordinary to the life of faith itself. Rather, in reflecting upon Ruusbroec's theology of minne at 
the intersection of spiritual praxis and Christological doctrine necessarily questions the current 
profile of Christian social organizations by way of their very own Christian humanistic tradition. Doing 
so emphatically stresses the mutual dependencies upon both erotic, possessive love, in and through 
desire for union with Christ, with that of charity's gratuitousness that overflows from such union and 
gives itself freely to others without exclusion, and without seeking anything in return. Such a loving 
dynamism thus helps us transform our very public engagements and the social works of Christian 
organizations, encouraging us to root ourselves in a stronger particularity that can do no other than 
to commonly attend to the needs of others without partiality, without exclusion. 
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  See generally See Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 
Liberia Editrice Vaticana, (London: Burns & Oates, 2004) n. 164-165. 
Chapter X. Ghemeyne Leven. Part II—Learning How To Desire 
230 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
“FOR GOD IS A COMMON FOOD AND A COMMON GOOD”:  
JAN VAN RUUSBROEC AND LEARNING HOW TO DESIRE IN THE 
CHRISTIAN HUMANIST TRADITION 
 
 
 §1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 A. WHAT IS COMMON IN CATHOLIC EDUCATION 
 The following proceeds from an ongoing, comprehensive theological retrieval of the late 
medieval Brabantine contemplative,  Jan van Ruusbroec and his understanding of love, or minne, within 
contemporary discussions over love in theological and philosophy of religion quarters. Currently, I will 
like to reflect upon certain foundational dimensions of Ruusbroec’s mystical theology—exemplary of the 
tradition of early Christian humanism—as possessing an enduring theological relevance. Especially so, 
concerning the question of Catholic identity of education within contemporary, Western pluralistic 
societies. Fundamentally, I will like to argue that one of the basic virtues of Catholic education is that it 
is common and that it traditionally has upheld such distinction, not primarily due to any sense of 
contextual accommodation, yet as arising from and thus reaffirming the very particularity of its identity 
as such. Common, is not understood here as either ‘general’ or 'ordinary'; it is not a mean or, 
qualitatively speaking, as that which is ‘mediocre’. Rather, by 'common', I in part understand as a 
relational conviction that it is only by being more common that one becomes more particular.  Here, we 
are treading upon a more dynamic synthesis, which, I would suggest was recalled by the Congregation 
for Catholic Education’s 1997 text, The Catholic School on the Threshold of the Third Millennium. 
Recalling the spiritual impetus of various religious orders, such the Ursuline sisters, as well as well-
known figures such as De la Salle, as well as Don Bosco, it states:  
Spurred on by the aim of offering to all, and especially to the poor and marginalized, the 
opportunity of an education, of training for a job, of human and Christian formation, it can and 
must find in the context of the old and new forms of poverty that original synthesis of ardor 
and fervent dedication which is a manifestation of Christ's love for the poor, the humble, the 
masses seeking for truth.
1 
 
 B. THE COMMON AND ITS ANTHROPOLOGICAL BASIS IN RUUSBROEC 
 
 In my current doctoral research, I have argued that in order to seriously consider the 
constructive theological relevance and credibility, as well as the contextual plausibility of retrieving a 
figure such as Ruusbroec, then one must hermeneutically engage, not so much with questions of 
“mystical experience” and the underpinnings of its autonomous, modern subject that are wholly 
discontinuous with pre-modern thought. Rather, one must contend explicitly with Ruusbroec’s distinct 
                                                          
1
 See Congregation for Catholic Education, The Catholic School on the Threshold of the Third Millennium (1997), 
n. 15: 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccatheduc/documents/rc_con_ccatheduc_doc_27041998_
school2000_en.html, as accessed on 23.03.13. 
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theological anthropology and the primacy it holds towards relationality as a constructive/critical 
interlocutor amid current efforts in rethinking human relationality. For Ruusbroec, this intrinsic 
presupposition can primarily be situated in terms of "mutual indwelling", a defining characteristic of 
late-medieval mystical theology of Northern Europe and specifically the Low Countries. As a uniquely 
Trinitarian, "interpersonal" imago Dei anthropology,2 Ruusbroec uniquely stresses mutual indwelling as 
an intrinsic relationality of God’s radical alterity within immanence, wherein both eternal and 
exemplarist strains dynamically converge with the historical and soteriological  in this natural union of 
the human person and God. Echoing the Johannine prologue that "'All that is made, was life in Him'"3 
Ruusbroec develops upon this theme at considerable length in his  Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit: 
 
In this image God knew us before we were created, 
in Himself, and now, created in time, unto Himself. 
This image is essentially [w      ] and personally in 
all people have of it among them all no more than 
one person has. And thus we are all one, united in 
our eternal image, that is God's image and the 
origin of us all: of our life and our becoming; 
wherein our created being and our life hang 
without intermediary as in its eternal cause. Yet 
our createdness does not become God, nor (does) 
the image of God (become) creature; for we are 
created unto the image, that is: to receive the 
image of God. And that image in uncreated, 
eternal: the Son of God. 
In desen beelde bekinde ons god, eer wi ghescapen 
waren, in hem selven, ende nu in der tijd ghescapen, 
toe hem selven. Dit beelde es weselec ende 
persoonlec in alle menschen ende ieghewelc 
mensche heevet al te male gheheel, onghedeilt, 
ende alle menschen en hebbens onder hen allen niet 
meer dan .i. mensche. Ende aldus sijn wi alle een, 
vereenecht in onsen eeweghen beelde, dat gods 
beelde es ende onser alre orsprong, ons levens ende 
ons ghewerdens, daer onse ghescapene wesen ende 
onse leven sonder middel in hangt alse in sine 
eeweghe sake. Nochtan en wert onse ghescapenheit 
niet god noch dat beelde gods creatuere. Want wi 
sijn ghescapen toe den beelde, dat es: dat beelde 
gods te ontfane. Ende dat beelde es onghescapen, 
eewegh: de sone gods.
4
 
 
 While affirming the "naturalness" of union with such a radically other God, Ruusbroec will in 
turn develop his theology of grace, his understanding of minne, its rootedness within revealed Christian 
faith and the practice of virtues as all building from, deepening and "cleaving" to [aencleven] such an 
Image—Christ, the 2nd Person of the Trinity. Such cleaving thrives upon an inexhaustible dynamic, from 
which we can then better engage with Ruusbroec’s more characteristically distinct reflections upon 
minne's more erotic and desirous instances of responding to and growing in likeness with such a 
fundamental, natural relationality.  
 
Should knowing and loving [minnen] perish in God, 
so also would perish the eternal birth of the Son and 
the gushing forth of the Holy Spirit, as well as trinity 
of persons; and so there would be neither God nor 
any creature, and that is altogether impossible and 
an insane stupidity (even) to think (of it) [....] Even 
though we all gather together in one love [minne], in 
one embrace, and in one enjoyment of God, 
nonetheless each one keeps his own life and degree 
in grace and in virtue; each receives from God grace 
Want verginge kinnen ende minnen in gode, soe 
verginghe oec die ewege geboert des soens ende uut 
vloete des heileghen geest; ende alsoe verginge driheit 
der persoene; ende alsoe en ware noch god noch 
creature: dat altemale onmogeleec es ende ene 
verwoedde sotheit te peinsene [....] Want al eest alsoe 
dat wi alle vergaderen in ene minne ende in een 
behelsen ende in .i. gebruken gods, nochtan behout 
ygewelc sijn leven ende sinen staet in gratien ende in 
doechden. Ende yegewelc ontfeet van gode gratie ende 
                                                          
2
 See Bernard McGinn's typology of the differing schools of imago Dei anthropology: "intellectual, volitional, 
and the interpersonal", "Humans as Imago Dei" in E. Howells and P. Tyler (eds.)  Sources of Transformation: 
Revitalising Christian Spirituality, (London: Continuum, 2010), p.19-40, esp. 24-25. 
3
 Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera Omnia XIII, Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit, ll. 901-902. See also Jn 1, 3-4. 
4 
Ruusbroec, Spieghel, ll. 910-920. 
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and gifts according to his dignity, and according to 
his likeness unto God in virtue. And so each is 
dedicated to God and cleaves to Him to a greater or 
lesser degree according to his hunger, thirst, and 
craving after God. It is according to this same 
measure that he may feel [gevoelen], savor, and 
enjoy. For God is a common food and a common 
good [....] 
gaven na sine werdde ende na dat hi gode gelijc es in 
doechden. Ende alsoe es oec ygewelc toegevoecht 
ende aneclevende ane gode min ende meer: na dat 
hem hongert ende dorst ‹ende›gods gelust, daer na 
mach hi gevoelen, smaken ende gebruken. Want god es 
ene gemeyne spise ende .i. gemeyne goet [....]
5
 
  
 
 C. EMERGING IDENTITIES IN GIVEN RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 To seriously consider the theological relevance and credibility of this distinct, imago dei theo-
anthropological tradition is in part to see the primacy of this natural relation to God, from which the 
distinctiveness and particularity of our communal and personal identities emerge. "Identity", keeping 
with Ruusbroec’s idiom, is here of the order of likeness, of distinction [onderscheet]—an unending 
work whereby we will be known by the fruits of our desires and their extent. Similarly, education—in 
the classical tradition at the oracle of Delphi—is the work to know thyself, what Clement of 
Alexandria termed as the “greatest of all lessons”.6 While in the Christian humanist context, to know 
thyself is to further become transformed in relationship and union with God and others as rendering 
one more distinct. Hence, the question of identity, while important, is nonetheless a secondary 
reflection to the primacy of this contextual relationality that we commonly bear with God and others.  
 
 Which thus begs the question: Whose identity is presently under question, if not Christ 
incarnate within humanity, to which the Church, and the distinct members of the Mystical Body of 
Christ, in her humility uniquely and unrepeatably reflects. This perspective was dramatically recalled 
recently in the pre-conclave congregations, wherein then-Cardinal Bergoglio, citing De Lubac’s 
M    a      u   ’E     , cited the insufficiency of the Church’s identity as self-referential as nothing 
other than a “theological narcissism” and “spiritual worldliness”.7 To which, de Lubac further states: 
 
There is no ‘private Christianity’, and if we are to accept the Church we must take her as she is, 
in her human day-to-day reality just as much as in her divine and eternal ideality; for a 
separation of the two is impossible both in fact and by right [....] We must be ‘the common 
people of God’ with no reservations made. To put it another way: the necessity of being 
humble in order to cleave to Christ involves the necessity of being humble in order to seek Him 
in His Church [...]
8
 
 
 Returning back to Ruusbroec, by better coming to understand the distinctiveness of "mutual 
indwelling" and his view of union with God as rendering one more and more human, more particular, 
we can thus better engage with the wealth and relevant implications of this mystical theological 
tradition. For it supports both a greater vertical and horizontal continuum of mutual relations 
between the radical alterity of the Trinitarian God as precisely within the immanence of creation and 
                                                          
5
 Ruusbroec, Vanden seven sloten, ll. 700-704; 706-713. 
6
 See Panayiotis Nellas, Deification in Christ: The Nature of the Human Person, (trans.) Norman Russell 
(Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997) 9. 
7
 See Sandro Magister, “The Last Words of Bergoglio Before the Conclave”, 
http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/1350484?eng=y, as accessed on 06.05.2013 
8
 Henri De Lubac, S.J., The Splendor of the Church (New York: Paulist Press, 1963), 192. 
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the human person. A continuum of world and reciprocal demand and exchange that distinctly 
upholds both mutuality, while stemming from a greater dissimilarity and asymmetry of the created 
world and the human person towards the gratuitousness of God as Creator. Such a continuum—both 
exalted and glorified in the Trinity, as well as radically concrete and embodied in the world—is what 
Ruusbroec calls the common life [ghemeyne leven].  
 
 
 D. PARADOX OF THE COMMONS 
 
 
 Like our cleaving desires, that which is “common” is an equally important theme in 
Ruusbroec—as well as relevant, especially in a reflection upon Catholic education and the struggle to 
(re)claim the distinctiveness of its identity within contemporary, pluralistic Western societies. 
Common. I desire to standby this most beleaguered and often bruised understanding of the world: 
both in all its Trinitarian depth and profundity, as well as its concrete ordinariness, skirting the banal, 
the mundane and sometimes even the hideous, the fallen and undesirable. Nevertheless, desiring 
such a “common” has been dangerously under threat amid the ruthlessness and resiliency of our 
consumer-driven capitalistic societies as it endlessly narrates what we are to desire as a furthering of 
self-identity. Such economic narratives rely upon the basic presumption of scarcity, or that which we 
lack9—what ecologist Garret Hardin famously termed as the paradox or “tragedy of the commons”.10 
                                                          
9
 See generally Daniel M. Bell, Jr. The Economy of Desire: Christianity and Capitalism in a Postmodern World 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012). While I am generally very intrigued by Bell’s critical-theological take 
on Capitalism, nonetheless, there are strongly implicit Nygerian overtones in opting for a division between eros 
and agape, as seen in the following: “The driving force of capitalism is scarcity—limited resources to meet 
unlimited desires. Scarcity warps desire into a grasping, acquiqitive power and so prepares it for the agony that 
is the capitalist market [....] In constrast, Christianity has long proclaimed that God has given and continues to 
give abundantly [....] Care should be taken, however, not to mistake the character of God’s abundance. The 
opposite of scarcity is not ‘unlimited’ in the sense that God will satisfy our avarice, gluttony and lust—all the 
cravings of our disordered or fallen desire. Rather, the abundance that God gives is a matter of enough[....] 
God’s abundance is not about meeting our wildest consumer dreams. Rather, God’s abundance takes form in 
the disciplines that heal our desire so that it moves in accord with its true end, so that we desire what and how 
we should desire.” (178-180) See contra Ruusbroec, Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit, ll. 739-741: “ If we could 
see the voracious lust Christ has for our blessedness, we would not be able to restrain ourselves from flying 
into His throat.” “Mochten wi sien de ghiereghe ghelost die Cristus heeft tote onser salecheit, wi en mochten 
ons niet onthouden, wi en souden heme in de keele vlieghen.” 
10
 See Garret Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science 162 (1968):1243–1248: “The tragedy of the 
commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to 
keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for 
centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the 
carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-
desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly 
generates tragedy. As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more 
or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has 
one negative and one positive component. 1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one 
animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility 
is nearly +1. 2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. 
Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular 
decision making herdsman is only a fraction of -1. Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational 
herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And 
another; and another[....] But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a 
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
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A paradox, to which some are trying to re-envision, such as the Italian Focolare economist, Luigino 
Bruini and the development of an “economy of communion”, wherein gratuitousness does not lapse 
back into suspended asymmetry of power relations, privilege and philanthropy. Rather, by 
reimagining our mutual, common, local relationships, Bruini argues that “human beings need 
reciprocity to fulfill themselves, but to have it one must make the leap of gratuitousness” without 
which, “genuine reciprocity does not develop, nor society with it.”11 Such an effort is formed in part 
by its resistance to current market-ideology that seeks to eliminate conflict by way of isolation, 
privatization, with the result of incentivizing and regulating our interactions by becoming increasingly 
immune and sterilized from the other. Which, by dint of a mixed realism of relationships and local 
communities that avoids any form of romantic idealism, Bruini attempts instead to “connect 
economics and the struggle with the wound and the blessing of the other.”12 Or, from a different 
angle, what transformational theologian Oliver Davies calls for in reorienting the very location of our 
theological reflection, transforming its praxis away from the very modern, academic presupposition 
of critical neutrality and "cognitive distance from the everyday situational reality" and instead, 
towards common, "crowded spaces" wherein this continuum, in all of its humility is more fully 
realized and heeded.  
 
 Nevertheless, despite the admirable worthiness of these attempts at trying to re-envision 
that which is “common”, to simply reclaim or to reassert a defense of the common and its attending 
values is to simply play into the postmodern critique. Which, in this case, would assert such attempts 
as a form of ontological enclosure and a reduction of difference and otherness to a closed, 
hegemonic narrative in its privilege of unity and sameness as primary. Which is to say, in some sense, 
such a view is itself ideological, if not historically naive. For in part, to claim such a certain degree of 
ownership over the commons presupposes a highly reified sense of Tradition as an artifact, as 
something inherited and passed on down, without development or change. How then to concretely 
restore such a sense of Tradition, while remaining attentive to the features and causes of its modern 
withdraw are some of the key positions in Gabriel Marcel’s beautifully evocative series of reflections 
in The Decline of Wisdom.13  
 
 Here, Marcel’s reflections are inescapably contextualized by post-war Europe, its historical 
anxieties and as an attempt at trying to comprehend the devastation befallen the continent. And yet, 
amid the rapid calls for innovation and modernization, Marcel takes a very patient, unwavering look 
at the horrific destruction and the “spiritual heritage on which it seemed that human blindness had 
inflicted such irreparable damage.”14 Surprisingly, however, Marcel’s rhetoric is by no means dour, 
nor does he seek an abstract causal analysis or turn to ideology ad nauseam. Rather, the continuing 
appeal and relevance to his reflections is in the manner in which he holds onto a patient 
contemplation and commitment to the concrete particular, to which he claims go against modern 
technological advances, its view of history and  its “devitalized rationality”, most evidently seen in its 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his 
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin 
to all.” 
11
 See Luigino Bruni, The Wound and the Blessing: Economics, Relationships and Happiness, (trans.) N. Michael 
Brennen, (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2012), 68. 
12
 See Luigino Bruni, The Wound and the Blessing, xvii.  
13
 Gabriel Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, trans. Manya Harari (London: The Harvill Press, 1954). 
14
 Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, 21. 
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preference for the abstract. Here, such preferences for the abstract are likened to modern 
corporations, “creat[ing] the needs which it later claims to satisfy”, which, as a self-perpetuating 
phenomenon, “tends to create its own inevitability”.15 Here, Marcel is thinking about modern 
architectural trends and city planning—appropriately so, given its post-war context—and the 
preference for the abstract as “agglomerations”, super-imposed and the “very embodiment of 
uprootedness”.16 Here, the “vital link is broken between man and his environment”17, which, in 
theological terms, is to say creation and the creatureliness of the human person as distinctly 
relational. By historical contrast, he then notes, albeit somewhat ideally, that “in the past a city 
molded itself on the natural structure or pre-structure, as though it were fulfilling it.”18 
 
 Hence, Marcel is in a suspended dynamic, held between two horrors: that of post-war 
Europe and the wreckage of its discontinuity, as well as the super-imposition of modern, 
technological innovations as the furthering of a violent, de-humanized technological rationality of 
inevitable progress. And yet, instead of reacting with a “frenzy of integralism...[and] return to the 
most rigid and antiquated thinking in theology,”19 Marcel instead advocates for a continuing 
attention and commitment to the concrete particular and the contextual wherein incarnation takes 
place. Herein, such a contextual committment offers a far more robust, thick hermeneutical frame, 
held in stark relief to the plasticity and thinly abstract technological rationality. Which in turn, if 
indeed love incarnate is the salvific remedy to such a triumph of technological, de-vitalized rationality 
and its enduring persistence, then Tradition well informs us that “such an incarnation, if it can take 
place at all, can only do so at the humblest level.”20 Here, attention to the concrete and the 
embodied is none other than the defining principle upon which the retrieval of sources within our 
Tradition will be “valuable [...] only if it is incarnate” in the concrete particular. Which is to say, at the 
“humblest and most intimate level of human life.”21 
 
 Here, one can rather boldly say that Marcel is recalling the Church to her distinctly Marian 
character, as Ruusbroec writes: 
 
  
Then she said: ‘Behold the handmaid of the Lord.’ 
When God lifted her up in the highest, then she 
put herself lowest. And the wisdom of God taught 
her that. For highness cannot keep existing but in 
lowness... 
Doe sprac si: ‘Siet hier de deerne ons heeren.’ Doese 
god verhief ten hooeghsten, doe sette si hare ten 
nedersten. Ende dat leerde hare de wijsheit gods. 
Want hooechgheit en mach niet staende bliven dan in 
nederheit.
22
 
 
 
A lowliness, to which is never mediocre, yet profoundly common, as Ruusbroec further expands upon 
this theme by developing the tradition of the patristic fathers and continued within Christian 
humanism as none other than a profoundly “admirable exchange”: 
                                                          
15
 Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, 14. 
16
 Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, 17. 
17
 ibid. 
18
 Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, 19. 
19
 Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, 55. 
20
 Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, 18. 
21
 Marcel, The Decline of Wisdom, 55-6. 
22
 Jan van Ruusbroec, Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit, ll. 567-570 
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[T]hat is: that He has sent His only Son into our 
nature, so that He is a human being with us, and 
brother of us all. He has lowered Himself and 
elevated us, impoverished Himself and made us 
rich [....] He remained all that He was and put on 
what He was not. He remained God and became 
human, that humans might become God. He has 
clothed Himself with the human nature of us all, 
like a king who clothes himself with the clothes of 
his dependents and his servants so that we are all 
with Him from one garment of human nature. 
[D]at es dat hi sinen enneghen sone ghesendt heeft in 
onser natueren, also dat hi es een mensche met ons 
ende onser alre brueder. Hi heeft heme ghenedert 
ende ons ghehooeght, heme ghearmt ende ons 
gherijct [....] Want hi bleef al dat hi was ende nam ane 
dat hi niet en was. Hi bleef god ende wart mensche, 
op dat de mensche god worde. Hi heeft heme 
ghekleedt met onser alre menscheit, alse .i. coning die 
hem kleedt met den kleede sijnre familien ende sijnre 
knechte, alsoe dat wi alle sijn met heme van eenen 
kleede menscheleker natueren.
23
 
 
 E. CONCLUSION 
 
 Unlike the presumption of scarcity and the “tragedy of the commons”, for Ruusbroec, 
humanity’s potentia obedientialis and natural desire for God proceeds from what is already distinctly 
common—joined “with Him from one garment of human nature”. From which, by desiring the 
immanent otherness of God and others, as ongoing and eternal work, offers a profound alternative 
to modern ideologies that regard our ‘rational’ desires as signaling a lack that needs appeasing with 
goods that are themselves, scarce and limited. Instead, desire is seen here as participative in the very 
life and fullness of Christ’s minne towards the Father. Which in turn, by way of the tradition of 
Christian humanism, is nourished by a continual vision of humanity as fundamentally relational, 
showing human integrity, flourishing and solidarity with others by way of furthering union with God. 
Hence, in the unending pursuit of that which is common, our Catholic Tradition possess a wealth of 
sources that not only challenge existing, cultural narratives about what to desire, from what not to 
desire, but furthermore, convincing witnesses of how to desire—beyond any and all banal 
consumerism—and instead, as inexhaustible and without end. 
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 Jan van Ruusbroec, Spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit, ll. 974-976; 978-982. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 This dissertation is rooted in a fundamental, constructive/critical theological retrieval of the 
Brabantine contemplative, bl. Jan van Ruusbroec (1293-1381) and the Admirable Doctor's 
understanding of love [minne] while situated within contemporary discussions over love in 
theological and philosophy of religion quarters. Specifically, it engages in a constructive/critical 
dialogue with Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology of love and its conceptual univocity, while 
additionally addressing various sub-themes that this retrieval initiates and encounters: the 
problematic of mystical theology and its contemporary relevance for theological reflection; accessing 
competing priorities between "experience" and a theological anthropology in mystical authors; 
Ruusbroec's synthesis of the "common life" [ghemeyne leven] as a corrective to a privatized, 
disembodied forms of 'mysticism'; postmodern theories of the 'gift' and its privileging of 
gratuitousness as a pure gift; the "natural desire for God" in 20th Century ressourcement theology; 
competing figures of "desire" in philosophical and theological reflections on love. The grounds of this 
retrieval are as follows: as a fundamental, constructive/critical retrieval, equal consideration must 
bear upon that which Ruusbroec's minne presupposes, so as to gauge its theological relevance, 
textual accountability as well as its contemporary contextual plausibility.  
 
 A. THEOLOGICAL RELEVANCE  
 
 As an explicitly theological retrieval of Ruusbroec, one immediately encounters the fragile, 
situated identity of mystical theology (and/or 'spirituality) within academic, theological reflection as 
one strongly marked by discontinuity. While the "rediscovery" of (medieval) mystical theological 
texts has certainly taken place in various quarters as an emerging resource for constructive 
theological reflection and its critical relevance in providing sources for a renewed, "transformative" 
anthropology and the praxis of Christian identity. However, such a rediscovery and discussion across 
various theological disciplines still remains tenuous at best. Therefore, so as to access the continuity 
of its theological relevance, retrieving Ruusbroec's minne first requires considering that which minne 
presupposes, as an intelligible, rigorous concept. For Ruusbroec, this intrinsic presupposition can 
primarily be situated in terms of his mystical anthropology of "mutual indwelling", a distinct 
relational anthropology and a defining characteristic of late-medieval mystical theology of Northern 
Europe and specifically the Low Countries. As a uniquely Trinitarian, "interpersonal" imago Dei 
anthropology, Ruusbroec uniquely stresses mutual indwelling as an intrinsic relationality of radical 
alterity within immanence wherein both eternal and exemplarist strains ('in the image') converge 
with the historical and soteriological modalities ('unto likeness') in this natural union of the human 
person and God. Relationality and the "common life" thus convey a dynamic immanence that is 
continuously supported by Ruusbroec's mystical anthropology of mutual indwelling, which likewise 
underlays the very dynamism of minne itself.   
 
 
 B. TEXTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
 This research contends that the contemporary reception and possible critical retrieval of 
Ruusbroec  hinges more upon the theological relevance and contemporary contextual plausibility of 
his mystical anthropology of mutual indwelling and the various consequences stemming therefrom, 
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more so than the question of 'mystical experience'  and its [im]possibility as a determining criterion 
of legitimacy and hermeneutical engagement. This research operates within a close, textual heuristic 
executed in search of a rigorous conceptuality and unique theological hermeneutic of minne in 
Ruusbroec's texts. Thus, its hermeneutical engagement, while historically recognizing the important 
question of Ruusbroec's sources, has nonetheless opted primarily for a close reading of his texts as 
offering a unique hermeneutic as thus situated prior to, yet inseparable from its historical/contextual 
embedding. 
 
 
 1. Minne's conceptuality 
 
 
  Ruusbroec's understanding of minne and its distinctly univocal character—in its origins; its 
enduring, everyday individual and communal praxis; and the deified perfection of such love—is that 
it is mutually one, "without difference or distinction" [sonder differentie  ochte  onderscheet], amid a 
dynamic relational dissimilarity that is asymmetrical, yet mutually reciprocal between Creator and 
creature. It is a "double minne" that is both fully ours and fully God's—a common love. "This minne 
that is God is common to us all and to each one in particular and (belongs) totally to those who love." 
The principle to 'unify, so as to distinguish' is thereby deeply helpful in explaining Ruusbroec's unique 
insistence—compatibly distinct from analogia—in maintaining minne's univocity as common.  
 
In turn, by better coming to understand the distinctiveness of mutual indwelling for Ruusbroec, we 
can thus see it as supporting a continuum of mutual relations between the radical alterity of the 
Trinitarian God within the immanence of world and the human person as creation. While at the same 
time, such a continuum of world and relations as created, also reinforces the greater dissimilarity of 
creation and the human person with that of the Creator. Thereby conceiving such a radical 
dependence, intimate bond and relational continuity with the nonetheless distinct and autonomous 
orders of the creaturely to that of the Creator renders sensible and consistent what Ruusbroec says 
of minne's distinct sense of knowing―recalling  the tradition of  Gregory the Great's  "amor  ipsia  
notia  est"  [love  itself  is knowledge]―as "above reason, but not without  reason". For such an 
ontological relationality is itself a relation of "essential minne" [wezeleke minnen]  from  which  
Ruusbroec's  anthropology  can  be   seen  as  supporting  the  four  fundamental movements or 
rhythm of the life of minne itself: (1)facilitating a continual, dynamic tension of first charitably "going 
out" in mediated works that lovingly affirms alterity by way of its "overflowing", gratuitous activity; 
(2)pivoting in its turn towards an interiority of immediacy and marked by an erotic and insatiable 
yearning in its reciprocal demand for the other; (3) yielding thus and "over-formed"  [overforminghe] 
in an immersion  of  minne and resting enjoyment in unity "without  difference  or   distinction"; (4) 
only to lastly reaffirm one's created  particularity  in  distinction  and otherness with God and others 
as the full-flowering of Ruusbroec's "common life", seen here as an eternal, "restlessness of loving" 
[ongheduer van minnen] that is modeless and "beyond reason and beyond manner, for minne desires 
what remains impossible for it and reason bears witness that minne is right but it can neither advise 
minne in this case nor forbid it."1
                                                          
1
 Ruusbroec, The Sparkling Stone, ll. 721-723 
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 2. Ruusbroec's reconfiguring of desire 
 
  The distinctive univocity of Ruusbroec's minne as "common" and its contemporary retrieval 
offer a constructive reconfiguration of our (theological) understanding of desire. Herein, Ruusbroec's 
theologically-based, proto-phenomenological reflections upon desire are set against and in contrast 
to various contextually-normative presumptions held towards desire as necessarily a "desires of 
lack"—as seen consistently in Marion—as a fetishized scarcity that mirrors a weak subjectivity of 
restless finitude. Instead, Ruusbroec's reflections upon the eternality of minne's voracious 
[ h     h  ] desire stems from a 'fullness' reflective of his theology of creation and mystical 
anthropology of mutual indwelling. This reconfiguration in turn thereby highlights the intrinsic 
character of minne's  demands [ y  h  ] and its insatiable, impossible object as none other than the 
greater dissimilarity between Creator and the human person's immanent creatureliness as a    u  
 apax D   [place capable of God]. 
 
 3. Common life as Deification 
 
  Mystical union, sanctification and deification—or in Ruusbroec's frequent neologism, being 
"over-formed" [ v  f  m   h ]—in the Brabantine's mystical theology is portrayed as b  h        y 
 a u a  (mutual) a          y G  -  v   (asymmetrical). While, the "common life" highlights the 
primacy of concrete, contextual relationality in Ruusbroec's thought—"becoming partakers of the 
divine nature" (2 Pt. 1, 4) equally affirms minne's thoroughly Christological and Trinitarian character. 
Therein, Ruusbroec's understanding of the various modes of mystical union of God―with mediation; 
without mediation; without difference or distinction [         ff          h          h   ]―are 
invariably regarded as accenting mystical union not as a lifting one above and beyond one's 
embodied self and the creaturely order in the form of a wholly disembodied, two-tiered 
"supernatural grace". Rather, the conviction is held  that in terms of minne's radical language of union 
with God―without difference [         ff       ] in terms of identity, and without distinction 
[              h   ] in terms of our loving and virtuous works―is an ongoing affirmation that by 
drawing closer to the alterity of God and His "greater dissimilarity", such movement equally renders 
one more and more human, more and more concretely and uniquely particular. 
 
 C. CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTUAL PLAUSIBILITY  
 
 Amid contemporary approaches to the univocity of love, Jean-Luc Marion's erotic reduction 
and its emphasis upon the givenness of the "weight of love" [pondus amoris] certainly stands out as  
rigorously provocative. This retrieval is opened by a critical/constructive dialogue with Marion in his 
emphasis upon a purely asymmetrical transcendence that acts as a strong, postmodern corrective to 
intrinsicist views of 'graced nature' and their frequent, anthropological reduction, by way of the 
[im]possible—as succinctly denoting the heteronymous dissimilarity of God; the [im]possibility of 
God for us. Which in turn, as a form of radical negative certitude that announces the complete 
caesura between God and creature, the [im]possible possesses an equally radical denomination for 
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God: the 'impossibility of impossibility'. By retrieving Ruusbroec, Marion's position has been critiqued 
precisely due to this view of radical [im]possibility, insofar as such a heteronymous account elides 
any form of creation's intrinsic, "native attunement" towards, as well as any sense of desiderium 
naturale for God. For Marion, such a creaturely desire would constitute a counterweight of mutual 
reciprocity that would domesticate the pure gratuity of the gift and its phenomenological givenness, 
placing it instead within an 'economy of exchange'. Therefore, while Marion upholds the certainty of 
our possible desires for God, he secures this universality porportionate to God's [im]possible 
uncertainty, as infinitely and radically Other and at the cost of human capacity for moral/ethical 
action to respond to such alterity. The architecture of radical apophasis is thereby set up as the 
guarantor for a turn towards universality with God as the [im]possible, deployed in givenness that is 
both anterior to forms of intentionality, coming from "elsewhere" which simultaneously makes 
possible desire itself. Hence, the certainty of Marion's desire indubitably remains a desire of lack as 
Marion secures the universal certainty of this [im]possible desire precisely as an a-contextual, 
univocal givenness, which in no sense should be confused with having any "native origins". That is, in 
no sense is it to be confused with a natural desire for God, a locus capax dei and/or potentia 
obedientalis for divine grace. Rather, the weight of such an [im]possible desire in its pure givenness is 
asymmetrically anterior and stemming from pure givenness itself, absent of any reciprocal economic  
response or return.  
